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Abstract
It is the central argument of this thesis that the three Beckett plays Waiting for Godot; 
Endgame, and Happy Days can be understood as Schopenhauerian-informed theatre of 
asceticism. By proposing an understanding of Beckett's middle-period tragedies as works 
that promote life-denial, this work presents a challenge to the life-affirming reading of 
Beckett's work presented by Adorno, Cavell, Deleuze, Critchley, and Badiou, for whom 
Beckett exemplifies art's capacity to provide genuine resistance to nihilism.
In contrast to the life-affirming interpretation of Beckett's work, I believe the spectator to 
the performance of these three tragedies witnesses something unique in the history of 
theatre: deliberately generated, self-inflicted physical and mental suffering undertaken 
with the intention of attaining a painless, will-less, state. Beckett is the first tragedian to 
stage ascetic practice where, in Schopenhauerian terms, the human intellect refuses the 
agreeable and, instead, looks for disagreeable in its attempts to break the will.
To understand Beckett’s contribution to asceticism, it is vital that we understand 
Beckett’s work in relation to Schopenhauer, Beckett’s most important ascetic 
predecessor. In the process of developing his own ascetic method -  that of 
representational deprivation -  I argue that Beckett appears to draw upon and further 
develop the central aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophical system. By so doing, Beckett 
incorporates both ascetic and non-ascetic elements of Schopenhauerian philosophy into 
his own ascetic thought. These non-ascetic aspects include Schopenhauer's 
understanding of the dynamically sublime, the experience of boredom, and the 
conception of the self as a single entity comprised of willing and knowing subjects.
By appreciating the foundation upon which Beckettian asceticism appears to be built, 
one can then also appreciate the significant development of asceticism that one finds in 
Beckett’s tragedies.
On Beckett’s stage, one witnesses the practice of a variety of ascetic methods which focus 
on inhibiting the body, methods such as self-mortification, fasting, poverty, and celibacy. 
With a long history of implementation, these ascetic methods may be referred to as 
‘traditional’ asceticism. It is this version of asceticism that Schopenhauer discusses at 
length in the Fourth Book of The World as Will and Representation. In addition to the 
depiction of traditional asceticism, Beckett employs the artistic medium of tragedy to 
display the effectiveness of radical ascetic methods of his own devising. These 
‘Beckettian’ ascetic methods, which operate in conjunction with traditional methods, 
focus on depriving the w ill -  that perpetually striving aspect of the self (WWR 1: 164-5) - 
of the knowledge that it requires to strive. In its attempts to attain the will-quieted state 
of'nothingness', Beckettian asceticism starves the mind as much as it starves the body.
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PART ONE:
Introduction and Literature Review
l
Chapter 1: Introduction
In the second volume of The World as Will and Representation the 19th century 
German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer discusses a number of important 
thinkers in the history of quietism. For Schopenhauer, quietism, or ‘the giving up of 
all willing', and the supportive practice of asceticism, the 'intentional mortification 
of one's own will', both follow the mystic understanding of 'the identity of one's 
own inner being with that of all things' (WWR 2: 613). Schopenhauer's catalogue of 
quietist thinkers and practitioners includes Saint Francis of Assisi, Blaise Pascal, 
the Buddha Sakya Muni, Meister Eckhart, and Madame de Guyon (WWR 2: 613- 
615)—a disparate group of thinkers who, for Schopenhauer, recognise that it is 
one's unchecked desires that cause one to suffer.
Schopenhauer's own considerable contribution to the study of quietism -  one that 
necessitates his name being placed alongside the aforementioned thinkers -  is to 
explore the cause of one's suffering, which Schopenhauer describes as the 'will-to- 
life'. It is the will-to-life within every living thing that forever drives one forward. It 
is the unplacatable nature of the will that causes one to suffer. Like the thinkers 
who come before him, Schopenhauer recommends a process of systematically 
denying the will-to-life by depriving it of nourishment. At the heart of 
Schopenhauerian asceticism is the systematic denial of the body. It is 
Schopenhauer's understanding of the will-to-life, and the necessity of denying the 
will that subsequently appeals to many of the artists of the first rank who are 
subsequently influenced by Schopenhauer's work (Young: 2005: 246). It has long 
been understood that the 20th century author and playwright Samuel Beckett is 
one such artist.
But what, exactly, are we to make of Beckett's sustained interest in the subject of 
Schopenhauerian life denial? Is Beckett an advocate of quietism, a thinker whose
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work should be considered in the light of committed quietists such as 
Schopenhauer? Or does Beckett's work ultimately provide a critique of the 
possibility of ever quieting one's desires? The present position on the subject of 
Beckett and quietism understands Beckett as a thinker whose work engages with 
quietist ethics, but who ultimately calls into question the viability of such a 
worldview. Though Beckett is no doubt intrigued by the notion of being able to 
quiet one's desires, Beckett's interpreters argue that he remains ultimately 
unconvinced, and therefore uncommitted (see Ackerley, 2000, 2004).
In contrast to this position on the subject of Beckett and life-denial, I believe that a 
number of Beckett's middle-period tragedies can be understood as the work of a 
sincere and committed quietist. Indeed, I believe that an updated list of history's 
important quietists, one that incorporates the thinkers who lived and worked after 
the death of Schopenhauer, would be wholly incomplete if it did not include the 
name Samuel Beckett. Not only ought Beckett to be considered in this light, but a 
number of Beckett's middle-period tragedies -  Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and 
Happy Days -  should be considered alongside The World as Will and Representation 
as significant contributions to the study of asceticism as a form of ethical practice.
On Beckett's stage, one witnesses the practice of a variety of ascetic methods which 
focus on inhibiting the body's ability to function, methods such as self­
mortification, fasting, poverty, and celibacy. With a long history of implementation, 
these ascetic methods may be understood as 'traditional' asceticism. It is this 
version of asceticism that Schopenhauer discusses at length in the Fourth Book of 
The World as Will and Representation. In addition to the depiction of traditional 
asceticism, Beckett also employs the tragic form to display the effectiveness of 
radical ascetic methods of his own devising. I shall refer to these methods as 
'Beckettian asceticism'. These 'Beckettian' ascetic methods, which operate in 
conjunction with traditional methods, focus on depriving the will -  that 
perpetually striving aspect of the self (WWR 1: 164-5) -  of the knowledge that it 
requires to strive. In its attempts to attain the will-quieted state of'nothingness', 
Beckettian asceticism starves the mind as much as it starves the body.
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This understanding of Beckett's middle-period tragedies as theatre of asceticism 
presents a challenge to the life-affirming reading of Beckett's work presented in 
the interpretive work of Adorno, Cavell, Deleuze, Critchley, and Badiou, for whom 
Beckett exemplifies art's capacity to provide genuine resistance to nihilism 
(Weller, 2006: viii). In contrast to the life-affirming interpretation of Beckett's 
work, I believe the spectator to the performance of these three middle-period 
tragedies witnesses something unique in the history of theatre: deliberately 
generated, self-inflicted physical and mental suffering undertaken with the 
intention of breaking the will, and thus attaining a painless, will-less, state. Beckett 
is the first tragedian to stage ascetic practice where, in Schopenhauerian terms, the 
human intellect refuses the agreeable and, instead, looks for the disagreeable 
(WWR 1: 392) in its attempts to break the will.
To better appreciate Beckett's significant contribution to the field of asceticism, or 
life-denial, I believe it is vital that we understand Beckett's work in relation to the 
work of Arthur Schopenhauer, Beckett's most important ascetic predecessor. 
Whilst it is now known that Beckett studied the works of a number of quietist 
thinkers, including the works of Thomas ä Kempis, Arnold Geulincx, and Meister 
Eckhart,1 Beckett's repeated utilization of asceticism as a means to attain a quieted 
will indicates the importance of Schopenhauer to Beckett's conception of quietism. 
It is in the work of Schopenhauer that Beckett first encounters asceticism, the 
active, will-inhibiting element of quietist ethics, and it is Schopenhauer's depiction 
of asceticism in the Fourth Book of The World as Will and Representation which 
Beckett repeatedly draws upon in his middle period tragedies. Only by 
understanding the foundation upon which Beckettian asceticism is built can one 
then also appreciate the significant development of asceticism that one finds in 
Beckett's work.
When viewed in the light of Schopenhauer's philosophical system, Beckett's work 
can be understood as an attempt to portray both the effective and the ineffective 
means of breaking one's will, or having one's will turn its back on life. It can be
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argued that by staging the ascetic process, by revealing both the successful and 
unsuccessful methods for breaking one's will, along with the significant obstacles 
that confront the ascetic practitioner, Beckett's middle-period tragedies not only 
advocate resignation (cf. WWR 2: 433-4], they teach one how to resign (cf. 
Nietzsche, 1968: 434-5].
This genetic understanding of Beckett's middle-period tragedies -  as a sustained, 
productive, engagement with the life denying thought of Arthur Schopenhauer -  is 
an understanding that is supported by the content of Beckett's published works, 
and by the extensive biographical and archival material that is now available to 
Beckett scholars.
The approach taken by literature, comparative literature, and history to the 
pre-Nietzschean philosophical component of Beckett's work
Since the opening up of the Beckett archive, there has been renewed 
critical enthusiasm for the philosophical works with which Beckett 
engaged (Boxall, 2010: 35].
In marked contrast to the discipline of philosophy, which has yet to explore the 
matter of Beckett's engagement with quietist thought,“ in the fields of literature, 
comparative literature, and history, Beckett's sustained interest in Western 
quietism is well documented. Beckett is known to have both studied, and later 
incorporated a range of quietist thought into many of his published works. It is now 
understood that Beckett studied the works of Christian quietists of the Middle Ages, 
the 17th century Occasionalism of Arnold Geulincx, and, most comprehensively of 
all, the 19th century atheistic quietism of Arthur Schopenhauer. Beckett scholars 
have established Beckett's engagement with quietism by gaining access to Beckett's 
extensive reading and writing notebooks held in the Beckett Collection at the
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University of Reading, through Beckett's personal correspondence, and by 
exploring moments in Beckett's work where quietist thinkers are named, cited, or 
alluded to.üi The archival material, and Beckett's personal correspondence suggests 
that Schopenhauer was a particularly important thinker for the development of 
Beckett's thought (Feldman, 2010:168). Indeed, it is now known that Beckett 
studied Schopenhauerian philosophy over the course of five decades.
It is well known that Beckett first encounters Schopenhauerian philosophy during 
the process of writing his critical monograph on Marcel Proust in 1930. Aware of 
Proust's interest in Schopenhauer, Beckett reads A la recherche du temps perdu 
through the lens of Schopenhauerian aesthetics (Rosen, 1976:145; Wood, 1994: 4; 
Nixon, 2011). During this period letters to friends evince a great deal of interest in 
Schopenhauerian thought, especially Schopenhauer's focus on the subject of 
unhappiness: 'an intellectual justification for unhappiness' as Beckett describes 
Schopenhauer's work in a letter to his friend Thomas MacGreevy (Knowlson, 1996 
118; Nixon, 2011: 9). This attitude towards Schopenhauerian philosophy, and the 
effect this had on Beckett's outlook continued long after writing Proust:
While the influence of Schopenhauer on Proust has long been noted in 
Anglophone scholarship, Beckett's gravitation towards the former's 'veil 
of Maya' ... is without a doubt, a major influence on both Beckett's 
artistic temperament and his philosophical outlook during the interwar 
period (Feldman, 2009: 23).
It is now known that Beckett studied Schopenhauer's The World as Will and 
Representation while writing Proust (Nixon, 2011: 9). In addition to this, it is also 
now known that Beckett studied Schopenhauer’s doctoral dissertation, On the 
Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the period 1936-7, and notes 
were taken on it in Beckett's Whoroscope notebook. As Pothast indicates, Beckett 
appears to have studied Schopenhauer's doctoral thesis 'extensively', his notes on 
the work revealing particular interest in the ideas of cause and effect (Pothast,
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2008: 13). Indeed, Beckett returned to Schopenhauer on numerous occasions; 
Beckett referred to Schopenhauerian philosophy as one of the 'old chestnuts' - 
alongside the works of thinkers such as Pascal and Dante -  which he revisited time 
and time again (Knowlson, 1996: 653). For instance, Pothast cites Beckett's 
notebooks from the late 1970s, which reveal an ongoing interest in 
Schopenhauer's works, an interest that was not limited to Schopenhauer's major 
work, and doctoral dissertation but also included essays in Parerga and 
Paralipomena:
Just as Beckett turned to Schopenhauer as a young man, he still turned 
to him in his seventies -  possibly more intensely and more thoroughly 
than before (Pothast, 2008:14-16).
Pothast continues:
There can be little doubt that Beckett's interest in Schopenhauer was a 
lifelong intellectual commitment, probably stronger and deeper than his 
contact with any other of the many philosophers whom he quotes or 
refers to in passing (Pothast, 2008: 189; see also Feldman, 2006: 12-14; 
Weller, 2009: 43-44).
To date, the analysis of Beckett's engagement with Schopenhauerian thought has 
focused on two areas in particular: Beckett's utilization of Schopenhauerian 
aesthetics and epistemology (see Pothast, 2008), and Beckett's engagement with 
Schopenhauerian ethics, particularly with regard to Schopenhauer's 
resignationism (see Weller, 2005, Chapter 2). It is a central argument of this thesis 
that when Beckett scholars interpret Beckett's engagement with the latter, namely 
the resignationism found in Schopenhauerian ethics, the matter of asceticism has 
been overlooked.
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Whilst the disciplines of literature, comparative literature, and history have begun 
to work through the implications of Beckett's well-documented engagement with a 
number of specific quietist thinkers, and broader areas of quietist thought, this 
investigation has centred on the passive aspects of quietism, namely the quietist 
acts of humility, indifference, and the negative disregard for oneself (see Rosen, 
1976: 26-7; Weller, 2005: Chapter 2; Feldman, 2008, 44). For instance, Weller 
(2005), presents Beckett's quietism primarily as the giving up of all willing, where 
one ceases to strive after objectives. Weller therefore understands Beckett's 
quietism as a matter of'pure passivity':
... All that the suffering creature can do in the painful meantime of 
w illing is to hope or pray— and w a it... All w ill depend upon a 
'dispensation' or w ha t... in III Seen III Said (1981) is termed 'grace'... 
Regarded in this lig h t.. .  the 'nothing to be done' is not a task, but pure 
passivity, utter dependence on an Other whose power to grant or 
withhold grace is absolute (Weller, 2005: 81).iv
Thus in Beckett scholarship, Beckett's quietism is understood as a continuation of 
the quietist thought found in the work of thinkers such as Arnold Geulincx, for 
whom the virtue of humility counsels will-lessness after the recognition of one's 
powerlessness: 'Wherein you have no power, therein neither should you w ill' (cite< 
in Feldman, 2008: 44).
This particular understanding of quietism as passivity alone has meant that the 
more active, or aggressive, aspect of Beckett's quietism, asceticism, which plays an 
important role in Schopenhauerian ethics, is yet to garner the same level of critical 
attention as Beckett's interest in the passive aspects of quietist thought. Despite thi 
repeated implementation of ascetic methods across a number of Beckett's middle- 
period tragedies -  methods such as celibacy, fasting, self-mortification, and self­
castigation -  none of the academic fields that engage with Beckett's work have
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attempted to understand Beckett's depiction of these practices as an attempt to 
convey an ascetic method.
To understand how Beckett's tragic characters attain a quieted state, as I later 
argue a number of them do, one needs to understand Beckett's debt to 
Schopenhauer, and in particular, Schopenhauer's focus on ascetic practice as a 
means of maintaining a quieted will.
The approach taken by philosophy to the pre-Nietzschean philosophical 
component of Beckett's work
Unlike the disciplines of literature, comparative literature, and history, the 
discipline of philosophy has yet to respond to the challenge that extensive archival 
and biographical material presents to the dominant understanding of Beckett's 
work as a life-affirming endeavour. Beckett's tragedies have been a contested 
philosophical space since the early 1960s when Adorno, and Cavell first 
interpreted Endgame by employing a number of divergent philosophical 
frameworks/ To date, thinkers working in the discipline of philosophy have, for 
the most part, counseled against understanding Beckettian tragedy as either an 
interpretation, or development, of pre-Nietzschean philosophical quietism/*
There are presently two main interpretive approaches to the philosophical 
component of Beckett's published works. The first approach is to interpret the 
philosophical quietist aspects of the work as having an ultimately life-affirming 
intention. This approach to Beckett's work is found in the work of Cavell (2002), 
Deleuze (1995), and Badiou (2003). The second approach is to argue that Beckett's 
engagement with pre-Nietzschean thought is undertaken with the intention of 
parodying pre-Nietzschean philosophy's life-denying propensity. This approach is 
found in the interpretive work of Adorno (1991), and Critchley (1997).
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In both of the life-affirming philosophical approaches to Beckett's work, the idea 
that Beckett's engagement with quietist thought, and pre-Nietzschean 
philosophical thought, might be undertaken for the purpose of promoting life- 
denial is perfunctorily dismissed. This dismissive approach to Beckett's pre- 
Nietzschean philosophical engagement permits Beckett's philosophical 
interpreters -  namely Adorno, Cavell, Critchley, Deleuze, and Badiou -  to 
incorporate Beckett's oeuvre into contemporary philosophical thought (Clement, 
2006).
To date, in the field of philosophy, Beckett's oeuvre has been employed as a vehicle 
to communicate the ideas of other thinkers on matters such as the life-affirming 
nature of art, alterity, or openness to the 'Other', and the refusal to ascribe 
'meaning' to existence as an anti-nihilist act. The issue of Beckett's incorporation 
into contemporary thought is not viewed as a problem for Beckettian 
interpretation.
In an essay in the collection Beckett after Beckett, Bruno Clement charts the history 
of Beckett's French philosophical reception, noting, at first, a certain 
'ventriloquism' -  that is, a tendency on the part of theorists to repeat Beckett's 
words, though in a critical discourse -  followed by a tendency towards 
incorporation or 'deployment' (Weller, 2006: viii). As Clement states:
Simplifying a good deal, one could say that we have passed, little by 
little, from a mimetic criticism, of the type practiced by Blanchot (and to 
which the work, in general, made one say about it if not what it wanted, 
at least what it said) to a philosophical criticism (that can give the 
impression of making Beckett's oeuvre do, sometimes against its 
expressed desires, exactly what the criticism desires that it do) 
(Clement, 2006: 120).
10
Clement argues that this is the fate of all great works, the very thing that ensures 
their on-going importance (Clement, 2006: 120-1). Following this line of argument, 
Clement puts forward the thesis that more recent incorporation by the likes of 
Badiou is acceptable because it tends to ignore the avowed philosophical 
references or sources actually found in Beckett's work -  dismissed by Clement as 
employed more or less ironically by Beckett - and instead makes the author work 
'against his expressed desires.' Clement finds this acceptable because, 'Deviation is 
the destiny of every oeuvre. We tend to forget it, but we know it well, 
fundamentally...' (Clement, 2006: 131).
One finds a similarly dismissive approach to Beckett's engagement with 
philosophical thought in the work of Simon Critchley. Critchley argues that 
'Beckett's work contains innumerable philosophical red herrings' (Critchley, 1997: 
144). We are therefore encouraged to discount Beckett's philosophical inheritance, 
and to eschew any interpretive work that attempts to understand Beckett's work 
in reference to that inheritance:
Beckett's work seems to offer itself generously to philosophical 
interpretation only to withdraw the offer by parodically reducing such 
interpretation to ridicule (Critchley, 1997:143).
This kind of incorporation, when the avowed interests of the author are dismissed 
in preference for those of the interpreter, is not therefore restricted to French 
philosophical thought. One also finds this phenomenon in German philosophy 
(Adorno), and in the work of American (Cavell) and British (Critchley) 
philosophers. Here we see a similar tendency to assimilate Beckett's work into 
contemporary thought, and to recuperate Beckett's work by presenting his overt 
negativity as something implicitly affirmative, so that, in turn, we are presented 
with the anti-capitalist Marxist Beckett, the Wittgensteinian Beckett of the 
'Ordinary', and the Post-Nietzschean, Heideggerian Beckett of the 'Everyday'. The
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most recent philosophical approach to Beckettian art, that undertaken by Alain 
Badiou, similarly presents Beckett as an exemplar of contemporary thought. The 
Badiouian Beckett is an artist whose work ensures that the 'Event' of the Other's 
recognition is kept alive by ensuring that all is done to prepare for the (possible) 
arrival of that Other (Badiou, 2003: 4, 73).
Thus the history of philosophical interpretation of Beckett's work is a history of 
bringing the most fashionable readings -  for which Beckett seems to have cared 
littlevii -  to the work of a most unfashionable philosophical reader (Feldman, 2006, 
2010 ).
With regard to the work of thinkers such as Adorno, Cavell, Deleuze, and Critchley, 
the tendency to dismiss the life-denying, pre-Nietzschean, philosophical aspects of 
Beckett's published works is somewhat understandable when one takes into 
account the prevailing philosophical position on the life affirming nature of art, 
combined with the paucity of Beckettian archival and biographical material 
available to researchers when these interpretive works were written. More 
troubling is the tendency of later life-affirming philosophical interpretation of 
Beckett's work -  such as that undertaken by Badiou (2003) -  to ignore the 
archival, and biographical material -  along with its implications for the quietist 
content of the published works -  and instead to continue to interpret Beckett's 
oeuvre in the light of the interpreter's own political and philosophical concerns.
What philosophy has consistently done, and continues to do, is to do what it argue: 
should not be done (Adorno, 1973: 6; Critchley, 1997: 141-47; Derrida, 1992: 61), 
which is to understand the work of one thinker -  an ascetic thinker interested in 
pre-Nietzschean thought -  through the lens of other thinkers, such as the 
affirmative thought espoused in post-structuralism -  where it is argued that 'It's 
better that there be a future, rather than nothing' (Derrida, cited by Weller, 2006: 
14) -  and Nietzschean aesthetics -  where the purpose of art is the 'deification of 
existence’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 434).
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The interpretive problem that this dismissive approach to Beckett's pre- 
Nietzschean philosophical inheritance generates is perhaps most obvious when 
one finds other disciplines -  such as English, and comparative literature -  that 
draw upon post-Nietzschean philosophical thought for their interpretive 
frameworks, then attempt to make sense of the quietist 'Beckett' that emerges 
from archival material through a life-affirming philosophical lens. The limitations 
and preoccupations of the philosophical discourse impinge upon the 
understanding of Beckett's development of quietism in the disciplines of literature, 
and comparative literature. As such, Beckett is either portrayed as a thinker who is 
unable to take quietism entirely seriously (Ackerley, 2004), or as an artist whose 
work depicts the failure of longed-for negation (Rosen, 1976: 27,160; Weller, 
2005). In short Beckett's quietism is perceived in relation to the two main 
interpretive approaches that the discipline of philosophy has employed in relation 
to the philosophical component of Beckett's works, namely that Beckett's 
negativity ultimately has a life-affirming intent, or that Beckett engages with 
philosophy for the purpose of parody. Though acknowledging Beckett's 
engagement with Schopenhauer, the overriding tendency is to want to deny the 
possibility that Beckett endorses Schopenhauer's assertion of one's ability to attain 
the state of nothingness through the practice of quietism (see Weller, 2005: 81-
96) vüi
In view of the biographical and archival material which has come to light over the 
past twenty years -  material which provides a significant challenge to both the 
parodic, and life-affirming reading of Beckett's work -  it is incumbent upon the 
discipline of philosophy to re-evaluate its present, dismissive position on Beckett's 
engagement with pre-Nietzschean philosophy, quietism, and -  given the extent of 
Beckett's engagement -  Schopenhauerian philosophical quietism in particular. 
Summarizing this imperative, Peter Boxall states:
We are now entering into a period in the reception of Beckett in which a 
new set of possibilities for the articulation of Beckett's negativity are
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beginning to make themselves felt. This new period or phase, I would 
argue, is one that is enabled by a growing awareness both of Beckett's 
debts and his legacies, and one that is informed by a much stronger and 
deeper body of knowledge than was previously available both about the 
ways in which Beckett's thinking interacts with a number of traditions 
that he inherits, and about the ways in which those who come under his 
influence interact with the legacies that he passes on (Boxall, 2010: 35).
To claim that Beckett reduces philosophy to cultural trash (Adorno, 1991: 241), or 
provides pre-Nietzschean philosophical reference points merely for the purpose of 
making a fool of anyone who attempts to pursue their import (Critchley, 1997:
144) simply fails to do justice to the scale of Beckett's philosophical investigation.1*
With these interpretive issues in mind, this thesis poses two broad questions. The 
first question relates to Beckett's work: what in Beckett's middle-period tragedies 
has the discipline of philosophy overlooked as a result of its present interpretive 
method? What emerges once one removes the life-affirming interpretive lens that 
has been used to interpret Beckett's engagement with Schopenhauerian life- 
denial? The second question relates to Schopenhauer's work: what do Beckett's 
middle-period tragedies have to tell us about Schopenhauerian thought? What is 
there to be gained by positioning Beckett as Schopenhauer's interlocutor, and not 
Schopenhauer's critic?
Rationale for the choice of the three tragedies, Waiting for Godot, Endgame, 
and Happy Days
As previously stated in this introduction, the tragic works of Samuel Beckett have 
been a space of philosophical contestation for more than fifty years. Of all of 
Beckett's theatrical works, Endgame has received the most philosophical analysis.
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Indeed the play Endgame was the focus of much of the early, influential 
philosophical interpretation of Beckett's work. Adorno's interpretation of Endgame 
as an evocation of the failure of nihilism (Adorno, 1973: 381) has been particularly 
influential in the later interpretive work of thinkers working in the fields of English 
(for example, Boxall (2010)) and comparative literature (for example, Weller 
(2005)). The early interpretive work of Adorno and Cavell has also been further 
developed in the later philosophical interpretation of Beckett's work undertaken 
by Critchley (1997).
To provide a challenge to the life-affirming understanding of Beckettian tragedy, 
one must provide a challenge to a number of the assumptions that one finds in the 
philosophical reading of Endgame. Given what is now known about Beckett's 
lifelong engagement with Schopenhauerian thought, I believe it is important to 
provide a significant retort to Adorno's dismissive reading of Endgame as 'a 
homely version of Schopenhauer's negation of the will to life' (Adorno, 1991: 269).
The decision to incorporate a reading Waiting for Godot into the thesis was 
influenced by a number of factors, most notably a comment made by Beckett 
himself that connects Waiting for Godot to Endgame: ‘You must realise that Hamm 
and Clov are Didi and Gogo at a later date, at the end of their lives...' (Worton,
1994: 67). To take a claim like this literally would do a disservice to its figurative 
intent. However, Beckett's enigmatic comment does suggest that Waiting for Godot 
is in some way a precursor to Endgame, and that understanding the subject matter 
of the later play depends upon understanding the subject matter of the earlier 
work, and vice versa. That the dominant philosophical interpretations of Beckett's 
tragedies have, to date, sought to understand Endgame in isolation suggests an 
interpretive flaw, which this thesis seeks to correct.
Finally, Happy Days is explored because of it is contemporaneousness to the other 
works under consideration, and its ongoing utilization of particular structural 
elements, notably the model of the antagonistic pseudocouple,x and the overt
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practice of'traditional' asceticism. This reading of Happy Days in conjunction with 
Waiting for Godot, and Endgame further develops the idea of the 
interconnectedness of the works of Beckett's middle-period.xi As such, the reading 
of the plays that is undertaken here applies a consistent interpretive framework 
from one play to the next. This method enables a view of Beckett's work which the 
interpretation of one play in isolation cannot.
Chapters in the Thesis
This thesis is divided into four parts, summarised as follows.
Part One 'Introduction and Literature Review' (Chapters 1 and 2) establishes the 
context of the study and outlines the rationale for its argument and method. Here 
existing approaches to Beckett's work, as found in the literature from a number of 
disciplines, are reviewed. Chapter 2 specifically focuses on the three central claims 
of Beckettian philosophical interpretation found in the secondary literature, 
namely the life-affirming role of art, the absence of meaning as an anti-nihilistic 
endeavour, and the affirmation of difference through the acknowledgement of the 
'Other'.
Part Two of the thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) explores the life-denying role of art in 
Schopenhauerian and Beckettian thought. Chapter 3, 'Schopenhauerian Aesthetics' 
sets out the key features of Schopenhauerian aesthetic theory. In this chapter I 
describe the way Schopenhauer differentiates between 'ordinary', willful, 
consciousness, and the aesthetic state. Further to this, I discuss the role of art in 
Schopenhauerian aesthetics, paying close attention to the role of tragedy. In 
Chapter 3 I argue that Schopenhauer's theory of tragedy as an art form that 
presents the spectator with an affective experience that is analogous to the 
dynamically sublime is vital for our understanding of Beckett's middle-period
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tragedies. In witnessing the tragic performance the spectator becomes aware of his 
or her negative freedom to deny the individual will, and his or her ability to 
present the will with knowledge that is a disincentive for further action. Beckett 
reinforces this process by also making the dynamically sublime the subject matter 
of the tragic performance. Beckettian tragedy thus employs the dynamically 
sublime on two levels.
In Chapter 4, 'Beckettian Aesthetics', I present the argument that Beckett's middle- 
period tragedies appear to engage with Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory and 
Schopenhauer's understanding of the role of tragedy, namely the promotion of 
resignationism. This chapter sets out Beckettian aesthetics in detail, from the early 
critical manifestation in Proust, to the later, artistically presented aesthetics found 
in Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days. In this chapter I discuss Beckett's 
conception of'ordinary' and 'aesthetic' consciousness, and the connection between 
these two states and the two types of memory -  'voluntary' and 'involuntary' 
memory -  that one encounters in Beckett's middle-period tragedies. In the 
Beckettian aesthetic state the intellect presents the will with an involuntary 
memory of suffering. This unwanted knowledge -  of the pain one has caused, or 
endured -  is presented by the intellect to the will with the intention of promoting 
the will's resignation.
In Part Three (Chapters 5 and 6) of the thesis I discuss Schopenhauerian and 
Beckettian ontology and epistemology. At the heart of Beckett's engagement with 
Schopenhauerian thought is Beckett's ‘pseudocouple'. It is in Beckett's theatrical 
pseudocouples that one finds Beckett's ontology and epistemology. It is an 
ontology and epistemology that is greatly informed by Schopenhauer's work in 
these fields.
In Schopenhauerian thought human beings are a somewhat miraculous 
combination of bodily drives and intellectual knowledge (WWR 1:102). The body 
is blind will, which drives us on from one urge to the next (WWR 1: 164,180). The
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intellect exists solely to provide knowledge to the will, so that its constant striving 
may be provided with direction, or a temporary aim (WWR 2:278]. The T of the 
Schopenhauerian self is the meeting point of these two aspects of the self, the 
meeting point of the subject o f willing and the subject o f knowing (WWR 2: 203]. 
Fundamentally it is a relationship of drive and response, repeated ad infinitum.
Beckett's tragic pseudocouples can be understood as a sustained engagement with 
Schopenhauer's ontological and epistemological understanding of the 'I' as an 
entity which possesses aspects of willing and knowing, or bodily drives and 
intellect.
In Chapter 5, 'Ontology: the Subject of Willing', I set out Schopenhauerian ontology, 
and the pertinent aspects of the highest grade of the Schopenhauerian 'will-to-life', 
namely human beings. Having established this ontological framework, I then argue 
that the Schopenhauerian will-to-life appears to provide an important 
philosophical foundation to Beckett's ontology, the 'will not to suffer' (Beckett, 
1999: 43). In Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days, Beckett consistently 
utilizes key features of the Schopenhauerian willing subject in his tragic depiction 
of the 'will not to suffer', namely Vladimir, Pozzo, Hamm, Nagg, Winnie, and Mr 
Shower.
Chapter 5 thus presents a challenge to the present philosophical understanding of 
Beckett's work as an oeuvre that affirms existence because it is either free from 
nihilistic metaphysical meaning (Adorno, 1991], or seeks to be free from 
metaphysical meaning (Cavell, 2002; Deleuze, 1995; Critchley, 1997] so that life 
may then be affirmed. In contrast to this dominant, affirmative, line of 
interpretation, I argue that the early manifestation of Beckett's ontology that one 
finds in the critical work, Proust, namely that of Beckett's 'will not to suffer', is later 
manifested in the ascetic tragedies of Beckett's middle period. The Beckettian 'will 
not to suffer' can be understood as the problem of Beckettian asceticism. The ‘will
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not to suffer's’ resignation, or life denial, and the state of'nothingness' that follows 
the will's resignation is the objective of the Beckettian ascetic intellect.
In Chapter 6, 'Epistemology -  The Subject of Knowing', I discuss the key aspects of 
Schopenhauerian epistemology, and explore Beckett's apparent utilization of 
Schopenhauerian thought with regard to the way the Beckettian intellect functions. 
In the ascetic tragedies of Beckett's middle period, Beckett's intellectual characters 
-  Estragon, Lucky, Clov, Nell, Willie and Mrs Shower -  possess many of the 
essential representational capacities of the Schopenhauerian 'servant' of the will 
(WWR 2: 216), namely the ability to generate representational and conceptual 
knowledge which is situated in space and time.
Finally in Part Three (Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10) of the thesis, I explore Beckett's 
development of asceticism as ethical practice. Having presented the argument that 
Beckett's theatre of asceticism appears to be comprised of Schopenhauerian 
informed pseudocouples, in this part of the thesis I discuss the nature of the 
relationship that exists between the two aspects of the Beckettian self. The 
relationship that exists between Beckett's theatrical 'wills not to suffer' and each of 
their respective 'intellects' is a hostile relationship, a relationship of'warring 
opposites' (Weller, 2005: 151). The tactics of the 'war' that we witness on Beckett's 
stage are the tactics of demand and refusal. On one side the willing subject 
demands the provision of information from the knowing subject, and on the other 
side, the knowing subject refuses to furnish the willing subject with actionable 
representations.
In Chapter 7, 'Schopenhauerian Ethics -  Asceticism', I discuss Schopenhauer's 
understanding of asceticism as a practical means to ensure that an already quieted 
will remains quieted. I also describe the various methods by which the 
Schopenhauerian ascetic deprives his or her will of the means to strive, methods 
such as poverty, celibacy, and self-mortification. Chapter 7 also establishes 
Beckett's understanding of'nothing'. 'Nothing', the state one experiences once the
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will resigns from life, is presented in this chapter as the goal of the Beckettian 
ascetic intellect. Beckettian nothingness, I argue, appears to build upon 
Schopenhauer's conception of nothingness as an attainable, though ultimately 
unrepresentable, state of being. In Beckett's middle-period tragedies a number of 
ascetic intellects are successful in their attempts to break the will-not-to-suffer. I 
believe a number of Beckett's interpreter's claims regarding the open-endedness of 
Beckettian tragic endings can be called into question by reading Beckett's 
depiction of having successfully broken one's will in the light of Schopenhauer's 
claim that one can only depict the state of 'nothingness' in negative terms, that is, 
as one's lacking some attribute one once possessed. Beckett consistently presents 
the attained state of nothingness in two ways: through the willing subject's loss of 
sight, and the knowing subject's inability to respond.
In Chapters 8 and 9, in which I discuss the various ascetic methods that Beckett's 
intellectual characters employ, I analyse Beckett's contribution to the development 
of ascetic thought. Whereas the Schopenhauerian ascetic focuses his or her efforts 
on depriving the body of the means to strive, the Beckettian intellect also deprives 
the will-not-to-suffer of knowledge. By refusing to present the will with an 
actionable representation or 'motive', the Beckettian intellect deprives the will of 
the information it needs to strive. It is a central claim of this thesis that Beckett's 
middle-period tragedies evince a unique ascetic utilization of the human capacity 
to reason. It is the ephectic quality of reason, namely the ability to prevaricate, and 
to suspend judgement, which the Beckettian tragic intellect uses to great effect in its 
attempts to deny the will knowledge that permits it to strive.
In Chapters 8 and 9 I explore the Beckettian intellect's utilization of memory as an 
integral aspect of a unique ascetic method: whilst refusing to present the will-not- 
to-suffer with an actionable representation, the knowing subject instead generates 
'involuntary' memories of suffering in its attempts to break the will. In addition to 
this, I describe Beckett's original employment of ascetic practice, not as a means of 
maintaining an already broken will, but as a means of breaking the will in the first 
instance. In contrast to the ex post facto nature of Schopenhauerian asceticism,
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Beckett presents asceticism as an ex-ante means of encouraging the will to freely 
choose to extinguish itself.
Finally, in Chapter 10, 'Schopenhauerian Suicide and Beckettian Suicidal 
Contemplation', I interpret the oft-repeated, though under-explored, motif of 
suicidal contemplation in Beckett's tragedies in the light of Schopenhauer's 
understanding of suicide as confirmation of the illusion of individuality. In Chapter 
10 I discuss the last-ditch tactic that the long-suffering willing subject employs in 
an attempt to alleviate its own distress, namely to demand, or provoke the 
provision of suicide as a motive. For both Schopenhauer and Beckett, I argue, the 
thought of suicide is the ultimate act of egoism. In the act of contemplating suicide, 
whereby one prioritises one's own distress, the intellect precludes the willing 
subject from gaining awareness of the universality, or ubiquity of suffering. 
Building upon Schopenhauer's understanding of the act of suicide, Beckett's 
theatre of asceticism presents the contemplation of suicide as the main stumbling 
block for the ascetic practitioner in his or her attempts to break the will-not-to- 
suffer.
With this broad outline of the thesis in place, I now turn to a review of the 
secondary philosophical literature on the subject of Beckettian art.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review: Affirmation of Existence, 
Meaninglessness, and Alterity
There are three premises that fundamentally shape the present understanding of 
Beckett's tragedies in the field of philosophy. The first premise relates to the role ol 
art: through its confrontation with the negative, art affirms existence. The second 
premise, which is both supported by, and in turn supports and builds upon, the 
first premise, is that the import of Beckett's art is its refusal to give in to 'nihilism', 
where nihilism is understood as the attribution of'meaning' to existence. Beckett's 
work has consistently been read in this light:
Time and again, since Adorno's interventions... Beckett's works have 
been deployed in the struggle against nihilism (with nihilism being 
taken not as a deviation from, but, following Nietzsche, as a synonym for 
metaphysics). In Blanchot, in Cavell, in Deleuze, in Derrida, in Cixous, 
and most recently in Badiou and Critchley, Beckett is championed for 
having articulated an affirmation that is taken, at least by Blanchot and 
Derrida, to lie beyond the very opposition of affirmation and negation 
within metaphysical thinking ... (Weller, 2005: 15).
And the third premise, one again supported by, and which in turn supports and 
builds upon the premise that Beckettian tragedy is life affirming, is the premise 
that Beckett's art implicitly, and explicitly, promotes the recognition of difference, 
or recognition of the 'Other'.
The first premise of the philosophical interpretation of Beckett's work -  that the 
role of art is to affirm life - is an implicit utilisation, and thus affirmation, of 
Nietzschean aesthetics; 'implicit', for at no point is Nietzsche's understanding of
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the role of art defended, rather the affirmative, or justificatory role of art is taken 
for, and presented as, a philosophical given. The interpretive starting point for the 
consideration of Beckett's tragedies invariably begins at Nietzsche, or, as one 
might alternatively understand it, after Schopenhauer. It is from the Nietzschean 
understanding of the role of art that Beckettian tragedy is now considered:
[Through art], 'life is made both possible and worth living' (Nietzsche, 
1993: 16).
'Art is essentially affirmation, blessing, deification o f existence... 
Schopenhauer is wrong when he says that certain works of art serve 
pessimism. Tragedy does not teach "resignation" —  To represent 
terrible and questionable things is in itself an instinct for power and 
magnificence in the artist... Art affirms...' (Nietzsche, 1968: 434-5)
The question that philosophers tend to ask, then, is not 'Does Beckett's art make 
life both possible and worth living?' That question has already been answered in 
the affirmative: 'All of Beckett's genius tends towards affirmation' (Badiou, 2003: 
44). Rather, the question one is encouraged to provide an answer to is this: 'How 
does the artwork of Samuel Beckett affirm existence?' By both asking and 
answering this question in the way it does, philosophy positions Beckett's 
tragedies as twentieth century manifestations of ancient Greek tragedy as 
interpreted by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy. Much like the tragedies of ancient 
Greece, Beckett's tragedies are said to evince a 'craving for ugliness ... for the image 
of everything terrible... destructive and deadly underlying existence...' (Nietzsche, 
1993: 6) because like the ancient Greeks, Beckett has the 'strength for tragedy, for 
pessimism' (Nietzsche, 1993: 7, 3), where the worst that life has to offer is 
confronted and assimilated into one's understanding of existence.
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In the following review of the philosophical literature on Beckett's work I present 
the various ways that philosophy answers the question of how it is that Beckett's 
art affirms existence. This literature review starts with a rehearsal of the literature 
that endorses the second premise: Beckett's tragic works are life affirming because 
they refuse to attribute meaning to existence.
Meaninglessness
What seemed to be required was a critical or elucidatory language that 
could somehow interpret the plays' uninterpretability, that could cast 
light on the plays' meaninglessness in ways that made it appear 
meaningful, without reconstructing the very critical and dramatic 
conventions whose denial constituted their meaning. The struggle to 
create such a language -  to preserve the impact of the plays' 
meaninglessness whilst exploring what such meaninglessness might 
mean -  has characterised the development of Beckett studies over the 
last five decades (Boxall, 2010: 6).
That we speak about 'meaninglessness' in relation to the tragic works of Samuel 
Beckett is due in large part to the early interpretive work of Martin Esslin [1961], 
Theodor W. Adorno (1991, first published 1961), and Stanley Cavell (2002, first 
published 1964). This line of argument is again pursued in the later interpretive 
work of Simon Critchley (1997). Beckett's philosophical interpreters argue two 
broad lines of thought in regard to Beckett's meaninglessness: that in the world of 
Beckettian theatre meaninglessness is either presented as a fact of life, or a goal, 
which, through one's actions, one must purposively engender.
Falling within the first school of thought - meaninglessness as a fact -  Esslin 
argues that in Beckett's tragic works language is used to depict the determined
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‘disintegration of language' where the denial of certainty also withholds a definite 
meaning (Esslin, 1961: 63). Similarly, Adorno argues that the absence of 
foundational metaphysical meaning precludes meaning in the content of the work:
Because there is no longer any metaphysical meaning, there can be no 
meaning in the words we use to communicate. Thus there can no longer 
be communication (Adorno, 1991: 263).
In contrast to this line of thought, and therefore falling within the second school of 
thought -  meaninglessness as a goal -  Cavell suggests that the content of Beckett's 
work is not meaningless. Far from evincing meaninglessness, Beckett's language 
depicts the burden of meaning, which, through the genre of tragedy, Beckett seeks 
to cast off (Cavell, 2002:116-7).
Whilst there is some disagreement, then, amongst Beckett's interpreters regarding 
the ability to ascribe meaning to the content of one of Beckett's tragedies, it is, 
however, for the most part argued that Beckettian tragedy either manifests the 
absence of nihilistic metaphysical meaning, or the need for the removal of nihilistic 
metaphysical meaning from the world. It is this line of argument in the secondary 
literature that I pursue here.xii
Meaninglessness as a fact
Martin Esslin's early liberal humanist reading of Beckettian theatre presents 
Beckett as a playwright concerned with an attitude that is comparable to Sartrean 
'bad faith':
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The hope of salvation may be merely an evasion of the suffering and 
anguish that spring from facing the reality of the human condition 
(Esslin, 1961: 46).
Esslin's reading positions Beckett, much like Sartre and Camus, as an artist whose 
work confronts the absurdity of human existence in a godless universe. However, 
unlike Sartre, and Camus whose works convey the absurdity of existence as a 
message, whilst employing traditional formal aspects such as logic and reason to 
convey absurd content, Beckett's work is described as an example of the Theatre of 
the Absurd:
While Sartre or Camus express the new content in the old convention, 
the Theatre of the Absurd goes a step further in trying to achieve a unity 
between its basic assumptions and the form in which these are 
expressed (Esslin, 1961: 17).
No longer is absurd content presented in a rationally argued form, rather in 
Beckettian tragedy absurdity is presented ‘in terms of concrete stage images,' thus 
'openly abandoning rational devices and discursive thought' (Esslin, 1961: 17-18).
However, despite the absurdity of both the formal and dialogic elements, the 
continued use of language suggests an attempt by the author to communicate a 
message, even if this is to 'communicate the incommunicable' (Esslin, 1961: 64). 
Though any interpreter must be cautious, he or she is still able to isolate images 
and themes and to discern their structural groundwork, and by so doing, 'make it 
easier to follow the author's intention and to see, if not the answers, at least the 
questions that he is asking' (Esslin, 1961: 33). For Esslin, then, Beckett's tragic 
works depict something comparable to the existential brute fact of our being there 
'after the collapse of metaphysical meaning structures' (Boxall, 2000: 24). For 
Esslin, Beckettian tragedy assures us that we live in a universe without meaning,
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and belief in a beyond, or indeed waiting for salvation of any kind, is revealed as 
'essentially absurd' (Esslin, 1961: 42).
For Adorno, Beckett's work issues a condemnation of philosophical thought -  such 
as existentialism -  which attempts to make something meaningful out of 
meaninglessness (Adorno, 1991; 251, 249; Critchley, 1997:148-9). In contrast to 
Esslin's position, Adorno views the attribution of meaning to modern works of art 
(such as Beckettian tragedy) as missing the very point of the message they seek to 
convey: namely that the search for, and attribution of'meaning' is the problem, for 
it lies at the heart of nihilism (Adorno, 1973: 380). Rather than attempting to 
ascribe meaning to life, modern artists such as Beckett have passed judgment on 
meaning as the principal negator of life. For Adorno, nihilism is the act or desire to 
'overcome' that which is. The attempt to overcome nihilism only leads to the 
perpetuation of nihilism, indeed is nihilism (Weller, 2005: 12-13).
In Beckettian tragedy, Adorno finds the type of relentless engagement, or 
confrontation, with nihilism that allows for the only hope for the future. In 
Endgame, it is Beckett's submission to the negative, followed by the subsequent 
failure of nihilism that permits Adorno to see Beckett as an anti-nihilist artist, as 
one who allows for the only permissible form of hope, that which is found within 
the negative itself. This, then, forms the basis to Adorno's Negative Dialectics: out 
of nihilism's failed attempts to overcome emerges 'a haven of hope' for a better, 
'reconciled' world (Adorno, 1973: 381). In Beckett's tragedies Adorno reads a 
profound acceptance of life as it is, that there is no overcoming, no other realm to 
cross over to. True 'reconciliation', then, is when one relinquishes the desire to 
overcome, and in turn the non-identical is freed from totalizing oppression 
(Weller, 2005:14 in reference to Adorno, 1973: 6).
For Adorno, the role of any theorist when tasked with the interpretation of a 
modern work of art such as Endgame is to 'concretely construct the fact that it 
[Endgame] has no meaning' (Adorno, 1991: 243). This, then, is not a matter of
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simply replacing meaning with meaninglessness, as Adorno believes existentialist 
thinkers have done:
Drama cannot simply take negative meaning, or the absence of meaning 
as its content without everything peculiar to it being affected to the 
point of turning into its opposite. The essence of drama was constituted 
by that meaning ... one cannot speak of meaninglessness because this 
fact cannot be conveyed ... language exists to convey meaning (Adorno, 
1991: 242).
In the form of Beckettian tragedy, Adorno sees a fundamental challenge to 
language, and more specifically to art, the content of which has traditionally sought 
to convey a message. Adorno interprets Endgame as a play that undermines the 
traditional view of'meaning' in art. Adorno divides this traditional understanding 
into three component parts. The first of these parts or elements is the 
'metaphysical' meaning of the play, which Adorno defines as the 'metaphysical 
content that is represented objectively in the complexion of the artifact'. The 
second element is the overall intention of the work as a 'complex of meaning', the 
‘inherent meaning of the play'. And, finally, the third element is the dialogic 
meaning, the meaning that comes about through the sequence of sentences 
(Adorno, 1991: 242.) The significance of Beckett's work for Adorno is that it 
undermines the idea of meaning from its philosophical foundations. By 
undermining the metaphysical meaning - by reducing philosophy to mere 'cultural 
trash' (Adorno, 1991: 241) -  Endgame also undermines the other two types of 
dramatic meaning. All meaning collapses (Adorno, 1991: 263). Thus on Beckett's 
stage we bear witness to 'the fact that there is no longer any substantive, 
affirmative metaphysical meaning that could provide dramatic form with its law 
and its epiphany. T hat... disrupts dramatic form down to its linguistic 
infrastructure' (Adorno, 1991: 242).
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Meaninglessness as a task
In the work of Stanley Cavell one observes a post-Nietzschean understanding of 
Beckettian tragedy, that is, the problem of the work is the attribution of meaning to 
existence. However, this diagnosis is then followed by a Nietzschean solution to the 
stated problem: one must overcome meaning.™*
Writing some three years after the publication of Adorno and Esslin's first 
proclamations of Beckett's formal meaninglessness, Cavell puts forward the theory 
that Endgame is a play about a world suffocating under the weight of meaning, i.e. 
meaning is a problem because of its proliferation:
The discovery of Endgame, both in topic and technique, is not the failure 
of meaning (if that means the lack of meaning) but its total, even 
totalitarian, success—our inability not to mean what we are given to 
mean (Cavell, 2002:116-7).
Thus, once again, meaninglessness is the 'message' of Endgame. However, in the 
interpretive work of Cavell, meaninglessness is no longer a given but, rather, an 
unending 'task' (Cavell, 2002:150), the ultimate goal of which is a life that is not 
judged unworthy of being lived by those who live it.
The other key difference between the Cavellian reading and the Adornian reading 
of Beckettian tragedy - one that partially aligns the work of Cavell and Esslin -  is 
the claim that the content of the play is as important as its form for conveying the 
message of meaninglessness (Cavell, 2002:115). One also finds later support for 
this view in the work of Martha Nussbaum. In 'Narrative Emotions: Beckett's 
Genealogy of Love', Nussbaum describes the relationship of form and content as 
'inseparable'. ]ust as one cannot overlook the form of an artwork, any study of
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literature that attempts to understand the work through its form alone is held to 
be 'seriously incomplete' (Nussbaum, 1990: 290-1). With this in mind, Cavell 
begins his essay on Endgame, 'Ending the Waiting Game', by attributing 
significance to the play's content:
Various keys to its interpretation are in place: 'Endgame' is a term of 
chess; the name Hamm is shared by Noah's cursed son, it titles a kind of 
actor, it starts recalling Hamlet. But no interpretation I have seen details 
the textual evidence for these relations or shows how the play's meaning 
opens with them (Cavell, 2002: 115).
Cavell argues that these details assist us to answer the questions that the play 
raises, namely:
Who are these people? Where are they, and how did they get there? 
What can illuminate their mood of bewilderment as well as their mood 
of appalling comprehension? What is the source of their ugly power over 
one another, and of their impotence? What gives to their conversation 
its sound, at once of madness and of plainness? (Cavell, 2002: 117).
For Cavell, the textual references, the location in between water and land, the 
name of one of the central characters, 'Hamm', the negation that takes place 
throughout the play, help us to understand the intention of the work. Endgame 
takes place after the Flood of the Old Testament. The negation of the play is an 
attempted undoing of the curse that has befallen both Hamm and humankind, an 
attempted unraveling of meaning that has made life unbearable. And, given this:
Solitude, emptiness, nothingness, meaninglessness, silence -  these are 
not the givens of Beckett's characters, but their goal, their new heroic
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undertaking ... These states are, rather, 'infinite tasks' (Cavell, 2002: 
156).
The position that Cavell takes on Endgame is a significant one, then, because it 
provides an important philosophical counterweight to the reading given by 
Adorno. Cavell is alive to the way that the content provides a basis for the rationale 
of the negation: the negated content assists us to understand why negation is 
sought, and the reasons it is being sought in a particular way.
Together, these two aspects -  form and content -  provide an explanation for 
Hamm's psychology and Endgame’s progression:
The end Hamm seeks must be shown in the efforts made throughout the 
play. What are these efforts? Take these:
1. To play out a game, or drama, to a conclusion.
2. To finish a story.
3. To secure fruitlessness, and in particular:
4. To defeat meaning, of word and deed.
The success of which will result in 'human existence at last' (Cavell, 2002: 148; 
149). Thus Cavell argues that the intention of Hamm's attempts to overcome 
meaning is to make life livable.xiv
In this approach to Endgame, Weller sees a decidedly Nietzschean undertaking:
with its emphasis on the heroic, the choice that Hamm faces in Endgame 
is a decidedly Nietzschean one: 'either nihilism or else the task of
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purposely undoing, re-evaluating all the purposes we have known, re­
locating the gravity of purpose itself (Weller, 2005: 132 citing Cavell 
2002: 150).
These are the answers, then, that Cavell provides to the questions that he believes 
are raised by Beckett's work. However, it is the very fact that Cavell seeks to 
answer these questions that then provides the basis to Simon Critchley's critique of 
early Beckettian interpretation.
Though admiring the extent to which Adorno has appreciated the difficulties of 
interpreting Beckett and 'taken up the challenge' that this poses for philosophy 
(Critchley, 1997: 147), Critchley's own interpretation of Beckett's work is, 
however, more closely aligned to the argument presented by Cavell: 
meaninglessness is not a given, it is an achievement (Critchley, 1997: 152):
Thus it is not true to say that Beckett's work is meaningless as if 
meaninglessness were a fact that did not need to be conceptually 
communicated; rather it is a question of establishing the meaning of 
meaninglessness, making a meaning out of the refusal of meaning that 
the work performs without that refusal of meaning becoming a meaning. 
It is a question of conceptualizing and communicating that which resists 
conceptualization and refuses communication - a necessary and 
impossible task (Critchley, 1997: 151).
Whilst criticising Cavell for 'overshooting' the text in his 'ordinary language 
reading' of Beckett's play, and attempting to establish the meaning of Endgame 
(Critchley, 1997:177), (something that is prohibited if one accepts, as Critchley 
does, Adorno's understanding of modern art), Critchley does approve of Cavell's 
assertion regarding the importance of unburdening the everyday of all its 
deadening meaning. So when Cavell states that, 'Solitude, emptiness, nothingness,
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meaninglessness, silence' -  are the goals of Beckett's characters (Cavell, 2002: 
156), Critchley interprets this quote to mean:
Beckett is not telling us that the universe is meaningless, rather that 
meaninglessness is a task, an achievement, the achievement of the 
ordinary or the everyday (Critchley, 1997:179).
In agreement with Cavell, Critchley understands Beckett's art as an attempt to 
'declutter the world' so that humankind might 'once again appreciate its 
ordinariness', for it is the inability to see what 'is' that renders us in need of 
'salvific narratives' (Critchley, 1997: 179).xv Thus, according to Critchley, and in 
line with preceding thinkers on this matter, Beckett is not a nihilistic thinker:
The stalest of all stale philosophical cliches in terms of which Beckett's 
work has been interpreted is the claim that it celebrates the 
meaninglessness of existence and is therefore nihilistic (Critchley, 1997: 
176).
Rather, Beckett is an artist who questions meaning, and by doing so potentially 
places us in a position where we will no longer despair for the failure of the 
meaning we have ascribed. In turn we will no longer seek deliverance from, but, 
rather, better appreciate the here and now by seeing it not as something from 
which we can or need to be saved. To quote Critchley:
What passes for the ordinary is cluttered with illusory narratives of 
redemption that conceal the very extraordinariness of the ordinary and 
the nature of its decay under conditions of nihilism (Critchley, 1997: 
179).
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Beckett the metaphysician
In the work of Ulrich Pothast (2008) we witness the first philosophical 
acknowledgement, and exploration, of Beckett's metaphysics. Thus in the form of 
Pothast's work we observe a challenge to the assertion of Beckett's metaphysical 
meaninglessness. The work of Ulrich Pothast is also the first philosophical attempt 
to understand Beckett's oeuvre in the light of Beckett's now well documented 
engagement with the work of Arthur Schopenhauer. Indeed, Pothast's work is, to 
date, the only book-length work to focus solely on the Schopenhauer-Beckett 
nexus. As the title of Pothast's work, The Metaphysical Vision, suggests, Pothast 
traces the influence of Schopenhauerian aesthetics, ontology, and epistemology on 
Beckett's literary criticism, prose and drama.
It is generally acknowledged that Beckett's early critical work, Proust, is greatly 
influenced by Schopenhauerian aesthetics (see, for example, Rosen, 1976: 145-6; 
Wood, 1994: 4; Pothast, 2008: 4; Acheson, 1978; Murphy, 1994; Feldman, 2010). 
Endorsing this position, Pothast states that Beckett reads Proust's A la recherche 
du temps perdu as a 'metaphysical venture undertaken by the means of an artist, 
not a philosopher. Beckett arrives at this interpretation by taking central theses 
from Schopenhauer's aesthetics and using them in his own way, i.e., using them as 
the starting point for developing his own philosophical ideas on the metaphysics of 
art' (Pothast, 2008: 4). However, Pothast then significantly extends the influence of 
Schopenhauerian aesthetics to include Beckett's artistic output:
My thesis concerning Beckett's literary work is that very important 
parts of this work can still be seen as representing a metaphysical vision 
of human life and the world we have to live in. The contents of this 
metaphysical vision show amazing similarities with the contents of 
Schopenhauer's metaphysical view of life and world, notwithstanding 
that important elements of the theoretical as well as aesthetic
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framework of Schopenhauer's philosophy were left behind by Beckett 
very soon after having used them for his own purposes in Proust 
(Pothast, 2008: 5-6; see also 27).
According to Pothast, at the heart of the Beckettian metaphysical vision is the 
Schopenhauerian idea that, unlike philosophy, art can get at reality [Pothast, 2008: 
3). Thus Pothast is alive to the fact that for Beckett ‘there exists a difference 
between the phenomenal surface of the world and the true reality beyond' 
(Pothast, 2008: 95-6). Whereas Schopenhauer views the phenomenal realm as an 
illusion (WWR 1: 353, 379), Beckett presents it as a 'caricature' (Pothast, 2008: 
123-4 citing Beckett, 1999: 14). And, as is also the case in Schopenhauerian 
thought, in Beckettian thought one sees beyond the illusion, or caricature of space, 
time, and causality (Schopenhauer: WWR 1: 129-130; Beckett, 1999: 75, 79) when 
one perceives the world aesthetically. In the aesthetic state, one sees the Idea 
(Schopenhauer), or the 'ideal object' (Beckett) (Pothast, 2008: 97). Whereas, for 
Schopenhauer the Platonic Ideas are different grades of the will's objectification - 
the eternal forms of things -  not themselves entering into time and space -  (WWR 
1:129-3), for Beckett, Pothast argues, the ideal object is, rather, the 'total past 
sensation' of an event (Beckett, 1999: 72-3) (Pothast, 2008:127). The Beckettian 
Idea, then, is no longer about archetypes, but about 'representing the non- 
empirical, undistorted, integral truth of a living person's experience in his or her 
world' (Pothast, 2008:128).
Pothast's work is important, then, for a number of reasons. Firstly, Pothast is the 
first philosophical thinker to thoroughly acknowledge, and interpret, the 
Schopenhauerian epistemology and ontology that one finds in Beckett's early 
critical work. In addition to this, Pothast then traces Beckett's on-going artistic 
utilization and development of Schopenhauerian thought. Based upon 
biographical, archival, and textual evidence, Pothast contends that the influence of 
Schopenhauerian philosophy continues into Beckett's prose and tragedy. Secondly, 
Pothast's use of archival material permits him to trace a genetic philosophical basis 
to Beckett's ideas regarding the role of art, namely to provide the spectator with
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the aesthetic moment, which in Beckett's case is when one experiences the 
'integral truth of a person's existence' or the 'suffering of being' (Beckett, 1999: 18- 
19). There can be little doubt that Pothast's work on Beckett's engagement with 
philosophy, particularly Schopenhauerian philosophy, benefits from the 
discoveries of archival investigation.
By acknowledging and exploring Beckett's metaphysics, Pothast's work offers an 
important counter to the existing philosophical literature on Beckettian tragedy, 
which consistently posits the absence of metaphysical meaning in Beckett's 
work.™*
Having discussed the subject of meaninglessness in Beckett's work, I turn to the 
third premise that shapes Beckettian scholarship in the field of philosophy, namely 
openness to the 'Other'.
Alterity
The third premise that fundamentally shapes the present understanding of 
Beckettian tragedy in the field of philosophy is the premise that Beckett's work 
promotes a 'saving alterity' (Weller, 2006: 2). It is claimed that Beckettian tragedy 
performs this life-affirming role in two ways. In the first instance it is argued that 
Beckettian tragedy refuses the totalizing tendency of philosophical interpretation. 
In the second instance, Beckett's work, in its textual indeterminacy, and openness 
to the 'Other' -  both within oneself, and in the outside world -  affirms life by 
affirming difference.
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Beckett's Tragedies Refuse Philosophy's Totalizing Tendency
The writings of Samuel Beckett seem to be particularly, perhaps 
uniquely, resistant to philosophical interpretation. To speak from the 
vantage point of a conceptual framework, an interpretive method or any 
form of metalanguage, is, at the best of times, a hazardous exercise 
(Critchley, 1997:141).
In Adornian theory, the history of Western thought is marked by a tendency 
towards identity thinking, either in the form of the attempted assimilation or 
annihilation of alterity. For Adorno, philosophy's position at the apex of Western 
thought renders it especially culpable for society's desire to destroy difference. 
Within philosophy itself it is the field of aesthetics that performs the role of 
oppressor by subsuming the object of contemplation into an existing conceptual 
framework. Interpreting Adorno's position, Cunningham argues that:
Aesthetics is implicated within such a logic [the logic of identity thinking] 
in so far as it exemplifies philosophy's traditional striving for an absolute 
conceptual identity which would seek, with varying levels of violence or 
repression, to erase or subsume any moment of non-identity or otherness 
in its 'object' (Cunningham, 2002: 127).
The significance of the work of Samuel Beckett, then, is that, in its formal negation 
of the linguistic infrastructure, Beckett's art thwarts philosophy's attempts to 
provide a totalizing account of its meaning. The modern work of art's lack of 
meaningful content precludes the manifestation of this tendency, so that, according 
to Adorno, 'Interpretation ... cannot pursue the chimerical aim of expressing the 
play's meaning in a form mediated by philosophy' (Adorno, 1991: 243).
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Derrida raises a similar argument with regard to Beckett's importance. Though 
seemingly a far more reluctant commentator on Beckett, Derrida also situates 
Beckett's work within the framework of resistance to meta-narratives and identity 
thinking. Derrida's only recorded commentary on the works of Beckett occurs 
during an interview with Derek Attridge (Derrida, 1992). In this interview Derrida 
discusses the 'remains' of the artwork that get left behind in the process of 
interpretation. In Beckett's case, what is left behind after one has gone into the 
work and extricated a theme is that which supports the theme and without which 
the theme appears nonsensical—namely, the 'work-character' of the work, its 
'signature' (Derrida, 1992: 61). This particular quality, the work's 'signature', 
always slips between one's fingers because to grasp it one must rely on a 
generalisation, which guarantees its escape. One simply cannot claim the particular 
with a generalization, or as Critchley understands it, relying upon such a method 
means that 'one cannot hope to be faithful to the idiom of Beckett's language 
(Critchley, 1997: 145).' For Derrida, it is Beckett's grammar that provides his 
words with their meaning; to colonize Beckett's grammar with a philosophical 
concept ultimately renders the work meaningless. Whilst this is the case with any 
work of art, it is the fact that Beckett deliberately structures his work to thwart the 
goal of interpretation that sets Beckett's work apart from other artists. As Critchley 
states:
The peculiar resistance of Beckett's work to philosophical interpretation 
lies ... in the fact that his texts continually seem to pull the rug from 
under the feet of the philosopher by showing themselves to be conscious 
of the possibility of such interpretation ... (Critchley, 1997: 141).
It is Beckett's pre-emptive self-interpretation, combined with the belief that the 
field of aesthetics tends to provide a totalizing, and therefore destructive reading 
of its art object, that leads Critchley to argue that:
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It might well be that philosophically mediated meanings are precisely what we 
should not be in search of when thinking through Beckett's work (Critchley, 
1997: 142).
For Critchley, then, the danger and destructiveness of interpretive totalization is 
one of the implicit lessons of Beckett's work. Any attempt at interpretation is 
bound to fail because the artwork seems to have been written to generate such 
interpretive failure. Critchley cites the tendency of Beckett's philosophical 
interpreters -  including Beckett's more astute philosophical interpreters (Adorno 
and Cavell) -  to fall for Beckett's 'red herrings' (Critchley, 1997:19,144) to 
'overshoot' the mark, to read too much into the work and to obliterate its non­
identity with the applied philosophical concept (Critchley, 1997: 141). Like 
Derrida, for Critchley the importance of Beckett's work is that it resists 
thematization, and this resistance makes it futile to search for examples in the 
work that support the pre-existing conceptual ideas of the interpreter. In essence, 
then, Critchley endorses Adorno's interpretation of Beckettian formalism— 
understanding meaninglessness as an idea conveyed in the form of the artwork is 
the only approach that precludes one from committing the error of reading too 
much into the text.
Indeterminacy and the 'Other'
In addition to its formal resistance to metalanguage, Beckett's work has also been 
interpreted as an implicitly ethical undertaking due to its indeterminacy at the 
textual level. Connor (1988), for example, concentrates on the repetition that 
occurs within a number of works throughout Beckett's oeuvre, and the difference 
that one finds within the repeated events themselves. Similarly, Hill (1990) focuses 
on Beckett's self-translation, and the difference one finds within the 'same' text 
when presented in a different language. The ethicality of Beckett's work has also 
been perceived at the thematic level in the works' depiction of the multiplicitous
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nature of the self, or, as Weller describes it, Beckett's 'radical splitting' of the self. 
Summarizing the poststructuralist approach to Beckett's prose and tragedy, Weller 
states that:
In their openness or undecidability, Beckett's self-deconstructing works 
become cites of resistance. In short, they become the most ethical form 
of textual production, ethical precisely through their inexhaustible 
resistance to what are taken to be the totalitarian threats of meaning, 
stability, fixity, and identity, each of which is predicated on a negation of 
alterity (Weller, 2006: 27-8].
The poststructuralist reading of Beckett as an author of alterity is one that finds its 
counterpart in the 'many-layered author' that one finds in Martha Nussbaum's 
essay on Beckett (1990). Here Nussbaum holds that 'Beckett's antinarrative is too 
many-sided, too ironic, to leave us with any simple comfort'. Quite simply, in 
Beckett's art all is called into question (Nussbaum, 1990: 305).
The argument that Beckett's work not only has an implicit ethical component but 
also an explicit one, and that this ethicality is connected to an awareness of the 
'Other', or at the very least the possibility of the 'Other', is presented in the work of 
Alain Badiou (2003). Badiou reads Beckett's work as philosophy, and positions 
Beckett as a thinker whose oeuvre purposively transitions from the evocation of 
the isolation of solipsism to the later depiction of the recognition that the world 
may be something more than 'One', namely 'Two' (Badiou, 2003: 16, 5):
Without doubt it is in Beckett's theatre, with the couples of Vladimir and 
Estragon [Waiting for Godot) or Hamm and Clov [Endgame), that 
something which will not cease to be at the heart of Beckett's fictions 
comes to the fore: the couple, the Two, the voice of the other, and lastly, 
love (Badiou, 2003: 60).
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For Badiou, Beckett's work becomes ethical only once the possibility of the 'Other' 
becomes a focus of narrative intent (Badiou, 2003: 4; Smith, 2008: 16), that is 
when the work becomes the process of'clearing the ground' in preparation for the 
anticipated event of the Other's arrival (Gibson, 2003:124). Given this 
understanding, Vladimir's determined waiting for news from Godot, his 'holding on 
to the uncertain', is positioned as an exemplar of the refusal to relinquish the 
possibility of the Event once conceived (Badiou, 2003: 73), or as an act of'fidelity 
to the transformative event' (Smith, 2008: 8). It is not truth, then, that we observe 
in Beckettian tragedy, but the 'hope of truth' (Badiou, 2003: 22), the potential 
arrival of which, in the form of the 'Other', Beckett's work facilitates.
Finally, with regard to the claim that the ethicality of Beckett's work centres on 
Beckett's acknowledgement of the 'Other', Shane Weller (2006) questions the 
straightforwardness of this position by focusing on the seemingly equally 
determined negation of the 'Other' in Beckett's work. Whilst Beckett's works 
'undoubtedly thematise the experience of seemingly unmasterable alterity in the 
most explicit fashion, that experience is situated within an unremitting struggle to 
reduce the other to nothing, to achieve a labour of negation ... that would put an 
end to being as such, and with it the being (or otherwise) of alterity' (Weller, 2006: 
24).
In this reading of Beckett's work, Weller affirms an Adornian understanding of 
Beckettian art, namely that at the heart of Beckett's oeuvre is the evocation of 
nihilism's failure:
in Beckett the negations repeatedly fail to deliver the very 'nothing' they 
seem to promise, and it is this failure that comes to constitute the very 
stuff of the work. This is not to say that what remains necessarily 
possesses a value; rather in a process that disintegrates difference no
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less than identity, Beckett opens the ethicality of both negation and 
affirmation to question (Weller, 2006: 193).
In short, Beckett shows the failure of nihilism by repeatedly attempting, and 
failing, to attain the state of nothingness. In this way, to quote Critchley, Beckettian 
nihilism is a 'redemptive nihilism' (Critchley, 1997: 23). It is for this reason that 
Weller, in a move that echoes Derrida's earlier assertion that Beckett is both 
nihilist and anti-nihilist (Derrida, 1992: 60-62), understands Beckett's work as 
neither ethical, nor unethical, but, rather, 'anethical': 'a failure either to establish or 
negate the difference between the ethical and the unethical, nihilism, and anti­
nihilism...' (Weller, 2006: 194-5).
Having provided a broad overview of the secondary philosophical material on the 
subject of Beckett's work, the final section of this chapter offers a brief retort to the 
central claims of this interpretive work. This retort will in turn provide an 
alternative interpretive framework for the rest of the thesis.
Retort to the Secondary Philosophical Literature on Beckettian Art
I begin with a challenge to the first premise of the philosophical interpretation of 
Beckett's work, namely that Beckett's work affirms existence.
The present interpretation of Beckett's tragedies as something which are 
ultimately life affirming in nature is an interpretive endeavour that is greatly 
informed by Nietzschean thought. Nietzsche is the undeclared third man of the 
philosophical interpretation of Beckett's work. This interpretive approach, where 
Beckett's engagement with pre-Nietzschean thought is consistently viewed 
through the lens of Nietzschean thought tends to conflate Beckett's understanding
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of the role of art, and metaphysics, w ith Nietzsche's philosophical viewpoint. When 
one takes into consideration Beckett's lifelong intellectual engagement with 
Schopenhauerian philosophy, the decision to understand Beckett's tragic works 
through the interpretive lens of Nietzschean thought, i.e. in relation to the main 
critic of Schopenhauerian philosophy appears, at the very least, questionable.
It is a central claim of this thesis that the discipline of philosophy has yet to 
interpret Beckett's work in a manner that is free from Nietzsche's pathologising 
critique of Schopenhauerian thought. Viewed in Schopenhauerian terms, the 
desired state of'nothing' is not nihilism. In Schopenhauerian thought 'nothing' is 
the desired state beyond w illfu l consciousness, and thus beyond suffering. 
'Nothing' becomes nihilism only once it is understood in Nietzschean terms. 
Nihilism is Nietzsche's diagnosis of the life-denying world-view of philosophers 
such as Schopenhauer. It is Nietzsche's understanding of'nothing' as nihilism that 
guides the interpretation of Beckett's work, namely that 'nothing' is a problem, not 
a goal.
Beckett's engagement with Schopenhauerian 'nothingness' has yet to be 
interpreted in a manner that is unencumbered by Nietzsche's critique of the w ill- 
to-nothingness as an example of nihilism. The degree to which the terms 'nihilism' 
and 'anti-nihilism' are used in Beckettian scholarship indicates the extent to which 
Nietzschean thought permeates the philosophical interpretation of Beckett's 
understanding of'nothingness', and acts as an interpretive lens situated in 
between Beckett and his avowed interests.
The use of the Nietzschean interpretive lens has, to date, precluded an 
interpretation of Beckett's tragedies as a development of Schopenhauer's 
understanding of art as an event or interaction that can liberate one from suffering 
(Atwell, 1996: 84). It has also precluded a reading of Beckett's work where the 
state of'nothing' is both desired by a number of Beckett's characters and attained 
by a number of Beckett's characters. The alternative reading of Beckett's work that
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I propose is one that understands Beckett's tragedies as art forms that build upon 
Schopenhauerian quietism by providing a new means of achieving the very thing 
Nietzsche diagnoses as nihilism: withdrawal from the 'embodied' life, through the 
destruction of one's bodily drives; ascetic practice undertaken with the intention of 
attaining the state of nothingness.
Once one questions the first premise of the interpretation of Beckett's work -  the 
life-affirming role of art -  this in turn calls into question the other life-affirming 
premises of Beckettian interpretation, namely 'meaninglessness' as life-affirming 
anti-nihilism, and the life-affirming recognition of difference in the form of the 
'Other'.
With regard to the second premise of the philosophical interpretation of Beckett's 
work, 'meaninglessness', this thesis will present two points of criticism. The first 
point relates to Beckett's ontology.
Philosophy's claims of Beckett's metaphysical meaninglessness -  particularly in 
the work of Adorno (1991) -  do not sufficiently take into account Beckett's early 
ontology, the 'will not to suffer', as espoused in the critical work Proust (Beckett, 
1999: 43). Because of this, Beckett's philosophical interpreters have not explored 
the way that Beckett continues to develop this early ontology in the tragedies of 
Beckett's middle period. Beckett's will not to suffer, I argue, evolves into the 
dominant aspect of the pseudocouples that populate Beckett's middle period 
tragedies.
The second criticism that I have of the philosophical interpretation of Beckett's 
meaninglessness once again relates to the claim that Beckett's tragedies espouse 
meaninglessness in an attempt to affirm existence, that is, nihilistic meaning is 
removed with the intention of making life livable. This claim is made in the work of 
Cavell and Critchley. In contrast to this position I argue that Beckett's
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meaninglessness is not an affirmative endeavour but, rather, part of a unique 
ascetic method employed by the other aspect of Beckett's tragic pseudocouple, the 
intellect, to break the will. The intellect's refusal to ascribe meaning to the world, 
to describe 'what's happening' (Beckett, 1958:17), effectively denies the will the 
knowledge it requires to be able to strive. This in turn causes the 'will not to suffer' 
to suffer to such an extent that it freely chooses to resign from life (WWR 1: 285). 
Beckett's meaninglessness is life denying.
Finally, with regard to the third premise of Beckettian interpretation -  that 
Beckett's art is life affirming because of the way it implicitly, and explicitly, 
promotes the recognition of difference, or recognition of the 'Other' -  I instead 
claim that in Beckett's theatre of asceticism the event of the 'Other's' recognition is 
a life-denying event. In Beckett's middle-period tragedies, the awareness of the 
'Other' is an awareness of the suffering 'Other'. Far from being a moment where life 
is affirmed, the recognition of the suffering 'Other' promotes the will's resignation. 
Indeed, the recognition of the suffering 'Other' is a necessary precursor to the will 
turning its back on life. It is for this reason -  namely that the awareness of the 
suffering 'Other' causes the 'will not to suffer’ to suffer -  that the will seeks not to 
acknowledge the 'Other', and in turn the intellect attempts to promote the will's 
awareness. My own position -  that Beckett's will-not-to-suffer fights to avoid 
acknowledging the 'Other' - is antithetical, then, to that argued by Badiou.
My intention in the following thesis is to work through the life denying 
implications of Beckett's sustained engagement with Schopenhauerian thought. I 
begin this process by providing a detailed discussion of Schopenhauerian 
aesthetics, which is then followed by a discussion of Beckett's utilization and 
development of Schopenhauerian aesthetics, in particular, Beckett's ascetic 
development of the Schopenhauerian dynamically sublime.
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PART TWO:
Schopenhauerian and Beckettian Aesthetics
Chapter 3: Schopenhauerian Aesthetics
Introduction
In contrast to the life affirming role assigned to art in the work of the majority of 
post-Nietzschean thinkers who have engaged with Beckett's work, the role of art in 
Schopenhauerian philosophy is to guide the audience to a different conclusion 
about the value of life (WWR 2: 435], namely that 'it would be better for us not to 
exist' (WWR 2: 605). In aesthetic contemplation a number of transformations are 
said to occur, two of which are central to Schopenhauer's aesthetics and broader 
philosophical thought: first, the spectator is freed from 'practical interest', and thus 
the pain that accompanies the fear and anxiety of egoistical thought; and, second, 
the pain-free, though momentary, aesthetic state guides the spectator of art onto 
'the path to salvation', which is the 'denial and renunciation of life' (Nussbaum, 
1999: 360-1; Young, 1987: 85; Zoller, 1999: 36-37, Came, 2012: 243].
What we see, then, in Schopenhauerian thought is that resignation is a two-stage 
process. First, based upon the will-free experience of the aesthetic state, there is an 
awareness that the will can, for a few moments at a time, be forgotten, and that 
during these times the subject experiences a painless state (WWR 1: 196]. Second, 
this momentary state leads the subject to contemplate longer-term, possibly 
permanent, means of silencing the will; that is one is guided towards ascetic 
practice (WWR 1: 390]. Unlike aesthetic contemplation, and acts of compassion, 
where suffering is only temporarily interrupted, in ascetic practice the goal is to 
permanently break the will, and thus put an end to suffering. Asceticism is, then, an 
awareness that the life of striving is itself suffering, that one's own willing aspect 
causes one to suffer, and that breaking one's will leads to the state of'blessed' 
nothingness (WWR 1: 198-9; Atwell, 1995:17]. Asceticism differs from 
compassion in that no assistance to relieve suffering is provided, whether it is the
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provision of assistance to oneself or to others. Whereas the compassionate person 
provides relief from suffering, the ascetic understands -  as Beckett put it -  that the 
only true painkiller is the non-provision of painkiller (Beckett, 1958: 14,16, 23, 34, 
46). Because of this understanding, the ascetic allows suffering to continue, for 
suffering is the only means of ultimately breaking the will. The knowledge 
presented to the will in ascetic practice is that 'the world is full of misery' (WWR 1: 
400). This knowledge affords the possibility of 'salvation': the will turns its back on 
life in horror (WWR 1: 411; and see Atwell, 1995: 31).
For Schopenhauer the true value of art is that it provides us with a glimpse of such 
lasting peace. Young describes the process in the following way:
... what occurs in aesthetic consciousness is the occupation, for a brief 
moment, ofthat stance towards the world the permanent maintenance 
of which represents the solution to the problem of life, the path to 
salvation (Young, 1987: 85 in reference to WWR 1: 390; WWR 2: 369; 
see also Taminiaux, 1987: 90).
This, then, is the reason art plays such an important part in Schopenhauerian 
thought: the aesthetic state guides one onto the path to permanent will-lessness 
(WWR 1: 390; Zoller, 1999: 36-37), by revealing the very possibility of 'delivering 
knowledge from the service of the will' (WWR 1: 199).
In the following chapter I elaborate upon these statements, and then proceed to 
establish this understanding of the role of art as a significant influence upon the 
aesthetic, and ascetic, thought of Samuel Beckett. In particular, I pay close attention 
to the role of tragedy in Schopenhauerian aesthetics, and consider Beckett's 
middle-period theatre in the light of Schopenhauer's conception of tragedy as the 
'highest degree' of the feeling of the sublime (WWR 2: 433).
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This discussion will commence with the presentation of Schopenhauer's 
understanding of'ordinary', or will-full, consciousness in comparison to aesthetic, 
will-free, consciousness.
'Ordinary' Consciousness
Central to Schopenhauer's understanding of the role of art is the way he 
distinguishes the aesthetic state from ordinary, or empirical, consciousness*™
Ordinary consciousness is 'interested' consciousness (WWR 1: 177), it is 
consciousness that understands the world in terms of how the events of the world 
affect 'me', an individual will among innumerable individuals. In ordinary 
consciousness the intellect, or 'subject of knowing’ (WWR 2: 277) views, and 
understands, the world from the 'central' position of an individual body (WWR 1: 
332), which, in Schopenhauerian terms, is an objectification of the will, or the will 
seen in representation. The intellect represents the world from, and solely in 
relation to, this body (WWR 1: 177). As Young states:
In ordinary, will-serving consciousness, all spatio-temporal locating of 
things is relative, ultimately, to a here and now that is determined by my 
own location in space-time as an embodied thing. All lines of direction, 
as it were, radiate out from myself as the world's 'centre'. I shall call this 
first mark of ordinary consciousness its 'egocentricity' (2005: 108-109; 
see also Atwell, 1995: 140; cf. Beckett, 1958: 23-24).
The role of the intellect, then, is to provide information to the individual will with 
regard to how other objects in the world relate to the body, be they of some 
benefit, potential harm, or of no interest to the will (Came, 2012: 240; see also 
Shapshay, 2012a: 489).
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For Schopenhauer, the will is the 'primary' aspect of the self, ‘the kernel of our 
inner nature' (WWR 2: 239; see Atwell, 1990: 14]. The intellect, and therefore 
ordinary cognition, is, the mere servant of the will (WWR 1: 176-177; Young, 1987: 
83]. The intellect has come about solely to provide the individual will (in the form 
of the objectified body and its insatiable drives] with information, or knowledge, 
about the environment in which the individual will finds itself. What the will 
knows about itself is dependent upon the information that is presented to it by the 
intellect. When functioning as a tool of the will, the intellect converts the raw 
sensory data received by the senses into individual empirical objects which are 
understood to exist 'out there' in the world in 'space' and 'time', and causally 
connected to one another (WWR 1: 8,177,187], or, that is, subject to the 'principle 
of sufficient reason' (WWR 1: 7]:
The function of the intellect in experience is to connect representations 
according to the principle of sufficient reason in its various guises, and it 
is this connecting which constitutes the principle of individuation within 
the empirical realm (Janaway, 1989: 275; see WWR 1: 112,127].
In this way of viewing the world -  namely in relation to the individual will -  the 
intellect presents the objects of the world to the individual will solely with regard 
to their utility (Guyer, 2008:169-170]. In short, all objects viewed in space, and 
time, and causally connected to one another are understood as a means to an end; 
the end being the well being of the individual will, and the body which is the will's 
objectivity. Schopenhauer describes this process as the addition of'relative 
essences' -  viewing something with regard to my needs -  and the subtraction of 
'absolute essence' (WWR 2: 372; Janaway, 1989: 275-276; Young, 2005: 109-110], 
which can be understood as the essential nature of something prior to my 
understanding it in relation to my own wellbeing, and thus situated in space, and 
time, and causally related to other objects.
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This 'interest-relative' (Janaway, 1989: 8], or egocentric, way of perceiving the 
world results in a fearful and anxious existence (WWR 1: 373). Thus ordinary 
consciousness is a suffering consciousness (Young, 1987: 84). As I am at the centre 
of my representations every thing, and every event, is perceived in relation to how 
it relates to me, or, in other words, to my will (WWR 1:176-177; 332), and because 
of this:
... the world shows up as full of dangers that threaten to engulf us and 
allurements, objects or desire, which, as desired, are not in our present 
possession. We are constantly being pushed and pulled here and there 
by danger and desire. Hence 'care for the constantly demanding will ... 
continually fills and moves consciousness' (WWR 1: 196). Even at its 
best, there is a permanent undertone of'discomfort or disquiet' (WWR 
1: 368); 'anxiety' is the 'keynote of our disposition' (WWR 1: 373). It 
follows that so long as we inhabit ordinary, 'interested' consciousness, 
'lasting happiness or peace is impossible' (WWR 1: 196) (Young, 2005: 
110 - 11) .
In contrast to this egoistical way of viewing the world, the aesthetic state is a form 
of'disinterested' consciousness, or contemplation, where both the object and the 
subject experience a transformation from 'individual' to 'pure' entities, that is, 
entities freed from the desires of an individual will (WWR 1: 199).
For whilst the intellect is the servant of the will, there are still ways in which the 
knowing subject may experience a degree of freedom. One of these is in the 
aesthetic state, a rare state (WWR 1: 178) of will-free knowledge.
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Aesthetic consciousness
In the aesthetic experience the knowing subject, or intellect, is released from the 
demands of the willing subject in a process Schopenhauer describes as 'tearing 
itself free' (WWR 1:178]. In the aesthetic state the knowing subject no longer 
perceives with regard to the needs and aims of the individual will (Pothast, 2008: 
60, Nussbaum, 1999: 360-1; O'Hara, 1981: 256; Neill, 2012: 206], that is, it no 
longer situates itself and other things in space and time, and is thus temporarily 
freed from representing the world in terms of the principle of sufficient reason 
(WWR 1:199]. Aesthetic consciousness, then, is a state of being where the 
knowing subject experiences a sense of'liberation from the normal mode of 
knowledge ...' (Atwell, 1996: 84]. In the aesthetic state there is a 'suspension of the 
laws of connection between representations', and objects are freed from 'mind- 
imposed interrelations' (Janaway, 1989: 276, 9]. In essence, then, the aesthetic 
state depends upon the 'loss of oneself (WWR 1: 178], or the abolition of 
individuality in the knowing subject (WWR 1: 169].
In aesthetic consciousness a dual process of transformation of the subject and the 
object simultaneously occurs. On one side of this transformation the knowing 
subject, now freed from the imperatives of the willing subject becomes the pure, 
will-less, subject of knowledge (WWR 1:178]. Unlike the knowing subject, which 
presents the individual will to itself as an individual in a world of individuals, the 
pure knowing subject, no longer presents the will as an individual, that is, the pure 
knowing subject 'ceases to identify himself as an object in the world' (Young, 1987: 
85]. As such, the pure knowing subject, no longer occupies a position in space or 
time. Individuality has been 'set aside' (Janaway, 1989: 276], and rather than 
perceiving the world in terms of utility alone (Janaway, 1989: 8], the subject 
becomes the 'clear mirror of the object' (WWR 1:178] that stands before him or 
her:
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...we lose ourselves entirely in the object... entire consciousness is filled 
and occupied by a single image of perception (WWR 1:179].
This is one side of the transformative process. On the other side of this process 
stands the object, which when no longer perceived by the subject in terms of its 
relation to the individual will, also assumes a 'pure' form. Schopenhauer refers to 
this pure form of the object as the Platonic 'Idea' (WWR 1:179):
Schopenhauer's thought (presented in Book III [of The World as Will and 
Representation]) is that ordinarily we set ourselves on the possession of 
particular objects that we expect to fulfil desires, but that it is possible to 
so immerse ourselves in the perception of an object that we can actually 
forget our inevitably unsatisfying desire to possess or consume it, at 
least for a while (Guyer, 2008: 169-70; see also Janaway, 1989: 276-77).
When no longer viewed in terms of the principle of sufficient reason, the object is 
freed from inessential mind-imposed features, that is, features that were earlier 
described as its 'relative essences'. The pure, will-less subject of knowledge, no 
longer contemplating the object in terms of utility, now considers 'simply and 
solely' what the thing is (WWR 1: 197). Indeed, the 'whole power of the mind' is 
now 'devoted to perception' (WWR 1: 178; Young, 1987: 85). In the aesthetic state, 
only the 'essential' aspects of the object are perceived (WWR 2: 379; Young, 2005: 
131). For Schopenhauer, then, the Idea is the 'adequate objectivity of the will' 
(WWR 1: 257), as it is the closest that humanity can come to understanding the 
nature of reality beyond, or prior to, consciousness; the Idea is the thing-in-itself in 
representation, though, unlike empirical objects, it is an object that is not subject to 
the principle of sufficient reason (WWR 1: 180).
The 'Idea' is an object seen as a timeless, location-free, eternal form. Schopenhauer 
describes the Idea as 'every definite and fixed grade of the will's objectification, in
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so far as it is thing-in-itself and is therefore foreign to plurality. 'These grades are 
certainly related to individual things as their eternal forms, or as their prototypes' 
(WWR 1:129-30]. By 'fixed grade of the will's objectification' Schopenhauer 
suggests that the Ideas are permanent objects that to a greater or lesser extent 
reveal the will as a thing of constant striving. Thus the Ideas are themselves 'higher 
or lower grades of the will's objectification', the grade depending upon 'the 
respective degrees of individuality among the instances of each Idea' (jacquette, 
2005:151; WWR 1:128]. At the very top of this hierarchy is the human being, 
which for Schopenhauer is the most complete objectification of the will, and at the 
bottom of the hierarchy one finds the natural forces, such as gravity, the will's least 
individuated objectifications (see also Young, 2005:105].
The Idea, then, is the thing-in-itself in representation, prior to the principle of 
sufficient reason, though still subject to the most basic feature of perception, 
namely the subject-object relationship, or being object for a subject 
(Schopenhauer, 1974a: 41-2]. All empirical objects are individual instantiations of 
the Ideas, with the additional distortion imposed upon then by the subject of 
knowing in its impure form. When we perceive an Idea:
We are seeing it, as it were, 'pure': we are seeing through the 
sense-dependent trappings of accidental qualities, and the 
mind-dependent trappings of location in time and space and causal 
interconnection, to the universal that all these are manifestations of 
Magee, 1997: 165].
Given this understanding, the representation of the world that occurs when the 
intellect functions as a servant of the will -  so-called 'ordinary' consciousness -  is 
merely an indirect objectivity of the will, or the will perceived in representation 
subject to the additional mind-imposed forms of space, time, and causality 
(Pothast, 2008: 60].
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For Schopenhauer, aesthetic consciousness, unlike ordinary consciousness, is a 
painless state, where the pure subject of knowing is momentarily 'delivered from 
the miserable self (WWR 1:199). Painlessness is a consequence of 
disinterestedness (Came, 2012: 241), for when willing ceases so does suffering 
(Janaway, 1999b: 10). In the aesthetic state we are momentarily 'delivered from 
the miserable pressure of the will' and we 'celebrate the Sabbath of the penal 
servitude of willing' (WWR 1: 196).
In the next chapter I describe the way that Beckett's epistemology adheres to 
Schopenhauer's differentiation between ordinary and aesthetic consciousness 
(Pothast, 2008: 3-4; Wood, 1994: 4; Murphy, 1994: 234; Feldman, 2009: 23).
However, whilst Beckett proposes a similar delineation of experience into ordinary 
and aesthetic consciousness, Beckett significantly alters the implications of 
existing in either one of these two states. In Beckettian epistemology, the ordinary 
state of consciousness -  Habit (Beckett, 1999: 28) -  is one of painlessness, and the 
aesthetic state is the mode of consciousness in which one experiences the 
'suffering of being' (Beckett, 1999: 18-19). Thus Beckett inverts Schopenhauer's 
understanding as to which state is, or is not, one of suffering. I explore the 
implications of this inversion in the next chapter and in two later chapters in which 
I discuss the theatrical presentation of Beckettian asceticism.
The next chapter presents a discussion of Beckett's development of the 
Schopenhauerian 'Idea'. In Beckett's aesthetics the Idea becomes the 'ideal object', 
or the awareness of the totality of one's past experience. Importantly, with regards 
to the development of the Idea in Beckett’s work, the ‘ideal object' continues to be 
an object of contemplation that has a detrimental effect on the will's ongoing urge 
to strive by revealing a reality beyond mere utility.
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The role of art in Schopenhauerian aesthetics
Having discussed aesthetic consciousness in relation to ordinary consciousness, 
we are now in a position to define what art is for Schopenhauer, and to discuss the 
role of art in Schopenhauerian thought.
As we have seen, for Schopenhauer, the aesthetic state is a way of seeing, 
unencumbered by the striving will, a 'metaphysical vision' of underlying forms 
(Pothast, 2008: 48). Schopenhauer writes:
We can therefore define it accurately as the way of considering things 
independently of the principle of sufficient reason (WWR 1: 185).
The role of art is to facilitate aesthetic consciousness in the mind of the spectator 
by conveying the Ideas (WWR 1: 237; WWR 2: 408) at their different grades:
... what kind of knowledge is it that considers what continues to exist 
outside and independently of all relations, but which alone is really 
essential to the world, the true content of phenomena, that which is 
subject to no change, and is therefore known with equal truth for all 
time, in a word, the Ideas that are the immediate and adequate 
objectivity of the thing-in-itself, of the will? It is art, the work of genius.
It repeats the eternal Ideas apprehended through pure contemplation, 
the essential and abiding element in all the phenomena of the world. 
According to the material in which it repeats, it is sculpture, painting, 
poetry, or music. Its only source is knowledge of the Ideas; its sole aim is 
communication of this knowledge (WWR 1: 184-5).
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Whereas natural beauty, and, for that matter any object may facilitate aesthetic 
contemplation, only an artwork has that sole intention, or purpose (WWR 2: 369). 
The artist, a 'genius' in Schopenhauerian terms, someone able to occupy a will-less, 
aesthetic state for extended periods of time, creates works which in turn promote 
this state in the mind of the audience (Young, 1987: 82):
Art... according to Schopenhauer's aesthetics, is supposed to provide a 
special, non-philosophical and non-conceptual kind of access to the direct 
or adequate objectivity of the will (Pothast, 2008: 42).
Which Idea the artist captures in a work of art depends upon which medium he or 
she chooses to work within. As discussed earlier, the Ideas comprise a 'definite and 
fixed grade of the will's objectification’ (WWR 1: 129-30). For Schopenhauer there 
is also a corresponding hierarchy of art forms, which capture the hierarchy of the 
Ideas (Jacquette, 2005:151; Young, 2005: 105), or, in other words, lower and 
higher forms of art capture the lower and higher objectifications of the will. At the 
bottom of this hierarchy one finds architecture, which reveals Ideas such as 
'gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, those universal qualities of stone, those first, 
simplest, and dullest visibilities of the will' (WWR 1: 214). At the other end of this 
hierarchy one finds the art forms that reveal the Idea of humanity, such as poetry, 
and the novel. At the top of this hierarchy one finds the art form of tragedy, 'the 
summit of poetic art (WWR 1: 252), which for Schopenhauer best captures the 
terrible lot of the will's most complete objectification: humanity.
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The two-fold value of Art
We are now in a position to be able to provide a comprehensive answer to the 
question of what the value of art is for Schopenhauer. By facilitating the aesthetic 
state, art provides a temporary 'release' ‘from the tyranny under which we 
customarily live' (Magee, 1997:170,171]. The aesthetic state is one in which the 
knowing subject escapes its servitude (O'Hara, 1981: 260]. We have seen that the 
work of art, produced out of a state of aesthetic consciousness, facilitates will- 
lessness in the spectator:
Aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists, to a large extent, in the fact 
that, when we enter the state of pure contemplation, we are raised for 
the moment above all willing, above all desires and care; we are, so to 
speak, rid of ourselves (WWR 1: 390].
This momentary sense of will-lessness, in contrast to the striving egoism of 
ordinary consciousness, is held to be a painless state:
... in its rare moments of success we understand the true function of the 
aesthetic in human life: 'namely the deliverance of knowledge from the 
service of the will, the forgetting of oneself as individual, and the 
enhancement of consciousness to the pure, will-less, timeless subject of 
knowing that is independent of all relations' (WWR 1:199] (Nussbaum, 
1999: 355].
In terms of facilitating and promoting aesthetic consciousness art also provides, as 
it were, 'a sign-post to the higher condition of asceticism' (Came, 2012: 243]:
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Schopenhauer acknowledges that any such aesthetic transport is only 
temporary... Yet the experience, more precisely its very possibility, 
reveals the radical heterogeneity of the intellect and the will in the self. 
The aesthetic dissociation of the intellect from the will, of the self from 
the world, and of the self from itself points to a conception of selfhood 
independent of the will (Zöller, 1999: 36-37).
Thus the momentary freedom from willing that one experiences in the aesthetic 
moment generated by the work of art, is suggestive of the possibility of longer- 
lasting, even permanent peace (Young, 1987: 85):
From this we can infer how blessed must be the life of a man whose will 
is silenced not for a few moments ... but forever, indeed completely 
extinguished... (WWR 1: 390).
The second role that art performs, then, in Schopenhauerian thought is that of an 
awakening to the possibility of the subject's more permanent negation of his or her 
individual will (Vandenabeele 2008: 206):
The contemplation of art and the ensuing temporary silencing of the ego 
show that there is attainable for human beings a state that is free from 
the domination of the will and the evil that attends all egoism and strife. 
Art, in other words, points to a mystical state in which our true salvation 
consists -  permanent nothingness (Came, 2012: 243).
There is, then, a fundamental separation of art and asceticism in Schopenhauerian 
thought. For though the aesthetic state can lead one's mind to subsequent ascetic 
practice, the work of art is not one of ascetic practice. By that I mean that art leads 
one's mind to a way of conducting oneself aside from, or after one's engagement
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with the artwork. Indeed, even the subject matter of tragedy, as we will see in the 
next section, only implicitly suggests the path that one is to take. For 
Schopenhauer, tragedy explicitly reveals the inevitability of suffering that 
accompanies acts of striving. One suffers because one wants. Daniel Came 
describes this process in the following way:
All self-conscious beings are characterised by an incessant and 
inherently painful willing. Willing is a sufficient condition of suffering, 
because all willing arises necessarily from want or deficiency, and to 
experience a want is to suffer; therefore to live is to suffer [2012: 237; 
See WWR 1: 196).
Tragedy, like all other forms of art, guides one to the path of salvation. However, 
tragedy does not explicitly guide one through the ascetic practice it is said to 
suggest. Tragedy leads one to the path of salvation and then allows one to continue 
unaccompanied. In the next chapter on Beckettian aesthetics I describe the way 
that Beckett draws aesthetics and asceticism much closer together. Whereas in 
Schopenhauerian thought there is a two-step process of understanding -  namely 
that first one achieves a will-free state in aesthetic consciousness, and then one 
pursues such will-lessness in deliberate practice that denies the will gratification - 
in Beckett's middle-period tragedies asceticism is the subject matter of the work.
In Beckett's theatre of asceticism, one not only suffers because one strives -  as is 
the case in Schopenhauer's understanding of tragedy - but one also suffers 
deliberately. On Beckett's stage we witness something unique in tragedy. We watch 
ascetic practice unfold. We watch one part of the self -  the knowing subject - 
deliberately cause the suffering of the other part of the self, namely the willing 
subject. Beckett is, therefore, far more explicit than Schopenhauer about the value 
of art. In Schopenhauerian thought, art alludes to another way of being. In 
Beckett's tragedies, art shows the audience how to attain the will-less state of 
permanent 'nothingness'.
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In preparation for a full discussion of Beckett's middle-period tragedies as an art 
form that portrays the practice of asceticism, which is undertaken with the 
intention of attaining resignation from life, it is necessary to first set out 
Schopenhauer's understanding of tragedy in detail. Schopenhauer's understanding 
of tragedy as the highest form of the sublime will prove to be significant for our 
understanding of Beckett's tragic works as a depiction of the tactics employed by 
the intellect, or knowing subject, to destroy the willing part of the self.
Schopenhauer and Tragedy
But Schopenhauer does see the possibility of escape to a better 
existence, though only for the individual who can use his knowledge of 
life as a weapon against the will. This possibility Schopenhauer evokes 
in discussing the form of art that he takes to be the highest, that which 
deals with the individual suffering human (O'Hara, 1981: 259).
At the moment of the tragic catastrophe, we become convinced more 
clearly than ever that life is a bad dream from which we have to awake 
(WWR 2: 433).
This section outlines Schopenhauer's understanding of tragedy, what tragedy is, 
and what tragedy conveys. This pre-Nietzschean version of the role of tragedy is of 
fundamental importance for our understanding of what Beckett in turn appears to 
'do' with tragedy. The presentation of Schopenhauer's conception of tragedy 
permits an alternative reading of Beckettian tragedy to the present philosophical 
understanding. In contrast to the life-affirming interpretation of Beckettian 
tragedy found in the works of Adorno, Cavell, Critchley, and Badiou this alternative 
reading understands Beckett's work in terms of resignationist thought, and 
positions Beckettian theatre as a unique form of life-denying thought and practice.
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As already discussed, Schopenhauer argues that the role of art is to allow the 
audience to experience the Platonic Idea of the thing of which the individual is an 
instantiation. We have seen that for Schopenhauer the Ideas appear at different 
grades, and that each grade is in turn captured by a different art form. The Idea of 
‘humanity’ is revealed by a number of art forms, such as poetry, the novel, and 
drama, but that the Idea of'humanity' is best captured by tragedy. For 
Schopenhauer, tragedy is the 'the summit of poetic art' (WWR 1: 252) because its 
subject matter is humanity, which he understands as the highest grade of the will's 
objectivity, and tragedy best captures the terrible lot of humanity (Janaway, 1996: 
57). In short, tragedy expresses the:
The unspeakable pain, the wretchedness and misery of mankind, the 
triumph of wickedness, the scornful mastery of chance, and the 
irretrievable fall of the just and the innocent are here presented to us; 
and here is to be found a significant hint as to the nature of the world of 
existence. It is the antagonism of the will with itself which is here most 
completely unfolded at the highest grade of its objectivity, and which 
comes into fearful prominence [WWR 1: 253).
Unlike the novel, or poetry, then, art forms which often depict life as something 
other than that of'wretchedness and misery', the very subject matter of tragedy is 
the stuff of resignation [Vandenabeele, 2008: 206). The one and only subject 
matter of tragedy is the description of the suffering that leads to resignation 
(Janaway, 1996: 57). In this sense, as an art form, tragedy is 'self reinforcing' 
(Nussbaum, 1999: 355; Young, 2005: 143). Whereas all art alludes to resignation, 
or, alternatively, points to the peace of a will-free existence:
we see in tragedy the noblest men, after a long conflict and suffering, 
finally renounce for ever all the pleasures of life and the aims till then
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pursued so keenly, or cheerfully and willingly give up life itself (WWR 1: 
253).
Thus the explicit subject matter of tragedy is the misery which leads to resignation, 
and then, in some cases, the depiction of resignation itself. In contrast to this, all 
other art forms only implicitly suggest resignation by suggesting the possibility of 
escaping the demands of the individual will.
With resigned humanity as the subject matter of tragedy, what, then, does 
Schopenhauer see as the form of tragedy? How is the resigned state reached? 
Schopenhauer believes there are essentially three tragic modes. To put it another 
way, tragedy reveals that misfortune is created in three ways. These are 
'wickedness, blind fate, and mere attitude to one another (Atwell, 1996: 101, in 
reference to WWR 1: 254-255; see also Shapshay, 2012b: 21). In the first mode, 
Schopenhauer lists Richard the III, Iago in Othello, and Shylock in The Merchant of 
Venice, among others, as characters of'extraordinary wickedness' whose 
behaviour manifests their character (WWR 1: 254). In the second mode of tragedy, 
‘blind fate', Schopenhauer cites King Oedipus of Sophocles, the Trachiniae, and 
'most of the tragedies of the ancients' as examples. 'Modern' examples of this tragic 
mode are said to include works such as Romeo and Juliet, and Schiller's The Bride of 
Messina. Such works evince the suffering that comes about through 'chance or 
error' (WWR 1: 254). In the third, and final, mode, misfortune is brought about 'by 
the mere attitude of the persons to one another through their relations.' Because 
this final mode requires nothing more than the everyday encounter between 
ordinary people to create the tragic situation, Schopenhauer holds this mode in the 
highest regard. The final mode shows us 'the greatest misfortune not as an 
exception, not as something brought about by rare circumstances or by monstrous 
characters; but as something that arises easily and spontaneously out of the 
actions and characters of men, as something almost essential to them, and in this 
way it is brought terribly near to us' (WWR 1: 254). Realising that the action 
occurring on the stage is something of which we are quite capable, we are left 
shuddering, 'already in the midst of hell' (WWR 1: 255).™"*
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What we may take from Schopenhauer's understanding of the three modes of 
tragedy is the idea that suffering is something that is inflicted on one individual by 
another individual as a consequence ofthat individual misperceiving his or her 
own wants and needs as more important than, or separate to, those of the other. 
Thus for Schopenhauer, tragedy reveals the suffering that occurs when the will, in 
response to the knowledge that is presented to it by the knowing subject, 
misperceives its essential nature -  namely that of being one, undifferentiated 
entity -  and instead takes the knowledge subject to the principle of sufficient 
reason as knowledge of reality. Although I discuss Schopenhauer's understanding 
of the essential nature of the will-to-life in a later chapter (Chapter 5), it is 
important to understand that for Schopenhauer individuality is a dangerous 
illusion (WWR 1: 379), an illusion which leads human beings to act egoistically and 
to inflict suffering upon one another. Thus for Schopenhauer, tragedy reveals the 
consequences of the misperception of the essential nature of life—that all is 
'one'— as well as the peace that comes when one finally ceases to act egoistically.
In contrast to Schopenhauer's understanding of tragedy, the subject matter of 
Beckettian theatre is that of interiority. Beckettian theatre is not a war amongst 
separate individuals misperceiving reality, and thus suffering the consequences of 
that misperception, but rather a battle within, between the subject of knowing and 
the subject of willing. In Beckett's ascetic tragedies the subject of knowing 
attempts to destroy its willing subject with knowledge of the destructive 
consequences of egoism and the reality of ubiquitous suffering. It is my contention 
that the purpose of Beckettian tragedy is to convey a variety of ascetic methods to 
the spectator.
Having clarified this matter, I now return to Schopenhauer's understanding of 
tragedy. Regardless of the mode in which it is presented, the central message
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imparted to the audience by the subject matter of tragedy is the call to 'resign' 
from willed life:
What gives to everything tragic, whatever the form in which it appears, 
the characteristic tendency to the sublime, is the dawning of the 
knowledge that the world and life can afford us no true satisfaction, and 
are therefore not worth our attachment to them. In this the tragic spirit 
consists; accordingly, it leads to resignation (WWR 2: 433-4).
Each tragedy draws the audience to this state of mind by presenting 'a great 
misfortune', and the 'terrible side of life' [WWR 1: 254, 252):
Thus the summons to turn away the will from life remains the true 
tendency of tragedy, the ultimate purpose of the intentional 
presentation of the sufferings of mankind; consequently it exists even 
where this resigned exaltation of the mind is not shown in the hero 
himself, but is only stimulated in the spectator at the sight of great 
unmerited, or indeed even merited suffering [WWR 2: 435).
Thus tragedy involves a two-step process in its portrayal of terrible events and the 
reception of these events by the audience. The events taking place on the stage, the 
suffering endured by the guilty and innocent alike, is a form of knowledge: striving 
equates to suffering. Upon watching the trials and tribulations of the protagonist, 
the audience is left with the thought that it would be better 'not to be' [WWR 2: 
605):
For if this ... turning away from life ... were not the tendency of tragedy, 
then how would it be possible generally for the presentation of the 
terrible side of life, brought before our eyes in the most glaring light, to
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be capable of affecting us so beneficially, and of affording us an exalted 
pleasure? Fear and sympathy, in the stimulation of which Aristotle puts 
the ultimate aim of tragedy, certainly do not in themselves belong to the 
agreeable sensations; therefore they cannot be the end, but only the 
means (WWR 2: 435).
In turn, this realisation on the part of the audience is itself a two-part process, 
though this one occurs simultaneously: as the audience appreciates that it would 
be better 'not to be', a sense of elevation is also experienced. This elevation occurs 
because the spectator, in appreciating that willing, or striving, is the problem, and 
not the raison d'etre of life, is momentarily elevated above the imperatives of their 
individual will. Accompanying the experience of resignation, then, is the 
corresponding feeling of having been 'liberated' from the suffering that comes 
from willing:
Liberation, in the most general formulation, is freedom from the will to 
life, or cessation of the affirmation of the will to life ... [Atwell, 1996: 82).
These are the events the audience witnesses on the tragic stage, and by being an 
audience to the protagonist's suffering and resignation, 'we learn by suffering in 
some measure ourselves' [Janaway, 2002: 83-4). What we have 'learned' through 
suffering, according to Schopenhauer is that individuation is an error of 
perception, and the egoistical approach to life that stems from that error causes 
only pain. Suffering, then, is a form of knowledge about the true nature of existence 
[WWR 1: 253).
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Tragedy as an art form analogous to the dynamically sublime
In witnessing the subject matter of tragic theatre, the audience undergoes a 
particular kind of aesthetic experience, which Schopenhauer describes as 
'sublime':
Our pleasure in the tragedy belongs not to the feeling of the beautiful, 
but to that of the sublime; it is, in fact, the highest degree of this feeling 
... that aspect of the world is brought before our eyes which directly 
opposes our will. At this sight we feel ourselves urged to turn our will 
away from life, to give up willing and loving life. (WWR 2: 433).
Tragedy, then, is 'analogous to that of the dynamically sublime' because it 'raises us 
above the will and its interests...' (WWR 2: 433). Typically, the dynamically 
sublime has been associated with aspects of the natural world that are hostile to 
humanity:
Nature in turbulent and tempestuous motion; semi-darkness through 
threatening black thunder-clouds; immense, bare, overhanging cliffs 
shutting out the view by their interlacing; rushing, foaming masses of 
water; complete desert; the wail of the wind sweeping through the 
ravines (WWR1: 204).
The contemplation of such scenes, not as a threatened subject, but as a pure, will­
less subject of knowledge, is the feeling of the sublime. Tragedy is 'analogous' to 
such a state, then, as it allows us as an audience to observe events that are hostile 
to the Idea of humanity, and to do so in an aesthetic, contemplative manner.
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In this the sublime differs markedly from the experience of the 'beautiful'. Whilst 
both the sublime and the beautiful are states in which the Idea of an object 
presents itself, the reception of an Idea occurs with different degrees of effort.
For Schopenhauer, an object is 'beautiful' if the Platonic Idea ofthat object 
presents itself to the observer 'without apprehension' [Trigg, 2004: 172), or when 
an individual object invites the observer to engage with it in a will-free manner, or 
a manner that is free from its relations to other things in space and time (WWR 1: 
197):
With the beautiful, pure knowledge has gained the upper hand without a 
struggle, since the beauty of the object, in other words that quality of it 
which facilitates knowledge of its Idea, has removed from 
consciousness, without resistance and hence imperceptibly, the will and 
knowledge of relations that slavishly serve this will. What is then left is 
pure subject of knowing, and not even a recollection of the will remains 
[WWR 1: 202; see Shapshay, 2012a: 491-492).
Conversely, the 'sublime' object only becomes the Idea of which it is an 
instantiation with a degree of effort on the part of the observer. For the sublime 
object to be considered in a pure, will-free manner, the subject must first undergo 
a struggle with his or her will. Unlike the beautiful object, which invites will-free 
apprehension, the sublime object has a 'hostile relation to the human will in 
general, as manifested in its objectivity, the human body [WWR 1: 201)', and is 
generally understood as a threat to the body. Therefore the intellect must first 
'consciously', and 'violently tear itself away' 'from the relations of the same object 
to the will which are recognized as unfavourable . . .  [WWR 1: 202)' to then be able 
to appreciate the Idea of which the individual object is an example.
Once again, the 'contemplation of something destructive' to the Idea of humanity is
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done from a ‘vantage point of present safety' (WWR 2: 433-4], such as when 
watching a character's protracted suffering on the stage from one's seat in the 
audience.
In a state of subjective safety, and therefore without fearing for oneself, one is able 
to contemplate the subject matter -  that would ordinarily be considered in 
subjective terms as harmful, and therefore avoided -  in terms of its broader 
implications for 'human willing in general' (WWR 1: 202].xix If one feared for 
oneself in these situations there would then be a reaction -  such as running away 
in fear -  and contemplation would therefore cease (Neill, 2012: 209]:
If a single, real act of will were to enter consciousness through actual 
personal affliction and danger from the object, the individual will, thus 
actually affected, would at once gain the upper hand. The peace of 
contemplation would become impossible, the impression of the sublime 
would be lost, because it had yielded to anxiety, in which the effort of the 
individual to save himself supplanted every other thought (WWR 1:
202].
Unlike the beautiful, then, where the particular object of contemplation permits a 
sense of will-lessness to readily occur, and the will is, as it were, momentarily 
forgotten, the 'sublime' is portrayed in Schopenhauerian thought as an active 
suppression of will-full responses. The sublime state is reached through a two-step 
process: the knowing subject first violently tears itself away from the will, which 
later permits will-lessness (Neill, 2012: 208]. In the sublime experience the will is 
borne in mind throughout the entire process that leads to the perception of the 
sublime Idea of humanity (see Atwell, 1996:100]; that is, the subject is self- 
conscious during the process of liberation (Shapshay, 2012a: 493, 494).
In tragedy, the will is, figuratively speaking, made to sit and watch what willed life
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is like for the highest grade of its objectivity (Shapshay, 2012b: 29). From a 
position of safety, the sublime ‘exposes us to the “bitterness and worthlessness of 
life (WWR 2: 435)/' in such a way as to make us feel "urged to turn our will away 
from life, to give up willing and loving life... (WWR 2: 433)" (Young, 2005: 142).' 
And herein lies the 'pleasure' of tragedy for Schopenhauer (Neill, 2012: 210): a 
feeling of resigned 'exaltation' (WWR 1: 202; see also Shapshay, 2012a; 2012b).
But as well as having experienced 'resignation', there are a number of other 
possible 'causes' or 'reasons' for this exalted state. In one sense the spectator of 
tragedy becomes aware of the insignificance of the individual human being, which 
he or she is:
He feels himself as individual, as the feeble phenomenon of will, which 
the slightest touch of these forces can annihilate, helpless against 
powerful nature, dependent, abandoned to chance, a vanishing nothing 
in face of stupendous forces... (WWR 1: 204-5).
As subjects we are humbled by such scenes (Young, 2005: 116; Shapshay, 2012a: 
497). This is cause for 'exaltation' because by appreciating one's ultimate 
insignificance, one also perceives existence beyond the mere strivings of the 
individual will, which on the whole, ensures that one perceives, and acts, 
egoistically:
This knowledge allows the characters to free themselves from the drive 
of their individual will, and it allows the spectators to temporarily 
acquire the same attitude of freedom ... (Pothast, 2008: 70).
Conversely, one also experiences a sense of power or exaltation in regard to the 
immensity of the forces of nature by appreciating that all the forces of nature are
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dependent upon the same 'feeble' subject for their existence (Atwell, 1996: 100; 
Shapshay, 2012a: 495):
... he also feels himself as the eternal, serene subject of knowing, who as 
the condition of every object is the supporter of this whole world, the 
fearful struggle of nature being only his mental picture or 
representation... One is not oppressed but exalted by its immensity 
(WWR 1: 205).
Similarly, feelings of power can be attributed to the subject in another, very 
important, way: in the sublime, the subject of knowing becomes aware that he or 
she can hold the will at bay (WWR 1: 202). For Shapshay there is a 'qualitative 
difference in the pleasure experienced' between the beautiful and the sublime 'due 
to the presence or absence of self-consciousness in these types of experience.' In 
the former one experiences 'tranquility', in the latter one experiences 'elevation', 
which is 'due to the fact that for Schopenhauer the subject of the sublime 
experience is conscious of having attained liberation by struggle and of maintaining 
that liberation from his own individual body and particular strivings' (Shapshay, 
2012b: 23-24). Though this jars somewhat with Schopenhauer's position on the 
subject's lack of free will, and his overall critique of Kant's categorical imperative 
(see WWR 1: 504), and the necessity of action as a consequence of human 
character in response to motives, this ability to hold the will at bay suggests that 
the subject possesses some form of'negative freedom'. In short, it suggests an 
important vestige of Schopenhauer's Kantianism (Shapshay, 2012b: 25). The so- 
called 'negative freedom' that one experiences in the sublime relates to the 
subject's ability to ‘resist the demands of the will to life'. An important difference 
between Schopenhauer and Kant in this matter, one to which Shapshay alludes, is 
that Schopenhauer's 'negative freedom' does not then permit the 'positive 
freedom' to act in accordance with moral law, as is the case with the Kantian 
categorical imperative (Shapshay, 2012b: 25). Rather for Schopenhauer, the 
negative freedom, the freedom not to act, is an end in itself. Indeed, for 
Schopenhauer, the very point of the sublime aesthetic experience is to preclude
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further action of any kind, What the audience gains by watching tragic theatre, 
then, is this: by 'contemplating threatening objects aesthetically', the spectator of 
tragedy 'gains a felt recognition of his or her ability to resist for a time the 
demands of egoistic striving' (Shapshay, 2012b: 25, 28). This points to life-denying 
practice beyond the aesthetic experience, i.e., in everyday life outside the theatre. 
Schopenhauer's understanding of the destructive potential of the sublime is 
therefore an important development of the Kantian sublime.
This particular understanding of the Schopenhauerian sublime (see also Shapshay, 
2012a) -  namely that an intellect possesses the 'negative freedom' to resist the 
demands of the will to life, and that such resistance is undertaken for the purpose 
of causing the will to suffer -  is also of considerable importance for our 
understanding of Beckett's tragic works as theatre of asceticism. Just as 
Schopenhauer develops Kant's understanding of the sublime, Beckett subsequently 
develops the Schopenhauerian sublime into the Beckettian sublime: Beckett stages 
the sublime as an ascetic method. Not only is the Beckettian sublime an experience 
had by the audience, in Beckettian tragedy the dynamically sublime is also the 
subject matter of the performance. In Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days, 
Beckett stages the dynamically sublime process of holding one's will at bay so that 
the will may gain knowledge it would otherwise seek to evade.
'Ancient' and 'Modern' tragedy
As we have seen, for Schopenhauer the lesson of tragedy is that 'it would be better 
for us not to exist' (WWR 2: 605). Thus Schopenhauer believes that the subject 
matter of tragedy promotes resignationism (WWR 2: 433-4). A highly influential 
critique of this assertion is made by Friedrich Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy. 
One of Nietzsche's main arguments regarding ancient tragedy and Schopenhauer's 
claims regarding its resignationist affect is that the protagonists of ancient tragedy 
do not resign from life. Indeed, far from it. When having reached the point of
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resignation, because of the suffering he or she has endured, and the protagonist is 
forced to make a decision about whether or not to continue, he or she invariably 
persists (Nietzsche, 1993: 23). The role of art, then, is to promote an affirmative 
attitude towards life, even in the face of immense suffering:
Aware of truth from a single glimpse of it, all man can now see is the 
horror and absurdity of existence...it repels him... Here, in this supreme 
menace to the will, there approaches a redeeming, healing enchantress -  
art. She alone can turn these thoughts of repulsion at the horror and 
absurdity of existence into ideas compatible with life... (Nietzsche, 1993: 
40).
Schopenhauer concedes that this is indeed the case with ‘tragedy of the ancients' 
(WWR 2: 434). As Schopenhauer sees it, this is a failing on the part of ancient 
tragedians: 'the ancients had not yet reached the summit and goal of tragedy, or 
indeed of the view of life generally' (WWR 2: 434-5). Schopenhauer's point is that 
whilst intrinsically dealing with the subject of resignation, ancient tragedy tends to 
explicitly contradict itself by encouraging the affirmation of a life shown to be 
unworthy of affirmation. It is for this reason that Schopenhauer prefers the works 
of a number of'modern' tragedians. In a number of modern tragedies, tragedies 
'written in the spirit of Christianity' -  a religious doctrine that Schopenhauer 
believes centres on resignationist thought (WWR 2: 615-16) -  resignation takes 
place on the stage (Young, 2005: 143). Because of this, Schopenhauer claims that 
modern tragedies are superior to their ancient counterparts, that Shakespeare is a 
“much greater" playwright than Sophocles (WWR 2: 434) (Young, 2005: 143-4). 
The reason that Schopenhauer makes this claim is that the resignation of the 
protagonist tends to emphasise the effect of the experience had by the audience 
upon witnessing the protagonist's suffering. This experience is one of 
understanding the vanity, or pointlessness, of willed existence (WWR 1: 253).
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For Schopenhauer the audience's response to the artwork is the key aspect of the 
tragic performance. It is because of this particular focus -  namely audience 
reception -  that the modern tragedy is preferred to the ancient form: the modern 
tragedy, in its portrayal of resigned attitude, further facilitates this attitude in the 
members of the audience. However, even ancient tragedy that explicitly affirms the 
willed life still facilitates awareness on the part of the audience -  no matter how 
'obscure' (WWR 2: 435) -  that, despite the protagonist's attitude of affirmation, it 
would be better to resign from life. Therefore
In both cases [in ancient and modern tragedy] ... there is an invitation to 
resignation; and although the tragic hero may not actually reach that 
state the suffering he or she experiences invites the spectator to do so. 
(Atwell, 1996: 101-102).
Schopenhauer's focus on audience reception of, and audience reaction to, the 
events on the stage allows him to, as it were, recuperate much of ancient tragedy, 
along with modern tragedy that also does not explicitly evince resignation on the 
part of it's protagonists, and to incorporate it into his overall thesis regarding the 
role of art (Janaway, 1996: 55-6). With regard to tragedy, this permits 
Schopenhauer to make the claim -  and here I repeat an important quotation -  that:
the summons to turn away the will from life remains the true tendency 
of tragedy, the ultimate purpose of the intentional presentation of the 
sufferings of mankind; consequently it exists even where this resigned 
exaltation of the mind is not shown in the hero himself but is only 
stimulated in the spectator at the sight of great unmerited, or indeed even 
merited, suffering (WWR 2: 435 emphasis added).
In the next chapter on Beckett's aesthetics I argue that the subject matter of 
Beckettian tragedy is the intellect's attempts to promote the will's resignation from
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life. In this regard, Beckettian tragedy evinces a Schopenhauerian understanding of 
the role of tragedy as an art form: to reveal to the spectator the worthlessness of 
willed existence. To this end, as I later discuss in Chapters 8 and 9, a number of 
Beckett's characters in the tragic works of his middle period resign from life. 
However, Beckettian tragedy also presents us with moments when, despite the 
extent of the character's suffering, that character persists in willed life. This 
persistence is not to be understood as affirmation, but, rather, as a lesson for the 
audience regarding the failure of an intellect's chosen ascetic method.
In Beckettian tragedy, then, broadly understood as a process of trial and error for 
the purpose of ascertaining 'best practice' regarding the destruction of one's 
individual will, failure to break one's will is presented as a determination to 
endure. That is, failure to break the will is presented in 'ancient' terms. Conversely, 
resignation, breaking of the will, or success, is presented in 'modern' terms— i.e. 
the protagonist resigns from life. As such, in Beckettian tragedy, a character's 
determination to continue striving may be understood in terms of failure— a 
failure to break the will. In turn, a character's resignation may be understood as a 
victory over one’s own will, and thus a victory over the very cause of suffering.
The key to Beckettian theatre is that the audience's understands the reasons for 
the success or failure on the part of the protagonist to attain resignation from the 
willed life, i.e., which ascetic methods work, and which methods are ineffective. An 
individual will's determination to endure is not, therefore, a lesson on the subject 
of steadfastness in the face of ubiquitous suffering, but a report to the audience 
about an unsuccessful method for breaking one's will.
Understood in the light of Schopenhauerian tragic theory, Beckettian theatre is not 
a return to the ancient, 'affirmative', mode of tragedy as demanded by Nietzsche, 
and as implicitly affirmed by many of Beckett's philosophical interpreters. In 
Beckettian tragedy the affirmation of life is presented as a failure to truly
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understand the lesson presented by suffering: that we suffer because we strive not 
to suffer.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the role of art in Schopenhauerian aesthetics is to 
facilitate a state of will-lessness in the mind of the spectator. Schopenhauer argues 
that the will-less state is a painless state. Thus the role of art is to temporarily free 
the intellect from its inherently anxious role as servant of the will. In addition to 
this, the aesthetic state is of great importance because it alludes to the possibility 
of the intellect's ability to hold the will at bay. In witnessing the tragic performance 
in particular, the spectator becomes aware of his or her negative freedom to deny 
the individual will, and, specifically in connection to the tragic form, the ability to 
present the will with knowledge that is a disincentive for action. This ability to 
temporarily deny the will, guides the art spectator to the more permanent life- 
denying practice of asceticism.
The next chapter provides a comprehensive discussion of Beckett's aesthetics as an 
aesthetic that appears to systematically utilize, further develop, and, most 
importantly, challenge a number of the key features of Schopenhauerian aesthetic 
theory.
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Chapter 4: Beckett's Aesthetics
Introduction
In this chapter I explore the key features of Beckett's aesthetics, first setting out 
the different states of consciousness that one finds in Beckett's middle-period 
tragedies -  namely 'ordinary' and 'aesthetic consciousness' -  and the different 
types of memory that offer support to the different states of consciousness, namely 
'voluntary' and 'involuntary' memory. I also discuss the role of art in Beckett's 
aesthetics, and, more specifically the role of tragedy in Beckett's aesthetics.
In this chapter I will also explore the importance of the sublime, specifically 
Schopenhauer's ethical development of the dynamically sublime, for our 
understanding of Beckett's tragedies.
On each point, I reflect upon the ways in which Beckett appears to have 
systematically utilized, and, in many cases, significantly developed 
Schopenhauerian thought. By providing a reading of Beckettian tragedy that 
understands the work of Beckett's middle period as 'systematic', both in terms of 
its own method, and with regard to its engagement with Schopenhauerian 
philosophy, I necessarily present a number of challenges to the way Beckett's work 
is presently understood. For example, contrary to a number of Beckett's 
interpreters, I argue that the aesthetic theory that Beckett first espouses in the 
early critical work Proust is maintained and developed in the three ascetic 
tragedies, Waiting for Godot; Endgame, and Happy Days. Whereas Beckett's 
interpreters argue that there is a diminution of aesthetic ambition during the 
course of Beckett's oeuvre, I contend that Beckettian aesthetics evolves into a 
complex, systematic aesthetics of ethical self-destruction.
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I begin, however, with a broad overview of Beckett's lengthy engagement with 
Schopenhauerian thought.
From Proust to Beckett's Theatre of Asceticism
The principal source for the critical understanding of Beckett's aesthetics is 
Beckett's early work Proust (Beckett, 1999; first published in 1930). It is in Proust, 
a work ostensibly on Marcel Proust's Ä la recherche du temps perdu, that Beckett 
establishes his own conception of time (Smith, 2004: 412), and also takes his first 
steps towards an ontological understanding of the self: the Beckettian will, the 'will 
not to suffer'.xx Here, utilizing a Schopenhauerian 'filter' for exploring Proust's 
masterpiece (Wood, 1994: 4), Beckett espouses a Schopenhauerian-informed 
epistemology, an epistemology that differentiates between ordinary, willful 
consciousness, and aesthetic consciousness, a state in which one's perception is 
freed from the restrictive needs of the individual will. It is Beckett's contention that 
the former state is marked by its painlessness, and that the latter state is a state in 
which one experiences the suffering of being (Beckett, 1999: 18-19).
In this chapter I argue that the Schopenhauerian-informed aesthetic framework 
that Beckett establishes in Proust is of on-going value for the comprehension of the 
tragedies of Beckett's middle period.5“1 A number of assertions made in Proust, 
such as the difference between ordinary, and aesthetic consciousness, and 
'voluntary' (Beckett, 1999: 32-33) and 'involuntary' memory (Beckett, 1999: 72-3), 
are elaborated upon in Beckett's middle-period tragedies. It will therefore be 
necessary to comprehensively elucidate the different types of consciousness first 
espoused in Proust, and to illustrate their on-going utilization and development in 
the tragic works. What I later show is that central to the generation of suffering in 
the tragedy of Beckett's middle period is the intellect's refusal to present material
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that permits the will to exist in a painless state. In the place of painless, ordinary, 
consciousness -  comprised of representations in space and time -  and voluntary 
memory, which repeats these spatio-temporal representations -  the intellect 
instead presents the individual will with an aesthetic moment in the form of a 
painful, involuntary memory. Beckett's involuntary memories are invariably the 
knowledge of suffering.
Further to this, I argue that Beckett's early ontological understanding of the 
individual human will as the 'will not to suffer' (Beckett, 1999: 43) has a 
considerable bearing on later Beckettian ascetic practice -  here understood in 
Schopenhauerian terms as the deliberate breaking of the will by refusing the 
agreeable and looking for the disagreeable (WWR 1: 392) -  where unalleviated 
suffering is presented as an essential component of will-destruction.
The early critical Schopenhauerian-informed theoretical framework that Beckett 
formulates in Proust is further developed in the theatrical works of Waiting for 
Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days in the following way. Whilst the early critical 
framework establishes the difference between the intellect and the individual will, 
it is only in the later tragedies that Beckett pits these two entities against one 
another. In Proust, Beckett establishes his ontology: essentially we are the will not 
to suffer, it is our 'first nature' (Beckett, 1999: 22), and the intellect's role is to 
assist the will in this essential desire. Later, in Beckett's middle-period tragedies, 
Beckett establishes that the will not to suffer is the very cause of suffering. Waiting 
for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days can be understood as a series of 
interconnected lessons about what we as rational beings can do about the suffering 
caused by our essential desire to avoid suffering: the intellect can attempt to break 
the individual will by allowing the will to suffer. The intellect does this by adhering 
to a two-part ascetic method that utilizes the destructive effects of involuntary 
memory. It is for this reason that I understand Beckett's tragedies as theatre of 
asceticism -  the unique combination of aesthetics and asceticism -  in which 
Beckett stages the intellect's deliberate attempts to destroy the will.
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In short, Beckett's early critical work establishes the problem, and the tragic works 
of his middle period propose a solution to this fundamental problem.
It is evident, then, that as well as elucidating a Schopenhauerian informed 
aesthetics in his early critical work, Beckett continues to develop and refine this 
aesthetic through an engagement with Schopenhauerian ethics [Weller, 2010b: 
111), that is, Beckett uses the tragic form to convey an ethics of ascetic practice, or 
will-destruction.
In addition to this, Schopenhauer's understanding of the dynamically sublime is 
vital for our understanding of Beckett's middle-period tragedies. I believe a 
comprehensive understanding of the Schopenhauerian dynamically sublime, and 
Beckett's apparent utilization of this particular aspect of Schopenhauer's 
aesthetics, helps us to understand 'what's happening' [Beckett, 1958:17) in 
Beckettian tragedy.
It is my contention that the Schopenhauerian dynamically sublime -  the key 
feature of which is suffering, as opposed to the 'tranquility' one experiences in 
other aesthetic states -  provides a productive framework for interpreting the 
tragedies of Beckett's middle period. The Schopenhauerian dynamically sublime, a 
two-step process where the will is first held at bay [WWR 1: 202), so that it may 
then appreciate suffering, or gain 'knowledge' of suffering, is later manifested in 
Beckettian tragedy as a process of the knowing subject holding the willing subject 
at bay by refusing to provide a clear motive for action, then subsequently revealing 
the 'reality' [Beckett, 1999: 22, 33) of one's experience through the presentation of 
an involuntary memory.
This appears to be a significant development of Schopenhauerian thought. Beckett 
transforms an important aspect of Schopenhauerian aesthetics -  the dynamically 
sublime - into a central feature of a unique ascetic method. Beckett therefore
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transforms Schopenhauer's theory regarding tragic spectatorship -  namely the 
necessity of first holding the will at bay, so as to then appreciate the Idea of 
Humanity -  into the subject matter of the performance. Beckett is the first 
tragedian to understand that the thing that allows one to appreciate the suffering 
that takes place on the tragic stage - the negative freedom to deny the will -  has 
great ascetic potential. What one must first do to be able to observe the suffering of 
the characters on the stage, one must also do to appreciate one's own suffering.
This is what Beckett shows the audience.
In Beckettian tragedy the aesthetic theory of the dynamically sublime is 
transformed into an integral aspect of practical ethics. Beckett's apparent 
utilization of Schopenhauer's understanding of the dynamically sublime as an 
integral aspect of an ascetic method is one of the most important and, at the same 
time, most overlooked aspects of Beckett's tragedies, and Beckett's aesthetics more 
broadly.
Though 1 explore this contention at length in a number of later chapters on the 
subject of asceticism (Chapter 7, 8, and 9), several examples taken from Beckett's 
three ascetic tragedies will help to both introduce, and to illustrate, this point.
In Waiting for Godot we witness Lucky's protracted attempt to deny his master, 
Pozzo, any information about the world that will permit his master to strive. That 
is, Lucky denies Pozzo habitual knowledge -  knowledge that presents the 
individual will with a range of options, or motives, regarding its own wants and 
needs -  and, instead, generates the suffering that accompanies irresolution:
LUCKY: But not so fast and considering what is more that as a
result of the labours left unfinished crowned by the 
Acacacacademy of Anthropopopometry of Essy-in- 
Possy of Testew and Cunard it is established beyond
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all doubt all other doubt than that which clings to the 
labors of men that as a result of the labors unfinished 
of Testew and Cunnard it is established as hereinafter 
but not so fast for reasons unknown that as a result of 
the public works of Puncher and Wattmann it is 
established beyond all doubt that in view of the 
labours of Fartov and Belcher left unfinished for 
reasons unknown of Testew and Cunard left 
unfinished it is established what many deny that man 
in Possy of Testew and Cunard that man in Essy that 
man in short that man in brief in spite of the strides of 
alimentation and defecation wastes and pines wastes 
and pines and concurrently simultaneously what is 
more for reasons unknown ... (Beckett, 1956: 43).
Whilst 'holding the will at bay' in this manner, where the will is denied the 
knowledge it requires to be able to act -  the first step in a two-part ascetic method 
- the intellect then alternatively provides the will with information about the will’s 
true nature. Whilst held in a state of uncertainty, Lucky provides his master with 
the knowledge of his culpability for the starvation death of thousands of people:
LUCKY: ... figures stark naked in the stockinged feet in
Connemara in a word for reasons unknown... the 
skull... the tears...the skull the skull the skull the skull 
in Connemara in spite of the tennis... the skull the skull 
in Connemara in spite of the tennis the skull... (1956: 
44-5).
The second step, then, in the two-part Beckettian ascetic method is the provision of 
knowledge regarding previous suffering, which arrives in the form of an 
involuntary memory. This involuntary memory is presented to the will with
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destructive intent, that is, an involuntary memory is recalled for the purpose of 
placing the individual will in such a position of suffering that the will freely 
chooses to cease striving (WWR 1: 285, 295).
Similarly in Endgame, the knowing subject, Clov, refuses to provide his master, 
Hamm, with a clear motive for action. This 'refusal' on Clov's part is carried out 
with the intention of making Hamm suffer. Hamm is, therefore, denied the kind of 
knowledge - a representation in space, and time, which is in turn causally 
connected to other representations -  that permits the individual will to strive and 
to avoid suffering:
HAMM: Is it night already then?
CLOV: [looking.) No.
HAMM: Then what is it?
CLOV: [looking.) Grey. [Lowering the telescope, turning
towards Hamm, louder.) Grey! [Pause. Still louder.) 
GRREY!
Pause. He gets down, approaches Hamm from behind, 
whispers in his ear.
HAMM: [starting). Grey! Did 1 hear you say grey?
CLOV: Light black from pole to pole (Beckett, 1958 26).
Again, this denial of a representation subject to the principle of sufficient reason is 
carried out as the first part of a two-part ascetic method. When permitted to suffer 
in this way -  that is, when the will is denied habitual perception - the individual 
will is susceptible to the suffering that accompanies an involuntary memory. Once 
again, in Hamm's case, the involuntary memory comes in the form of the unwanted 
knowledge of his own cruelty and indifference (Beckett, 1958: 48).
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Finally, in Happy Days we witness the intellect's attempts to deny the individual 
will a motive for action. In an attempt to make the individual will, Winnie, suffer, 
the intellect, Willie, refuses to provide his 'wife' with information about the world:
WINNIE: [Long pause. Calling.] Willie! [Pause. Louder.] Willie!
[Pause. Mild reproach.] I sometimes find your attitude 
a little strange, Willie, all this time, it is not like you to 
be wantonly cruel (Beckett, 1961: 26}.
The withholding of trivial, habitual, knowledge -  knowledge subject to the 
principle of sufficient reason - is carried out with the intention of facilitating the 
reception of unwanted knowledge. In Winnie's case the unwanted knowledge is 
the involuntary memory of how much the individual will has suffered as a child.
I argue that in all three plays we witness Beckett's unique utilization of 
Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory regarding the dynamically sublime. In all three 
plays the intellectual aspect of the self denies the will (WWR 1: 202} by denying it 
the painless experience of ordinary consciousness, or information presented in 
space and time. In Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days we also witness 
the presentation of destructive knowledge in the form of involuntary memories of 
past suffering presented with the intention of placing the will in such a position of 
suffering that the will freely chooses to resign from life.xxii
I further argue that in each of Beckett's ascetic tragedies, the dynamically sublime 
is utilized as an integral part of an ascetic method. The Beckettian dynamically 
sublime, then, is not only an aesthetic theory it is also part of a Schopenhauerian- 
informed aesthetic-ascetic method for will-destruction.
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Bearing this introductory material in mind, I shall now proceed to a detailed 
discussion of Beckett's aesthetics in which I first outline Beckett's conception of 
'ordinary', willful consciousness.
Ordinary consciousness
VLADIMIR: But habit is a great deadener (Beckett, 1956: 91).
Central to any understanding of Beckett's epistemology is Beckett's understanding 
of the workings of Habit (Beckett, 1999:18). For Beckett, Habit plays a comparable 
role to that of Schopenhauer's knowing subject (WWR 2: 277-8). As for 
Schopenhauer, for Beckett, the 'world' is merely a 'projection of the individual’s 
consciousness' (Beckett, 1999,19), 'habitual' perception is perception that 
positions the world in space and time for the benefit of the individual will (Beckett, 
1999: 90). Wood describes Beckett's 'habitual consciousness' as that which 
understands the things of the world as possessing, or lacking utility:
Habit-determined mental attention packages sensory impressions into 
motives -  habit orders events in space, and time, and places them in a 
causal chain - these disguise the object into one of use for the subject 
(Wood, 1994: 4; see also Pothast, 2008: 118).
Thus Beckett's conception of habitual perception appears to utilize Schopenhauer's 
portrayal of'ordinary' consciousness (see WWR 1: First Book). Habit distorts 
perception for the benefit of the individual will. The individual will needs only to 
understand enough of the world to permit the individual will to function without 
suffering. This spatio-temporal understanding for the benefit of the individual will 
has an inherently distorting and deadening affect:
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WINNIE: ... no better, no worse ... no change ... no pain (Beckett, 
1961: 2).
As well as positioning the world in relation to the individual will, Habit also 
defends the individual w ill by further filtering the types of representation it 
provides. According to Acheson, Beckettian Habit 'intervenes in the act of forming 
perceptual images to ensure that psychologically unpleasant elements are 
excluded' (Acheson, 1978: 169, in reference to Beckett, 1999:18-19).
This suggests a 'historical' understanding on the part of the intellect: certain, prior 
representations have caused the w ill to suffer, and are therefore not to be 
presented again. Schopenhauer proposes a similar understanding when he 
describes the way the w ill often 'prohibits the intellect from having certain 
representations' that it knows from previous occasions w ill cause it distress (WWR 
2: 208; and see Gardner, 1999: 377). There is, then, a two-fold aspect to the 
intellect’s 'filtering role'. The first aspect is that of the mind's a priori filtering of 
data into images situated in space and time, which are causally connected to one 
another. The second aspect is the intellect’s filtering out of specific 'knowledge', 
which the intellect knows from previous experience w ill cause the w ill to suffer.
The 'truth' is irrelevant for such need-generated perception. The only utility  is that 
which permits the w ill to act in a habitual fashion, and therefore to avoid suffering. 
It is for this reason that Rabinovitz understands the role of Beckettian Habit as a 
defence mechanism against painful knowledge:
Habit generates the mind-numbing ennui we use to anesthetize 
whatever is painful or threatening; by invoking it we live at a re-move 
from whatever is authentic in our existence (1995: 217).
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To this end 'the will buckles all experience into incoherence' (Beckett, 1999: 72), 
by which Beckett means that the habitual intellect, on behalf of the individual will, 
understands, or represents the world solely with regard to that which has utility 
for the individual 'will not to suffer' (Beckett, 1999: 43) at a particular time, and in 
a particular place, and based upon present concerns:
Habit is a compromise effected between the individual and his 
environment, or between the individual and his own organic 
eccentricities, the guarantee of a dull inviolability, the lightning- 
conductor of his existence. Habit is the ballast that chains the dog to his 
vom it.... Life is habit. Or rather life is a succession of habits, since the 
individual is a succession of individuals; the world being a projection of 
the individual's consciousness (an objectivation of the individual's will, 
Schopenhauer would say), the pact must be continually renewed, the 
letter of safe-conduct brought up to date... Habit then is the generic term 
for the countless treaties concluded between the countless subjects that 
constitute the individual and their countless correlative objects (Beckett, 
1999: 18-19).
When perceiving the world in this manner, one perceives merely 'the mock reality 
of experience'. In comparison to the experience of'reality' such perception is 
'vulgar' as it deals only in the phenomenal realm. For Beckett the phenomenal 
realm is merely a protective filter placed in between the individual will and the 
world: 'a minister of dullness,' and 'an agent of security' (Beckett, 1999: 33, 22,17, 
21):
Habit acts as a screen between us and unpleasantness in the everyday 
world, or rather, as a series of screens, since changes of environment 
expose us to different sense data and require us to adapt (Acheson, 
1978: 169).
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For Beckett, then, as for Schopenhauer, there is more to experience than that 
presented in perception for the benefit of the individual will. And like 
Schopenhauer, Beckett believes that 'reality' is perceived in the moments when 
one perceives in a will-less state, that is, when one perceives aesthetically (see 
W W R1:185).
Aesthetic consciousness
In contrast to habitual perception, which is a mere projection of the will, aesthetic 
experience is an event when ‘the surface' is penetrated, and one sees more than 
'the facade, behind which the Idea is prisoner' (Beckett, 1999: 79). Whilst Habit is a 
generally effective means of delimiting the individual's experience, there are 
moments when Habit either fails, or is forced to adjust to a new circumstance. 
These moments, when the individual is in the process of adapting to a new state of 
affairs, are both painful and filled with possibility:
The periods of transition that separate consecutive adaptations... 
represent the perilous zones in the life of the individual, dangerous, 
precarious, painful, mysterious and fertile, when for a moment the 
boredom of living is replaced by the suffering of being (Beckett, 1999: 
18-19).
Beckett goes onto describe 'the suffering of being' as ‘our first nature', which is 
'laid bare during these periods of abandonment' (Beckett, 1999: 22), that is, when 
the will is exposed to reality (Pothast, 2008:118):
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... in the intervals between Habit's changes of screen we suffer because 
we are presented, harshly, with an uncensored view of the world 
[Acheson, 1978: 170).
Appearing to follow both Schopenhauerian epistemology and aesthetics at this 
juncture, Beckett observes that when Habit fails, that is, when the individual will is 
temporarily exposed to reality, what is observed is not an object amongst other 
objects, and thus perceived in relation to the principal of sufficient reason but 
something perceptually 'unique':
... when the object is perceived as particular and unique and not merely 
the member of a family, when it appears independent of any general 
notion and detached from the sanity of a cause, isolated and inexplicable 
in the light of ignorance, then and then only may it be a source of 
enchantment. Unfortunately Habit has laid its veto on this form of 
perception, its action being precisely to hide the essence—the Idea—of 
the object in the haze of conception —  preconception [Becket, 1999: 
22 ) .
Thus an object is a source of'enchantment' only when the subject no longer 
perceives as an individual situated in space and time, and, correlatively, the object 
is perceived as being alone and nowhere:
When the subject is exempt from will the object is exempt from causality 
[Time and Space taken together) [Beckett, 1999: 90; cf. WWR 1:10; see 
also Rabinovitz, 1995: 208-9).
Beckett's understanding of both habitual perception, and aesthetic consciousness 
appears to mirror Schopenhauer's understanding up to this point, including the
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idea that in the aesthetic moment a simultaneous transformation occurs in the 
subject and the object, rendering both 'pure' (Beckett, 1999: 75; WWR 1: 178). 
Where Beckett begins to progress this thought beyond Schopenhauerian aesthetics 
is in connection to the way that Habit subsequently affects memory. As with 
moments of transition from one habit to the next, the way one remembers may 
also provide a powerful means of affecting the individual will. That is, the way the 
intellect remembers can be either deadening or 'deadly' (see Beckett, 1958: 25).
Voluntary and involuntary memory
VLADIMIR: Extraordinary the tricks that memory plays!
(Beckett, 1956: 50)
There are essentially two types of memory in Beckettian thought. The first and 
foremost of which is described as 'voluntary memory'. As with ordinary 
consciousness, voluntary memory functions in a similar way to Schopenhauer's 
servant of the will (cf. WWR 1: 176, WWR 2: 216; 641). Voluntary memory is a 
repetition of a moment in time, which has already been deformed by the intellect, 
by Habit:
This is the uniform memory of intelligence; and it can be relied on to 
reproduce for our gratified inspection those impressions of the past that 
were consciously and intelligently formed. It has no interest in the 
mysterious element of inattention that colours most commonplace 
experiences. It presents the past in monochrome. The images it chooses 
are as arbitrary as those chosen by the imagination, and are equally 
remote from reality. ...The material that it furnishes contains nothing of 
the past, merely a blurred and uniform projection once removed of our 
anxiety and opportunism —  that is to say, nothing. ... It insists on that
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most necessary, wholesome and monotonous plagiarism—the 
plagiarism of oneself (Beckett, 1999: 32-33).
In short, if one recalls for the benefit of the individual will, one finds nothing more 
than the material of Habit, which was in turn perceived for the benefit of the 
individual will:
The most successful evocative experiment can only project the echo of a 
past sensation, because, being an act of intellection, it is conditioned by 
the prejudices of the intelligence which abstracts from any given 
sensation... whatever... cannot be fitted into the puzzle of a concept 
(Beckett, 1999: 71-2).
In the tragic works of Beckett's middle period there are numerous examples of 
voluntary memory, that is, where the willing subject either demands that the 
intellect ‘habitually’ retrieves an event formed by ordinary consciousness, or the 
will itself merely repeats such knowledge. In Waiting for Godot, Vladimir asks 
Estragon to recall his earlier reading of the bible, in response to which, Estragon 
recalls the pleasurable memory of encountering the maps of the Holy Land:
Coloured they were. Very pretty. The Dead Sea was pale blue. The very 
look of it made me thirsty. That's where we'll go, I used to say, that's 
where we'll go for our honeymoon. We'll swim. We'll be happy (Beckett, 
1956: 12).
In Endgame we witness an extended 'voluntary' evocation in the form of Hamm's 
lengthy 'chronicle' (Beckett, 1958: 35-37), the story that he has been telling 
himself all his days (40). In the representation of an important moment in his life -
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where his servant-son, Clov, comes into his service -  Hamm recollects events for 
the purpose of maintaining his sense of being a benevolent man:
Well to make it short I finally offered to take him into my service. He had 
touched a chord (37).
In his story -  the voluntary memory of habitual consciousness -  Hamm 
understands himself -  that is, presents himself to himself -  as the kind of person 
who takes a starving man and his child into his own home.
In the play Happy Days, upon hearing the name Charlie Hunter, Winnie evokes the 
memory of her coming of age. The earlier, disturbing, childhood memory of sitting 
on Charlie Hunter's knee has thus been conflated with later, pleasant, social events, 
including Winnie's first romance:
WILLIE: His Grace and Most Reverend Father in God Dr Carolus
Hunter dead in tub.
WINNIE: [Gazing front, hat in hand, tone of fervent reminiscence.]
Charlie Hunter! [Pause.] I close my eyes -  [she takes 
off spectacles and does so, hat in one hand, spectacles in 
the other, Willie turns page.] -  and am sitting on his 
knee again, in the back garden at Borough Green, 
under the horse-beech. [Pause. She opens eyes, puts on 
spectacles, fiddles with hat.] Oh, the happy memories!
WINNIE: My first ball! [Long pause.] My second ball! [Long
pause. Close eyes.] My first kiss! (1961: 5).
93
Thus voluntary memory reinforces habitual perception, by repeating information 
that has previously passed the censorship of the individual will, and further 
immerses the individual will into the warm bath already poured by habitual 
consciousness (WWR 2: 208).
In Waiting for Godot, voluntary memory consoles Vladimir with the thought of 
future happiness. In Endgame, voluntary memory assures Hamm that he is a good 
man, and in Happy days, voluntary memory encourages Winnie to believe in the 
inviolability of childhood innocence, and romance.
In contrast to voluntary memory, 'involuntary memory' is a moment when the 
subject is said to remember an event objectively, and therefore experiences reality. 
Occurring because of the 'negligence or agony of Habit' (Beckett, 1999: 35), 
involuntary memory is when one experiences:
... the total past sensation, not its echo nor its copy, but the sensation 
itself, annihilating every spatial and temporal restriction, [which] comes 
in a rush to engulf the subject in all the beauty of its infallible proportion 
(Beckett, 1999: 72-3).
An involuntary memory, where one is said to experience the totality of a past 
experience, comes about as a result of an external stimulus, for example, a sound 
heard in the present moment can conjure up, all the 'circumreferential phenomena, 
stored away in the back of the memory in unconceptualized form' (Wood, 1994: 4; 
see also Acheson, 1978:172). One experiences the entirety of a past experience 
and not merely that fragment, or version, which had utility to the individual will at 
the time of its initial reception (see Beckett, 1999: 72-3). In his description of the 
content of involuntary memory, Beckett goes on to say that:
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... thanks to this reduplication, the experience is at once imaginative and 
empirical, at once an evocation and a direct perception, real without 
being merely actual, ideal without being merely abstract, the ideal real, 
the essential, the extratemporal (Beckett, 1999: 75).
This dense, seemingly contradictory, passage requires some explication. The 
sensation is said to be 'imaginative' and 'empirical' as it resides in the intellect, yet 
it is 'present to the subject's will-less aspect in exactly the same form as when 
originally experienced.' As the totality of events of the moment held no utility for 
the will, they neither registered at the time of reception, nor have they become the 
content of subsequent voluntary memory. For, as we have seen, only that which 
had utility for the individual will at the time of reception will later form the basis of 
voluntary memory. The involuntary memory is also 'real' in the sense that it is ‘a 
facet of the reality we daily neglect', but not 'merely actual’ in that for it to be 
remembered, or recreated, it does not require the very same type of event to take 
place in the present. And, finally, the content of involuntary memory is 'ideal' to the 
extent that it is perceptual content, 'concrete' as opposed to an 'abstraction' 
(Acheson, 1973: 173-4), which is a generalization of specific perceptual material 
for the benefit of the individual will (WWR 1: 21-22). The 'ideal real', then, is a past 
experience, the sensation, as it was originally received in full by the intellect. It is 
the early Beckettian Idea.
Pothast (2008) has noted that the substance of the Beckettian Idea -  'the 
metaphysical reality, which according to Beckett is the object of art' -  is a radical 
and welcome departure from the 'Platonic Idea' found in Schopenhauerian 
aesthetics (127-8). Whereas for Schopenhauer, as we have seen, the Platonic Idea 
is an adequate objectification of the will (WWR 1: 257), the thing-in-itself in 
representation, an object seen by the pure knowing subject as a timeless, location- 
free, eternal form (WWR 1:129-30), in early Beckettian aesthetics, the Idea is 
manifested as:
95
the true reality of an experience once made in the course of time, and in 
itself shows, as it were, a temporal structure... involuntary memory 
recalls the past self as well as the full extent of the seifs experience; both 
not disfigured by the will-controlled mechanisms of everyday survival 
and both therefore true (Pothast, 2008:125-126).
It should be noted that Beckett's evocation of the 'ideal real' is viewed by a number 
of commentators as a short-lived attempt to 'formulate a viable aesthetic' at a time 
when it was fashionable to do so, and that whilst the 'Ideal real' permeates 
Beckett's later work it does so in a more and more ironic, sometimes parodic, 
manner (Ackerley, 2009: 66; see Gontarski, 2008: 93-106; Eastham, 2007).
I would argue that this 'ironic' reading of Beckett's deployment of involuntary 
memory is one subject to the effects of philosophy's determination to discount the 
implications of Beckett's engagement with pre-Nietzschean aesthetics as a whole, 
especially the idea that Beckettian thought may be in any way systematic.
In contrast, then, to the argument of a number of Beckettian interpreters who 
suggest that Beckett's aesthetics after Proust experiences a significant diminution 
with regards to its ambition -  i.e. that the aesthetic moment no longer features as 
part of an overarching aesthetic theory, but rather becomes a mere comedic, or 
dismissive, device -  I argue that the Beckettian Idea first discussed in Proust 
continues to play an essential part in a complex system of thought. This system of 
thought, one based upon the notion that there are different ways of seeing and 
knowing, continues to evolve throughout Beckett's oeuvre.
The framework of the aesthetic found in Proust, namely that the role of art is to 
present the audience or reader with material that facilitates the aesthetic moment, 
is still firmly in place in the tragedies of Beckett's middle period. The foundational 
aspects of this framework, such as Beckett's differentiation between ordinary
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consciousness and aesthetic consciousness, continue to operate in Beckett's 
tragedies. In addition to this, in Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days, 
Beckett continues to situate his two ways of experiencing life -  ordinary and 
aesthetic consciousness -  in relation to the individual will's desire 'not to suffer'. In 
both Proust and the three plays, the individual will either avoids or experiences 
suffering depending upon what kind of knowledge the intellect presents to the will. 
In ordinary consciousness the will evades suffering. In aesthetic consciousness the 
willing subject suffers. This, then, is an enduring feature of Beckett's aesthetic 
position.
To claim that involuntary memory, or the aesthetic moment, is not part of an 
overarching aesthetic theory, as Beckett's aesthetic interpreters are wont to do, 
appears to overlook the consistent way that the aesthetic moment comes about in 
Beckettian tragedy, and the intention that lies behind its deliberate generation, 
namely as a destructive device. The aesthetic moment of Beckettian tragedy may 
be understood as a kind of negative epiphany. In contrast to an epiphany, where a 
character, or person suddenly understands what he or she is to do with his or her 
life (Young, 1987:100; Shapshay, 2012a: 480), the negative epiphany is the 
moment when the individual will -  confronted by the suffering of being - 
understands that it is for the best that it ceases to strive. Whereas the epiphany 
appertains to future conduct, the negative epiphany is a painful awareness of past 
events. But this destructive knowledge of suffering only comes about because of 
the intellect's deliberate non-presentation of painless, habitual knowledge. The 
negative epiphany as portrayed in Beckettian tragedy is the final part of a 
systematic method for breaking the individual will. Beckett consistently employs 
the tragic form to convey this method.
In essence, then, my approach, which is to acknowledge the ontological basis to 
Beckett's middle-period tragedies, in turn permits one to acknowledge the 
negative epiphany that threatens that ontological basis. This approach counters 
Adorno's assertion that the absence of metaphysical meaning precludes the 
epiphany (Adorno, 1991: 242). In my reading of Beckett's tragedies, the ontological
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basis to life -  the Beckettian 'will not to suffer' -  necessitates the negative epiphany. 
It is the 'will not to suffer's' refusal to acknowledge suffering, be it the suffering one 
has caused or the suffering one has endured, which in turn allows the 'will not to 
suffer' to continue to strive, and thus to continue to suffer.
Although Beckettian ascetic practice as presented in Beckett's three ascetic 
tragedies will be discussed at length in two later chapters, we are now in a position 
to formulate this ascetic method for encouraging the individual will's resignation. 
This overarching ascetic method - which bears many similarities to the two-part 
process described by Schopenhauer as the dynamically sublime - is found in all 
three of Beckett's ascetic tragedies.
In the Beckettian sublime, the intellect, or knowing subject, first holds the 
individual will at bay (WWR 1: 202] by refusing to provide a clear motive (WWR 1: 
138-9, 300-1) for action, that is, a representation subject to the principal of 
sufficient reason. This denies the individual will the deadening experience of 
habitual consciousness [Beckett, 1956: 91). Held in this 'perilous zone' [Beckett, 
1999: 18-19) between acts of habitual perception, the individual will suffers in two 
distinct ways: it first suffers the pain of lacking an object towards which it may 
expend its energy [WWR 1: 164), and it then suffers from the knowledge it 
receives in the place of habitual consciousness, namely knowledge about the 
ubiquitous nature of suffering. Denied the painlessness of habitual consciousness, 
the individual will is revealed to itself -  via an 'involuntary memory' [Becket, 1999: 
72-3) -  either as a being that has suffered, or a being that has caused others to 
suffer. This sudden awareness of past suffering -  a negative epiphany -  is itself a 
cause of suffering. The intention that lies behind the deliberate generation of such 
suffering is to place the individual will in a position of such pain that it chooses to 
turn its back on life. This method is the focus of two later chapters (Chapters 8 and 
9) on Beckettian asceticism.
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This reading bears a number of structural similarities to Badiou's understanding of 
later Beckettian literature. Badiou also understands Beckett's work as a 
determined clearing away (Gibson, 2003: 124) of the trivial aspects of life in 
preparation for the 'Event', namely the 'truth'. Similarly, Badiou claims that 
Beckett's characters evince the trait of'holding on to the uncertain' (Badiou, 2003: 
73), in that a number of Beckett's characters refuse to give up on the hope of truth 
(Badiou, 2003: 22), once that truth has presented itself as a possibility. For this 
reason it is important that I differentiate my reading from that presented by 
Badiou. The main difference between the two readings is the intent which 
underlies the 'clearing of the ground' and the 'holding on to the uncertain'. Badiou 
understands Beckett's ultimate intention as one of affirmation. The Badiouian 
Beckett clears the ground in preparation for the arrival of the 'Other'. Thus 
Beckett's work is presented as an escape from the isolation of solipsist thought. In 
contrast to this reading, I believe that this process of refusing the mere 
phenomenal is undertaken for the purpose of life-denial. Beckett's ascetic 
characters both clear the ground, and refuse to provide the will with certainty -  or, 
in other words, refuse to furnish the will with habitual consciousness -  in an 
attempt to generate knowledge of the truth, which is unbearable. In Waiting for 
Godot; Endgame, and Happy Days the truth is a destructive occurrence. In my 
reading of Beckettian tragedy, awareness of the 'Other' is an awareness of the 
suffering other, an awareness that results in resignation not affirmation. In 
Beckett's tragedies, when one beholds the 'truth', one becomes aware of the 
ubiquitous suffering of one's 'comrades in distress' (Beckett, 1999: 67), and most 
importantly one becomes aware of one's contribution to that suffering:
CLOV: [harshly.) When old Mother Pegg asked you for oil for
her lamp and you told her to get out to hell, you knew 
what was happening then, no? [Pause.) You know what 
she died of, Mother Pegg? Of darkness.
HAMM: [feebly.) I hadn't any.
CLOV: [as before.) Yes, you had (Beckett, 1958: 48).
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Far from experiencing a diminution in ambition, it appears that the aesthetic that 
one encounters in Beckett's theatre of asceticism is both more ambitious in its 
claims than the aesthetic theory found in Proust, and more systematic than its 
critical progenitor.
What, then, are the features of the more ambitious aesthetic that one finds in 
Beckett's theatre of asceticism? What developments have occurred between the 
writing of Proust and the writing of Waiting for Godot?
Firstly, in the three ascetic tragedies Beckett consistently argues that one kind of 
consciousness -  ordinary consciousness -  can be deliberately denied, and by doing 
so another kind of experience -  aesthetic consciousness -  can be evoked. Whereas 
in Proust it was argued that the aesthetic state could not be 'importuned' [Beckett, 
1999: 34), in the three ascetic tragedies Beckett consistently argues that a way has 
been found to generate involuntary memory, or the aesthetic moment, namely by 
denying the individual will the protective filter of Habit.
Secondly, by deliberately evoking the aesthetic state through the non-presentation 
of habitual consciousness, the intellect can present the individual will with 
destructive knowledge, that is, knowledge that acts as a disincentive to further 
action.
By the time Beckett writes Waiting for Godot, then, his work has transitioned from 
establishing his ontological and epistemological theories to providing answers to 
the questions they raise. The problem that Beckett implicitly raises in Proust is 
this: life is essentially a matter of suffering, and yet we as individuals are driven by 
the will not to suffer. In short, we seek to avoid knowledge of 'reality' (Beckett, 
1999: 22, 33) and by doing so exacerbate our own, and other's, suffering. In the 
three ascetic tragedies of his middle period, Beckett sets out a solution to this 
problem. The role of art, as repeatedly, and systematically evinced in Beckett's
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ascetic tragedies, is to convey both effective, and ineffective, methods for breaking 
one's own will with knowledge of suffering. Beckett conveys the success of an 
ascetic method by depicting the individual will's resignation -  i.e. in 'modern' 
tragic terms, and Beckett conveys the failure of an ascetic method by depicting the 
individual will's determination to endure -  i.e. in 'ancient' tragic terms.
To this end - that of causing the individual will to suffer - there are numerous 
examples of the destructive effect of involuntary memory in Beckett's theatre of 
asceticism. These painful moments where the intellect recalls 'the total past 
sensation, not its echo nor its copy, but the sensation itself (Beckett, 1999: 72-3; 
see also Ackerley, 2009) occur after a sustained refusal on the intellect's part to 
function habitually, that is, to either perceive or to recall in a manner that protects 
the will from suffering.
We saw earlier in Waiting for Godot that when the intellect, Estragon, habitually 
remembers the maps of the Holy Land he does so in such a way that it provides 
some comfort to his willing subject, Vladimir, namely as to the possibility of future 
happiness: 'We'll swim. We'll be happy' (Beckett, 1956:12). When later recalling in 
an involuntary way, however, Estragon provides for an unwanted awareness of 
past distress:
Do you remember the day I threw myself into the Rhone? (Beckett, 
1956: 53).
Here the past self, previously presented to the will in the voluntary memory of the 
Dead Sea recollection as one who longed to swim, is now presented in involuntary 
memory as one who wanted to drown.
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Similarly, in Endgame, the intellect, Clov, challenges the benevolent self-perception 
of Hamm's self-aggrandizing chronicle by presenting an alternative version of past 
events in which Hamm is shown to be cold-hearted:
HAMM: Go and get two bicycle-wheels.
CLOV: There are no more bicycle-wheels.
HAMM: What have you done with your bicycle?
CLOV: I never had a bicycle.
HAMM: The thing is impossible.
CLOV: When there were still bicycles I wept to have one. I 
crawled at your feet. You told me to get out to hell. 
Now there are none (Beckett, 1958: 15].
Finally in Happy Days, Winnie is forced to remember her traumatic childhood 
when her 'husband' Willie refuses to assist his 'wife' in her lifelong quest to ignore 
her own pain:
WINNIE: What now, Willie? [Long pause.] There is my
story of course, when all else fails.
'All else' is Winnie's way of describing habitual thought; thoughts that distract her 
from the memories of her own earlier suffering. Willie's refusal to provide a motive 
in the form of a distraction results in Winnie involuntarily recounting her 'story' of 
undressing a doll, and a having mouse run up her leg, which causes her to scream 
in fright (Beckett, 1961: 26-28].
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In these examples of Beckettian involuntary memory we observe the purpose to 
which Beckett employs this particular type of remembering: to 'accentuate the 
desolation of the present' (Ackerley, 2009: 70) by acknowledging the desolation of 
the past. Involuntary memory undermines the substance of voluntary memory. If 
voluntary memory assists the individual will in its goal to avoid 'the suffering of 
being' (Beckett, 1999:19), involuntary memory has the opposite effect. The object 
of involuntary memory is the awareness of the suffering self, and the suffering 
other. The intention of its deliberate presentation is to have the 'will not to suffer' 
suffer to such an extent that it freely chooses to resign from life (WWR 1: 285).
The role of art in Beckett's aesthetics
Suffering ... opens a window on the real and is the main condition of the 
artistic experience ... (Beckett, 1999: 28).
The role of art in Beckett's aesthetics is to present the aesthetic moment. The 
aesthetic moment in Beckett's early criticism, and in the middle-period tragedies, 
is the individual will's subjection to, or reception of, a painful involuntary memory, 
which Beckett describes as revealing 'the real', or the 'Idea' (Beckett, 1999: 33, 22).
As I have shown, the role of art in Beckett's aesthetics is to reveal the 'suffering of 
being (Beckett, 1999:18-19). The Beckettian aesthetic moment is, therefore, 
invariably accompanied by the experience of pain. More than this, the aesthetic 
moment in Beckett's aesthetics is the two-fold experience of suffering: as the 
individual will suffers from the denial of habitual consciousness, it simultaneously 
becomes aware of the suffering that it had previously denied.
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In addition to this, the intellect's deliberate attempts to generate involuntary 
memory are carried out with the intention of breaking the will, which upon gaining 
an understanding of its essential nature may freely choose to resign from life 
(Beckett, 1958: 50; cf. WWR 1: 285, 395).
Of the many similarities and differences that have been documented in 
Schopenhauerian and Beckettian aesthetics (see, for example, Pothast, 2008: 81- 
86) the apparent divergence of Beckett and Schopenhauer regarding the aesthetic 
state as a condition of suffering has yet to be explored. As we have seen, for 
Schopenhauer ordinary consciousness, that is, consciousness subject to the 
principal of sufficient reason, is one of suffering due to its anxious nature:
... care for the constantly demanding will ... continually fills and moves 
consciousness (WWR 1: 196).
Beckett, however, describes ordinary consciousness, where one functions 
habitually, as the way the individual will avoids suffering. Thus ordinary 
consciousness in Beckett's aesthetics is equated to boredom:
Boredom... that must be considered as the most tolerable because most 
durable of human evils (Beckett, 1999: 28).
Conversely, in Schopenhauerian thought the aesthetic state brings with it a sense 
of peace, as the willing aspect of oneself is forgotten, that is:
...we lose ourselves entirely in [the] object... we forget our individuality, 
our will, and continue to exist as the pure subject, as the clear mirror of 
the object... (WWR 1: 178; see also WWR 1: 196,199).
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In Beckett's aesthetics the aesthetic consciousness is the state in which 'for the 
moment the boredom of living is replaced by the suffering of being' (Beckett, 1999: 
19]. Far from being rid of ourselves (WWR 1: 390], in the Beckettian aesthetic 
state the subject is more there than ever, that is, is more aware of itself, than is the 
case in ordinary, habitual consciousness. Indeed, in the Beckettian aesthetic state 
the individual will suffers because of increased self-knowledge, or, in other words, 
for becoming self-aware. For as we have seen, this 'uncensored view of life' 
presented in the aesthetic state includes 'psychologically unpleasant elements' 
(Acheson, 1978: 170,169] normally filtered by Habit.
At first glance, then, Beckett's aesthetics appears to be something of an inversion of 
the aesthetics one find in Schopenhauerian thought: ordinary consciousness is 
portrayed as an attempt by the individual 'will not to suffer' to filter out harmful 
information. Aesthetic consciousness, on the other hand, is suffering consciousness 
for the very fact that one perceives in such a way as to acknowledge this 
delimitation. In Beckettian scholarship this would typically signal another 
demarcation of Beckett's aesthetics from Schopenhauerian thought, the point 
where Beckett leaves Schopenhauer behind (Pothast, 2008: 5-6]. In contrast to this 
position, I believe that this apparent divergence may in fact indicate a strong 
intellectual connection on Beckett's part to a particular aspect of Schopenhauerian 
aesthetics, namely Schopenhauerian tragic theory, and, more specifically still, 
Schopenhauer's understanding of the dynamically sublime. What I mean by this is 
that Beckett's aesthetics appears to incorporate a specific aspect of 
Schopenhauerian aesthetics as one of its key features.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Schopenhauer's theory of tragedy diverges 
from his overall aesthetic theory. For Schopenhauer, tragedy is the only art form 
that requires an active suppression of willing, or striving, on the part of the 
spectator. It is also the only art form that provides the will with knowledge, as it is 
the only art form in which the will is present during the aesthetic process 
(Vandenabeele, 2008:199]. As we recall, unlike the 'beautiful' object, which
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invites will-free apprehension, the sublime object has a 'hostile relation to the 
human will in general, as manifested in its objectivity, the human body' (WWR 1: 
201), and is generally understood as a threat to the body. Therefore the intellect 
must first 'consciously', and 'violently tear itself away' 'from the relations of the 
same object to the will which are recognized as unfavourable' (WWR 1: 202) to 
then be able to appreciate the Idea of which the individual object is an example. 
Thus there is an element of pain prior to the appreciation of the Idea. For 
Schopenhauer, then, tragedy is the only art form that generates knowledge and the 
subsequent suffering caused by that knowledge, as it is the only art form in which 
the will is there, in attendance, to be able to know and to suffer (Shapshay, 2012b: 
23-4). Being there to suffer is the key differential between the 'sublime' and the 
'beautiful' aesthetic experience, where tragedy evinces the former, and all other art 
forms, the latter.
In Beckett's aesthetics the sublime appears to play a far more prevalent role than 
it does in Schopenhauer's aesthetics: for Beckett the aesthetic state is necessarily a 
sublime state, for it is a state in which one always suffers. Indeed in Beckett's early 
criticism the aesthetic state is described as the moment when one experiences the 
'suffering of being' (Beckett, 1999: 19). I believe that this early understanding 
continues on into a number of Beckett’s tragic works in which Beckett employs the 
tragic form to display acts of deliberate will-destruction, or self-inflicted suffering. 
In short, Beckett's middle period tragedies appear to evoke Schopenhauer's theory 
of tragedy as an art form that communicates to the individual will the destructive 
knowledge of the true nature of existence (WWR 1: 253).
Given what we now know about the level of Beckett's interest in, and engagement 
with, Schopenhauerian thoughtxxiii the apparent influence of Schopenhauer's 
theory of tragedy on Beckett's middle-period tragedies, particularly 
Schopenhauer's insight that tragedy is analogous to the dynamically sublime 
(WWR 2: 433), warrants further exploration.
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Beckett and the Sublime
To date, Beckett's interpreters have focussed their attention on the mathematical 
sublime. In particular, Beckett's work has been read in the light of the 
mathematical sublime in both Kantian aesthetics (see, for example, Myskja (2002); 
Armstrong (2002); and Tubridy (2010)) and postmodern aesthetics, particularly 
that of Lyotard (see, for example, Olivier (1996); Smith, (2004); Slade (2007); and 
Tubridy (2010)). This has a number of consequences both for Beckettian 
aesthetics and Beckettian ethics, the most significant of which is to again portray 
Beckett as an artist whose work affirms existence.
In his early critical work Proust, Beckett describes the aesthetic moment in 
language that evokes the mathematical sublime. In the aesthetic moment a person 
is said to experience the 'total past sensation', which 'comes in a rush to engulf the 
subject in all the beauty of its infallible proportion' (Beckett, 1999: 72-3). This 
depiction of the aesthetic state mirrors the Kantian understanding of the sublime 
as depicted in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, where the mathematically 
sublime object is experienced as 'contra-purposive for our cognitive faculties' 
(Shapshay, 2012a: 484). That is,
In the mathematically sublime, a subject is cognitively frustrated and 
humbled by objects that are too vast to comprehend, and whose 
appearances ‘[bring] with them the idea of its infinity' (Shapshay, 2012a: 
484 citing Kant, 2000,138; 5: 255).
It also mirrors -  for itself mirroring Kant -  Schopenhauer's understanding of the 
mathematical sublime:
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The impression of the sublime can arise in quite a different way by our 
imagining a mere magnitude in space and time, whose immensity 
reduces the individual to nought (WWR 1: 205).
However, whilst in Beckett's early critical work the mathematical sublime is the 
pre-eminent aesthetic mode, by the time Beckett writes his ascetic tragedies, the 
mathematical sublime -  where the cognitive faculties are overwhelmed by the 
magnitude of external forces -  is a far less prevalent aesthetic mode, having been 
supplanted by the dynamically sublime -  where the individual will is placed in a 
position of comprehending events that threaten it's wellbeing.xxiv This is a 
significant development in Beckett's thought. It marks the moment, I believe, when 
Beckett's aesthetics begins to draw upon Schopenhauer's conception of tragedy, in 
which the dynamically sublime plays a pivotal role. This suggests that it is 
necessary to investigate Schopenhauer's writings on the sublime, so as to better 
understand Schopenhauer's development of the dynamically sublime, and to better 
understand Beckett's sustained engagement with this aspect of Schopenhauerian 
aesthetics. In Schopenhauerian thought the dynamically sublime transitions from 
it’s Kantian understanding -  namely the moment where the subject experiences its 
moral power to affirm a different version of life from that given by nature 
(Shapshay, 2012b: 25) -  to the Schopenhauerian understanding - where the 
sublime becomes a moment when the subject experiences its capacity to destroy 
its essential striving nature (WWR 2: 433).xxv
There are a number of implications of focussing on both the mathematical sublime 
in Beckett’s work, and focussing on the influence of the Kantian sublime on 
Beckett's work. I will briefly discuss the implications of this approach here.xxvi The 
interpretive work of Myskja (2002) Armstrong, (2002), and Tubridy (2010) evince 
this method in relation to the works Molloy, The Unnamable and Breath 
respectively. Here the primary focus is on the Kantian sublime -  primarily the 
mathematical sublime -  and its cognitive effects:
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To experience something as sublime, then, is to experience it as having 
elements that defy cognition in a way that give rise to a complex feeling 
of pleasure and displeasure ... the aesthetic experience of the sublime is 
morally significant in the sense that it may contribute to moral 
conversion and to cultivation of character (Myskja, 2002:1-2).
In essence, in the Kantian (mathematical) sublime moment we understand that we 
are able to resist nature (the empirical world), and thus are free to act according to 
moral law, or, that is, laws we give to ourselves, which are independent of nature 
(Myskja, 2002:141). In the Kantian sublime moment we understand that we are 
free. Myskja subsequently reaches the conclusion that Beckettian aesthetics and 
ethics closely follows Kantian aesthetics and ethics because in relation to Beckett's 
work, Kant's theory 'is the only one that in an adequate way explains the sublime 
as an aesthetic judgement with moral significance' (Myskja, 2002: 8). This 
conclusion implicitly discounts the connection that Schopenhauer draws between 
the dynamically sublime, tragedy, and resignationist thought. For as we have seen, 
Schopenhauer believes that tragedy, which is analogous to the dynamically 
sublime, is able to lead the spectator towards a life of ascetic practice by alerting 
the spectator to his or her capacity to deny the will (WWR 1: 390). Ascetic practice 
is an ethical approach to suffering, as it seeks to bring suffering to a permanent 
end. Minus an exploration of Beckett's engagement with Schopenhauerian thought, 
it can be claimed that Beckett's intention, like Kant, is to provide a 'positive 
reaffirmation of the value of human life' (Myskja, 2002: 302). However, to include 
Schopenhauer's understanding of the dynamically sublime in our understanding of 
Beckett's aesthetics has broad implications for our understanding of Beckettian 
ethics as an ethic of resignation brought about through ascetic practice*™*
My ultimate position regarding Beckett and the sublime, and the present state of 
the literature on this subject is this: Myskja, et al, are correct to assert a Kantian 
basis to Beckett's work on the sublime. Indeed both Beckett and Schopenhauer are 
greatly influenced by Kant's understanding of the sublime (Beckett, 1999: 72-3; 
WWR 1: 205). This influence is most clearly manifested in the negative freedom to
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deny one's instincts (Shapshay, 2012b: 25). However, Myskja, et al, present a 
somewhat incomplete picture of the Beckettian sublime by not also discussing 
Schopenhauer's development of the Kantian sublime, and Beckett's 
Schopenhauerian legacy. The consequence of this is that Myskja, who is otherwise 
correct to assert that Beckett argues in favour of the negative freedom to deny 
one's instinct, potentially overreaches when he subsequently argues that the 
negative freedom to deny permits the positive freedom to act differently. In 
Beckett, as in Schopenhauer, the negative freedom, the freedom not to act, appears 
to be an end in itself. By discounting the influence of Schopenhauer's 
understanding of the dynamically sublime on Beckettian aesthetics, Myskja also 
discounts the possibility that, like Schopenhauer, Beckett asserts a negative 
freedom for the purpose of destroying the individual will. Beckett, I contend, does 
not utilize the negative freedom to deny the will, or one's instincts, so as to then act 
in accordance with moral law, but rather to break the will. The Beckettian 
dynamically sublime provides an important formal aspect in an overall ethic of 
resignationism. Beckett's characters do not act differently upon the knowledge of 
suffering that is brought about through the intellect's denial of habitual knowledge, 
but rather cease to act at all. We may note, for example, Hamm's response to the 
awareness of the suffering ‘Other’ towards the end of Endgame:
HAMM: It's the end, Clov, we've come to the end. I don't need
you anymore. (Beckett, 1958: 50).
Were Hamm to be morally converted in the Kantian sense then Hamm would 
continue to need his intellect, Clov, to be able to act in accordance with the moral 
law. Indeed, Hamm would need his intellect to be able act perse because 'Will in 
itself is without consciousness...' (WWR 2: 277). That Hamm releases Clov suggests 
the cessation of action, a turning away from life.
The negative freedom not to act that one finds in Beckett's theatre is a freedom 
that Beckett's intellectual characters utilize with destructive intent. It is not, then, a
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freedom that permits the subject to act morally in the Kantian sense, that is, with 
regard to the future. In this way, Beckett builds upon Schopenhauerian aesthetics 
and ethics: one holds the will at bay so as to bring about the cessation of all 
striving.
In the next section, I discuss the role of tragedy in Beckettian aesthetics. I will 
argue that the role of tragedy is to convey a number of effective methods for 
deliberately generating the aesthetic moment in the specific form of a destructive 
involuntary memory.
Beckett and Tragedy
In an earlier section on the subject of Beckettian aesthetics, I claimed that the 
central aspect of the Beckettian aesthetic is the infliction of the suffering that 
accompanies an involuntary memory, which is, invariably, a recollection of 
previously unacknowledged suffering. The role of art, then, is to generate the 
aesthetic moment, or involuntary memory, and, in doing so, cause the Beckettian 
'will not to suffer' to suffer.
I believe the role of tragedy, more specifically, is to present a number of methods 
for generating the aesthetic moment, or moment of suffering. For Beckett, tragedy 
is a vehicle for communicating an effective ascetic method. In the three ascetic 
tragedies, Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days, Beckett portrays a series 
of systematic attempts by the human intellect to cause its own willing aspect to 
suffer by involuntarily remembering moments of previously unacknowledged 
suffering. In addition to this, Beckettian tragedy presents a number of successful 
and unsuccessful ascetic methods. As such, Beckett's middle-period tragedies 
communicate the reason that a successful ascetic method works when it works, 
and the reason an unsuccessful method fails when it fails. In short, Beckettian
i l l
tragedy presents what amounts to 'best practice' for the intellect’s destruction of 
the willing, or striving, aspect of the self.
Beckett's middle-period tragedies are a significant advancement in our 
understanding of the role of tragedy: by making the deliberate generation of self- 
inflicted suffering the focus of aesthetic production and contemplation, Beckett 
draws together aesthetics and asceticism. Beckett's unique contribution to theatre 
and to ascetic thought, then, is to combine the two, making the former a vehicle for 
the latter. As we have already seen, unlike Beckett, Schopenhauer consistently 
divides the aesthetic and the ascetic. Whilst observing that one sometimes leads to 
the other, in that an aesthetic awareness of suffering can promote subsequent 
ascetic practice (WWR 1: 390], at no point does Schopenhauer suggest that tragedy 
is the revelation of an ascetic method. Whereas Schopenhauer believes that art can 
lead one up to the path to salvation (WWR 1: 390) by promoting ascetic practice, 
the very subject matter of Beckettian tragedy is ascetic practice. Beckett is not 
content to lead one up to the path to salvation but, rather, guides the audience 
along it.
Beckett' tragedies, then, not only inform us about the fundamental problem of 
willing, they also inform us about what needs to be done about this fundamental 
problem. In Schopenhauerian tragic theory the suffering experienced by the 
protagonist is said to guide the audience to an appropriate attitude towards want 
and desire (WWR 1: 253). In Beckettian tragedy, Beckett stages the next phase of 
this realisation—namely the human intellect's deliberate attempts to harm its own 
individual will in an attempt to halt the will's striving. By doing so, Beckett turns 
deliberate self-harm into art, and art into deliberate self-harm. Each tragedy in 
Beckett's theatre of asceticism outlines a variety of tactics for providing the willing 
aspect with adequate knowledge of its true nature for the purpose of 'overcoming 
and annihilating the world' (WWR 1: 330). In each tragedy, the dynamically 
sublime is shown to be an essential component in this 'overcoming'. In Beckett's 
hands, the dynamically sublime transitions from an important aspect of aesthetics, 
to an important feature of a unique ascetic method.
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That Beckett employs the medium of tragedy to display acts of ascetic practice, or, 
in other words, an individual's attempts to break his or her own will, draws our 
attention to another way that Beckettian tragedy appears to both utilize and 
develop Schopenhauerian thought. We saw in the previous chapter that for 
Schopenhauer the explicit subject matter of tragedy is the misery (WWR 1: 253) 
that human beings inflict upon one another as they each attempt to appease the 
unappeasable will-to-life. Building upon this understanding, Beckettian tragedy is 
the next step in the process of understanding the world as a place full of misery. On 
Beckett's stage, we witness not the 'war' (Weller, 2005:151) of discrete 
individuals, but the war within the individual, the war between the ascetic intellect 
and the will not to suffer. Beckettian tragedy can be understood as the individual's 
response to Schopenhauer's ontological claim regarding the cause of suffering. 
Whereas Schopenhauer states the problem -  that suffering is caused by one's 
striving - Beckett's tragedies reveal a number of attempts to resolve this problem. 
Thus whilst Schopenhauer views tragedy's role as the diagnosis of one's illness, 
Beckett understands the role of tragedy as 'treatment' for that illness. To this end, 
Beckettian tragedy consistently displays the individual as an individual divided 
into aspects. These aspects are those of the intellect, and the individual will. The 
essential 'mode' of Beckettian tragedy is that in which the intellect attempts to 
reveal to its own individual 'will not to suffer' the suffering it has caused, or 
endured. The intellect does this with the intention of placing the individual will in 
such a position of self-understanding that it freely chooses to turn its back on life.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the role of art in Beckett's aesthetics is to 
generate the aesthetic moment, or involuntary memory, which in Beckett's 
aesthetics occurs as a result of the intellect's refusal to provide the individual will 
with habitual material. In addition to this I have argued that the role of tragedy
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more specifically is to provide guidance on the subject of successful and 
unsuccessful methods for deliberately generating the aesthetic moment.
Central to the intellect's deliberate generation of the aesthetic moment in the form 
of an involuntary memory is the utilization of the dynamically sublime as an 
ascetic method. The intellect's negative freedom not to act, which one finds in 
Beckettian tragedy, is used for the purpose of precluding further willing, and thus 
further suffering.
In this chapter I have also described the development of the role of tragedy that 
one finds in Beckett's tragedies. Whereas Schopenhauer believes that tragedy 
reveals the antagonism of the will with itself (WWR 1: 253), that is, tragedy reveals 
the individual objectifications of the will at war with each other, Beckett's tragedies 
reveal the interiority of the war within the individual. Beckettian tragedy can be 
understood as a response to the awareness that the striving, or willing, aspect of 
the self is the cause of suffering.
In the next chapter I present a discussion of the significance of Schopenhauer's 
subjects of the T -  the willing and knowing subjects -  in the formation of the 
Beckettian tragic 'pseudocouple'.
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PART THREE:
S ch o p en h au erian  and  B eckettian  Ontology an d  Epistem ology
Chapter 5: Ontology -  The Subject Of Willing
Introduction
Thus far I have made a number of claims regarding the importance of 
Schopenhauerian ontology, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics in the generation 
of the three Beckett tragedies, Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days. The 
following discussion elaborates upon this interpretative framework.
I believe it can be argued that Beckett's tragic pseudocouples are a sustained 
engagement with Schopenhauer's ontological and epistemological understanding 
of the T as an entity which possesses aspects of willing and knowing, or bodily 
drives and intellect. In developing the means to express the process of ascetic 
practice as a war between one's intellect and one's drives, Beckett repeatedly 
draws upon Schopenhauer's conception of the divided self. I believe this 
conceptual framework assists us to understand the 'war' that takes place between 
Beckett's pseudocouples, as well as the unusual tactics that are used during the 
conduct of that war.
Whereas Schopenhauer uses the term 'subject of willing' to describe the primary, 
striving, aspect of the self, I believe that Beckett, having earlier described this same 
aspect as the 'will not to suffer', now uses the pronouns Pozzo, Vladimir, Hamm, 
Nagg, Winnie and Mr. Shower, or Cooker. That is, in the tragedies of Beckett's 
middle period we witness an ongoing development of the Beckettian will not to 
suffer in relation to the Schopenhauerian will to life. In turn, whereas 
Schopenhauer uses the term 'subject of knowing' to describe the tertiary aspect of 
the self, that which serves the will by providing representations in space and time,
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Beckett names this aspect Lucky, Estragon, Clov, Nell, Willie, and Mrs. Shower, or 
Cooker.
Essentially, it is my contention that Beckett utilizes the key features of 
Schopenhauer's subjects of willing and knowing to convey an ascetic method. At 
the heart of this unique Beckettian ascetic method is the knowing subject's refusal 
to perform its servile function of providing the will not to suffer with habitual 
knowledge, or, in other words, a representation of the world situated in space and 
time.
To establish the veracity of the claim that there is a Schopenhauerian ontological 
and epistemological basis to the Beckettian tragic pseudocouple one needs to set 
out the pertinent aspects of Schopenhauer's ontology and epistemology.xxviii To this 
end, I shall set out Schopenhauer's claims about the essential nature of the will-to- 
life, which Schopenhauer argues is to strive in a tireless, 'blind' manner. 
Schopenhauer also argues that the will manifests itself as a person's 'character', 
and that only the wi\l-to-\ife has 'free will'. On each one of these points 1 shall draw 
together Schopenhauerian and Beckettian thought.
The alignment of Beckett's middle-period tragedies with Schopenhauerian 
ontology necessarily provides a challenge to Adorno's central claim that Beckett's 
tragedies refuse metaphysical meaning (Adorno, 1991: 263). Adorno's central 
claim regarding Beckettian 'meaninglessness' is that by refusing metaphysical 
meaning, that is, by refusing foundational meaning, Beckettian tragedy precludes 
other kinds of meaning that would otherwise inhere in the work, such as the form 
and content (Adorno, 1991: 242). Denied the support of the metaphysical 
foundation, the idea of meaning itself collapses (Adorno, 1991: 263). Therefore, 
one can no longer say that this scene means this, or that this sentence suggests this 
because the very intention of the work is to prohibit assertions of this kind.
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My central argument regarding Beckettian ontology is that thinkers such as 
Adorno have not sufficiently taken into account Beckett's early critical work. A 
number of claims that Beckett makes in his interpretation of Proust's Ä la 
recherche du temps perdu with regard to the 'will not to suffer' are foundational 
claims that Beckett continues to build upon throughout his oeuvre. The will not to 
suffer of Proust is further developed in the tragedies of Beckett's middle period. I 
argue that in Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days the very problem of 
Beckettian tragedy is the destruction of one's ontological basis. In addition to this, I 
also argue that it is the process of refusing the will's demands for habitual 
knowledge that forms the basis to the action, or inaction, on the Beckettian stage. 
Essentially, then, my argument is this: The metaphysical basis to Beckett's middle- 
period tragedies is the 'will not to suffer'. The form of Beckett's middle-period 
tragedies is that of the intellect's attempts to 'break' the will not to suffer. The 
content of Beckett's middle-period tragedies reveals this ethical, self-destructive, 
process.
In the next chapter (Chapter 6) I establish the key aspects of Schopenhauerian 
epistemology. 1 discuss Schopenhauer’s claim that the intellect is the tertiary 
aspect of the self, a mere 'servant' of the will' (WWR 1: 176; WWR 2: 216-217), the 
essential purpose of which is to furnish the will with representations in space and 
time. Again, on each point I shall explicate Beckett's utilization of Schopenhauerian 
epistemology in the formation of the intellectual aspect of his theatrical 
pseudocouples.
The task of aligning Beckett's pseudocouples with Schopenhauer's subjects that 
constitute the 'I' is not a straightforward undertaking. On each occasion that we are 
introduced to the world of a Beckettian pseudocouple it is during the heat of battle, 
not before the outbreak of hostility, but as the war is being fought. Whereas 
Schopenhauerian ontology and epistemology describes the willing and knowing 
subject's normal roles,xxix that is, their typical function prior to battle -  where the 
willing subject is master, and the knowing subject is servant - Beckettian tragedy 
largely eschews the depiction of the intellect's typical functioning, and for the most
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part focuses on depicting the intellect's attempts to destroy the servile relationship 
that exists between it and the will. It is my contention, then, that the war we 
witness on the Beckettian stage may be understood as 'asceticism', or the 
'intentional mortification of one's own will' (WWR 2: 613). In Beckettian ascetic 
practice, the knowing subject refuses to provide motives to the will with the 
intention of causing the will to suffer. In turn the willing subject harangues the 
knowing subject for habitual information about the world - that is, delimiting 
knowledge of particularities which are positioned in space and time -  so that it 
may avoid 'the suffering of being' (Beckett, 1999: 18-19), or, in other words, avoid 
any knowledge which challenges the egocentric self-understanding of the 
individual will.
To understand the way each battle is fought -  to understand the tactics that we see 
on the Beckettian stage -  one must understand the capabilities that each 
combatant naturally possesses. The next two chapters will set out the essential 
nature of each 'side'.
Warring opposites: the two parties to Beckett's tragic pseudocouples
A good deal of interpretive work has already been carried out on the subject of 
Beckett's repeated utilization of often 'antagonistic' or 'warring' couples (Weller, 
2006: 78). In this chapter I shall contribute to this body of research by exploring 
another model for Beckett's pseudocouples, namely the subjects of the 'I' as 
elucidated in Schopenhauerian thought. However, before I elaborate upon this 
ontological and epistemological model, I shall first briefly discuss the existing 
frameworks that have been established for understanding Beckett's 
pseudocouples.
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At present, the interpretive work on the subject of the Beckettian 'pseudocouple' - 
a concept first raised by Beckett in The Unnamable (first published in French 1953) 
-  can be divided into two broad schools of thought. The first school portrays the 
pseudocouple as the product of an antagonistic union of separate individuals that 
depend upon one another for the attainment of their goals, and for the 
maintenance of their identity. This interpretive framework argues that hostility in 
Beckett's work is engendered by the irresolvable tension caused by irreconcilable 
difference and mutual dependence; often positioning Beckett's concept of the 
pseudocouple within the post-Nietzschean, and poststructuralist philosophical 
concern with alterity and the 'other', as well as identity aspects of Hegelian and 
Marxist thought.xxx
Such readings attempt to ground Beckett's work in the push and pull world of 
human relations:
Who are these people? Where are they, and how did they get there?
What can illuminate their mood of bewilderment as well as their mood 
of appalling comprehension? What is the source of their ugly power over 
one another, and of their impotence? What gives to their conversation 
its sound, at once of madness and of plainness? (Cavell, 2002: 117).
Here, then, the term 'pseudocouple' refers to the problematic nature of a 
perennially strained, yet necessary external relationship.
In contrast to this understanding, the second school of thought regarding the 
nature of Beckett's pseudocouples positions Beckett's work as an exploration of 
something that is prior to, and thus subsequently affects, human interaction, 
namely the push and pull of the relationships within the individual. One might call 
this the primary relationship.
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The second school of thought understands the pseudocouple in terms of the 
individual psyche. Here the pseudocouple has been conceived variously as a war 
between ego and alter ego (Little, 1978), a war between the intellect and the 
emotions (Esslin, 1961), a forum for presenting Beckett's challenge to Descartes' 
assertions regarding the knowability of one's own mind (Weller, 2006), and a case 
of Freudian projection -  where an 'other' is needed for the purpose of seeing he or 
she who projects that other in a favourable light (Baroghel, 2010). A common 
thread of these diverse readings is that the theatrical pseudocouple is one person, 
a single entity.
A significant aspect of the latter schools' understanding of Beckett's work, then, is 
that the events of the drama take place within the skull. In his seminal work on 
Beckettian theatre, Theatre of the Absurd (1961), Martin Esslin describes this 
'situation' as one of'monodrama', where in the play Endgame the physical space of 
the stage resembles a human head. With two windows as eyes looking out upon 
the world, and with hated parents deposited in ash cans much like the mind stores 
away unwanted 'memories', the audience is encouraged to understand the events 
as occurring inside a person’s mind (Esslin, 1961: 50-51; see also Kenner in Boxall, 
2000: 75; Chambers, 1976: 7).
Rather than depicting an exterior alterity, then, as Beckett's pseudocouple is 
otherwise held to do, the second school of thought argues that the pseudocouples 
of Beckettian theatre reveal an interiority—in particular the to and fro of incessant 
demand and response.
It is the second schools' understanding of Beckett's pseudocouples that I seek to 
build upon with the following analysis. Beckett's work is concerned with 
interiority, with introspection. The events that occur on the stage in Waiting for 
Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days occur within the skull. There is, however, a point 
where my own work diverges from the second school of thought. Whereas many of 
the thinkers in this school have focused their attention on the mind alone -
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emotions and intellect, ego and alter-ego, and so on - I believe it is important to 
understand the 'skull' in Beckettian theatre as the 'venue' for processing and aiding 
the drives of the body (see Esslin, 1961: 36, 50, 51), or, indeed, for hindering that 
process, as is so often the case in Beckett's work. The Beckettian stage as mind, 
then, is the place where the battle between the individual will not to suffer and the 
individual will's intellect is played out.
What the audience to a Beckett tragedy witnesses is self-consciousness, the 
process where the Beckettian 'will not to suffer' (Beckett, 1999: 43) becomes an 
object for the Beckettian intellect. This epistemological model appears to engage 
with an important aspect of Schopenhauerian epistemology, namely the fourth 
class of object in the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. As the 
Fourfold Root is discussed at length in the next chapter it will suffice to say that 
Schopenhauer believes that there are four kinds of object in the world -  empirical 
objects, concepts, space and time, and the human will -  because these are the 
objects that the intellect is capable of forming. In the fourth class of object, 
Schopenhauer argues that in introspection the willing subject becomes an object 
for the knowing subject (WWR 2: 202), that is, in introspection the intellect 
understands bodily desires, or feelings, as its own wants and needs. Uniquely, I 
believe, Beckett gives a voice to these feelings by in turn giving a voice to the will 
(O'Hara, 1981: 265, 267). Importantly, then, for the formation of the T, or the unity 
of the two aspects of the self, the intellect here 'apprehends itself as identical with 
its own basis from which it has sprung, i.e., with what wills' (WWR 2: 277). The 
intellect understands the pleasure and pain experienced by the will in response to 
the presentation of motives by the intellect as its own feelings of pleasure or pain. 
In turn, the willing subject conceives of the knowledge presented to it by the 
intellect as self-knowledge. Schopenhauer describes this mutual self-recognition as 
the 'world-knot' (1974a: 212). The Schopenhauerian 'I' is a pseudocouple, then, to 
borrow Beckett's term, because it is a 'unity with two aspects', aspects that 
coincide because they are 'two parts of the one whole' (Atwell, 1995: 26).xxxi
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This understanding of the 'I' has a great deal of significance for our understanding 
of Beckettian tragedy: as spectators to a Beckettian tragedy we watch events 
occurring inside a person's mind. In turn these events are instances of 
introspection, where the knowing subject 'watches', or is 'conscious of (Atwell, 
1995: 27] another aspect of itself, namely its willing subject. Here the willing 
subject makes demands of its intellect for representations of the world. In 
response to these demands, the knowing subject attempts to refuse to provide a 
clear picture of the world, or a picture that will permit the will to strive, and to 
avoid suffering.xxxii
In line with the second school of thought it is my claim that the Beckettian 
pseudocouple is a single entity. With regard to the term 'pseudocouple', the prefix 
'pseudo' refers to the fact that the 'couple' is not a couple at all. Rather, Beckett's 
tragic pseudocouples are aspects of a single entity, a single entity metaphorically 
divided on the stage for the purpose of understanding these aspects. By dividing 
the self into aspects of willing and knowing, Beckett performs a metaphorical 
division of the self comparable to that of Schopenhauer in his main work, The 
World as Will and Representation. As Schopenhauer believes that everything that 
exists is the one 'will', consciousness must also be a form of will (Aquila, 1993: 
245-6; Atwell, 1995: 211). So as to better understand the way that will with 
intellect functions, Schopenhauer attempts to pull apart this single entity -  thus 
dividing will with intellect into will and intellect. It is this approach to self­
understanding, namely to divide the self for the purpose of self-understanding, that 
I believe Beckett subsequently utilizes”™“
It is my argument, then, that the character that Beckett names 'Pozzo', for example, 
can be understood as functioning in an analogous way to Schopenhauer's willing 
subject, as in turn 'Lucky', can be understood as manifesting characteristics that 
permit him to be read as an engagement on Beckett's part with Schopenhauer's 
concept of the knowing subject. Together, Pozzo and Lucky combine to form the 'I' 
of Pozzo-Lucky, where the willing subject, Pozzo, acquires self-knowledge because
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he perceives the intellect, Lucky, as his own intellect, and, in turn, the knowing 
subject, Lucky, perceives the will in self-consciousness as his own will.
The Beckettian pseudocouple's connection to Schopenhauer's subjects of the T is 
at its most palpable in Beckett's evocation of the manner in which Pozzo and Lucky 
are connected, that is by a rope around Lucky's neck. The nature, or effect, of 
Schopenhauer's 'world-knot' (Schopenhauer 1974a: 212), where the intellect and 
will intertwine, is there for Vladimir and Estragon to see. At the very point where 
Pozzo and Lucky 'meet', a running sore weeps:
ESTRAGON: Oh I say.
VLADIMIR: A running sore!
ESTRAGON: It's the rope.
VLADIMIR: It's the rubbing.
ESTRAGON: It's inevitable.
VLADIMIR: It's the knot (Beckett, 1956: 25).
Without the 'knot' that binds the willing and knowing subject the world as 
representation would not exist. It is, I argue, the foremost intention of Beckettian 
asceticism to untie the world-knot, and by so doing return to a state of 
'nothingness' (WWR 1: 411).
Understanding Beckett's pseudocouples in the light of Schopenhauer's subjects of 
the 'I', which are manifestations of Schopenhauer's ontology and epistemology, in 
turn makes it possible to read Beckett's pseudocouples as manifestations of 
Beckett's own work in these philosophical subject areas. In addition to this, it 
suggests that Beckettian metaphysics and epistemology builds upon a 
Schopenhauerian foundation. Beckett's sustained engagement with, and
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subsequent utilization of, Schopenhauerian thought is not undertaken merely as a 
means of parodying Schopenhauer's negation of the will to life, as Adorno (1991: 
269) suggests, but is undertaken in the manner of a serious investigation into the 
matter of developing effective ascetic practice.
With these broad claims in place I shall now proceed to an explication of 
Schopenhauer's ontology and epistemology, focusing on the specific aspects upon 
which Beckett appears to draw in the formation of his tragic pseudocouples.
The world as will and representation - the subject of willing and the subject 
of knowing
In Schopenhauerian thought the 'I' is presented as two distinct, yet complimentary 
aspects: the 'will' and the 'intellect', or the subject of willing, and the subject of 
knowing.
As the willing subject, one is 'the most articulate manifestation of the blindly 
striving drive that underlies all reality'. Whilst as the knowing subject, one is also 
the 'ineliminable and indispensable formal condition of objects of all kinds' (Zoller, 
1999: 20). In technical terms, then - for Schopenhauer tends to describe his theory 
of the self in an admixture of both technical and metaphorical language -  the 
willing and knowing subjects are the very possibility of all feeling and all knowing 
respectively. The willing and knowing subjects, therefore, are not experienced, are 
not objects of experience (Janaway, 1989:118,122,123, 264), but, rather, are the 
reasons that we are able to feel and to represent:
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the two subjects are the inseparable poles of an original complex unity 
on the basis of which all intellection and volition comes to pass (Zöller, 
1999: 25}
Were it not for the poles of this unity, one would be incapable of having particular 
moments of experience, that is moments of'knowing' and moments of'willing'.
In another sense we may understand the willing subject as the ontologically 
primary, essence of human beings, whilst the knowing subject is the mere 
'accident' generated by the will's striving, which in turn has permitted the will to 
strive more effectively (WWR 2: 201}. Finally, and here we find Schopenhauer at 
his most metaphorical, will may be understood as 'heat', and intellect as the 'light' 
inadvertently generated by that 'heat' (WWR 2: 201}. I begin this review of the 
subjects of the 'I' by elucidating the nature of one's primary stuff (Atwell, 1990: 14; 
see WWR 2: 239}: the subject of willing. Schopenhauer's understanding of one's 
essential nature is, I believe, an illuminating way of conceiving of a number of 
Beckett’s characters, namely Vladimir, Pozzo, Hamm, Nagg, Winnie, and Mr. 
Shower or Cooker.
The World as Will: The Subject of Willing
The Schopenhauerian 'will' is the 'inner nature of all things in the world' (WWR 2: 
349}', 'the kernel of reality itself (WWR 2: 351}. The same will we find within 
ourselves upon introspection, which in self-consciousness we feel as a 'blind' 
impulse (WWR 1: 164,180}, an irresistible urge (WWR 1: 275}, and an 
unquenchable thirst (WWR 1: 312} is also objectified in the phenomenal realm as 
non-rational animal life, and life without consciousness. The will also objectifies 
itself in the forces of nature, such as gravity and electromagnetism (WWR: 117}.
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Thus it is the same will that 'appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and 
also in the deliberate conduct of man' (WWR 1: 110).
There is some debate as to whether or not Beckett subscribes to the idea that the 
will described in Proust is the essential nature of everything that exists. As we have 
already seen, the early Adornian interpretation of Beckettian tragedy argues the 
complete absence of an ontological basis to Beckett's work (Adorno, 1991: 242, 
263). Deviating from this absolute position, Pothast, for example, (2008: 124) 
argues that Beckett suggests a shared ontological basis to human experience, 
however there is little in Beckett's work to suggest that Beckett understands the 
will as anything other than the essential aspect of the individual human being. It 
has also been argued that Beckett's understanding of the Schopenhauerian will is 
more in keeping with Schopenhauer's all-encompassing ontology:
The extent to which Schopenhauer's thought has been assimilated by 
Beckett in his work is in fact astonishing. This does not only apply to 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetic, but to his philosophy of the unrepresentable 
will in all its ramifications (Olivier, 1996: 344).
I believe there are a number of instances in Beckett's tragedies where Beckett 
alludes to the idea that willful perception is a 'caricature' (Beckett, 1999:14) and 
that in reality all is one. As Beckett argues that the essence of humanity is will, it 
follows that if all is 'one' then the essence of all is 'will'.
That Beckett appears to argue that all is 'one' is revealed in the moments when the 
Beckettian intellect attempts to convey the unity of existence to the willing subject. 
For example, in Endgame, when the intellect, Clov is compelled by his willing 
subject to look out of the window, Clov wonders which version of the world it is 
that Hamm wishes to see:
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CLOV: Any particu lar secto r you fancy? Or m erely  the w hole 
thing? (Beckett, 1958: 47)
In o ther w ords, Clov is enquiring  as to w h e th e r Hamm w ishes him  to perceive as 
an individual, and thus u n d ers tan d  the  w orld  as b roken  up into parts, or 
'aesthetically ' th a t is, in a m anner th a t u n d ers tan d s the w orld  as a single entity, or 
substance.
In the  play Happy Days, w hen Willie is b era ted  by W innie to le t h e r know  how  she 
ought describe her hair, e ither ‘them  or it', Willie eventually  replies 'It' (Beckett, 
1961: 9). W hilst an apparen tly  trivial m om ent, w here  the  will has again p rovoked a 
response  from  its know ing subject, it is possible to read  th is passage as a m om ent 
w here  the  in tellect a ttem p ts to show  th a t som ething can be perceived in tw o ways. 
In the  first way, w hen perceiving egoistically, W innie's hair is com prised of m any 
sep ara te  s trands. W hen perceiving aesthetically, w hen seeing beyond the 
'carica tu re ' of the w orld  as rep resen ta tion , w hich occurs in space and time, 
everything is a singular 'it', i.e., 'one', as opposed  to  the  p lural 'they '.
T hat every th ing  is essentially  'one ' is also revealed in Pozzo's soliloquy, w hich 
occurs tow ards the end of Act II of Waiting for Godot
POZZO: [suddenly furious). Have you no t done to rm en ting  me
w ith  your accursed time! It's abom inable! W hen!
When! One day, is th a t no t enough for you, one day like 
any o the r day, one day he w en t dum b, one day I w en t 
blind, one day w e'll go deaf, one day w e w ere  born, one 
day w e shall die, the  sam e day, the sam e second, is th a t 
no t enough for you? [Calmer). They give b irth  astride  
of a grave, the light gleam s an instan t, then  it's night 
once m ore (Beckett, 1956: 89).
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Here Pozzo recounts the knowledge that he has received once seeing beyond the 
illusion of individuality: all is 'one'.
My central point relates to a claim made by Schopenhauer in regard to one's 
position on the unity of existence. As it is my claim that Beckettian tragedy is the 
evocation of ascetic practice, this claim also carries with it a number of other 
claims that relate to the advocacy of life-denial:
Quietism, i.e., the giving up of all willing, asceticism, i.e., intentional 
mortification of one's own will, and mysticism, i.e., consciousness of the 
identity of one's own inner being with that of all things, or with the 
kernel of the world, stand in the closest connexion, so that whoever 
professes one of them is gradually led to the acceptance of the others, 
even against his intention (WWR 2: 613).
By arguing two points, namely that all is 'one', and that the essence of human 
beings is 'will', Beckett in effect appears to advocate that all is will. We thus have 
the interconnected basis to Beckettian quietism. By understanding the world as 
'one' thing, the 'will', and that this one thing is the cause of all suffering, this in turn 
leads to asceticism -  the mortification of the will -  and ultimately the giving up of 
all willing, or 'quietism'.xxxiv This is an interpretation of Beckettian thought that 
becomes clear with the removal of the life-affirming interpretive lens that presents 
Beckett as an artist whose work affirms 'difference'. Having presented an 
alternative understanding of Beckett's position on the universality of the will, I 
now return to Schopenhauer's conception of the will-to-life.
It is because all forms of existence are objectifications of the one, essentially 
undifferentiated, will (WWR 1: 128) that all share its inner nature: to strive 
tirelessly, and without purpose. As 'blind', or 'ateleological and arational,' (Atwell,
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1990: 150) striving is the very nature of the will, when the will objectifies itself it 
necessarily does so as an individual thing that strives and strives without an 
ultimate aim (WWR 1: 275; Janaway, 1999a: 325).
In human beings, as with everything else that exists, the will is the 'primary', or 
'original' (WWR 1: 292), aspect of the organism, and of the self:
... in all animal beings the will is the primary and substantial thing; the 
intellect, on the other hand, is something secondary and additional... 
(WWR 2: 205).
Thus intellect -  or objectively, the 'brain' -  comes about because the will, as it 
becomes more and more complicated, requires an intellect to function effectively.
Prior to Schopenhauer!an philosophy the cognitive, intellectual, side of life was 
held to be the essential, primary, aspect of humanity. The ability to reason defined 
the fundamental nature of humanity, and, given that this capacity was found 
nowhere else in the natural world, it was held to differentiate us from the rest of 
nature. The will was held to exist as a controllable means of carrying out our 
thoughts (WWR 1: 293). Schopenhauer reverses this formulation, and holds our 
underlying drives, our arational, conative self, to be the principal aspect of what we 
are. With this the intellect is reduced to a mere function of the brain, an 'accident' 
(WWR 2: 201) of the will's ceaseless striving, a secondary feature of the self that 
acts as a mere 'servant' and 'instrument' of the will (WWR 2: 216; 641; See Zöller, 
1999:19; Gardner 1999: 376):
The first step in the fundamental knowledge of my metaphysics is that 
the will we find within us does not, as philosophy previously assumed, 
proceed first of all from knowledge; that it is not, in fact, a mere
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modification of knowledge, and thus something secondary, derived, and 
like knowledge itself, conditioned by the brain; but that it is the prius of 
knowledge, the kernel of our true being (WWR 2: 293).
Schopenhauer's ultimate point about the primary nature of the will is that whilst 
actions in the natural world may be guided by intellect, that is, by the light of 
consciousness, intellect is not a necessary and essential condition of the will's 
activity:
The will, as thing-in-itself, constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible 
nature of man; yet in itself it is without consciousness... (WWR 2: 201).
Indeed, much of life 'strives blindly in a dull, one-sided and unalterable fashion 
(WWR 1: 118).' Most willing is simply not accompanied by consciousness, or 
directed to conscious ends (WWR 2: 135-6). Here Schopenhauer refers to the 
behaviour of plants, and the inorganic world, but also to our own 'vegetative' 
nature, i.e., growth, digestion, circulation, reproduction, and so on (WWR 1: 115; 
Magee, 1997: 138).
The will, then, is the primary feature of the self in the form of the willing subject, 
and the fundamental nature of this primary aspect, the way it manifests itself in the 
phenomenal realm is as the 'will-to-life':
What the will wills is life. Thus the will may be called the will to life 
(WWR 1: 275).
[The will-to-life is the] premise of all premises ... the world appears as a 
consequence of the will-to-life (WWR 2: 360).
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Will as Sexual Aspect
The sentient individual experiences his or her essential being as the compulsion to 
maintain his or her bodily self, and to perpetuate the species of the thing of which 
he or she is an instantiation (WWR 1: 327; WWR 2: Chapter 44; Janaway, 1989: 7; 
Janaway, 1999a: 325; Young, 2005: 243).
That which makes itself known to the individual consciousness as sexual 
impulse in general, and without direction to a definite individual of the 
other sex, is in itself, and apart from the phenomenon, simply the will- 
to-life. But what appears in consciousness as sexual impulse, directed to 
a definite individual, is in itself the will-to-life as a precisely determined 
individual (WWR 2: 535).
The genitals, then, and not the intellect, are 'the real focus of the will' (WWR 1: 330; 
see also O'Hara, 1981: 260). Thus it is that in Schopenhauer we observe a tension 
between the individual's intellectual life and the drives of the body; the former, by 
providing the knowledge that all life is essentially 'one' undifferentiated thing, 
holds out the possibility of suppressing the will, the latter, on the other hand 
perpetuates the will by providing it with more and more individuals with which to 
strive: 'The genitals are the life-preserving principle assuring to time endless life' 
(WWR 1: 330).
In his theatre of asceticism, it can be argued that Beckett demarcates certain 
characters as 'will' through their connection to sexual desire. We may typically 
understand one half of each Beckettian pseudocouple as willing subject by
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Beckett's associating him or her with the will-to-life's sexual aspect and the 
ultimate focus on procreation.
In Waiting for Godot, Vladimir is the bearer of the Vladimir-Estragon 
pseudocouple's sexual aspect. Beckett signifies this in a number of ways, the most 
frequent of which is through Vladimir's defective prostate, which is, of course, part 
of the male reproductive system (Beckett, 1956:10,11,16, 35, 59). So dominant is 
the species-perpetuating aspect of the will to life (WWR 1: 276) that even the 
prospect of death by hanging is accompanied, or motivated, by a sexual element:
VLADIMIR: What do we do now?
ESTRAGON: Wait.
VLADIMIR: Yes, but while waiting.
ESTRAGON: What about hanging ourselves?
VLADIMIR: Hmm. It'd give us an erection1.
ESTRAGON: [highly excited)). An erection!
VLADIMIR: With all that follows (Beckett, 1956: 17).
Similarly, in Endgame, Beckett designates Hamm as willing subject, and therefore 
as sexual aspect, through the motif of intercourse and propagation. First we 
witness Hamm's personal longing:
HAMM: Quiet, quiet you're keeping me awake. [Pause.)
Talk softer. [Pause.) If I could sleep I might 
make love (Beckett, 1958: 19).
And later, Hamm reminisces about one of his neighbours, Mother Pegg:
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HAMM: She was bonny once, like a flower of the field. 
[With reminiscent leer.) And a great one for the 
men! (Beckett, 1958: 31).
In addition to Hamm's own urges, he also espouses a wish for overall fertility. 
Despite the barrenness of life inside the bunker, Hamm still holds out hope that life 
outside continues unabated:
HAMM: But beyond the hills? Eh? Perhaps it's still
green. Eh? [Pause.) Flora! Pomona! 
[Ecstatically.) Ceres! (Beckett, 1958: 30).
Flora, of course, is the Roman goddess of flowers and spring. Pomona is the Roman 
goddess of fruitful abundance, and Ceres is the Roman goddess of agriculture and 
crops. In short, all are mythical goddesses of fertility.
Similarly we may understand Endgame’s other willing subject, Nagg, as willing 
subject through his being depicted as possessing a sexual aspect. Nell's first 
question upon being roused by her willing subject, Nagg, involves his essential 
sexual function (WWR 1: 330):
NELL: W hat is it, my pet? [Pause.) Is it time for love?
(Beckett, 1958: 18).
In Happy Days, Beckett emphasises the willing subject, Winnie's, sexual aspect by 
drawing attention to her physical appearance in the stage directions:
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WINNIE. About fifty, well-preserved, blonde for preference, plump, arms 
and shoulders bare, low bodice, big bosom, pearl necklace (Beckett, 1961:
i).
Winnie is further denoted as willing subject by the way she attempts to maintain 
her appearance, by brushing her hair, applying lipstick, and clipping her fingernails 
(Beckett, 1961: 4-5, 8,18).
The character of Mr. Shower or Cooker is denoted as Happy Days' other willing 
subject through his objectification and sexualisation of the immobilised Winnie:
Can't have been a bad bosom, he says, in its day. [Pause.] Seen worse 
shoulders, he says, in my time (Beckett, 1961: 28).
Mr. Shower or Cooker also wishes to know whether or not Winnie can still feel her 
legs, and whether she is wearing any clothes under the mound of earth. Most 
importantly he twice asks Mrs. Shower or Cooker 'what good' Winnie is to Willie 
'like that', that is buried in such a way as to be sexually unavailable (Beckett, 1961: 
20, 28). That Mr. and Mrs. Shower or Cooker's repeated appearance on the scene 
comes solely in the form of Winnie's recollections, or possibly fantasies, of this 
having occurred also draws our attention to the fact that these may be nothing 
more than Winnie's hopes that Willie will find her sexually attractive once more.
The will-to-life, then, in terms of self-maintenance, and perpetuation of the species, 
is the way that the will manifests itself in the phenomenal realm. The will wills life. 
However, as to why the will wills life is not a question that can be answered. The 
will has no ultimate objective to its insatiable desire for the perpetuation of life. In
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short, when the will strives it does so in a 'blind' fashion. The will wants without 
knowing why it wants only that it wants 'without rest or aim' (WWR 1: 148-9).
Striving
Schopenhauer asserts that it is the nature of the will to strive tirelessly, that it 
generates innumerable individual objectifications to aid this nature (see WWR 2: 
350), but that it does so for no particular purpose, with no goal in 'mind':
In fact, absence of all aim, of all limits, belongs to the essential nature of 
the will itself, which is an endless striving ... the will always knows, 
when knowledge enlightens it, what it wills here and now, but never 
what it wills in general. Every individual act has a purpose or end; 
willing as a whole has no end in view (WWR 1: 164-5).
And, later:
... at all grades of its phenomenon, from lowest to the highest, the will 
disposes entirely with an ultimate aim and object. It always strives, 
because striving is its sole nature, to which no attained goal can put an 
end. Such striving is therefore incapable of final satisfaction. (WWR 1: 
308).
It is because of this lack of ultimate aim that 'constant suffering is essential to life' 
(WWR 1: 283). Came describes Schopenhauer's argument in the following way:
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All self-conscious beings are characterised by an incessant and 
inherently painful willing. Willing is a sufficient condition of suffering, 
because all willing arises necessarily from want or deficiency, and to 
experience a want is to suffer; therefore to live is to suffer (Came, 2012: 
237; see also Jacquette, 2005: 116}.
It is because we are essentially 'will', and our primary nature is one of ceaseless 
striving that we suffer. Our very nature is the cause of our suffering (Soil, 2012: 
300). As long as we are an entity that strives, we can never experience a lasting 
sense of peace or happiness (WWR 1: 320).
Magee perhaps best captures the consequences of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of 
the will for humanity when he chooses the word 'doomed' (Magee, 1983: 219). In 
Schopenhauer's schemata, suffering is not a contingent aspect predicated upon 
particular events happening to particular individuals, rather, suffering is a part of 
what we are (Atwell, 1990: 174):
... suffering is essential to life, and therefore does not flow in upon us 
from outside, b u t ... everyone carries around within himself its perennial 
source (WWR 1:318).
The cause of suffering is striving. As human individuals are the embodiment of the 
will to life, they suffer the fate of that constitution. As the will strives tirelessly, so 
must we. Given this, suffering is 'our normal state of affairs' (Magee, 1983: 219). 
We may occasionally receive respite from the urges of the will when, for example, 
we reach a goal, but this peace cannot last because the will shall soon urge us to 
will, or to strive again. This being so, we never progress but, rather, move from one 
attempt at satisfying the will to another—or as Vladimir in Waiting for Godot 
suggests, 'resume the struggle' (Beckett, 1956: 9).
138
Schopenhauer's understanding of the essential nature of the will-to-life, namely 
that of ceaseless striving, is mirrored by Beckett in the presentation of a number of 
his tragic characters. As Beckettian subjects of willing, Pozzo, Vladimir, Hamm, 
Nagg, Winnie, and Mr. Shower, or Cooker, strive tirelessly to avoid suffering. As 
Vladimir continually resumes the struggle, Pozzo continually, and abusively, drives 
his 'carrier', Lucky, 'On' (Beckett, 1956: 22). True to his nature as an entity of 
ceaseless striving, Pozzo's first word is 'On!'— indeed it is also the last word we 
hear him speak (Beckett, 1956: 22, 89).
In Endgame, Hamm, the tyrannical employer, is unable, or unwilling, to cease 
striving, though he knows only too well that the time has come for his story to end:
HAMM: Enough, it's time it ended, in the refuge too. [Pause.)
And yet I hesitate, I hesitate to... to end. Yes, there it is, 
it's time it ended and yet I hesitate to— [heyawns)—to 
end (Beckett, 1958: 12).
Hamm's inability to 'end', or, in other words, his desire to continue striving, is 
perhaps best captured by the manner in which he tells his 'chronicle' (Beckett, 
1958: 40)—forever embellishing his life story, forever attempting to portray 
himself, to himself, as a figure of benevolence. Perhaps most importantly, however, 
it is through Hamm's storytelling that we witness his propensity to go on, despite 
no longer knowing how to go on:
HAMM: I'll soon have finished with this story. [Pause.) Unless
I bring in other characters. [Pause.) But where would 
I find them? [Pause.) Where would I look for them? 
[Pause. He whistles. Enter Clov.) Let us pray to God 
(Beckett, 1958: 37).
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And later, after having in the previous passage attempted the ultimate Deus ex 
machina by actually introducing God as a possible solution to his problems, Hamm 
again displays a propensity to continue his 'storytelling':
HAMM: Perhaps I could go on with my story, end it and begin
another (Beckett, 1958: 44-45).
That Hamm has a continuous, 'irresistible' (WWR 1: 275), urge to tell his story is 
not lost on his servant Clov, who doubts Hamm's desire to end. When compelled to 
inquire as to how Hamm has progressed his chronicle, Clov evinces his profound 
doubt that Hamm wants to conclude per se:
CLOV: Will it not soon be the end?
HAMM: I'm afraid it will.
CLOV: Pah! You'll make up another (Beckett, 1958: 41).
Indeed, later in the play, Clov's scepticism proves to be well founded:
CLOV: Let's stop playing.
HAMM: Never! (Beckett, 1958: 49)
Whilst Hamm prolongs his 'ending', he makes continual demands of his servant 
Clov to report on life outside the bunker, or to, generally, satisfy his every whim. 
Endgame’s other willing subject, Nagg, demands that his 'wife', Nell, recalls a series 
of past events, and that she listens, again and again, to Nagg's re-telling of the same 
terrible, terribly told, joke (Beckett, 1958: 21-22).
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In Happy Days, it is Winnie who in the same breath exclaims that she can say no 
more before having to acknowledge that she must indeed 'say more' (Beckett, 
1961: 3; 29), and that to this 'saying' her long-suffering 'husband', Willie, must 
listen and respond. 'On, Winnie' (Beckett, 1961: 3), she says at the start of Act I as 
though verbalizing this inner compulsion to strive. This 'On' that Winnie says -  an 
'On' similar to that said by Pozzo in Waiting for Godot (Beckett, 1956: 22, 89) -  
appears not to be one said in affirmation, not one that succinctly captures the 
desire to go on, but, rather, of the fact that one strives because that is what one 
does, what one is. Thus this 'on' may be considered purely in terms of description 
and not necessarily in terms of affirmation, as Badiou holds it to be (Badiou, 2003: 
44).
Finally Mr. Shower, or Cooker may be understood as the tirelessly striving subject 
of willing by the way he forever drags his long-suffering 'wife' 'up and down this 
fornicating wilderness' (Beckett, 1961: 19-20), and whilst doing so demands that 
she explains the meaning of things encountered along the way.
As a brief but important aside, I shall take this opportunity to discuss a key feature 
of the will's striving, namely the pain that one experiences should one cease to 
strive for any length of time. Schopenhauer describes this kind of pain as 
'boredom'. It is important that I provide an outline of Schopenhauer's conception 
of'boredom', as in the later chapters on Beckettian asceticism (Chapters 8 and 9) I 
argue that Beckett's utilization of Schopenhauerian boredom is a key aspect of his 
unique ascetic method. To understand Beckett's development of Schopenhauerian 
boredom, it will be necessary, then, to provide an outline of Schopenhauer's 
understanding of boredom as a 'feeling' which compels the intellect to provide 
motives, or representations.
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Boredom
As we have seen, for Schopenhauer, human beings are trapped in a cycle of 
striving. A key factor in this cycle is the feeling of 'boredom'. The feeling of 
boredom ensures that the intellect continues to present the will with motives for 
action. The cycle of striving has a number of facets. First, there is the urge to strive 
brought about by the essential nature of the will. This urge is experienced as a 
feeling of 'lacking something':
For all striving springs from want or deficiency, from dissatisfaction 
with one's own state or condition, and is therefore suffering so long as 
it is not satisfied (WWR 1: 309}.
In an attempt to alleviate this feeling of'lack', the human intellect presents an 
array of motives from which the will chooses if it is so inclined. Following the 
presentation of a satisfactory object, or 'motive', the will then pursues the object. 
Finally, there is the matter of attainment, which the human being experiences as a 
feeling of'happiness', or frustration, which the human being experiences as 
'suffering' (WWR 1: 309}. But what, then, happens if the subject attains their goal, 
and what is the mechanism that ensures the subject will strive again? Given that 
the nature of the will is to constantly strive, not to do so itself causes pain (WWR 1: 
364}. It is through the feeling of boredom that the intellect is prevented from 
experiencing a lasting sense of satisfaction. Thus we suffer because we strive, and 
we also suffer if we do not strive.
What, then, is the nature of boredom? Schopenhauer describes boredom as a 
'fearful emptiness' (WWR 1: 312}, it is a state of real distress, suffering comparable 
to any other serious pain (WWR 1: 313}. Boredom is the feeling of the full force of 
willing, without the intellect being able to defer it onto a particular thing (WWR 1: 
364}.
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Essentially, then, when in the state of boredom, the will persists with its 
imperatives, but the intellect is unable to effectively direct these compulsions 
towards a satisfactory object.
From this brief introduction to the subject of Schopenhauerian boredom, one 
appreciates that Schopenhauer understands boredom in a mechanistic sense: 
boredom ensures that the intellect continues to provide motives to the will until 
the will is presented with a satisfactory object. I later argue that the Beckettian 
tragic intellect 'uses' the effects of unalleviated boredom as a means of breaking 
the will. In short, Beckett employs the key, painful, features of boredom in his 
ascetic method. Unlike Schopenhauer, Beckett is alive to the destructive potential 
of boredom and thus seeks to deliberately generate suffering by refusing to 
present the will with an actionable motive.
Having foreshadowed Beckett's utilization and development of Schopenhauerian 
boredom, I now turn to another feature of the will's essential nature, and thus the 
essential nature of the willing subject, namely the way the will strives, i.e., in a 
'blind' manner.
Blindness
Loss of sight is a particularly important metaphor in Beckettian theatre of 
asceticism. Pozzo, who wears glasses in Act I of Waiting for Godot (Beckett, 1956: 
23), has entirely lost his sight by Act II; Hamm is blind from the beginning of 
Endgame, as Nagg's eyesight is poor (Beckett, 1958:18); in Happy Days Winnie's 
sight is beginning to fail: 'Blind next,' she says in ACT I (Beckett, 1961: 2). I believe 
that this important motif in Beckett's theatre becomes clearer if one considers it in 
relation to Schopenhauer's description of the will, as 'blind will' (WWR 1:148-9).
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'Blindness' in Schopenhauerian philosophy, as we have seen, is the state in which 
the will exists prior to the knowledge that is supplied by the animal intellect (WWR 
1: 180). The will is pure energy waiting for a means to discharge itself (Atwell, 
1990: 150). In itself it is without consciousness (WWR 2: 277). With the addition of 
intellect, the will gains knowledge in the form of causally connected 
representations situated in space and time. These representations provide the will 
with motivation, that is, the provision of motives by the intellect provides the will 
with the direction it otherwise lacks. 'Motives' in Schopenhauerian thought will be 
discussed in the next chapter on the 'knowing subject', for it is the role of the 
knowing subject to provide motives in the form of objects or 'representations' to 
the willing subject, which in turn permits the will to act.
What is key here is the metaphor of blindness. As we have seen, Schopenhauer 
describes the will as 'blind' prior to the development of the animal intellect. 
Blindness, then, in Schopenhauerian thought exists only in the will prior to 
consciousness. After resignation, the will is not blind, it is 'broken' (WWR 1: 392), 
that is, the will no longer strives perse. When the broken will resigns from life, 
Schopenhauer claims that there is ‘nothing’ (WWR 1: 412). What Schopenhauer 
means by this is that with the extinguishing of the will, the world of representation 
is also extinguished, for the intellect, as servant of the will, only exists as long as 
the will persists. With 'No will' there is 'no representation', and in turn there is 'no 
world' (WWR 1: 411). There is nothing. Beckett, on the other hand, appears to use 
the motif of blindness as a means of illustrating the extent to which the will has 
been affected by the intellect's ascetic practice, namely the refusal to provide the 
individual will with a clear motive for action. The effective deprivation of a motive 
- a representation in space and time - returns the will to a state of blindness.
In Beckett's middle-period tragedies, the relative effectiveness of the intellect's 
asceticism is revealed by the extent to which the willing subject's sight has failed. 
In Beckett's tragedies, the more 'visually impaired' a willing subject becomes, the 
closer the knowing subject is to having placed the willing subject in a position of 
suffering from which it freely chooses to resign from life (WWR 1: 285, 395).
Again, this particular motif is discussed in more detail in the later chapters that
deal specifically with the subject of Beckettian asceticism.
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The next aspect of Schopenhauerian ontology which seems to have had some 
bearing on both the generation and representation of the Beckettian willing 
subject is Schopenhauer's argument that a person's 'character' is a manifestation of 
the will-to-life.
Character
Whilst each human being is essentially the will, which, as we have seen, strives 
blindly to preserve and to generate life, each human being is also so highly 
individuated that he or she expresses a distinct 'character' (WWR 1:124), or 
'individual will'. Character may be understood as the way one invariably responds 
to circumstance. Character in a person is the same as 'trait' in a so-called 'lower' 
species, or 'cause' in inorganic phenomena: it is both what I am, and the way I 
invariably respond to a given situation (WWR 1: 300-1; Janaway, 1989: 240; Zöller, 
1999: 28-9).
One's character, then, is an essential aspect of all action. Whilst a 'motive', in the 
form of a representation of events occurring in the world, is a necessary precursor 
for an action to occur, a motive can only call forward a person's character if that 
character is so inclined:
Only on the presupposition of my empirical character is the motive a 
sufficient ground of explanation of my conduct (WWR 1:106).
This, I believe, may be understood in simple terms as Character + Motive = Action.
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Schopenhauer believes tha t each person has his or her own character, thus his or 
her own individual will. Indeed, the higher the grade of the will's objectivity, the 
greater the individuality, and the greater the difference of character. Conversely, 
far fewer traces of individual character will be found at the lower grades of the 
will's objectification (WWR 1:131). W hereas individuals of a 'lesser' species will 
respond in the same way to the same stimuli, each individual human being 
responds differently to the same motive. This is because any action of the 
individual is always ultimately determ ined by the constitution and nature of a 
person's individual character (WWR 1: 106; see also PP 2: 231).
Building upon Kantian thought,5“™ Schopenhauer argues that a person's character 
can be understood in three ways: as som ething 'intelligible', as something th a t is 
m anifested 'empirically' (WWR 1: 158), and, finally, as something one 'acquires', or 
fails to acquire, over time. Schopenhauer uses the term  intelligible character to 
describe the character with which was in one is born. One's intelligible character is 
determ ined by an 'expressive' act of the will (Pothast, 2008: 31):
... the intelligible character of every man is to be regarded as an act of 
will outside time, and thus indivisible, and unalterable (WWR 1: 289; see 
also Atwell, 1990: 38).
According to Schopenhauer, then, I am born the thing that I am. My character is 
innate and unchangeable (Schopenhauer, 2005: 54). It is my intelligible character 
that necessarily determ ines the life I lead. In Waiting for Godot, Beckett has the 
Vladimir-Estragon pseudocouple endorse a com parable view:
VLADIMIR:
ESTRAGON:
VLADIMIR:
Question of tem peram ent. 
Of character.
Nothing you can do about it.
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ESTRAGON: No use struggling.
VLADIMIR: One is w hat one is.
ESTRAGON: No use wriggling.
VLADIMIR: The essential doesn 't change (Beckett, 1956:
21) .
However, one can never know one’s intelligible character in its entirety:
The person's character is the structure of his or her personality ... in the 
last analysis an expressive 'act' of the will as thing in itself... Since this 
original 'act' does not belong to the phenom enal world, the person can 
never know [his or her] nature in full, which means the person can 
never fully know her or his own character as far as it is an expression of 
the thing in itself (Pothast, 2008: 31; see WWR 1: 289)
The extent of my knowledge of the thing that I am is that which is observed in 
phenom enal action, that is, my empirical character (WWR 1: 289). My empirical 
character is each particular movement of my will in response to a particular 
motive. My acquired character (WWR 1: 303, 305) is the pieced together 
understanding that I gain of my intelligible character by observing, and 
acknowledging how I respond to particular motives each time they present 
them selves to me (Atwell, 1995: 122):
We obtain this only in life, through contact with the world, and it is this 
we speak of when anyone is praised as a person who has character, or 
censured as one w ithout character... although man is always the same, 
he does not always understand himself, but often fails to recognize 
him self until he has acquired some degree of real self-knowledge (WWR
1: 303).
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One often operates under the assumption of what one is, until one observes and 
acknowledges how one actually behaves over a period of time:
WINNIE: Then ... now... what difficulties here, for the
mind. [Pause.] To have been always what I am - 
and so changed from what I was. I am the one, I 
say the one, then the other. [Pause.] Now the one, 
then the other (Beckett, 1961: 24).
Defining one's acquired character, Schopenhauer states that:
... the acquired character ... is nothing but the most complete possible 
knowledge of our own individuality. It is the abstract, and consequently 
distinct, knowledge of the unalterable qualities of our own empirical 
character, and of the measure and direction of our mental and bodily 
powers, and so of the whole strength and weakness of our own 
individuality. [In this way] we know our will in general... (WWR 1: 305)
Thus a person can never know him or herself as a whole, and has no freedom to 
change what is an objectification of the only thing that is free, namely the thing-in- 
itself, however a person can come to understand their intelligible character in a 
more comprehensive manner by taking note of the empirical manifestations of 
their intelligible character, that is, how one invariably responds to particular 
events over the course of time (Atwell, 1990: 125; Atwell, 1995: 122). In basic 
terms, one cannot change what one is, but one can better understand what one is. 
This awareness of what one essentially is can, depending upon what one discovers, 
be a pleasurable or painful experience:
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Knowledge of one's character can generate either satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction overall, but in the main we shall be pleased to recognize 
some of our traits, and possibly horrified to recognize others. In 
Schopenhauer's view, this recognition or knowledge comes to us in 
virtue of conscience, and he maintains that recognition of morally bad 
traits cannot fail to be painfully and terribly distressing: ... "the wicked 
man by vehemence of his willing, suffers constant consuming, inner 
torment” (Atwell 1990: 137 citing WWR 1: 389).
Beckett appears to draw upon this Schopenhauerian understanding of acquired 
character in the tragedies of his middle period: knowledge of one's true self, one's 
intelligible character, as revealed by empirical character, is used by the Beckettian 
tragic intellect to cause the Beckettian 'will not to suffer' (Beckett, 1999: 43) to 
suffer. Beckett's intellectual characters -  here I speak of Estragon, Lucky, Clov, Nell, 
Willie, and Mrs. Shower, or Cooker -  reveal the will's intelligible character by 
recounting unfavourable instances of manifested empirical character. In 
Beckettian asceticism, then, acquired character is revealed as something that is 
potentially destructive to the will’s desire to continue striving.
Read in the light of Schopenhauer's understanding of character, Beckett's unique 
ascetic method may be understood in the following terms. The Beckettian intellect 
reveals to the individual will its intelligible character by ensuring that incidents of 
empirical character previously deemed by the will to be unfavourable to the will's 
self-image (Beckett, 1999:18-19; WWR 2: 208), and therefore not previously 
brought before the will because of the pain they would cause, are made known to 
the will. In this way the individual will acquires character, which as we have seen, 
may be understood as self-knowledge (WWR 1: 303). In short, Beckett uses self- 
knowledge -  painful 'involuntary' memories (Beckett, 1999: 72-3) -  to break the 
will:
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CLOV: [harshly.) W hen old M other Pegg asked you for oil for 
h er lam p and you told h e r to get out to hell, you knew  
w h a t w as happen ing  then, no? [Pause.) You know  w h at 
she died of, M other Pegg? Of darkness.
HAMM: [feebly.) I h ad n 't any.
CLOV: (as before.) Yes, you had.
Shortly after becom ing cognisant of this devasta ting  know ledge regard ing  his tru e  
nature , Hamm resigns from  life:
These claims are  fu rth er su bstan tia ted  in the la te r chap ters on Beckettian 
asceticism , w h ere  i argue th a t th e  B eckettian in tellect reveals the individual w ill's 
intelligible charac ter by recounting  incidents w hich challenge se lf-understanding . 
Again, these  incidents a re  delivered in the  form  of involuntary  m em ories.
However, I now  conclude this elucidation of the Schopenhauerian  sub ject of w illing 
as a concept th a t m ay shed som e additional light on a num ber of B eckett's tragic 
characters  w ith a d iscussion of Schopenhauer's understand ing  o f 'f ree  will'.
HAMM: It's the  end, Clov, w e've com e to the end. I don 't need  
you any m ore (Beckett, 1958: 48, 50).
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Free Will
Only the will is free (WWR 1: 272). What does Schopenhauer mean by this? For 
Schopenhauer, freedom is a matter of'determination', of'affirmation' and of 
'resignation' (WWR 2: 629).
The will is free because it is a self-causing entity (Young, 2005: 79). As a self- 
causing entity the will is not determined by reason or ground (WWR 1: 287). The 
will's freedom stems from the absence of causation. This overall freedom means 
that when the will manifests, or objectifies, itself in the phenomenal realm it does 
so freely. In other words, the will's actions are free. We saw in the previous section 
on 'character' that a person's character is determined by an event that occurs 
outside time, and therefore is not subject to alteration by events occurring in time 
(WWR 1: 286, 287). It is because of this that the objectified phenomena of the will, 
such as human beings, are not free. Each action of the will's phenomena is 
necessarily determined by the will's free willing (WWR 1: 288).
As well as the 'freedom' to bring phenomena into existence -  in other words, to 
objectify itself -  the will can also express its freedom through its phenomena in 
one other way: the will can resign within particular phenomena. Only the will can 
freely resign from life (WWR 1: 285, 288, 301). That, according to Schopenhauer, is 
the only way the will expresses its freedom in the phenomenal realm: the will 
ceases to will (WWR 1: 404). Human beings are the only phenomena of the will in 
which resignation of the will can occur (WWR 1: 288). Only in the highest grade of 
the will's objectification (WWR 1: 253) can the will acquire knowledge of its true 
nature, namely that all is one, undifferentiated entity, and that suffering is 
therefore unavoidable. It is the human capacity to perceive in a will-free manner, 
i.e., to present knowledge of the underlying basis of existence in the form of 
Platonic Ideas, that then allows the will to understand itself as 'one'. The will 
cannot be abolished, or quietened, by anything other than knowledge of its inner 
nature (WWR 1: 400, 403).
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Given that only the will is free, the intellect can at best promote the will's 
resignation by presenting it with knowledge that is a disincentive for action. The 
ultimate act of resignation, however, is not something the intellect can cause. The 
most the intellect can do is to place the will in a position from which it freely 
chooses to resign from life (WWR 1: 285, 395). In short the intellect can promote 
the will's self-understanding, but cannot make it resign as a consequence of such 
knowledge.
It is something comparable to this conception of free will that we observe in 
Beckettian theatre of asceticism: release from the servitude of the will is ultimately 
a matter of'grace' (WWR 1: 404; Weller, 2005: 81; Young, 2005: 193) or the will's 
choosing to resign. Whereas one individual will freely resigns from life when 
confronted with knowledge of oneness and ubiquitous suffering, another will 
freely chooses to continue striving (Atwell, 1995: 164-5).
Thus it is that in Endgame we see one willing subject, Hamm, freely resign from life 
when presented with knowledge of his true, intelligible, character (Beckett, 1958: 
50), and in Happy Days we witness another willing subject, Winnie, continue to 
strive despite having been presented with knowledge of her own suffering 
(Beckett, 1961: 29). Beckett appears to argue that the will's resignation is a matter 
of grace. All the intellect can do is hold fast to its goal of breaking the will. As to 
whether the will resigns is ultimately a matter for the will alone.
Conclusion
I have argued that Schopenhauer's ontological aspect of the 'I', the subject of 
willing, is a productive way of approaching a number of Beckett's tragic characters.
152
Many of the features of the Schopenhauerian willing subject are also present in 
Beckett's depiction of the dominant aspect of his tragic pseudocouples. These 
features include the willing subject's sexual aspect, and the propensity to strive in 
a tireless, 'blind' fashion. In addition to this, Beckett appears to draw upon 
Schopenhauer's understanding of will as a person's 'character', and 
Schopenhauer's conception of'free will', both in terms of the ability to enter into 
existence, and the ability to resign from life.
Given this ontological basis, we may understand the tactics employed by Beckett's 
willing subjects -  Vladimir, Pozzo, Hamm, Nagg, Winnie, and Mr. Shower, or Cooker 
-  as a manifestation of the capabilities of the Schopenhauerian willing subject. As 
the will's essential nature is to strive, striving is the central, indeed only, weapon 
that the will employs to compel the knowing subject to perform its role as servant 
of the will. Beckett depicts this propensity to strive as the urge to go 'on', and the 
drive to 'resume the struggle'. In addition to this, Beckett, who, unlike 
Schopenhauer, gives a voice to the will (O'Hara, 1981: 265, 267), also depicts the 
compulsion to strive in another way, namely as an endless series of demands for 
the habitual information that will avert suffering. By tirelessly coercing the 
knowing subject to provide habitual information (Beckett, 1999: 90), the willing 
subject attempts to avoid the 'suffering of being' (Beckett, 1999: 18-19). The 
intellect's attempts to refuse the willing subject's demands for the provision of 
information is the subject matter of the next chapter on Schopenhauerian and 
Beckettian epistemology.
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Chapter 6: Epistemology -  The Subject of Knowing
Introduction
Schopenhauer's conception of one's intellectual aspect, the knowing subject, 
provides a productive framework for interpreting the behaviour of a number of 
Beckett's middle-period tragic characters, namely Estragon, Lucky, Clov, Nell, 
Willie, and Mrs. Shower or Cooker. The intellect that Schopenhauer describes is the 
intellect that functions as a servant of the will; it is the intellect that perceives itself 
as one with the body within which it finds itself, and through which it experiences 
the world (WWR 1: 176; Schopenhauer, 1974a: 75). Though I believe there are 
many similarities between Schopenhauer's knowing subject and the knowing 
subject one finds in Beckett's middle period tragedies, the intellectual aspect of the 
self that one finds in these works is not the typical intellect as described by 
Schopenhauer -  rather it is the intellect that refuses to properly perform its servile 
function. I believe we may understand Beckett's intellectual character as such by 
the way they refuse to do the very things that Schopenhauer describes as the 
knowing subject's normal, will-serving, functions. The intellect's normal role is to 
provide representations in space and time, form concepts based upon these 
representations, and so on. These representations serve as motives for the will.
The Beckettian intellect essentially refuses to perform, or subverts, its function of 
providing motives to the individual will, which in turn continues to demand there 
presentation. In other words, whereas the Schopenhauerian formula for action 
may be understood as Character + Motive = Action (WWR 1: 106), Beckett's 
formula for ascetic practice may be understood as Character -  Motive 
(Representation) = Inaction. To understand the way Beckett's intellectual 
characters refuse to provide habitual information to the willing subject, we must 
first understand the way they would normally act when acting as a servant of the 
will, and that normal way of functioning is the basis to Schopenhauerian 
epistemology.xxxvi
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The Status and Role of the Knowing Subject
That which within us 'knows', or generates a picture of the world for the benefit of 
the willing subject, is the subject of knowing (WWR 1: 5). In contrast to the 
primary status of the will in the formation of the self, the subject of knowing is 
described variously as 'secondary' (WWR 1: 292), a ‘point of unity' or 'focus' of 
brain activity (WWR 2: 499), a 'mere function of the brain, and ... not our real self 
(WWR 2: 239), and the surface of a deep body of water (WWR 2: 216; Aquila,
1993: 245). Schopenhauer often describes the intellect as something that has 
occurred by 'accident' (WWR 2: 201), the result of the will-to-life's ceaseless 
striving (see Janaway, 1989: 257). Essentially what we understand as animal 
intellect is, for Schopenhauer, a result of the increased needs of particular 
manifestations, or objectifications of the will, (WWR 1:150; WWR 2: 205). For 
essentially defenceless human beings to persist in a hostile environment more and 
more intelligence is required, to the point where the intellect occupies a greater 
part of the brain, and, finally, reason comes about (WWR 1: 151; WWR 2: 205; 
278). But as this hypothesis indicates, intellect depends upon the existence of the 
organism, which in turn depends upon the will (WWR 2: 278). Therefore 'mind' is 
a 'product of the will' (Magee, 1997: 161), the will's 'will-to-know' (WWR 2: 258).
In Schopenhauer's conception of the self, then, the subject of knowing, or intellect, 
is a 'servant' (WWR 1: 176), or 'a mere slave and bondman of the will' (WWR 2: 
212) that the will drives towards life (WWR 2: 360):
Enter Pozzo and Lucky. Pozzo drives Lucky by means of a rope passed 
around his neck, so that Lucky is first to appear... Lucky carries a heavy 
bag, a folding stool, a picnic basket and a greatcoat. Pozzo a whip 
(Beckett, 1956: 21).
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Throughout the three plays under consideration, Beckett consistently employs the 
motif of utility or domestication to depict the way the willing subject considers its 
knowing subject. Pozzo has no qualms about calling Lucky a 'hog' (Beckett, 1956: 
40}. Vladimir reprimands Estragon in the same way (Beckett, 1956: 69], though 
admittedly with less conviction. Hamm refers to Clov as his dog; something of 
which Clov is more than aware (Beckett, 1958: 12, 30). Indeed, Pozzo also derides 
Lucky's distress by suggesting that 'old dogs have more dignity' (Beckett, 1956: 
32). Conjuring up the image of children approaching a violent dog, Pozzo also tells 
Vladimir and Estragon to be careful when approaching Lucky, as he is 'wicked... 
with strangers' (1956: 22). Winnie's question about the nature of a hog is as much 
about putting Willie in his place, as it is the desire to know a basic fact:
WINNIE: ... genuine pure... ah! hog's setae. [Pause.] What is a
hog exactly? [Pause. Turns slightly towards WILLIE.] 
What exactly is a hog, Willie, do you know, I can't 
remember. [Pause. Turning a little further, pleading.] 
What is a hog, Willie, please! [Pause.]
WILLIE: Castrated male swine. [Happy expression appears on
WINNIE'S face.] Reared for slaughter. [Happy 
expression increases...] (Beckett, 1961: 22).
Thus Beckett consistently depicts the relationship between the willing and 
knowing subject as that of user and used, master and servant, owner and 
owned—a fundamentally oppressive relationship regardless of how the willing 
subject chooses to view the union—be it as one of 'loyalty', or 'love', or 'friendship'.
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vis inertiae
That the individual will must drive the intellect towards life has much to do with 
the fact that the intellect is by its very nature 'indolent'. Unlike the tireless will 
(WWR 2: 239), the intellect tires easily (WWR 2: 211). Indeed, without the 
insistence of the will, and its constant promptings into action, the intellect quickly 
comes to rest:
... the intellect, like everything physical, is subject to vis inertiae [force of 
inertia], and is therefore active only when it is put in motion by 
something else, by the will; and this will rules it, guides it, incites it to 
further effort, in short imparts to it the activity that is not originally 
inherent in it. Therefore it willingly rests as soon as it is allowed to do 
so, and often declares itself to be indolent and disinclined to activity 
[WWR 2: 213).
Because of this tendency, Beckett's willing subjects have devised a variety of ways 
of summoning their respective knowing subjects. Pozzo and Hamm, summon, or 
put their respective knowing subjects into motion, with the tug of a rope and the 
blowing of a whistle. Nagg, the willing subject, summons Nell, his knowing subject, 
by knocking on the lid of her ashcan, and Winnie rouses Willie in a number of 
ways, namely by spitting toothpaste at him, calling 'Hoo-oo', and prodding him 
with her parasol (Beckett, 1956: 23; 1958: 13,18; 1961: 2-4).
Winnie portrays Willie's 'indolence' in terms of his having no 'zest for life':
Poor Willie ... no z e s t... for anything ... no in terest... in life ... poor dear 
Willie ... sleep for ever ... marvellous g ift... nothing to touch i t ... in my 
opinion ... always said so ... wish I had it... (Beckett, 1961: 2).
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Again, in Schopenhauerian terms we may productively view Willie's behaviour as 
revealing the vis inertiae so typical of the intellect prior to its being compelled to 
move (WWR 2: 213). Willie, as an 'indolent' knowing subject, 'disinclined to 
activity' (WWR 2: 213) requires constant prompting to perform his role:
WINNIE: [She strikes down at him with beak of parasol]
... Don't go off on me again now dear will you, I 
may need you. [Pause.] No hurry, no hurry, just 
don't curl up on me again (Beckett, 1961: 4).
And later:
WINNIE: Do you know what has occurred, Willie?
[Pause.] Have you gone off on me again? 
(Beckett, 1961: 16).
Beckett has Estragon enact this characteristic of vis inertiae by falling asleep 
throughout Acts I and II of Waiting for Godot (see Beckett, 1956: 15, 82, 88, 89). 
This state of sleeping is, for the most part, interrupted by Vladimir, who appears 
unable to tolerate existence without the 'company' of his 'friend':
ESTRAGON: Let's stop talking for a minute, do you mind?
VLADIMIR: [feebly.] All right. [Estragon sits down on the mound. 
Vladimir paces agitatedly to and fro, halting from 
time to time to gaze into distance off. Estragon falls 
asleep. Vladimir halts before Estragon.] Gogol ... 
Gogol ... GOGO!
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Estragon wakes with a start.
ESTRAGON: (restored to the horror of his situation.) I was asleep!
[Despairingly.) Why will you never let me sleep?
VLADIMIR: I felt lonely (Beckett, 1956: 15).
In this passage we see the interplay of the two subjects of the T at work: whereas 
Vladimir as will is tireless (WWR 1:164), Estragon's constitution ensures that he 
tires quickly. Only when the knowing subject is pressed into service by the willing 
subject does it then possess the requisite energy to function (WWR 2: 213).
True to his nature as the easily tiring knowing subject, Lucky falls asleep the 
moment he drops to the ground (Beckett, 1956: 23; cf. WWR 2: 213). Indeed, in a 
similar vein to Estragon, Lucky falls asleep 'as soon as [he] is allowed to do so' 
(WWR 2: 213). Not until the rope is yanked, that is, not until Pozzo presses him 
into service, does Lucky wake up.
The interplay between the willing and knowing subjects -  where the former 
presses the latter into service -  is portrayed throughout the three plays under 
consideration. Pozzo demands that his slave, Lucky, 'think' by abusively ordering 
him to do so -  ‘Think, pig!... Think ... Think' (Beckett, 1956: 42). Similarly, 
Estragon is ordered by his willing subject, Vladimir, to 'return the ball', that is 
resolve Vladimir's uncertainty (Beckett, 1956: 12):
VLADIMIR: Do you not recognise the place?
ESTRAGON: Recognize! What is there to recognize? All my
lousy life I've crawled about in the mud! And 
you talk to me about scenery! [Looking wildly 
about him.) Look at this muckheap! I've never 
stirred from it! (Beckett, 1956: 61).
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VLADIMIR: You don't remember any fact, any
circumstance?
ESTRAGON: [weary.) Don't torment me, Didi (Beckett,
1956:66).
In typical Schopenhauerian fashion, Estragon as knowing subject is 'indolent and 
disinclined to activity' (WWR 2: 213), sarcastically declaring, when prompted, that 
he finds Vladimir's concerns 'most extraordinarily interesting' (Beckett, 1956: 13). 
In Endgame, Hamm orders Clov to have 'a bright idea':
HAMM: ... Think of something.
CLOV: What?
HAMM: An idea, have an idea. [Angrily). A bright idea!
CLOV: ...Ah!
HAMM: What a brain! (Beckett, 1958: 33).
In Happy Days, Winnie bombards Willie with a number of incessant questions, as, 
similarly, Mrs. Shower or Cooker is continually asked to discover the meaning of 
things, and to explain the world to Mr. Shower or Cooker (Beckett, 1961: 9, 22,19- 
20). In each case we witness the depiction of internal cause and effect in the form 
of the individual will's prompting, and the knowing subject's response.
In turn, as the knowing subject ceases to act as soon as the will ceases to drive it 
forward (WWR 2: 213), the willing subject requires a motive to provide it with 
guidance (WWR 2: 208). In Schopenhauerian terms, each of the subjects of
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knowing and willing needs the other to move—the former requires the latter to 
move at all, the latter requires the former to move in a particular way.
Whilst the will may insist that we strive, the intellect determines the course ofthat 
movement in the form of the motives it presents. That the willing subject, Pozzo, 
for example, requires a motive to proceed, and presently lacks 'motivation' is 
captured in a number of ways. First, when deciding to remain in Vladimir and 
Estragon's company a little longer, Pozzo is faced with the problem of how he is to 
return to a seated position:
POZZO: But how am I to sit down now, without
affectation, now that I have risen? Without 
appearing to -  how shall I say - falter. [To 
V ladim ir.) I beg your pardon? [Silence.) Perhaps 
you didn't speak (Beckett, 1956: 28)
And later:
POZZO: I'd like very much to sit down, but I don't quite
know how to go about it.
ESTRAGON: Could I be of any help?
POZZO: If you asked me perhaps.
ESTRAGON: What?
POZZO: If you asked me to sit down.
ESTRAGON: Would that be a help?
POZZO: I fancy so.
ESTRAGON: Here we go. Be seated, sir, I beg of you.
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POZZO: No, no, I w ouldn't think of it! [Pause. Aside.) Ask 
me again.
ESTRAGON: Come, come take a seat, I beseech you, you'll get 
pneumonia.
POZZO: You really think so?
ESTRAGON: Why it's absolutely certain.
POZZO: No doubt you are right. [He sits down.) Done it 
again! [Pause.) Thank you, dear fellow (Beckett, 
1956: 36).
In the first passage, Pozzo resorts to inventing a motive by imagining that someone 
has spoken to him, in the second passage Estragon provides the motive, that is, 
Estragon acts as a surrogate for the recalcitrant Lucky. We thus w itness the 
process of character + motive = action. We may note that in a similar vein, Pozzo 
has great difficulty leaving in ACT I (Beckett, 1956: 47), and, after having fallen in 
ACT II, cannot get up w ithout assistance (Beckett, 1956: 77-84).
As one of Happy Days knowing subjects, Willie, m ust be prom pted into action, for 
as the knowing subject he inherently lacks 'will'. Winnie, in turn, requires a 
'motive' to proceed, for as willing subject she lacks motivation. This is a key 
Schopenhauerian thought:
... the will in itself is w ithout knowledge, but the understanding 
associated with it is w ithout will. Therefore the will behaves like a body 
tha t is moved, the understanding like the causes tha t set it in motion, 
for it is the medium of the motives (WWR 2: 208).
162
This relationship is never more clearly revealed than in the scene where Winnie 
raises her parasol above her head, and then, though no longer wishing to hold it 
aloft, is unable to put it down:
WINNIE: Reason says Put it down, Winnie, it is not
helping you, put the thing down and get on 
with something else. [Pause.] I cannot. I cannot 
move. [Pause.] No, something must happen in 
the world, take place, some change, I cannot, if 
I am to move again. [Pause.] Willie. [Mildly.] 
Help. [Pause.] No? Bid me put this thing down, 
Willie, I would obey you instantly, as I have 
always done, honoured and obeyed. [Pause.] 
Please Willie. [Mildly.] For pity's sake (Beckett, 
1961 : 16) .
In each of these examples we see that whilst the individual will is the primary 
aspect of the self, it is beholden to the intellect to guide it by providing it with a 
motive towards which it may expend its energy. Without a motive, the individual 
will is unable to move. It is this understanding of cause and effect that Beckett 
appears to build upon when developing his ascetic method of Character -  Motive 
(Representation) = Inaction. The previous examples illustrate the physical 
frustration that ensues when the will is unable to act.
Role of the Knowing Subject
What, then, is the role of the intellect according to Schopenhauer? What functions 
does the intellect typically perform when acting as a servant of the will? In contrast
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to the will, which strives without an ultimate purpose, the knowing subject is the 
aspect of human beings that orders the world, that categorizes the chaos:
CLOV: I love order. It's my dream. A world where all would be
silent and still and each thing in its last place, under 
the last dust (Beckett, 1958: 39).
Unlike the blind, arational will, the knowing subject's role is to 'classify' and 'relate' 
the representations it generates ‘in such a way as to attain objective knowledge' 
(Janaway, 1989: 264). In this sense the subject of knowing is the 'cold and 
indifferent spectator' (WWR 2: 277-8) of the world it represents. Without the 
knowing subject there are no objects in the world. Objects, representations, 
require a knowing subject, for in Schopenhauerian epistemology, there is no object 
without a subject because to say 'object' is to say 'representation', and all 
representations are creations of the knowing subject (WWR 1:13-14; Atwell,
1995: 11). Metaphorically, the subject of knowing may be understood as a set of 
eyes for the will that is otherwise blind:
The will, which hitherto followed its tendency in the dark with extreme 
certainty and infallibility, has at this stage kindled a light for itself (WWR 
1: 150):
This 'light' provided by the intellect is the 'world as representation'. Schopenhauer 
describes the world of representation as the 'self-knowledge of the will' (WWR 1: 
151; 165; 274):
POZZO: Guess who taught me all these beautiful things. [Pause.
Pointing to Lucky.) My Lucky!... But for him, all my 
thoughts, all my feelings would have been of common
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things... Beauty, grace, truth of the first water, I knew 
they were all beyond me. So I took a knook (Beckett, 
1956: 33].
In saying this, Pozzo essentially reiterates a claim that Schopenhauer makes about 
the will: that in itself the will is without consciousness (WWR 2: 201], that is, the 
will is 'blind'. Only by acquiring intellect as a servant -  or 'taking a knook' in 
Beckettian terms -  does the will gain an understanding of the world, and thus of 
itself. In Pozzo's act of taking a slave to reveal the world we therefore see a parallel 
to Schopenhauer's will 'kindling a light for itself in the form of the world as 
representation. Pozzo's 'knowledge' is the sum total of what Lucky has revealed to 
him. The will knows what it knows about itself, then, because of the material 
presented to it by the knowing subject (WWR 2: 277; WWR 1: 410]:
... the will-intellect union knows, in virtue of the intellect component, 
what it as will wills, that is, what its nature is only by knowing the world 
of appearance (Atwell, 1995: 28).
When acting as a servant of the will, that is, when affirming the will, the intellect 
presents the world as an unending series of particularities, and, as a consequence 
of this, the will also perceives, or misperceives, itself as an individual amongst 
innumerable individuals. Perceiving the word in this way, the will understands the 
world in relation to its own needs (WWR 1: 176; Atwell, 1995: 154]. Broadly 
understood, the essential role of the intellect is to provide the willing subject with 
representations of the world, which permit the willing subject to act in a manner 
that promotes the survival of the species. These representations act as 'motives' 
for the will to act upon (WWR 2: 206, 286]. As we recall, there are two necessary 
factors for an action to occur: character (the individual, human, will], and a motive 
(in the form of a representation]. Providing the second aspect of this formula for 
action, the intellect 'lays before the will all kinds of things, and in accordance with
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these the will selects what is in conformity with its true nature...' (WWR 2: 223; 
see also WWR 2: 358).
It is to the end of survival that the will has generated the will-to-know (WWR 2: 
258). It is also for the purpose of survival that the will, as the dominant, primary, 
aspect of the self, also possesses the will-not-to-know (WWR 2: 208). Indeed the 
primary status of the will is revealed by the will's ability to preclude the intellect 
from presenting harmful representations, as much as it is revealed by the will's 
ability to have the intellect generate actionable representations:
Our interest in preserving a tolerable view of ourselves often intervenes 
to prevent our thinking the truth (Janaway, 1989: 260).
In the interests of self-preservation, the intellect must often subvert its own 
function, which is to provide an accurate representation of the world, so that the 
will may not suffer the pain of that accuracy (Janaway, 1989-. 263-4). Given this, the 
will often 'prohibits the intellect from having certain representations' that it knows 
from previous occasions will cause it distress (WWR 2: 208; and see Gardner,
1999: 377).
This normal functioning of the will-intellect relationship is perhaps best captured 
by the interaction of the pseudocouple of Vladimir and Estragon. Vladimir's 
primary status is revealed by his ability to both refuse information that he believes 
may prove harmful, and, conversely, to demand certain information that allows 
him to avoid suffering.
Each time Vladimir awakens Estragon, Estragon endeavours to share with 
Vladimir the substance of his ‘nightmares'. Vladimir's response to this proposal is 
enlightening:
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ESTRAGON: I had a dream.
VLADIMIR: Don't tell me!
ESTRAGON: I dreamt that—
VLADIMIR: DON'T TELL ME!
ESTRAGON: (g estu re  tow ards the  universe.) This one is 
enough for you, is it? [Silence.) It's not nice of 
you, Didi. Who am I to tell my private 
nightmares to if I can't tell them to you?
VLADIMIR: Let them remain private. You know I can't bear 
that (Beckett, 1956: 15-16; see also 70, 89).
In addition to the suppression of painful thoughts, the subversion of the intellect's 
main function may also involve the production of positive representations. Near the 
beginning of ACT II, for example, Vladimir has Estragon repeat a number of 
platitudes seemingly for his own benefit:
VLADIMIR: You must be happy too, deep down, if you only
knew it.
ESTRAGON: Happy about what?
VLADIMIR: To be back with me again.
ESTRAGON: Would you say so?
VLADIMIR: Say you are happy, even if it's not true.
ESTRAGON: What am I to say?
VLADIMIR: Say, I am happy.
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ESTRAGON: I am happy.
VLADIMIR: So am I.
ESTRAGON: So am I.
VLADIMIR: We are happy.
ESTRAGON: We are happy (Beckett, 1956: 60).
Here the will w ants the intellect to profess a version of the world tha t it knows not 
to be true, so tha t the will may not know, or forget, how unhappy it is. This ability 
to falsify one's understanding of the world proves to Beckett and to Schopenhauer 
that, far from the truth, providing an acceptable version of itself is often the m ost 
im portant thing for the will not to suffer, and for the will to life:
... the will, when its servant the intellect, is unable to produce the thing 
desired, compels this servant at any rate to picture this thing to it, and 
generally to undertake the role of comforter, to pacify its lord and 
m aster, as a nurse does a child... Here the intellect is bound to do 
violence to its own nature, which is aimed at truth, since it is 
compelled, contrary to its own laws, to regard as true things tha t are 
neither true nor probable and often scarcely possible, m erely in order 
to pacify, soothe, and send to sleep for a while the restless and 
unm anageable will. We clearly see here who is m aster and who is 
servant (WWR 2: 216-217).
It is because of this capacity of the will, namely to preclude painful knowledge, tha t 
the intellect m ust devise an ascetic method that allows for the presentation of 
m aterial the will has already deemed harmful. The Beckettian ascetic method, 
w here the intellect appears to perform  its role of servant of the will but in effect 
provides representations tha t lack actionable material, is the Beckettian ascetic's 
means of circumventing the will's will-not-to-know. The Beckettian ascetic m ethod
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of depriving the will of habitual consciousness ultimately permits the intellect's 
presentation of harmful knowledge in the form of an involuntary memory.
Having provided a broad outline of the role of the Schopenhauerian knowing 
subject, and the way that Beckett appears to engage with this material, I shall now 
discuss the specific way that the intellect typically functions, and the material that 
is generated by an intellect when it acts as a servant of the will. To this end, one 
needs to look primarily to the First Book of Schopenhauer's main work, and to his 
doctoral dissertation, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle o f Sufficient Reason.xxxvii
The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
In the Fourfold Root Schopenhauer explains that there are four kinds of objects in 
the world because the subject has the capacity to project four kinds of objects as 
representations (WWR 1: 7,11). These objects divide into four distinct classes: 
empirical or 'real' objects; concepts; space and time; and, finally human will. 
Importantly, the Fourfold Root describes the 'normal' way in which the intellect 
functions when it acts as a servant of the will, that is, when it provides 
representations of individual things as motives for action. We may understand 
Beckett's knowing subjects as knowing subjects by their refusal to perform the 
very functions for which they were generated, and which the willing subject has 
come to expect them to perform.
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Empirical objects
The first class of object described in the Fourfold Root is that of empirical objects. 
Empirical objects begin as raw data received by the senses, which the intellect's 
faculty of understanding converts into objects that exist in space and time 
(Schopenhauer, 1974a: 75; WWR 1: 11-12). Unlike Kantian epistemology, in 
Schopenhauerian thought there is no role for the faculty of reason in 
perception.5“™“’ Though Schopenhauer divides the intellect into the two faculties of 
'understanding' and 'reason', only the understanding is at work in the generation 
of empirical objects (Young, 2005: 37-9). White describes the process in the 
following way:
Sensibility plays an important part in the creation of real objects by 
imposing time and space upon the data given to the intellect, but it is the 
faculty of understanding that plays the leading role, both 'summoning 
space' to its aid and imposing its own form of causality upon the data. 
What happens is that sensory data are presented to the intellect and 
'conceived of by the understanding as effects; or, to put the point 
another way, the understanding infers that objects cause the data. Since 
inner sensibility imposes its form of time upon the data, and since outer 
sensibility at the bidding of the understanding imposes its form of space, 
the outcome is an inferred, spatiotemporal, and causally active object 
(White, 1999: 71-72; see also Janaway, 1989: 157-8)).
In other words, with the aid of space and time, the understanding alone attributes 
a cause to an effect (WWR 1: 11-12,19):
In sum, then, for both us and the non-human animals, the entire 
rich fabric of the world of objects is constructed for us by the
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understanding, entirely without the aid of concepts (Young, 2005:
3 9 }  xxxix
We may understand a number of Beckett's characters as knowing subjects by the 
way they refuse to perform the normal intellectual function of generating 
empirical objects. In the tragedies that comprise Beckett's theatre of asceticism, 
the willing subject of each pseudocouple expects his or her respective knowing 
subject to perform this essential function. This, I believe, is particularly evident in 
the play Endgame. In Endgame, for example, we see a number of exchanges 
between the willing subject, Hamm, and the knowing subject, Clov, where the 
former demands empirical knowledge, and the latter refuses to provide clear, that 
is, actionable, empirical information:
HAMM: Go and get two bicycle-wheels.
CLOV: There are no more bicycle wheels.
NAGG: Me pap!
HAMM: Give him his pap.
CLOV: There's no more pap.
HAMM: Nature has forgotten us.
CLOV: There's no more nature.
HAMM: If I could drag myself down to the sea! I'd make a 
pillow of sand for my head and the tide would come.
CLOV: There's no more tide.
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HAMM: Give me a rug, I'm freezing.
CLOV: There are no more rugs (Beckett, 1958: 15,16, 41, 44].
It is through his refusal to provide his willing subject, Hamm, with actionable 
motives in the form of empirical objects, tha t we may understand Clov as an 
example of a Beckettian ascetic intellect, or a knowing subject tha t is attem pting to 
break its individual will.
Concepts
The second class of objects in the Fourfold Root is tha t of'concepts', or, as 
Schopenhauer refers to them, 'representations of representations' (WWR 1: 40], as 
for a concept to have any currency it m ust be built upon intuited knowledge, that 
is, the kind of knowledge gained in the first class of objects (WWR 1: 21]. A concept 
is a representation tha t has been fixed in the mind, and can be draw n upon at a 
later time, tha t is, when the actual thing perceived is no longer there. It is the 
faculty of reason that fixes intuitions of the understanding into concepts, and this it 
does for the purpose of explanation (WWR 1: 21-22]. The process of combining 
concepts, then, forms a 'judgem ent', or 'thought' (Young, 2005: 40]. A 'true ' 
judgem ent is one that follows the rules of logic (Schopenhauer 1974a: 154-156].
Schopenhauer is generally dismissive of the hum an capacity to reason, describing 
reason as ‘an em pty poor thing' (Schopenhauer, 1974a: 147] and 'suitably called 
"reflection" since tha t is all it is, a pallid reflection of perception' (WWR 1: 62]. He 
limits the role of the faculty of reason to that of repeating existing representations, 
and having no role to play in the formation of representations. There are several 
reasons for this dim inution of the im portance of reason in perception.
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There are, of course, Schopenhauer's well-documented concerns with thinkers 
such as Hegel, Schelling, and Fichte, whom Schopenhauer believed dealt with ideas 
that had no basis in intuited reality, that is, they worked with concepts that could 
not be traced to what they had perceived or experienced, and were, therefore, 
groundless (see, for example, WWR 1: 26). Schopenhauer is also attempting to 
emphasise the primary status of the will in the formation of the organism. In 
philosophy, prior to Schopenhauer, the human capacity for reason was held to 
differentiate human beings from the rest of nature. The devaluation of reason in 
perception is an attempt on Schopenhauer's part to return human beings to nature 
by re-emphasising our essence as primarily 'willing', and not 'knowing' organisms 
(see, for example, WWR 2: 216-217).
However, Schopenhauer's main concern about the human capacity to reason is that 
it ultimately undermines our intuitive grasp of the Platonic Idea, and thus the 
possibility of our seeing through the principle of individuation. One of the key 
features of reason is deliberation, which Schopenhauer believes, 'begets 
irresolution and uncertainty' and 'in many cases' reason 'obstructs the adequate 
objectification of the will through action’ (WWR 1: 151-2). Essentially, the human 
capacity to reason gets in the way of the human capacity to perceive the Idea:
Reason is necessary... where rapid decisions, bold action, quick and 
firm comprehension are needed, but if it gains the upper hand, if it 
confuses and hinders the intuitive, immediate discovery of what is right 
by the pure understanding, and at the same time prevents this from 
being grasped, and if it produces irresolution, then it can easily ruin 
everything (WWR 1: 57-8).
As a mere tool of the will, then, reason, cannot free a person from subjectivity 
(WWR 1: 301; Zoller, 1995: 8-9). For Schopenhauer, reason cannot be a means to 
allow the will to know its true nature because the products of reason, namely 
'concepts' are one of the fourfold root, and therefore one of the ways that the
173
intellect acts in a will-full manner. Through reason the will still only knows 
representation, and individuation (WWR 1: 185-6; and 190]. Whilst reason 
permits a 'conflict of motives', that is, the ability to deliberate WWR 2: 205], and to 
weigh up a number of options, the strongest motive - the one to which the will by 
its nature is drawn - still determines the will by necessity (WWR 1: 297]. In this 
way, a person is still subject to the control of motives (WWR 1: 301]. Reason, 
therefore, just like intuited knowledge, is a means of permitting the will to act. 
Though in the case of reason, action occurs after pause for thought, or an 'elective 
decision' (WWR1: 301].
All in all, Schopenhauer believes that the human capacity to reason has made life 
worse:
With abstract knowledge, with the faculty of reason, doubt and error 
have appeared in the theoretical, care and remorse in the practical 
(WWR 1: 35].
Reason enhances one's ability to suffer, as the ability to reflect on the past, and to 
project into the future magnifies the suffering one feels in the present (WWR 1: 
98]. Schopenhauer's criticism of reason -  the way it promotes irresolution, and the 
way it provides for additional suffering -  appears to be the very thing that Beckett 
utilizes in his ascetic practice. Indeed, I believe we may know a number of 
Beckett's tragic characters as subjects of knowing, then, by the way they use the 
capacity to reason not to furnish the individual will with judgements, but rather to 
cause irresolution.
In Waiting for Godot, we witness the knowing subject, Lucky, attempt to deny his 
willing subject, Pozzo, a judgement. In each case, Lucky presents a concept or 
thought which is either unfinished or lost, and by doing so precludes the addition 
of a further concept that then permits a judgment to be formed. This in turn
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prevents the will from acting, as the individual will (character) cannot act without 
a motive. As an example of this ascetic method I here provide an excerpt from 
Lucky’s 'tirade' that occurs in Act I:
LUCKY: Given the existence as uttered forth in the public
works of Puncher and Wattmann of a personal God ... 
who ... loves us dearly with some exceptions for 
reasons unknown ... but not so fast and considering 
what is more that as a result of the labours left 
unfinished crowned by the Acacacacademy of 
Anthropopopometry of Essy-in-Possy of Testew and 
Cunard it is established beyond all doubt all other 
doubt than that which clings to the labours of men that 
as a result of the labours left unfinished of Testew and 
Cunard it is established as hereinafter but not so fast 
for reasons unknown that as a result of the public 
works of Puncher and Wattmann it is established 
beyond all doubt that in view of the labours of Fartov 
and Belcher left unfinished for reasons unknown of 
Tetstew and Cunard left unfinished ... and considering 
what is more much more grave that in the light of the 
labours lost of Steinweg and Peterman it appears what 
is much more grave that in the light the light the light 
of the labours lost of Steinweg and Peterman ... 
(Beckett, 1956: 42-45).
The capacity to reason allows human beings to hold the will at bay (WWR 1: 202; 
WWR 2: 205), because the capacity to reason allows human beings to think 
'ephectically', that is, to suspend judgement, to delay, and to prevaricate/1 
Beckettian asceticism is a destructive utilization of this capacity. Beckett's 
intellectual aspects provide the impression of reasoned thought -  by providing a
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number of options -  but essentially deny the will an elective choice by never 
bringing the process of providing concepts to an end:
LUCKY: On the other hand ... but not so fast... but not so fast...
(Beckett, 1956: 42-5).
Space and Time
The third class of objects in the fourfold root is time and space. Time and space are 
the a priori forms of inner and outer sensibility respectively (Schopenhauer,
1974a: 77,193), which are brought to bear upon the raw sensory data received by 
the body in the process of the understanding's production of empirical objects 
(Janaway, 1989: 39). As well as providing objects with place and succession, 'time 
and space are themselves perceived, [and thus constitute] the objects of pure, a 
priori, and immediate perception' (White, 1999: 80 in reference to Schopenhauer, 
1974a: 193). It is because of time and space that plurality has become possible or 
conceivable (WWR 1: 127); for time and space divide what is originally undivided 
by representing the will as a 'plurality of coexistent and successive things' (WWR 
1:112-113). For this reason, Schopenhauer describes time and space as the 
principium individuationis, or the principle of individuation. One of the intrinsic 
characteristics of the intellect, then, is to represent the world as fractured into 
successive moments and particular places, and thus to present this fractured 
version of the world as motivation for the will to act upon. Thus if the intellect 
provides the will with representations of individual things, then that, fractured 
knowledge, is the knowledge of the world that the will possesses. Based upon such 
information, the willing subject perceives itself as an individual among individuals 
(WWR 1: 373), and acts in a manner appropriate to such knowledge: that is, 
egoistically.
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We may understand a number of Beckett’s tragic characters as subjects of knowing 
by the way they refuse to provide their individual will with knowledge situated in 
time and space, or about time and space.
In Endgame, the knowing subject, Clov, responds to each one of Hamm's demands 
to structure the world, or situate events in the world, by offering a series of 
imprecise responses:
HAMM: ... What time is it?
CLOV: The same as usual.
HAMM: Is it light?
CLOV: It isn't dark (Beckett, 1958: 13, 42].
In Act II of the play, Happy Days, the knowing subject, Willie, takes a vow of 
silence, or, in other words, ceases to furnish the will with representations of 
the world. Having closed off all communication to his individual will, the 
willing subject, Winnie, has lost her sense of time. As we saw in an earlier 
discussion, time is one of the a prior functions of the intellect. Beckett 
represents the intellect's recalcitrance by revealing the fact that without the 
intellect the will has no understanding of time:
WINNIE: Willie. [Pause. Louder.] Willie. [Pause. Eyes front.] May
one still speak of time? [Pause.] Say it is a long time
now, Willie, since I saw y o u ......The bag is there,
Willie, as good as ever, the one you gave me that day .. 
to go to market. [Pause. Eyes front.] That day. [Pause.] 
What day? (Beckett, 1961: 23-4].
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In Waiting for Godot, we observe Pozzo's struggle to comprehend time itself 
without the aid of his intellect:
POZZO: Yes, the road seems long when one journeys all alone
for ... [he consults his watch) ... yes ... [he calculates) ... 
yes, six hours, that's right, six hours on end ... (Beckett, 
1956: 24)
Though Pozzo's calculations are rendered somewhat questionable, when he later 
refers to his watch to ascertain the length of time that has past since taking on 
Lucky as a slave:
POZZO: That was nearly sixty years ago ... [he consults his
watch) ... yes, nearly sixty years (33).
Pozzo refers to his watch once more -  in an attempt to estimate when the sun had 
begun to set (Beckett, 1956: 37) -  before finally misplacing his watch, that is, 
before he ultimately loses all sense of time (Beckett, 1956: 46). Pozzo 'loses' his 
watch after Lucky's self-castigating 'tirade'. Pozzo loses his sense of time because 
he no longer possesses the thing that tells the time. Without a functioning intellect, 
Pozzo is returned to a state of'blindness':
POZZO: The blind have no notion of time. The things of time
are hidden from them too (Beckett, 1956: 86).
The final example of a Beckettian intellect's refusal to provide certainty about time 
and space is also taken from Waiting for Godot. Tired of waiting for word from
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Godot, and wishing to leave, the knowing subject, Estragon, attempts to generate 
uncertainty, first about the meeting place (space) and then about the time of the 
meeting:
ESTRAGON: You're sure it was here?
VLADIMIR: What?
ESTRAGON: That we were to wait.
VLADIMIR: He said by the tree. (They look a t the tree.) Do 
you see any others?
ESTRAGON: What is it?
VLADIMIR: I don't know. A willow.
ESTRAGON: Where are all the leaves?
VLADIMIR: It must be dead.
ESTRAGON: No more weeping.
VLADIMIR: Or perhaps it isn't the season.
ESTRAGON: Looks to me more like a bush.
VLADIMIR: A shrub.
ESTRAGON: A bush.
VLADIMIR: A—■. What are you insinuating? That we've 
come to the wrong place?
ESTRAGON: He should be here.
VLADIMIR: He didn't say for sure he'd come.
ESTRAGON: And if he doesn't come?
VLADIMIR: We'll come back tomorrow.
ESTRAGON: And then the day after tomorrow. 
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V L A D IM IR : P o s s i b l y .
E S T R A G O N : A n d  s o  o n .
V L A D IM IR : T h e  p o i n t  is—
E S T R A G O N : U n t i l  h e  c o m e s .
V L A D IM IR : Y o u ' r e  m e r c i l e s s .
E S T R A G O N : W e  c a m e  h e r e  y e s t e r d a y .
V L A D IM IR : A h ,  n o ,  t h e r e  y o u ' r e  m i s t a k e n .
E S T R A G O N : W h a t  d i d  w e  d o  y e s t e r d a y ?
V L A D IM IR : W h a t  d i d  w e  d o  y e s t e r d a y ?
E S T R A G O N : Y e s .
V L A D IM IR : W h y  ... [ A n g r i l y ) .  N o t h i n g  is  c e r t a i n  w h e n  
y o u ' r e  a b o u t .
E S T R A G O N : In  m y  o p i n i o n  w e  w e r e  h e r e .
V L A D IM IR : [ l o o k i n g  a r o u n d ) .  Y o u  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  p l a c e ?
E S T R A G O N : I d i d n ' t  s a y  t h a t .
V L A D IM IR : W e l l ?
E S T R A G O N : T h a t  m a k e s  n o  d i f f e r e n c e .
V L A D IM IR : All t h e  s a m e  ... t h a t  t r e e . . .  [ t u r n i n g  t o w a r d s  t h e  
a u d i t o r i u m )  ... t h a t  b o g .
E S T R A G O N : Y o u ' r e  s u r e  i t  w a s  t h i s  e v e n i n g ?
V L A D IM IR : W h a t ?
E S T R A G O N : T h a t  w e  w e r e  t o  w a i t .
V L A D IM IR : H e  s a i d  S a t u r d a y .  [ P a u s e ) .  I t h i n k .
E S T R A G O N : Y o u  t h i n k .
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VLADIMIR: I must have made a note of it.
He fumbles in his pockets, bursting with 
miscellaneous rubbish.
ESTRAGON: [very insidious). But what Saturday? And is it 
Saturday? Is it not rather Sunday? [Pause.) Or 
Monday? [Pause.) Or Friday?
VLADIMIR: [looking wildly about him, as though the date 
was inscribed in the landscape.) It's not possible!
ESTRAGON: Or Thursday?
VLADIMIR: What'll we do?
ESTRAGON: If he came yesterday and we weren't here you 
may be sure he won't come again today.
VLADIMIR: But you say we were here yesterday.
ESTRAGON: I may be mistaken (1956:15).
Estragon's refusal to assist Vladimir necessarily involves a refusal to perform the 
very functions for which the knowing subject was generated (WWR 2: 258). That 
is, Estragon, in having to use the weapons at his disposal, necessarily refuses to 
provide information regarding space and time—the a priori functions of the 
intellect.
The Will
The fourth and final class of object in the Fourfold Root is the human will (White, 
1999: 64). In this final class we are each aware of ourselves in introspection as a
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subject of willing (Janaway, 2002: 26), that is, in self-consciousness the willing 
subject is object for the knowing subject (WWR 2: 202; White, 1999: 82):
Not only the consciousness of other things... but also self-consciousness 
... contains a knower and a known. Therefore self-consciousness could 
not exist if there were not in it a known opposed to a knower and 
different therefrom ... As the known in self-consciousness we find 
exclusively the will (WWR 2: 202).
We may understand a number of Beckett's characters as subjects of knowing by 
the way their subjects of willing describe feelings of being surveilled when 
ostensibly on their own. Beckett tends to represent this subject/object relationship 
by having the object in question - which in introspection is the willing subject - 
declare that it is being observed:
HAMM: All kinds of fantasies'. That I'm being watched
(Beckett, 1958: 45).
Beckett employs similar language of surveillance on two other occasions to denote 
the relationship of subject and object, and of the willing subject becoming an object 
for the knowing subject. In Act II of Waiting for Godot, the willing subject, Vladimir, 
declares:
At me too someone is looking, of me too someone is saying, he is 
sleeping... (Beckett, 1956: 91).
As in Acts I and II of Happy Days, Winnie, in a similar vein to both Vladimir and 
Hamm, understands herself as an object:
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WINNIE: Strange feeling that someone is looking at me.
I am clear, then dim, then gone, then dim 
again, then clear again, and so on, back and 
forth, in and out of someone's eye (Beckett, 
1961: 18).
And later:
WINNIE: Someone is looking at me still. [Pause.] Caring
for me still. [Pause.] ... Eyes on my eyes 
(Beckett, 1961: 23).
In self-consciousness the knowing subject experiences the subject of willing as 
'feeling' (WWR 1: 109), and, more specifically, the feelings of pleasure and pain. 
Pleasure and pain are physical responses to motives:
In the process of willing we feel the cause qua motive solicit the 
respective manifestation of our will. We experience internally and 
immediately the interaction of motive and will: the will is all ability and 
potential waiting to be called forth and realized through the approach of 
the motive (Zöller, 1999: 31)
Schopenhauer refers to this as the 'law of motivation', or cause and effect seen 
from the viewpoint of self-consciousness: 'Motivation is causation seen from 
within' (Schopenhauer, 1974a: 214).
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It is this process, this interaction between the knowing subject, and the willing 
subject that I believe Beckett stages in the three plays that constitute his theatre of 
asceticism. However, whereas Schopenhauer describes the workings of a typical 
intellect, one that presents an array of motives for action to the willing subject 
(WWR 2: 223), and either receives feelings of pleasure or pain depending upon 
their reception (see Janaway, 1989: 236), Beckett, on the other hand, portrays the 
self-conscious interaction between the knowing subject that refuses, or attempts to 
refuse, to provide a motive to the willing subject, which in turn expresses its 
distress at this lack:
HAMM: (anguished.) What's happening, what's
happening?
CLOV: Something is taking its course (Beckett, 1958:
17,26).
This dynamically sublime process of holding the will at bay by refusing to provide 
an actionable motive results in the will's protracted suffering. Earlier, I referred to 
this state of suffering as analogous to Schopenhauerian 'boredom': the experience 
of'fearful emptiness' (WWR 1: 312). Such suffering is caused, then, when the 
individual will is unable to discharge its energy towards a distinct object, for the 
very lack of such an object. Likewise, what the audience witnesses on the 
Beckettian stage is the intellect's refusal to provide an actionable motive, and the 
willing subject's increasing desperation in response to this state of affairs. Again, 
Beckett gives a voice to these feelings (O'Hara, 1981: 265, 267):
WINNIE: And now? [Pause. Low.] Help ... Help, Willie...
No? (Beckett, 1961:28).
It is my contention that the knowing subject's refusal to respond to these feelngs 
by providing a clear motive for action lies at the heart of Beckett's ascetic method.
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This understanding of Beckettian tragedy - as the display of a human intellect's 
attempts to refuse its own will the knowledge that it requires to be able act, or 
strive -  challenges the understanding of Beckettian tragedy that one finds in the 
works of Cavell [2002], and Critchley (1997). My main criticism of Cavell and 
Critchley's interpretation of Beckettian tragedy focuses on the ultimate intent that 
both authors believe underlies the on-going attempt to attain a state of 
meaninglessness. Whereas both Cavell and Critchley understand the refusal of 
meaning as an attempt on Beckett's part to convey the nihilistic affects of ascribing 
meaning to life (Cavell, 2002:150; Critchley, 1997: 179), I, on the other hand, 
argue that the refusal of meaning is undertaken with the intention of breaking the 
will, and attaining the will-less state of'nothing'. I believe the Beckettian intellect 
does not refuse meaning so that life may then become livable. The Beckettian 
intellect refuses to ascribe meaning to the world in its efforts to hold the will in a 
position of unalleviated suffering from which it may freely choose to resign from 
life (WWR 1: 285, 395). I believe that both Cavell and Critchley's reading of 
Beckettian tragedy, which understands the refusal of meaning as a task (Cavell, 
2002: 150,156; Critchley, 1997: 179), is one that is indeed supported by the 
subject matter of the works in question. However, I believe the underlying reason 
that both Cavell and Critchley provide for the determined attempt to remove 
meaning from the world -  namely to affirm existence -  is a claim that is supported 
by the implicit assertion that the role of art is to affirm existence. This claim is valid 
only if one reads Beckettian tragedy through the lens of Nietzschean aesthetics, 
which, as I have argued elsewhere, is to read Beckettian tragedy in the light of the 
critic of one of its most significant influences. The assumption that the role of art is 
to affirm existence (Nietzsche, 1993:16) in turn leads to the further assumption 
that the refusal of meaning in Beckettian tragedy is intended with life-affirming 
affect.
The reading that both Cavell and Critchley provide of Beckettian tragedy as an
attempt to affirm existence by removing the meaning that has been ascribed to life,
meaning that makes life unlivable, is valid only if one understands the refusal to
ascribe meaning to life as an end in itself. The fact that in Beckett's theatre of
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asceticism something occurs after the intellect has refused to ascribe meaning to 
the world suggests that the refusal of meaning is not an end in itself but a means to 
an end. The refusal to ascribe meaning is undertaken for the purpose of facilitating 
the presentation of painful knowledge in the form of an involuntary memory. Thus 
the Beckettian intellect refuses to provide the comfort of habitual consciousness -  
that is, a representation of the world in space and time, which positions the needs 
of the individual will as central -  so that information may be provided to the will 
that acts as a disincentive to all further action. The refusal to ascribe meaning to 
the world is the first part of a two-part ascetic method. This method will be 
explored at length in Chapters 8 and 9.
Conclusion
In this chapter, and the previous chapter, I have presented the argument 
Schopenhauer's subjects of willing and knowing provide a productive interpretive 
framework for understanding the actions of the warring parties of Beckett's 
middle-period tragedies. The war we witness on the Beckettian stage is a series of 
skirmishes that occur when the willing subject attempts to compel the knowing 
subject to present habitual information, and in turn the knowing subject refuses to 
provide representations that permit the 'will not to suffer' to avoid the suffering of 
being.
In the previous chapter I argued that we may understand Beckett's dominant 
characters as willing subjects by the way they behave, in particular the way they 
strive. In this chapter I have argued that we may understand Beckett's knowing 
subjects as such by the way they refuse to behave. The very things that Beckett's 
servants -  his slaves and browbeaten spouses -  refuse to do, namely to present 
information, or representations, in space and time, are the typical functions of the 
intellect as described in Schopenhauerian epistemology.
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With this understanding of the combatants in place I now turn to the nature of the 
war itself: asceticism, the deliberate breaking of the will.
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PART FOUR:
S chopenhauerian  and  B eckettian  Ethics
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Chapter 7: Schopenhauerian Ethics -  Asceticism
Introduction: Observation, Diagnosis, and Cure
By the expression asceticism ... I understand in the narrower sense this 
deliberate breaking of the will by refusing the agreeable and looking for 
the disagreeable, the voluntarily chosen way of life of penance and self­
chastisement, for the constant mortification of the will (WWR 1: 392).
In an earlier chapter, I discussed the subject of Schopenhauerian ontology 
(Chapter 5). For Schopenhauer the essence of existence is the will to life, and the 
fundamental nature, or characteristic of the will is that of ceaseless striving (WWR 
1: 148-9). For the will to manifest its nature it objectifies itself in countless 
individuals who are constantly pitted against one another in the phenomenal 
realm (see WWR 2: 350). Thus the state of nature is one of perpetual anxiety and 
fear (WWR 1: 196). It is the fundamental nature of the will, namely to strive, which 
results in suffering: to live, then, is to strive, and to strive is to suffer: 'suffering is 
essential to life' (WWR 1: 318; Jacquette, 2005: 116).
As the will has no goal, no end objective, towards which its striving is directed 
(WWR1: 164), there is, therefore, no end, or limit to one's suffering (WWR 1: 308; 
(jacquette, 2000: 45). Thus ‘the existence of an individual consists essentially in 
suffering with no positive end', and because 'suffering robs existence of positive 
value the existence of the individual has no positive value' (Gemes and Janaway, 
2012: 287). This leads Schopenhauer to assert that 'it would be better for us not to 
exist' (WWR 2: 605). But given that the individual who reaches such a conclusion 
already exists, what, then, can that individual do about their plight? There are 
essentially three options: the individual can continue to strive, the individual can
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take their own life, or the individual can seek to break their own will.
Building upon an awareness of the temporary painlessness that is said to 
accompany the aesthetic state -  namely that in the state of aesthetic consciousness, 
one is momentarily freed from desire (will), and thus freed from the suffering that 
accompanies striving -  Schopenhauer presents denial of the will through 
asceticism as a means of attaining permanent salvation:xli
aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists, to a large extent, in the fact 
that, when we enter the state of pure contemplation, we are raised for 
the moment above all willing, above all desires and cares; we are, so to 
speak, rid of ourselves. We are no longer the individual that knows in 
the interest of its constant willing ... but the eternal subject of knowing 
purified of the will ... From this we can infer how blessed must be the life 
of a man whose will is silenced not for a few moments, as in the 
enjoyment of the beautiful, but for ever, indeed completely extinguished, 
except for the fast glimmering spark that maintains the body and is 
extinguished with it. Such a man who, after many bitter struggles with 
his own nature, has at last completely conquered, is then left only as 
pure knowing being ... Nothing can distress or alarm him any more; 
nothing can any longer move him; for he has cut all the thousand 
threads of willing which hold us bound to the world, and which as 
craving, fear, envy, and anger drag us here and there in constant pain 
(WWR 1:390).
It is a central claim of Schopenhauerian thought, then, that the very thing that was 
brought about to facilitate the will's striving, the intellect, can, after having fully 
comprehended its essential nature as the source of suffering, ultimately attempt 'a 
negation of the will -  a self-negation in which the very distinction between self and 
world collapses' (Zöller, 1999: 30). Thus in Schopenhauerian thought there is an 
observation -  that life is essentially suffering -  followed by a diagnosis -  such
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suffering is the result of the arational will-to-life's unappeasable nature -  and 
finally a cure (WWR 1: 397) -  by ceasing to strive, suffering abates (Atwell, 1995: 
17; see also Atwell, 1996: 81; Janaway, 1999b: 13).
In this chapter on the subject of Schopenhauerian ethics, and in the next two 
chapters on Beckettian ethics, I have two interrelated objectives. The first objective 
is to explicate Schopenhauer's understanding of asceticism, which is perhaps best 
understood as a means of ethical self-destruction: 'To pursue the path of morality 
leads to the abolition of the will' (WWR 2: 215). Asceticism is ethical because it 
destroys the individual's essence, the will, and not merely the phenomenon, the 
will's 'objectification', or 'body', as is the case with the act of suicide, for example.xlii
The result of ethical self-destruction is that it temporarily removes striving and 
thus suffering from a part of the world. The act of suicide, on the other hand, 
provides the space in which another sentient being shall strive and suffer. Thus:
The only logically coherent freedom to be sought from the sufferings of 
the will is not to will death and willfully destroy the self, but to continue 
to live while quieting the will, in an ultra ascetic submissive attitude of 
sublime indifference toward both life and death (Jacquette, 2000: 49- 
50).
The second objective is to analyse Beckettian theatre in the light of Schopenhauer's 
understanding of ethical self-destruction. It is the central argument of this thesis 
that the plays Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days can be understood as 
Beckettian theatre of asceticism. Indeed I believe the staging of asceticism is 
Beckett's unique contribution to theatre, as it is, simultaneously, Beckett's unique 
contribution to ascetic thought to perform asceticism, or, in other words, to 
embody the process which leads to disembodiment.
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In addition to this, I contend that Beckettian theatre of asceticism presents the 
tragic spectator with practical lesson after lesson on the subject of ethical self- 
destruction. In a systematic manner, Beckettian tragedy explores both effective 
and ineffective means of breaking one's will. These successful and unsuccessful 
methods are discussed at length in the next two chapters. As well as this 
revolutionary approach to the role of art, and tragedy in particular, namely that 
Beckett employs the tragic form to portray a variety of ascetic methods (see my 
earlier chapter on Beckettian aesthetics, Chapter 4), Beckett also devises a new 
approach to the role o f asceticism. Whereas for Schopenhauer, asceticism is a 
means of maintaining a 'quieted' will (WWR 1: 379), a will already broken by the 
knowledge that suffering is something that is essential to life, for Beckett 
asceticism plays a far greater role in providing the knowledge of suffering that 
results in the will's initial breaking.
The order of the process of transformation for Schopenhauer is this: first the will is 
'quieted' or gives up all willing, and then the knowing subject practices asceticism 
so as to maintain a quieted will. In Beckettian tragedy this order is reversed: first 
the knowing subject practices asceticism, then the will is quieted, or freely chooses 
to give up all willing (WWR 1: 395). Thus whilst Schopenhauer argues that 
knowledge of suffering leads to asceticism (WWR 1: 400), Beckett argues that 
asceticism leads to knowledge of suffering.
There is a degree of confusion in the secondary literature on Schopenhauer 
regarding the role of asceticism. Jacquette for example appears to attribute 
Beckett's position to Schopenhauer:
The ascetic's indifference to life and death is not the means whereby the 
will is denied. Rather, the ascetic sets out to break and tame the will to 
life through a regimen of discipline and suffering, which in turn is meant 
to lead to the sort of knowledge or enlightenment that more 
permanently quiets the will (Jacquette, 2000: 49-50).
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It is important to understand that for Schopenhauer asceticism is practiced as a 
means of maintaining a will quieted by knowledge of reality, and that for the later 
ascetic, Beckett, asceticism is the tactic that brings about such knowledge. This will 
help us to understand the greater degree of ascetic vehemence that one finds in 
Beckettian thought when compared to Schopenhauerian thought in WWR, Vol. 2, as 
for Beckett, asceticism plays a far greater role in bringing the individual to an 
awareness of reality.
In the later Schopenhauerian-informed reading of Beckettian tragedy I argue that 
the Beckettian knowing subject employs the kind of ascetic practices discussed by 
Schopenhauer -  practices such as celibacy, poverty, self-chastisement, and self­
mortification -  to guide the individual will to an awareness of the ubiquitous 
nature of suffering. In short, Beckett employs ascetic practice to present the willing 
subject with knowledge of its own nature. In addition to this, I argue that Beckett 
also devises a new, revolutionary, method of ethical self-destruction. This 
revolutionary method can be understood in simple terms as the non-relief of 
boredom, the intention of which is to cause psychic harm. The non-relief of 
boredom, through the failure to present a clear motive for action, is part of a 
uniquely Beckettian, two-stage ascetic method. In the first stage, the intellect opens 
up a 'perilous zone' (Beckett, 1999:18-19) by denying the will habitual, and 
therefore, painless consciousness. In Beckettian terms, habitual knowledge refers 
to knowledge that conforms to the a priori functions of the intellect, that is, 
representations of empirical objects situated in space and time (Beckett, 1999: 90), 
which are generated for the benefit of the individual will's striving. In the 'perilous 
zone’ which has opened up because the intellect denies the will an understanding 
of the world in regard to its own limited needs, the intellect then, instead, presents 
the will with the uncensored, and therefore painful, knowledge of its own nature, 
or in Beckettian terms, an awareness of the 'suffering of being' (Beckett, 1999: 18- 
19).
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The Beckettian ascetic method, which I discuss at length in my play-by-play 
analysis of Beckettian theatre of asceticism, draws upon the human capacity to 
reason, which permits the intellect to hold the will at bay, or to stand back from the 
will's instinctive imperatives (WWR 1: 202; WWR 2: 205). It is not the received 
understanding of reason which Beckett utilizes, namely the ability to weigh up the 
pros and cons of alternative points of view, and then come to a conclusion, but 
rather the deliberative quality of reason. It is the possibility of not reaching a 
conclusion, of not presenting the will with a clear course of action, and thus 
preventing the will from being able to act that Beckett explores at length in his 
tragic works:
LUCKY: On the other hand ... with some exceptions ... for
reasons unknown ... but not so fas t... (1956: 42-43).
This is a reading of Beckettian tragedy, then, which understands Beckett's work as 
an important event in the history, and development, of ascetic thought. To better 
understand the import of Beckett's contribution to that history, it is important that 
we understand Beckett's work in relation to Schopenhauer, one of the advocates of 
asceticism whose work appears to have had a significant bearing on Beckettian 
asceticism. Only by first comprehending the theoretical foundation upon which 
Beckettian asceticism is built can one then also appreciate the major development 
of ascetic thought and practice that one finds in Beckettian tragedy. I therefore 
begin by outlining Schopenhauer's understanding of asceticism.
Definition of asceticism
For Schopenhauer asceticism 'is denial of the will-to-life' (WWR 2: 615), the 
'intentional mortification of one's own will' (WWR 2: 613):
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In 'denial of the will to life', one turns against the particular 
manifestation of the will to life found in oneself, which means turning 
against the body, and against one's own individuality. Thus one ceases, 
as much as possible, to strive for one's own egoistic ends, ceases to avoid 
suffering or to seek pleasure, ceases to desire propagation of the species, 
or any sexual gratification ... (Janaway, 2002: 111}.
The purpose of strict ascetic practice is not to break, or quiet, the will -  as 
Schopenhauer believes that the will can only be broken by the knowledge that all 
that exists is essentially a single, undifferentiated, entity, the nature of which is the 
cause of suffering - but rather to ensure that the will, which has already been 
quieted by such knowledge, does not spark back to life and assert itself once more:
We must not imagine that, after the denial of the will-to-life has once 
appeared through knowledge that has become a quieter of the will, such 
denial no longer waivers or falters, and we can rest on it as inherited 
property. On the contrary, it must be achieved afresh by constant 
struggle. For as the body is the will itself only in the form of objectivity ... 
that whole will-to-life exists potentially so long as the body lives, and is 
always striving to reach actuality and to burn afresh with all its intensity 
(WWR 1: 391}.
In contrast to other means of self-destruction, such as the act of suicide, which 
perpetuates suffering (see Chapter 10 on this subject}, asceticism is presented as a 
regime of systematic, and ethical self-destruction, which can be understood as an 
attempt to maintain the will's quieted state by depriving it of the means to strive; 
thus ascetic practice manifests itself in the practice of celibacy (WWR 1: 380}, 
poverty (WWR 1: 381-2}, fasting, self castigation, and self-mortification (WWR 1: 
382}, all practices designed to inhibit the will's ability to spark back to life by 
depriving it of the motivation to do so. The ascetic, who 'has their true and ultimate
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welfare in mind' deliberately makes his or her life 'as poor, hard and cheerless as 
possible' (WWR 2: 638).
To better understand the role that asceticism plays in maintaining a quieted will, 
one must first understand how the will is broken. For Schopenhauer only 
knowledge can lead to resignation: 'The will itself cannot be abolished by anything 
except knowledge' (WWR 1: 400).
If a person is to 'quiet' his or her individual will, the knowing subject must provide 
the willing aspect of himself or herself with a particular kind of knowledge: namely 
'the most perfect knowledge of its own nature' (WWR 1: 233, 307-8; see Zöller, 
1999: 37); that is, one becomes conscious 'of the identity of one's own inner being 
with that of all things, or with the kernel of the world' (WWR 2: 613). When a 
person identifies his or her essential being with all that exists, he or she enters into 
a state of'mysticism'. In addition to the knowledge that existence is comprised of a 
single entity, the willing aspect simultaneously gains the 'knowledge of its inner 
conflict and its essential vanity', which expresses itself'in the suffering of all that 
lives' (WWR 1: 397).
Thus denial of the will occurs when knowledge acts as a quieter of the will, instead 
of motivating it, which is typically the case (WWR 1: 308, 334, 379, 397). For as we 
have seen, when the intellect represents the world in terms of the principle of 
sufficient reason, the will understands itself as an individual in a world which is 
populated by other, innumerable, individuals who are in constant competition with 
one another for limited resources. When the intellect represents the world in this 
'illusory' way (WWR 1: 397) it presents all objects which exist in space and time as 
potential motives for action (Atwell, 1995:154). In so doing the intellect hereby 
affirms the will, promotes striving, and encourages suffering in the form of 
constant anxiety, and infliction of harm to others. In contrast to this, 'knowledge of 
the whole becomes the quieter of all and every willing' (WWR 1: 379). Essentially, 
by 'quieting', Schopenhauer understands that the will-to-life within the individual
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is 'switched off, and 'my deep-lying natural dispositions to respond to motives are 
no more'. As a result of this, the subject continues to exist though now it does so 
not in connection to a particular body but, rather, as 'a disembodied point of view 
of the world' (Gemes, 2012: 286).
By representing the world as one, then, the intellect provides a 'radical 
disincentive' for action (Zöller, 1999: 38):
A person who is not totally immersed in egoism and is able to see 
through the principium individuationis realizes his kinship with 
everything that exists around him. The whole world seems as close to 
him as his own person seems to the egoist. Endowed with a holistic 
knowledge, and overwhelmed with empathy with all living things, such a 
person finds the nature of this world and its sufferings unacceptable, 
and no longer wishes to chase the motives of his selfish projects through 
endless willing (Singh, 2010: 133-4; see also Janaway, 1999b: 12).
How, then, according to Schopenhauer, does a person acquire knowledge of 
ubiquitous suffering?
Two Paths to asceticism
In Schopenhauerian thought the knowledge of the essential nature of suffering 
dawns on a person in one of two ways: one 'path' is through an awareness of the 
suffering of others, whilst another 'path' to such awareness is through personally 
felt suffering:
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The difference, that we have described as two paths, is whether that 
knowledge is called forth by suffering which is merely and simply known 
and freely appropriated by our seeing through the principium 
individuationis, or by suffering immediately felt by ourselves (WWR 1: 
397).
The first path to breaking the will, the 'narrow path of the elect' (WWR 2: 638) is 
the path taken by the 'magnanimous person' (Atwell, 1990: 191), or 'saint'. 
Schopenhauer describes this particular means of acquiring knowledge as a ‘rare 
exception'.
On the first 'path' the person appropriates the sufferings of the whole world (WWR 
2: 638). The person who follows this path leads a life of virtue. Understanding 
intuitively that all is one (WWR 1: 368), and, therefore, that the suffering of'others' 
is also his or her own suffering, the virtuous, or compassionate, person attempts at 
all times to alleviate suffering wherever it is found. However, virtue is only the 
penultimate step (WWR 2: 608) on the path to 'salvation' (WWR 2: 634). The 
highest good consists in 'denial of the will' (WWR 1: 362; see Young, 2005: 188). 
The move from virtue to asceticism (WWR 1: 380) comes when the virtuous 
person understands the ubiquitous nature of suffering, and that the 'ceaseless 
efforts to banish suffering achieve nothing more than a change in its form' (WWR 
1: 315). Recognizing that the world is 'full of misery' because the essence of the 
world, the will, generates such misery by striving tirelessly (WWR 1: 380), the 
compassionate person ultimately understands that the only true painkiller is the 
non-provision of painkiller (see Beckett, 1958:14,16, 23, 34, 46):
And with this insight comes a transformation of the way in which one's 
identification with the transcendental self expresses itself. Previously it 
expressed itself in the triumph over egoism ... now, however, one ... 
'renounces' life (WWR 1: 379), realising it to be irredeemably worthless 
... one ceases to identify with anything... (Young, 1987: 124).
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Schopenhauer describes this lack of identification with anything as the greatest 
indifference to all things' (WWR 1: 380). Once again, in this instance, merely 
knowing the suffering of others is sufficient for the will to resign from life.
The second path (WWR 1: 393) that leads to the understanding that suffering is 
essential to willed life -  the 'next best course' (WWR 2: 638) -  is that of personally 
felt suffering. Schopenhauer defines suffering in terms of one's continuing to lack 
something which one continues to want:
We call its [the will's] hindrance through an obstacle placed between it 
and its temporary goal, suffering (WWR 1: 309).
For all suffering is simply nothing but unfulfilled and thwarted willing. 
(WWR 1: 363)
On the whole, it is the feeling of intense disappointment that accompanies on-going 
frustration that Schopenhauer believes provides the necessary encouragement to 
resign from life:
In fact, suffering is the process of purification by which alone man is in 
most cases sanctified, in other words, led back from the path of error of 
the will-to-life (WWR 2: 636).
Such a person experiences so much loss, or frustration, and experiences so much 
anxiety and disappointment as to lose interest in life (Jacquette, 2000: 45):
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We then see the man suddenly retire into himself, after he is brought to 
the verge of despair through all the stages of increasing affliction with 
the most violent resistance. We see him know himself and the world, 
change his whole nature, rise above himself and above all suffering, as if 
purified and sanctified by it, in inviolable peace, bliss, and sublimity, 
willingly renounce everything he formally desired with the greatest 
vehemence, and gladly welcome death. It is the gleam of silver that 
suddenly appears from the purifying flame of suffering, the gleam of the 
denial of the will-to-life, of salvation. Occasionally we see even those 
who were very wicked purified to this degree by the deepest grief and 
sorrow; they have become different and are completely converted... 
(WWR 1: 392-3).
In the 'next best course' it is the loss of interest in life -  a situation brought about 
by unalleviated, personally felt, suffering - that allows the willing subject to 
understand that all is 'one' (WWR 1: 394). When one's own striving is halted by 
personally felt suffering, one ceases to act and think in an egoistic fashion. Ceasing 
to act in an egoistic manner allows one to see through the veil of Maya. Having lost 
interest in his or her own life, the individual, who had once attempted to avoid 
personally felt suffering, now deliberately inflicts suffering in the form of ascetic 
practice. Where the person had previously suffered because of his or her attempts 
to appease the desires of the will, that person now welcomes suffering in his or her 
attempts to maintain the broken will's silence. Of course, Schopenhauer is aware 
that most people either lack empathy, or simply continue to strive regardless of 
personal suffering, and thus enter onto neither 'path':
It is always an exception, when such a life [of striving] suffers an 
interruption through the fact that either the aesthetic demand for 
contemplation or the ethical demand for renunciation proceeds from 
knowledge independent of the service of the will, and directed to the 
inner nature of the world in general. Most men are pursued by want
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throughout their lives, without being allowed to come to their senses 
(WWR 1: 327-8).
For most, the imperative of the will's striving cannot be denied. This imperative is 
such that even though a person may gain some understanding of the essential 
nature of suffering, he or she fails to act upon this knowledge, and instead 
continues to strive:
At times, in the hard experience of our own sufferings or in the vividly 
recognized sufferings of others, knowledge of the vanity and bitterness 
of life comes close to us who are still enveloped in the veil of Maya. We 
would like to deprive desires of their sting, close the entry to all 
suffering, purify and sanctify ourselves by complete and final 
resignation. But the illusion of the phenomenon soon ensnares us again, 
and its motives set the will in motion once more; we cannot tear 
ourselves free. The allurements of hope, the flattery of the present, the 
sweetness of pleasures, the well-being that falls to the lot of our person 
amid the lamentations of a suffering world governed by chance and 
error, all these draw us back to it, and rivet the bonds anew (WWR 1: 
379; see also WWR 2: 638).
This returns the discussion to a topic that I touched upon at the end of an earlier 
chapter on the subject of willing (Chapter 5): the topic of'free will'. Why is it that 
some people continue to strive despite an awareness of ubiquitous suffering? The 
answer in short is that one's ceasing to strive is always a matter of'grace' (WWR 1: 
404). Whilst the intellect may present the willing subject with the knowledge of 
ubiquitous suffering, such knowledge does not have a causal effect. That is, there is 
'no causal explanation of the denial of the will' (Atwell, 1995:159). One cannot 
assume that if the will gains an understanding of universal suffering, either by the 
first or second path to such knowledge, it will necessarily result in the will's 
resignation. That is simply not the case. Suffering does not cause the will to be
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broken, but presents an opportunity for the will to freely choose to abolish itself 
(WWR 1: 285, 395). In some cases the will freely chooses to cease. In the vast 
majority of cases the will chooses to continue striving:
So it remains true that I can produce no radical effect in my life. If the 
transition to asceticism happens at all, it happens to me rather than 
through me. (Young, 2005: 193).
Whilst I believe it is the case that Beckett shares Schopenhauer's understanding of 
'grace', whereby it is the primary will that must choose to turn its back on life, I 
believe it also the case that Beckett sees a far more active role for the knowing 
subject in placing the will in a position of such suffering that it freely chooses to 
resign from life. Because Beckett understands asceticism's role as a series of 
actions that lead to an understanding of ubiquitous suffering, Beckett necessarily 
sees the role of the intellect as far more active when it comes to providing the will 
with such knowledge. The Beckettian intellect, then, is not a 'passive' entity that 
can do little but wait for the will to understand its essence (Weller, 2005: 81). The 
Beckettian knowing subject deliberately inflicts suffering to promote the 
acquisition of the knowledge of suffering by its willing aspect. I believe Beckettian 
tragedy presents the argument that the knowing subject's chances of having its 
will resign from life are markedly improved if that knowing subject holds fast to 
his or her regime of ascetic practice, and refuses to present the will with an 
actionable motive. In this way Beckett seeks to solve the problem of the will's 
becoming ensnared in life once more (Cf. WWR 1: 379). In short, by continually 
denying the will an actionable motive, by relentlessly presenting the will with an 
opportunity to freely choose to resign (WWR 1: 395), the knowing subject 
increases its chances of being freed.
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Beckett and the 'second path' to knowledge of suffering
It is Schopenhauer's second path to the knowledge of ubiquitous suffering - 
namely that of personally felt suffering - that I believe Beckett explores at length in 
his theatre of asceticism. The Beckettian willing subject, the 'will not to suffer', is 
brought to an understanding of ubiquitous suffering via the two stage ascetic 
method I have already discussed. Employing structural features of the 
Schopenhauerian dynamically sublime, the Beckettian intellect deliberately refuses 
the willing subject painless, habitual knowledge so that it might then gain an 
understanding of the suffering it has caused or endured.
In the next two chapters on the subject of Beckettian asceticism, I present the 
argument that the Beckettian intellect intentionally guides the willing subject along 
the second path to an understanding of ubiquitous suffering. The Beckettian 
intellect, then, unlike the Schopenhauerian intellect, practices asceticism prior to 
the will's breaking. Thus Beckettian asceticism - deliberately inflicted, personally 
felt, suffering -  leads to knowledge of suffering per se. However, before 
undertaking this analysis, it is necessary to set out Schopenhauer's understanding 
of'traditional' ascetic methods. These methods, which Beckett incorporates into 
his theatre of asceticism, focus primarily on resisting bodily needs and desires, 
they assist the ascetic practitioner to preserve the state of resignation first brought 
about by the knowledge that all is 'one', and that suffering is therefore ubiquitous. 
For although knowledge can lead to resignation, this state, if achieved, requires 
maintenance. Vigilance is required, as the individual remains embodied. As long as 
the last vestige of the will, the body, remains, it is always possible for the will -  in 
the form of instincts and desires -  to spark back into life:xliii
Therefore we see... those who have once attained to denial of the will, 
strive with all their might to keep to this path by self-imposed 
renunciations of every kind, by a penitent and hard way of life, and by
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looking for what is disagreeable to them; all this in order to suppress the 
will that is constantly springing up afresh (WWR 1: 391-2).
What, then, are the methods by which the ascetic attempts to maintain the denial 
of his or her will? Though Schopenhauer discusses a number of ascetic methods, 
there are essentially five core tactics, which may be employed simultaneously. 
These methods are celibacy, poverty, fasting, self-castigation, and self-torture 
(WWR 1: 380-2; 388).
Of all the methods for denying the will-to-life, Schopenhauer sees celibacy as the 
'first step in asceticism' (WWR 1: 380). Celibacy is asceticism's 'central point', 
(WWR 2: 625) as 'voluntary and complete chastity ... goes beyond the individual 
life, and thus announces that the will, whose phenomenon is the body, ceases with 
the life of this body' (WWR 1: 380). In essence, celibacy ultimately denies the will- 
to-life the very fuel with which to strive, and thus to cause suffering. The rationale 
for voluntary and intentional poverty on the other hand is to prevent the will from 
'backsliding' (Young, 1987:125). Unlike the compassionate person who gives away 
property with the sole intention of alleviating the suffering of others, the ascetic 
renounces property with the intention of causing his or her own suffering, and in 
the hope of denying the will the means to strive:
So that the satisfaction of desires, the sweets of life, may not again stir 
the will, of which self-knowledge has conceived a horror (WWR 1: 381- 
382).
Similarly, fasting, self-castigation, and self-torture are posited as ways the ascetic 
ensures the will cannot 'reignite'. The ascetic nourishes the body 'sparingly lest its 
vigorous flourishing and thriving should animate afresh and excite more strongly 
the will of which it is the mere expression and mirror' (WWR 1: 382). At the same 
time that the ascetic barely maintains his or her physical life, he or she also
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continues to make the will suffer through the means of self-castigation, where one 
accuses oneself one's own misdeeds, and physical suffering (self-torture). With the 
will subdued, the ascetic may then continue to experience the world as the 
painless, pure subject of knowledge (WWR 1:197), which, unlike the mere 
knowing subject is, unencumbered by the insatiable desires of the individual will:
To see the world as a whole from which I am not distinct is of value 
because it liberates me from the treadmill of striving, happiness, and 
suffering ... (Janaway, 2002: 114).
It should be noted that Schopenhauer moderates his views on ascetic practice in 
the second volume of WWR. In Chapter XLVIII, 'On the Doctrine of the Denial of the 
Will-to-Life', Schopenhauer claims that self-mortification is most likely 
unnecessary for the ascetic to attain his or her goal of sedating the will:
Justice itself is the hairy garment that causes its owner constant 
hardship, and philanthropy that gives away what is necessary provides 
us with constant fasting (WWR 2: 607).
Similarly, in the second volume, the concept of self-castigation is tempered by the 
concept of humility (WWR 2: 607). Whilst Schopenhauer's tempering of his stance 
towards extreme acts of asceticism in the second volume of WWR in no way 
suggests that Schopenhauerian thought ultimately returns to a 'middle way' -  a 
rejection of extreme acts in all their forms, be they asceticism or materialism 
(Singh, 2007: 93; 2010: 152) -  it does mark a point of difference with the 
consistently extreme asceticism one finds in Beckettian tragedy.
In the next two chapters, in which I read Beckettian tragedy in the light of 
Schopenhauerian ascetic theory, I argue that Beckett systematically incorporates
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many of the abovementioned methods of ascetic practice discussed in WWR vol. 1 
into his own work. In Waiting for Godot we witness the practice of poverty (1956: 
12], celibacy combined with self-mortification (1956: 16), self-castigation (1956: 
44, 73), and self-mortification (1956: 25) amongst others. In Endgame we are 
shown the practice of self-castigation (1958: 48), fasting (1958: 14), and celibacy 
(1958: 15, 35, 50) amid an array of ascetic methods. Similarly in Happy Days we 
observe the practice of combined celibacy and self-mortification (1961:1, 23), and 
a vow of silence (Act II) as part of an overall attempt to break the will.
One may note that self-mortification and self-castigation play an important part in 
Beckettian ascetic practice. Beckettian asceticism, then, appears to call into 
question Schopenhauer's later contention that a less strident form of asceticism is 
adequate. The ascetic practice one finds in Beckettian tragedy is, if anything, more 
vehement than that found in The World as Will and Representation. One possible 
reason for this is that asceticism plays a more significant role in Beckett's system, 
in that Beckettian asceticism generates knowledge of suffering. Whereas 
Schopenhauer understands asceticism's role as an ex post facto means of ensuring 
that the fire of the will’s already extinguished desire remains extinguished, Beckett 
understands asceticism as an ex-ante means of encouraging the will to freely 
choose to extinguish itself. We may note, then, that Schopenhauer's reappraisal of 
the need to practice self-mortification in WWR vol. 2 is challenged in Beckettian 
theatre by the character of Lucky in Waiting for Godot. And whereas in WWR vol. 2, 
Schopenhauer suggests that the practice of humility, and not self-castigation, is 
sufficient for maintaining a quieted will, in Beckettian tragedy self-castigation 
plays a pivotal role in bringing the will to consciousness of the suffering of itself 
and others, and by so doing promoting resignation. Indeed, a number of Beckettian 
intellects -  Lucky, Clov, and Nell -  successfully employ the ascetic method of self­
castigation in an attempt to disabuse the willing subject of any self-delusion. This, 
then, in addition to the fact Beckett finds it necessary to develop his own ascetic 
method, in the form of the non-provision of representations, suggests that 
Beckettian thought is -  with respect to its life-denying tendency -  more ruthless 
than Schopenhauerian philosophy.
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However, before discussing the more vehement version of asceticism that Beckett 
employs in a number of his tragic works, I shall first turn to the important matter 
of what can be said about the experience had by a person whose individual will has 
been broken by the knowledge of suffering, namely 'nothing'. In the fields of 
philosophy, English literature, and comparative literature, there is a consistent 
approach regarding Beckett's position on one's ability to attain the state of 
'nothingness', namely that Beckett advocates a line of thinking that suggests that 
nothingness is longed for but ultimately unattainable. In short, Beckett's works 
affirm existence by portraying the failure to deny or refuse existence. Arguments 
about the affirmative nature of Beckettian tragedy are supported by claims that a 
number of Beckett's works are unending, or at least ambiguous enough to preclude 
certainty regarding whether or not the works reach a conclusion.xliv I believe that 
this position regarding Beckett and the subject of 'nothingness' can be challenged 
by reading Beckett's work in the light of Schopenhauer's conception of 
nothingness, namely that 'nothing' is not something, and therefore cannot be 
shown. In short, I believe it can be argued that Beckett endorses Schopenhauer's 
philosophical position on the inability of philosophy to represent the world- 
lessness of the successful ascetic.
Schopenhauerian Nothingness
At the end of the first volume of The World as Will and Representation, 
Schopenhauer concludes his philosophical account of existence with the word 
'nothing', which is the point at which subject and object cease to exist (WWR 1: 
411). This is the state reached by the person who has quieted his or her individual 
will with knowledge of ubiquitous suffering, and an understanding that all is 'one'. 
With the quieting of the will, the knowing subject ceases to be. Schopenhauer's 
central point is this: the world of representation is a manifestation of the 'tertiary' 
part of the will (WWR 1: 292), the intellect. The intellect's primary function is to 
serve the will by assisting it in its determination to strive by providing it with a 
spatial and temporal understanding of the world. The knowing subject does not
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exist independently of the will. Once the will has resigned from life, the world of 
representation also comes to an end:
Denial, abolition, turning of the will are also abolition and disappearance 
of the world, of its mirror... No will: no representation, no world (WWR 
1:410-11).
Once the will resigns, and the servant of the will is simultaneously 'liberated' 
(Atwell, 1996: 82), the individual -  perhaps best understood as 'individual-no- 
more' -  continues to experience the world, though now as the will-free, 'pure 
subject of knowledge' (WWR 1:198). The individual-no-more is left with a form of 
consciousness, then, though consciousness of what one cannot say because of the 
absence of the very thing which usually provides such descriptions, i.e. the subject 
of knowing (WWR 1: 410). Schopenhauer does not then proceed to give an account 
of what the state of nothing might be like because such an account would 
transgress the role of philosophy:
Philosophy has its value and virtue in its rejection of all assumptions 
that cannot be substantiated, and in its acceptance as its data only of 
that which can be proved with certainty in the external world given by 
perception, in the forms constituting our intellect for the apprehension 
of the world, and in the consciousness of one's own self common to all... 
Its theme must restrict itself to the world, to express from every aspect 
what this world is, what it may be in its innermost nature, is all that it 
can honestly achieve. Now it is in keeping with this that, when my 
teaching reaches its highest point, it assumes a negative character, and 
so ends with a negation. Thus it can speak only of what is denied or 
given up; but what is gained in place of this, what is laid hold of, it is 
forced (at the conclusion of the fourth book) to describe as nothing; and 
it can add only the consolation that it may be merely a relative, not an 
absolute, nothing (WWR 2: 611-12).
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If the state of nothingness cannot be described, how can it be said to have 
occurred? 'Nothing' can only be represented as an absence of something. The 
Schopenhauerian conception of nothing, then, is one which is ‘essentially relative, 
and always refers to a definite something that it negates' (WWR 1: 409). In this 
case, when compared to the 'something' that is, namely the world as 
representation, the nothing of will-lessness is viewed as the loss of the world as 
representation:
... what remains after the complete abolition of the will is, for all who are 
still full of the will, assuredly nothing (WWR 1: 412).
What Schopenhauer means by this is that to the person who continues to strive, the 
resigned person appears as one who fails to strive. That is, to the willing individual, 
the resigned person's body no longer does what the body ordinarily does. The 
freedom of the will becomes visible as body but does not get expressed as the body 
normally appears (Atwell, 1995: 161-2). Resignation, then, can only be perceived as 
an absence, or the lack of some attribute:
But the only case where that freedom [of the will] can become 
immediately visible in the phenomenon is the one where it makes an 
end of what appears, and because the mere phenomenon, in so far as it 
is a link in the chain of causes, namely the living body, still continues to 
exist in time that contains only phenomena, the will, manifesting itself 
through this phenomenon, is then in contradiction with it, since it denies 
what the phenomenon expresses...The whole body is the visible 
expression of the will-to-life, yet the motives corresponding to this will 
no longer act (WWR 1: 402-3; also see Atwell, 1995: 161-2).
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Schopenhauer's conception of'nothing' as that which exists once one has been 
delivered from a life of willing (WWR 1: 409), is vital for an alternative 
understanding of the way Beckett conducts and concludes a number of his ascetic 
tragedies.
Beckettian Nothingness
To date, it has been acknowledged that a number of Beckett's characters may 
attempt to resign (Weller, 2006: 193) but that such attempts invariably fail. 
Beckett's philosophical interpreters typically understand Beckett's tragedies as life 
affirming works,xlv and a significant aspect of this interpretation is Beckett's 
supposed refusal to give into nihilism (Weller, 2005: 11-21). An important part of 
this refusal on Beckett's part is the determination to 'go on' (Badiou, 2003: 73). It is 
within this framework that the Beckettian tragic ending is presently conceived. For 
a Beckett tragedy to end, then, would evince a determination not to 'go on', would 
be 'nihilistic'. Similarly, the Beckettian tragic ending is viewed as open-ended, and 
thus open to a number of interpretations. It is because of this supposed open- 
endedness that Beckett's work is understood to be both thematically and 
structurally open to the 'Other' (Weller, 2006: 27-8).
Adorno's early critical work on the play Endgame is important in this regard. 
Noting that at the end of the play the character Clov does not physically exit the 
bunker, Adorno states that:
Whether the game ends in a stalemate or in an eternal check, or whether 
Clov wins, is not made clear, as though too much certainty about this 
would provide too much meaning (Adorno, 1991: 270).
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Similarly, Esslin presents the end of Endgame as an uncertain event: 'When the 
curtain falls, he is still there. It remains open whether he will really leave' (1961: 
49].
In line with this early understanding, later interpreters have continued to advocate 
that Beckett's 'endings' fail to end. In a number of his works on Beckett, Weller has 
argued that the failure to attain the state of nothingness is the very message of 
Beckett's art:
Crucially... in Beckett the negations repeatedly fail to deliver the very 
'nothing' they seem to promise, and it is this failure that comes to 
constitute the very stuff of the work (Weller, 2006: 193; see also (2005: 
23; 2009: 39)
In agreement with Weller, fellow post-structuralist interpreter Peter Boxall argues 
that:
Beckett's writing ... does not constitute a nothingness made palpable, 
but rather performs an endlessly failed reaching for a nothingness 
which gives rise to the work, which the work seeks endlessly to name, 
but which remains forever beyond the grasp of those forms which are its 
only manifestation (Boxall, 2010: 31).
It is this reading of Beckettian art, one which interprets Beckett's failure to 
represent nothingness as failure to attain nothingness that I wish to challenge.
I believe interpretations such as those presented in the work of Adorno, Weller, 
and Boxall may conflate the spectator's perspective with that of the character's 
perspective. The statement, 'Clov appears to be there for the audience' is conflated 
with the statement, 'The audience is still there for Clov'. There appears to be a
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tendency in Beckettian interpretation to require Beckett to show 'nothing' 
happening, otherwise the goal of achieving nothing is said to have failed. However, 
regarding the supposed failure to attain the state of nothingness at the end of a 
number of Beckett's tragedies, it is not so much the case that Beckett does not 
present nothingness at the end of his work, rather it is the case that he cannot do 
so.
The open-ended interpretation of the 'nothingness' that one finds in Beckett's 
work appears to stem from the belief that nothingness must be shown before it can 
be said to have occurred. This position sets Beckett an impossible task. What the 
spectator witnesses when watching works such as Waiting for Godot, and Endgame 
is what Simon Critchley refers to as an attempt to describe the 'impossible but 
necessary', a capturing through narration what narration cannot capture, namely 
the 'radical unrepresentability of death' (Critchley, 1997: 160-1). However, rather 
than capturing 'death', as Critchley sees it, I believe Beckett is attempting to 
capture the unrepresentability of the ascetic's world-lessness after the resignation 
of the will. Beckett can only portray this world-lessness as nothing happening. Here 
Beckettian tragedy follows a similar line to Schopenhauerian thought regarding 
the unrepresentability of the state of 'nothing'. As Weller correctly points out, from 
'the standpoint of philosophy', there can be only "negative knowledge" of that 
which lies on the other side of this negation ...' (Schopenhauer, WWR 1: 410; cited 
in Weller, 2005: 82-3). Because of this, the individual who crosses over into 
asceticism does not vanish, they are still embodied, but their embodiment is for us 
the audience alone. The resigned person does not disappear into thin air, so to 
speak, for although the individual will has resigned, the body remains (WWR 1: 
391), and continues to be represented as an object in the mind of he or she who 
continues to strive, i.e., in the mind of the spectator to the performance.
One's comprehension of nothingness depends, then, upon one's status, be it as one 
who continues to will, or as one in whom the will has been broken:
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We freely acknowledge that what remains after the complete abolition 
of the will is, for all who are still full of will, assuredly nothing. But also 
conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this 
very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is—nothing [WWR 
1:411-12).
In other words, 'nothing' is a matter of point-of-view:
the world is there for those persons who will it to be there, for those 
who affirm the will to life; but the world is not there for those who do 
not will it to be there, for those who do not affirm, but rather deny, the 
will (Atwell, 1995: 168-9).xlvi
It follows that what the audience sees is not what the ascetic character sees. The 
ascetic's perception is fundamentally unrepresentable. And this is the 'impossible' 
task Beckett has set himself. Philosophy and art can lead one up to an 
understanding of'nothing' but cannot show it because language only exists on this 
side of that understanding. Given this, Endgame, for example, takes us up to the 
point where the game comes to an end, where a ‘quieting of the will' (in 
Schopenhauerian terms) occurs, but the quieting is unrepresentable other than as 
'nothing happening'. Beckett is attempting to depict the impossible: namely, the 
possibility of nothingness. It is simply asking too much of Beckett as a tragedian to 
demand that 'nothing' is first shown through the absence of he or she who longs 
for the state of'nothingness' before 'nothing' can then be said to have occurred.
To return to an earlier argument, one that I presented in the 'retort to the 
secondary, philosophical literature on Beckettian art' in Chapter 2 ,1 believe there 
is an underlying reason that Beckett's middle-period tragedies are consistently 
interpreted as unending events. This underlying reason appears to be the reliance 
upon Nietzsche's interpretation of'nothing' as nihilism. When understood in the
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light of Schopenhauer's work, Beckettian tragedy comes to a conclusion by 
depicting, to the best of the author's ability, the state of nothingness. However, 
when interpreted in the light of Nietzsche's understanding of nothing as nihilism, 
'nothing' is understood as problem, and must therefore be discounted as a 
possibility. It is only by first conceiving of'nothing' as nihilism, and therefore as a 
problem, that it then becomes necessary to defend Beckett's work from 
accusations of nihilism by denying the possibility that nothing happens.
Conclusion
In this chapter I provided an outline of Schopenhauer's understanding of 
asceticism as the 'deliberate breaking of the will by refusing the agreeable and 
looking for the disagreeable' (WWR 1: 392]. I also argued that this understanding 
of asceticism provides a productive framework for understanding Beckettian 
tragedy. With regards to the way that Beckettian tragedy both utilizes and 
develops this central aspect of Schopenhauerian ethics, I have made the following 
claims. Whereas Schopenhauerian asceticism focuses on bodily deprivation, acts 
such as celibacy, and fasting, Beckettian asceticism also seeks to deprive the 
individual will of the information it needs to be able to strive. To this end, the 
Beckettian ascetic deprives its individual will of the energy to strive, and the 
knowledge that it needs to be able to strive.
Unlike Schopenhauerian philosophy, which understands the practice of asceticism 
as something one undertakes after the will has been broken by knowledge, 
Beckettian tragedy presents asceticism as a series of actions one undertakes so as 
to gain knowledge of suffering. Beckettian asceticism is an ex-ante, not ex post 
facto, act.
In addition to this I claimed that Beckettian asceticism is a more vehement version 
of asceticism than Schopenhauerian asceticism because of the role Beckett ascribes
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to it. Whilst in Schopenhauerian thought asceticism is a response to the knowledge 
that 'the world is full of misery' (WWR 1: 400), in Beckettian tragedy asceticism 
provides this knowledge to the will. It is because of this that Beckettian asceticism 
makes none of the concessions to ascetic moderation that Schopenhauer makes in 
Volume 2 of The World as Will and Representation.
Finally, in regard to the claims of a number of Beckett's interpreters that 
Beckettian tragedy is a life-affirming art form because one cannot say for certain 
that each work reaches a conclusion, I argued that this position does not take into 
account the artist' inability to show 'nothing' as an event that has occurred, rather 
the only way that Beckett can represent 'nothing' is by depicting the absence of 
traits once possessed by the individual prior to resignation.
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Chapter 8: Beckettian Ethics -  Asceticism, Part One: Waiting for 
Godot
General Introduction to Beckettian Ethics
Much has already been written on the subject of the ethicality of Beckett's work 
(Weller, 2006: 28-9; Weller, 2010c: 118-129). Throughout the history of Beckett 
interpretation, Beckett's prose and theatre has been read in the light of many of the 
major ethical schools. In the edited collection, Beckett and Ethics, Smith notes that 
the approach to the subject of Beckett's ethicality has been highly influenced by the 
framework that interpreters bring to Beckett's work. Citing the history of 
Beckettian ethical interpretation from the early humanist understanding (Esslin 
(1961), through to readings guided by deconstructionist thought (Connor (1988), 
Locatelli (1990), Hill (1990)), and then on to later works by Badiou (2003) and 
Weller (2005, 2006) that centre on the concepts of the 'event' and 'negation', 
respectively (2008: 5-10), Smith suggests that when providing an answer to the 
question 'is there anything of ethical value in Beckett's writing?' one's answer will 
'depend, of course, on what you understand by ethics...' (Smith, 2008: 1).
It is my contention that Beckett's philosophical interpreters have for the most part 
considered the affirmation of life as the only legitimate ethical approach to life, and 
as a consequence of this understanding a life-affirming ethical framework has been 
used to interpret Beckett's ethics. The dominance of this approach has meant that 
Beckett's work has not, to any great extent -  particularly in the philosophical realm 
- been read in the light of ethical systems that advocate quietism, and life-denial. I 
have discussed the exceptions to this position in the introduction to this thesis.
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In the case of Beckett interpretation, then, the ethical value of Beckett's work has 
been determined by what has been omitted from consideration, as much as it has 
been determined by the ideas that have become an established aspect of the 
Beckettian interpretive framework. The life-denying ethics of Schopenhauerian 
thought in particular, has had little part to play in the philosophical interpretation 
of Beckett's ethics. When Beckett's engagement with Schopenhauerian ethics is 
raised -  in that Beckett appears to endorse Schopenhauer's contention that the 
negation of the will is the 'only properly ethical act' -  it is argued that Beckett's 
quietist characters ultimately fail to attain the goal of Schopenhauerian quietism, 
namely to attain the state of nothingness (see, for example, Weller, 2006: 193; 
2005: 75-96), which therefore renders an implicit critique of Schopenhauer's 
position. According to this view, Beckett's characters may seek to resign from life, 
however Beckett's art reveals the impossibility of that desire.xlvii
The following two chapters will set out an alternative reading of Beckett's middle- 
period tragedies. I will seek to understand Beckett's utilization of Schopenhauerian 
ethics in the formulation of his own ethical position: ethical self-destruction. It is 
my contention that Beckettian tragedy can be understood not only a sustained 
engagement with Schopenhauerian aesthetic theory but also as a sustained 
engagement with Schopenhauerian ethics.
Whereas Schopenhauer is the first Western philosopher to systematically establish 
asceticism as the legitimate response to the suffering that is generated by one's 
internal drives, Beckett, I believe, is the first thinker known to be influenced by 
Schopenhauer to not only incorporate Schopenhauerian ascetic thought into the 
fabric of his own work (Young, 2005: 246), but to build upon it. Beckett's middle- 
period tragedies are not merely the reiteration of Schopenhauerian asceticism in 
theatrical form. Beckett's tragedies can be understood as the systematic response 
to another system of thought, a response that ultimately devises its own method 
for denying and breaking the will. At the heart of this method is the refusal to 
present a clear motive for action.
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Focussing on Beckett's engagement with Schopenhauerian ethics in a manner that 
is free from the lens of life-affirming thought allows us to perceive Beckett's unique 
and complex response to the problem of the suffering that invariably accompanies 
the endless compulsion to strive (WWR 1: 310), namely the intentional generation, 
and exacerbation of the experience of boredom, which is brought about by the 
deliberate generation of uncertainty. I believe it can be argued that Beckett's 
method of both generating and perpetuating mental torment, or anguish, for the 
purpose of breaking the will is a significant contribution to the field of ethics.
In the following reading of Beckett's work, Beckett's tragedies are considered 
ethical because they advocate for the destruction of the will-not-to-suffer, the part 
of the T that causes harm to oneself and to others. In contrast to existing 
interpretation where Beckett's tragedies are considered ethical because they 
ennoble the human condition after the death of God (Esslin, 1961), or because they 
affirm difference by holding on to the possibility of'one' becoming 'two', and thus 
the possibility of'love' (Badiou [On Beckett], 2003: 44, 4), or because they evince 
the repeated failure to entirely negate life itself (Weller 2006,193), I argue that 
Beckett’s tragedies are ethical because they propose an effective cure for an 
existence otherwise comprised of tireless striving and endless suffering. Beckett's 
work does this by providing a method for the destruction of the part of oneself that 
strives, namely the individual will. This method utilizes traditional methods of 
asceticism, in combination with the uniquely Beckettian ascetic method of 
boredom.xWi[i
The following reading of Beckettian tragedy is one that understands the 
barrenness of Beckett's landscapes and interior spaces as an embodiment of the 
human mind experiencing boredom. More specifically, I believe it is the 
embodiment of mechanistic boredom first elucidated in Schopenhauerian thought: 
the mind minus a motive, experiencing the full force of willing (WWR 1: 364).
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This reading is performed with the intention of contributing to the body of work 
already undertaken in relation to Beckett and the subject of boredom -  work that 
attempts to make sense of Beckettian 'boredom' by interpreting it in the light of 
Adornian (Brooker, 2001; Phillips, 2003), and Heideggerian (Phillips, 2009; Weller, 
2009) thought -  but also to contrast with this existing work by pursuing a genetic 
approach to understanding Beckettian tragedy. In this chapter I argue that Beckett 
incorporates Schopenhauer's understanding of boredom into a method of ascetic 
practice. Unlike Schopenhauer, Beckett is aware of the destructive potential of 
boredom, and thus seeks to deliberately generate boredom as a state of being.
The first thing that needs to be clarified in an attempt to understand Beckett's 
utilization of Schopenhauer's understanding of boredom is the term 'boredom' 
[Langeweile) itself. As Young indicates, the word boredom fails to satisfactorily 
convey 'the complex existential malaise Schopenhauer wishes to describe' (Young, 
1987:141). To fully comprehend what Schopenhauer means by the term boredom, 
one needs to look to the way Schopenhauer describes the state. For Schopenhauer, 
boredom is an awareness that:
... life has no genuine intrinsic worth, but is kept in motion merely by 
want and illusion. But as soon as this comes to a standstill, the utter 
barrenness and emptiness of existence become apparent' 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b Vol. 2: 287).
Schopenhauer also describes the experience of boredom as:
... a lifeless longing without a definite object, a deadening languor (WWR 
1: 164).
219
... a fearful emptiness [in which] existence itself becomes an intolerable 
burden [WWR 1:312).
And, finally:
... a feeling of the most frightful desolation and emptiness (WWR 1: 
364).
In an earlier chapter on the willing aspect of Beckett's theatrical pseudocouples 
(Chapter 5) I endorsed a reading of Endgame, which posited the stage setting as an 
'immense skull', where the events on the stage were the thoughts occurring inside 
that skull (Kenner in Boxall, 2000: 75; see also Esslin, 1961: 50; Chambers, 1976: 
7). I believe that this understanding of interiority can be extended to include the 
two other tragedies of Beckett's theatre of asceticism. In addition to this, I contend 
that each of these settings can be interpreted as the evocation of a mind in which a 
knowing subject deprives its individual will of an actionable motive. In short, each 
tragic setting reveals the consequence of Beckettian ascetic practice: the 
experience of unalleviated boredom.
We see this understanding of boredom mirrored in the austerity of the Beckett's 
tragic settings:
POZZO: What's it like?
VLADIMIR: (looking around). It's indescribable. It's like
nothing. There's nothing (Beckett, 1956: 86-7).
We may compare Vladimir's description of his experience in Waiting for Godot with 
the later settings for Beckett's other ascetic tragedies. First in Endgame:
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Bare Interior.
Grey light (Beckett, 1958: 11).
And later in Happy Days:
Expanse of scorched earth rising centre to a low mound .... Very pompier 
tromp-l'oeil backcloth to represent unbroken plain and sky receding to 
meet in far distance (Beckett, 1961: 1).
On each occasion, Beckett provides a setting that represents the consequences of 
the intellect's refusal to provide the willing subject with an actionable motive. 
Without a clear motive for action, the willing subject encounters a 'barren' 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b Vol. 2: 287), 'empty' (WWR 1: 312) world.
The following two chapters are an exploration of the Beckettian ascetic method of 
promoting uncertainty and irresolution, the intention of which is to generate 
boredom in the Schopenhauerian sense of the term, namely the experience of 
'desolation' (WWR 1: 364). This unique Beckettian, two-stage ascetic method, 
which first generates boredom, and, then provides the will with knowledge of 
suffering, utilizes Schopenhauer's two-part conception of the dynamically sublime. 
To facilitate further discussion, I shall now reiterate this two-part, Beckettian 
ascetic method - the Beckettian dynamically sublime -  in full.
In the Beckettian dynamically sublime, the intellect, or knowing subject holds the 
will at bay (WWR 1: 202) by refusing to provide a clear motive for action (WWR 1: 
364), that is, a representation subject to the principal of sufficient reason. By 
utilizing its negative freedom to resist the demands of the will not to suffer
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(Shapshay, 2012b: 25, 28), the knowing subject denies the individual will the 
painless experience of habitual consciousness. When held in this 'perilous zone' 
(Beckett, 1999: 18-19) between moments of habitual perception, the individual 
will suffers in two distinct ways: it suffers the pain of lacking an object towards 
which it may expend its energy -  or, in other words, the will experiences the effects 
of unalleviated 'boredom' (WWR 1:164, 312, 364) -  and it suffers from the 
knowledge (WWR 1: 400) it receives instead of habitual consciousness, namely 
knowledge about the ubiquitous nature of suffering (WWR 1: 315, 397).
Thus it is only partly true to say that 'Beckett’s subject is ignorance rather than 
knowledge' (O'Hara, 1981: 257) as a number of Beckett's interpreters claim (see 
also Rosen, 1976: 15). The provision of knowledge regarding the ubiquitous nature 
of suffering is the second part of the Beckettian dynamically sublime ascetic 
method. Denied painless habitual consciousness, the individual will is revealed to 
itself -  via an 'involuntary memory' -  'the total past sensation' (Beckett, 1999: 72- 
3), or, the 'reality' (Beckett, 1999: 22, 33) of an event, beyond mere utility -  either 
as a being that has suffered at the hands of others, or as a being that has caused 
others to suffer. This sudden awareness of past suffering is itself a cause of 
suffering. Ultimately such knowledge is brought to mind for the purpose of 
presenting the individual will with the opportunity to freely choose to resign from 
life (WWR 1: 285, 395). Involuntary memory provides the individual will with a 
radical disincentive for action (Zöller, 1999: 38).
Thus the Beckettian dynamically sublime may be understood as a process where 
the intellect 'refuses the agreeable' -  habitual consciousness -  and, rather, 'looks 
for the disagreeable' -  knowledge of suffering -  in its attempts to break the will 
(WWR 1: 392). It is this complex method of ethical self-destruction that I will now 
explore through a process of textual analysis.xlix Having provided an introduction 
to the subject of Beckettian ethics, the rest of this chapter is dedicated to a detailed 
analysis of the play, Waiting for Godot.
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Waiting for Godot
In Waiting for Godot the Beckettian intellectual characters of Lucky and Estragon 
are defined by both their understanding of, and their approach to, the subject of 
boredom. Whereas Lucky understands boredom as an opportunity to promote the 
cessation of striving, and thus seeks to exacerbate the experience of boredom, 
Estragon understands boredom as the cause of his suffering, and instead attempts 
to alleviate it.
Similarly, towards the end of the second volume of The World as Will and 
Representation, Schopenhauer distinguishes the behaviour of the person who 
attempts to avoid suffering from that of the person who deliberately generates 
suffering, that is, Schopenhauer distinguishes the vast majority of humanity from 
the ascetic practitioner. Most people in their attempts to ensure a 'secure and 
pleasant existence' 'chain' their will 'ever more firmly to life, thus ensuring their 
suffering continues'. In contrast to this, the ascetic 'deliberately makes their life as 
poor, hard and cheerless as possible, because they have their true and ultimate 
welfare in view' (WWR 2: 638). The behaviour of the ascetic announces to the 
world that suffering can only come to an end if one refuses to relieve it with a 
motive, or, in Beckettian terms, the intellect fails to provide a 'painkiller' (Beckett 
1958: 14,16, 23, 34, 46). I believe that this understanding regarding a person's 
approach to suffering is a productive way of understanding Beckett's knowing 
subjects in Waiting for Godot. Whereas Estragon seeks a 'secure and pleasant 
existence' for himself, Lucky 'deliberately' makes life as 'poor, hard and cheerless 
as possible'. Estragon is not an ascetic practitioner. Estragon is an intellectual 
'Everyman': an intellect that informs its will that suffering is something which one 
can avoid through further striving. Estragon is an intellect that mistakenly believes 
his individual will can change. Estragon does not want to break his will; rather he 
wishes his will to will something other than what it does. Essentially, Estragon 
does not understand the idea of intelligible 'character': 'the intelligible character of
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every man is to be regarded as an act of will outside time, and thus indivisible, and 
unalterable' (WWR 1: 289).
In contrast to Estragon, Lucky is an ascetic: an intellect that takes every 
opportunity to inflict suffering upon his willing aspect in his attempts to place the 
individual will in a position of suffering from which it freely chooses to resign from 
life (WWR 1: 285). Unlike Estragon, Lucky understands that his character cannot 
be altered, rather it must be eliminated (Schopenhauer, 2005: 54; see also Atwell, 
1990: 38; 1995: 163). In short, the two intellects, Estragon and Lucky, provide very 
different knowledge to their respective will regarding the essential nature of the 
world and of suffering. The former informs its will that suffering can be avoided. 
The latter intellect communicates to its will the knowledge that suffering is 
essential to its very nature.
Pozzo and Lucky: From Solipsism to an Awareness of the Suffering Other
In the preceding chapter on the subject of Schopenhauerian asceticism, I discussed 
Schopenhauer's 'cure' for the suffering that is caused by the essential, tirelessly 
striving nature of the will: namely the practice of suppressing bodily needs (Atwell, 
1995:17). I believe that Beckett's theatre of asceticism builds upon this 
understanding. Having gained an appreciation that life is essentially one of 
suffering, the knowing subject, Lucky, subsequently understands his own individual 
will, Pozzo, as the cause of his suffering, and attempts to communicate this 
knowledge to Pozzo through ascetic practice. Lucky, then, is 'a sick man applying a 
painful cure':
He endures the pain caused by the cure, since he knows that the more he 
suffers, the more is the substance of the disease destroyed; and thus the 
present pain is the measure of the cure (WWR 1: 397).
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In Schopenhauerian terms, Lucky 'refuses the agreeable and looks for the 
disagreeable' in his attempts to mortify the will (WWR 1: 392). In addition to this 
claim, I contend that Lucky is a successful ascetic, in that his actions permit his 
willing subject, Pozzo, to suffer to such an extent that Pozzo freely chooses to resign 
from life. Given this claim of Lucky's ascetic 'success', it then becomes important to 
note the methods of ascetic practice that Lucky employs, as they may then be 
compared to the successful, and unsuccessful, methods of Beckett's other tragic 
ascetics.
Before commencing this discussion of Beckett's approach to asceticism - that of 
generating suffering in the form of boredom through the creation, or non­
cessation, of uncertainty -  I shall first set out Lucky's utilization of'standard', or 
'traditional', means of breaking the will, as described by Schopenhauer in The 
World as Will and Representation (Vol. 1: 380-2; 388). In his persistent attempts to 
make his willing aspect suffer, Lucky carries out a wide array of ascetic acts, 
including acts of self-mortification, fasting, and self-castigation. With regards to the 
ascetic method of self-mortification, Lucky continually burdens himself with a 
heavy bag, which he never puts down, even when sleeping (Beckett, 1956: 25). In 
addition to this, we discover at the end of Act II that the bag is filled with nothing 
but sand (Beckett, 1956: 21, 88). The bag, then, holds nothing of value other than 
for the fact that carrying it causes Lucky to suffer. To answer Estragon's question 
as to why Lucky doesn't put down his bags, it is because he wants to endure the 
physical pain of carrying a heavy load (Beckett, 1956: 25). As well as enduring the 
weight of an unnecessary burden, Lucky also does nothing to prevent the running 
sore that has formed on his neck where the knot of the rope with which Pozzo 
controls him has rubbed him raw (Beckett, 1956: 25). We know from 
Schopenhauer that the practicing ascetic takes every opportunity that presents 
itself to receive, and to perpetuate suffering:
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... every injury, every ignominy, every outrage. He gladly accepts them as 
the opportunity for giving himself the certainty that he no longer affirms 
the will (WWR 1: 382].
In his attempts to break the will, Lucky also resorts to the act of fasting when he 
refuses the chicken bones to which he, as Pozzo's carrier, is entitled (Beckett, 
1956: 27).
The combination of these ascetic practices is performed with one purpose in mind:
that by constant privation and suffering, he may more and more break 
down and kill the will that he recognises and abhors as the source of his 
own suffering existence and of the world's (WWR 1: 382).
By employing these 'standard', or 'traditional', ascetic methods of bodily 
deprivation, Beckett provides the audience with a means of understanding the 
other self-destructive aspects of Lucky's behaviour, namely that which Pozzo 
describes as Lucky's 'thinking'. Whereas Lucky had once thought 'very prettily', 
providing Pozzo with a great deal of knowledge about the ways of the world, his 
thoughts are now said to make Pozzo 'shudder' (Beckett, 1956: 39):
POZZO: (groaning, clutching his head). I can't bear it... any
longer... the way he goes on... you've no idea... it's 
terrible...he must go... (he waves his arms) ... I'm going 
mad... (he collapses, his head in his hands)... I can't bear
it... any longer......(sobbing). He used to be so kind...
so helpful... and entertaining... my good angel... and 
now... he's killing me (Beckett, 1956: 34).
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Lucky's 'thinking' should be viewed in the light of his other self-destructive 
behaviour: the way Lucky now thinks is another means of generating suffering 
with the intention of breaking the will. In short, Lucky's use of the more traditional 
methods of asceticism alerts us to the fact that his seemingly odd behaviour (the 
way he dances and thinks] is a more unconventional method of asceticism.
Whereas the 'traditional' forms of asceticism, namely fasting, and self­
mortification, focus on undermining the body, the objectification of the will,
Lucky's way of'thinking' is a form of psychic self-harm. Other 'traditional' means of 
asceticism deprive the body of the energy it needs to strive. Lucky's 'thinking' 
deprives the will of the information it needs to strive; it deprives the will of 
certainty about the world. Deprived of certainty, of a clear motive for action, the 
will is left in a frustrated state. Lucky's way of thinking causes the 'will not to 
suffer' (Beckett, 1999: 43) to suffer by depriving it of habitual thought.
First part of the Beckettian Dynamically Sublime: Representational 
Deprivation— Holding the Will at Bay
In addition to the utilization of Schopenhauerian asceticism, I believe the 
Beckettian ascetic method - the deprivation of habitual thought -  also utilizes and 
further develops a number of the non-ascetic tenets of Schopenhauerian 
philosophy. The first of these non-ascetic aspects of Schopenhauerian thought that 
Beckett transforms into an aspect of ascetic practice is the concept of'motivation'.
Earlier (Chapter 5), I stated that Schopenhauer understands motivation, or the 
introspectively experienced response to a stimulus, in the following way: 
Character + Motive = Action (WWR 1:106). Thus we have two essential 
components for an action to occur. The first is the individual will, or character: 
what I am determines whether or not I shall respond, and how I respond if I do so. 
The second component is a motive: a stimulus is presented to the will by the 
intellect, and the will either responds or does not respond to this stimulus based
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upon its inherent nature. In Beckettian asceticism this formula has been radically 
reformulated so that the will is deprived of the requisite motivation. In other 
words: Character -  Motive (Representation) = Inaction.
Deprived of a clear motive for action, the individual will cannot discharge its 
energy towards a target or goal. This accumulation of energy causes the will to 
suffer, as an inability to strive towards an object causes pain (WWR 1: 364). Again 
this appears to utilize a Schopenhauerian understanding of experience - in this 
case of suffering -  and, once again, the utilization of Schopenhauerian thought is 
carried out in a such a way as to transcend the original understanding. I refer the 
reader back to an earlier discussion of the two 'paths', or ways, by which 
Schopenhauer believes the will is led to resign from life. In particular, I refer back 
to the discussion of the second path to resignation: that of personally felt suffering.
I believe that Beckett utilizes Schopenhauer's understanding of suffering, which ‘is 
simply nothing but unfulfilled and thwarted willing' (WWR 1: 363), to deliberately 
break the will. By deliberately denying Pozzo the information the willing subject 
requires to be able to act (WWR 1: 309), Lucky is intentionally inflicting the kind of 
suffering that comes with the mental state of boredom.
What, then, does Lucky 'think' (Beckett, 1956: 42) when he is ordered to think? 
Lucky provides the appearance of reasoned thought, with the standard features of 
argument, counter-argument, qualifications, and so on. However, in essence 
Lucky's speech provides only the form of such an argument, minus the content 
Lucky provides merely the appearance of'thinking'. Lucky's 'tirade' (Beckett, 1956: 
42) in Act I of Waiting for Godot is a complex process of refusing to provide Pozzo 
with a clear, and therefore usable, motive for action. Habitual knowledge is denied 
to the individual will through a series of endless qualifications and professions of 
uncertainty. In the following passage I have isolated these particular aspects:
LUCKY: On the other hand ... with some exceptions for reasons
unknown... for reasons unknown... but not so fast...
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left unfinished ... beyond all doubt all other doubt than 
that which clings to the labours of men... but not so 
fast for reasons unknown... left unfinished for reasons 
unknown... left unfinished... for reasons unknown... for 
reasons unknown... for reasons unknown... 
approximately by and large more or less... for reasons 
unknown... in light of the labours lo s t... the light of the 
labours lost... in the year of their Lord six hundred and 
something... for reasons unknown... but not so fast... 
for reasons unknown... the labours abandoned left 
unfinished... abandoned unfinished... unfinished... 
(Beckett, 1956: 42-45).
That Lucky's way of 'thinking' causes his willing subject to suffer is shown in the 
original stage directions:
Pozzo dejected and disgusted... Pozzo's sufferings increase ... Pozzo more 
and more agitated and groaning (Beckett, 1956: 42).
Here we witness the first aspect of Beckettian asceticism in action: the generation 
of uncertainty through the refusal to provide a clear motive for action in the form 
of a judgement. As I discussed in an earlier chapter on the subject of the knowing 
subject (Chapter 6), in Schopenhauerian epistemology there are four kinds of 
object in the world - empirical objects, concepts, space and time, and the 
individual human will -  because the knowing subject is capable of generating these 
four kinds of object. Lucky's ascetic practice revolves around the knowing subject's 
inherent capacity to form concepts, the second class of object in the 
Schopenhauerian fourfold root. Concepts are representations of representations, 
which the knowing subject combines in a logical way to form judgements 
(Schopenhauer, 1974a: 154-156). Lucky's way of thinking prevents this process 
from occurring. Rather, in each case, Lucky presents a concept or thought which,
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for a number of reasons, lacks resolution, and by so presenting such unresolved 
material precludes the addition of a further concept that then permits a judgment 
to be formed. This in turn prevents the will from acting, as the individual will, or 
'character', cannot act without a motive.
It is, therefore, not a refusal to provide a motive per se) Rather, Beckettian 
asceticism appears to be an exaggeration of the human capacity to reason, and the 
indecision that necessarily stems from the ability to behave in a non-reflexive, or 
non-instinctive manner (WWR 1: 205-6). In short, Samuel Beckett uses the human 
capacity to reason to destroy the individual will. It is the very thing about reason 
that Schopenhauer, and, subsequently, Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1997: 81), criticises, 
namely reason's 'ephectic' quality -  that it permits one to prevaricate, to put off, 
and delay -  which Beckett utilizes to such great effect in his middle period 
tragedies.
The most significant advance on Schopenhauer's life-denying thought is Beckett's 
use of 'reason' as a capacity of the human mind to destroy one's inner drives. 
Schopenhauer, as we have seen, dismisses the utility of reason in destroying one's 
will (WWR 1: 185-6,190).h Beckett, on the other hand, finds something in reason, 
which Schopenhauerian thought cannot accommodate. Reason permits 
deliberation (WWR 2: 205-6), and in Beckettian theatre, deliberation creates 
irresolution. Irresolution proves to be an effective means of causing unbearable 
suffering.
The very import of Lucky's famous rambling monologue in Act I of Godot is the 
awareness that a conclusion can only be reached by not reaching a conclusion:
LUCKY: On the other hand...with some exceptions, for reasons
unknown... but not so fa s t... labours left unfinished... 
beyond all doubt all other doubt than that which
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clings to the labours of men... in light of the labours 
lo s t... abandoned ... unfinished ... (Beckett, 1956: 44- 
45].
The phrase 'for reasons unknown' is said ten times. The word 'unfinished' is said 
some seven times. Indeed, Lucky 'finishes' with the word 'unfinished'.
Beckett's engagement with Schopenhauerian thought, in particular 
Schopenhauer's understanding of ascetic practice, results in an interesting 
Beckettian move regarding the utility of reason. Schopenhauer views reason as a 
mere device of the will for attaining its aims. Reasoned thought has its foundations 
in immediate perception, and is therefore merely an abstracted understanding of 
phenomenal material -  that is, the world divided by the mind into space and time 
(WWR 1: 40]. Because of this reason is unable to show the will 'reality', that is, its 
underlying unity prior to the mind's division. Thus reason cannot be employed to 
break the will.
Beckett, on the other hand, discovers something in the human capacity to reason 
that Schopenhauer' system cannot accommodate. It is the deliberative quality that 
comes with the capacity for reason that Beckett employs. Reason permits human 
beings to fail to come to a conclusion. Reason permits unending deliberation. This 
unending deliberation is presented in Beckettian theatre as a means of breaking 
the will by allowing it to remain in a state of frustrated irresolution. It is 
humanity's ability to think ephectically, to suspend judgement, which lies at the 
heart of Beckettian asceticism as displayed in Beckettian tragedy. This is not a stoic 
understanding of the utility of reason, where one can deploy reason to avoid 
suffering (see Uhlmann, 2008], that is, upon reflection find an answer to one's 
problems, and chart an appropriate course of action. Rather, reason can be used to 
cause suffering. Beckett's 'reason' is a matter of doing nothing. Reason's central 
Beckettian function is to reveal the fundamental inability of reason to overcome 
the suffering that comes from striving. Unlike the stoic's understanding of reason,
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then, in Beckett's theatre of asceticism reason's only, and therefore, ultimate utility 
is to show that nothing one does will result in painlessness. Doing nothing is the 
only solution. The consequence of doing nothing is 'boredom'.
Boredom
Beckettian uncertainty, or indeterminacy is a means to an end, a penultimate step 
in Beckettian ascetic practice. In Beckett's middle-period tragedies the tactic of 
uncertainty or indeterminacy is a key ascetic method employed by the intellect, or 
Beckettian knowing subject, in its attempts to deny the will a motive, thus 
generating the state of boredom, and by so doing placing the will in a position of 
suffering from which it may freely choose to resign from life.
In Schopenhauerian thought the experience of boredom is an important 
mechanism for ensuring that the individual continues to strive. Boredom is a key 
aspect in the cycle o f striving, wherein the individual constantly transitions from 
one desire to the next. For Schopenhauer, boredom is the state experienced after 
the attainment of one desire, and prior to the pursuit of another. In boredom one 
experiences the 'pressure of the will', but since it has no 'motive' on which to fix, an 
'inner torment' results. The individual experiences the pain of longing per se, that 
is, longing without any definite object towards which one's energies and attention 
can be directed (Young, 2005: 212 citing WWR 1: 364).
It is important to note that Schopenhauer limits his discussion of boredom to an 
understanding of its effects, and its purpose, namely that boredom is a means to 
ensure that human beings are never satisfied, and that the intellect continues to 
present motives to the will. But whereas Schopenhauer leaves his discussion of 
boredom at the level of description, Beckett goes further than this by utilizing the 
effects of boredom in ascetic practice: In Beckett's middle-period tragedies
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boredom is a 'perilous zone' (Beckett, 1999: 18) of'fearful emptiness' (WWR 1: 
312), which the Beckettian intellect enters and refuses to leave:
LUCKY: On the other hand... but not so fast... but not so fast...
(1956:42-3).
In Beckett's tragedies, the knowing subject's refusal to ascribe meaning to the 
events of the world is a life-denying task. Lucky's behaviour is a deliberate attempt 
by the intellect to hold the Lucky-Pozzo pseudocouple in a state of boredom -  'a 
lifeless longing without a definite object, a deadening languor' (WWR 1:164) -  by 
refusing to provide the will with a genuine range of motives that then permits the 
will to simultaneously choose, and to act.
Whereas Lucky once danced the 'farandole, the fling, the brawl, the jig, the 
fandango, and even the hornpipe', the only dance he now performs, or provides as 
an option, is 'The Net' (Beckett, 1956: 40), the dance of one who wishes not to 
dance, but who lacks the freedom to refuse. Thus the only motive that Lucky now 
presents to Pozzo is a disincentive for action: it offers no 'entertainment' (Beckett, 
1956: 34), and provides no relief. Similarly, regarding Lucky's 'thinking', providing 
a comprehensive list of thinkers -  Puncher and Wattmann, Testew and Cunard, 
Fartov and Belcher, Steinweg and Peterman (Beckett, 1956: 42-4) -  lends the 
appearance of the intellect performing its servile function, namely that of 
presenting options from which the will may ultimately choose (WWR 2: 207). 
Looked at more closely, however, Lucky only informs Pozzo of the work of 
thinkers who have been unable to finish their thoughts, or whose works have 
been lost (Beckett, 1956: 43-4). Lucky is not providing a motive, a definite object, 
on which Pozzo can 'fix', and towards which his energies can be directed (WWR 1: 
364), rather, Lucky is intentionally generating a key feature of Schopenhauerian 
boredom: 'a feeling o f- eventually acute -  frustration' (Young, 2005: 212; Beckett, 
1956:42).
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Lucky's behaviour -  whether dancing, or thinking -  can be understood as an 
enactment of Beckettian asceticism, which I have presented as the equation of 
Character -  Motive (Representation) = Inaction. Rather than shedding light on the 
world, as is the typical role of the intellect, Lucky's representation-denying 
behaviour has its metaphorical equivalent in the fluorescent tube that flickers 
incessantly, neither providing light nor passing into total darkness. Whilst lending 
the appearance of an intellect that is trying to perform its illuminatory role (WWR 
1:150), Lucky simply fails to provide Pozzo with a sufficient amount of 'light' to 
allow him to 'see'.
In defence of this proposition I again draw the reader's attention to Lucky's failure 
-  as Pozzo understands it -  to entertain (Beckett, 1956: 34). Here, 'entertainment' 
is to be understood in terms of utility. Even knowledge of the terrible nature of 
existence is a motive for the will's striving, if the will is not personally affected by 
such knowledge. Indeed, Pozzo is able to calmly recite the personally useful 
knowledge of others' suffering that Lucky has previously presented to him. He 
knows, for example, that the 'tears of the world are a constant quantity. For each 
one who begins to weep, somewhere else another stops' (Beckett, 1956: 33). Yet 
this knowledge has no effect on his behaviour, for Pozzo continues to strive. Pozzo 
accumulates deeper knowledge about the nature of the world, then, for the same 
reason that he positions objects in space and time: to improve his ability to strive:
POZZO: Guess who taught me all these beautiful things. [Pause.
Pointing to Lucky.) My Lucky! ... But for him all my 
thoughts, all my feelings would have been of common 
things... Beauty, grace, truth of the first water, I knew 
they were all beyond me. So I took a knook (Beckett, 
1956:33)
However, whereas Lucky had once informed Pozzo about the nature of the world 
in such a way that Pozzo could recite the content of such thoughts without being
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personally affected by it, Lucky now refuses content itself, and in doing so denies 
Pozzo the relief of mere entertainment. In short, Lucky's ascetic method of 
irresolution causes Pozzo to experience the kind of suffering he was unable to 
grasp by merely knowing a series of profundities about 'life'. This, then, is what 
boredom does in Beckettian tragedy: it causes the will personally felt suffering 
(WWR 1: 392-7], which in turn permits knowledge of suffering per se.
Second Part of the Beckettian Dynamically Sublime: The Negative Epiphany
It is at this point in the ascetic process, as Pozzo endures the frustration borne of 
uncertainty and irresolution, that Lucky then proceeds to the second part of the 
Beckettian ascetic method of psychic self-harm. Having opened up a 'perilous 
zone', a 'period of transition that separates consecutive adaptations', where Pozzo 
is allowed to experience the 'suffering of being' (Beckett, 1999: 18-19], Lucky then 
proceeds to the ascetic method of self-castigation (WWR 1: 382]. For as we have 
seen, 'in the intervals between Habit's changes of screen we suffer because we are 
presented, harshly, with an uncensored view of the world' (Acheson, 1978: 170]. 
Beckett's ascetic practice is essentially a means of manufacturing or generating 
these moments when the will suffers for want of habitual knowledge.
As with other forms of ascetic practice, self-castigation is undertaken with the 
intention of mortifying the will. In this case, the individual verbally accuses himself 
or herself as a form of penance. Self-castigation is, essentially, a pronouncement of 
one's own misdeeds, an attempt to disabuse oneself of self-misperception. As an 
example of self-misperception, Pozzo declares his nature to be 'liberal' (Beckett, 
1956: 39]. Thus although Pozzo is a landowner who owns many slaves, his self­
perception is that of one who is broad-minded, generous, tolerant, and so on. By 
preventing Pozzo from lapsing into habitual thought -  where he may once again 
view the world from the position of the egoist -  Lucky is able to present Pozzo with 
an understanding of his true nature, or intelligible character, an understanding
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that would otherwise go unacknowledged. This non-habitual knowledge is 
presented during Lucky's 'tirade' (Beckett, 1956: 42) -  ‘a long, angry speech of 
criticism or accusation... a denunciation' (New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary) 
-  in Act I of Waiting for Godot
Through the presentation of Lucky's tirade we see that Pozzo is unable to 
understand why it is that his countrymen and women are starving and miserable, 
'in spite of the strides of alimentation and defecation', or, in other words 'nutrition 
and hygiene'. Regardless of these improvements, they continue to 'waste and pine 
waste and pine', and to 'shrink and dwindle'. To the best of Pozzo's knowledge they 
should be fit and well, given the 'strides of physical culture the practice of sports 
such as tennis football running cycling swimming...' (Beckett, 1956: 43). In short, 
Pozzo appears to have no real awareness of the suffering of others. He assumes 
that all, like he, have access to food, sanitation, and time for recreation.
Essentially this is the version of the world that the defence of Habit has presented 
to Pozzo: his version of the world -  where, as a wealthy man, he has all he wants 
and needs -  is the only version. Given this, the terrible side of life is inexplicable. 
People die despite all the improvements that had been made to living standards. 
This, then, is how Pozzo understands past events. However in his 'tirade', Lucky 
finally breaks through. We know that Lucky is trying to 'kill' Pozzo by 'the way he 
goes on' (Beckett, 1956: 34). Whilst holding the will at bay by refusing to provide a 
clear motive for action, Lucky accuses the wealthy landowner, Pozzo, of culpability, 
of causing others to suffer:
LUCKY: ... in a word the dead loss per caput since the death of
Bishop Berkeley being to the tune of one inch four 
ounce per caput approximately by and large more or 
less to the nearest decimal good measure round 
figures stark naked in the stockinged feet in 
Connemara in a word for reasons unknown... the
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skull... the tears...the skull the skull the skull the skull 
in Connemara in spite of the tennis... the skull the skull 
in Connemara in spite of the tennis the skull... (Beckett, 
1956:44-5).
Whereas through 'voluntary' memory - 'the uniform memory of intelligence... 
relied on to reproduce for our gratified inspection those impressions of the past 
that were consciously and intelligently formed' (Beckett, 1999: 32-33) -  the self- 
censored version of the famine was that people starved despite all that Pozzo and 
his class had done, and all the improvements that had been made to the quality of 
life, the involuntary memory -  '... the total past sensation, not its echo nor its copy, 
but the sensation itself, annihilating every spatial and temporal restriction, [which] 
comes in a rush to engulf the subject in all the beauty of its infallible proportion' 
(Beckett, 1999: 72-3) -  is that people starved to death because Pozzo's gains in 
quality of life, his wealth, had come at the expense of others. Lucky's tirade, then, is 
ultimately a revelation of the effects of egoism.
Whereas people were once seen to 'waste and pine' amid the sanitized language of 
'alimentation and defecation', the more complete, 'involuntary' memory that Lucky 
now presents of the same events focuses on the horror of poverty and starvation, 
and the indifference of those whom, as landowners, did nothing to alter the 
situation, or, indeed, caused it to happen. The more comprehensive recollection of 
events causes the will to suffer the pain of negative self-knowledge. It is a negative 
epiphany, which I have defined as a painful awareness of past events; the moment 
when the individual will -  confronted by the suffering of being - understands that 
it is for the best that it ceases to strive.
In an earlier chapter on the Schopenhauerian subject of willing (Chapter 5), I 
discussed Schopenhauer's understanding of the individual will as 'character'. For 
Schopenhauer there are three ways of understanding character: as something 
'intelligible', as something 'empirical' WWR 1: 289) and as something that one
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'acquires' or fails to acquire (WWR 1: 303, 305). What we observe in the 
abovementioned ascetic process is the willing subject, Pozzo, being guided by his 
intellect along the second path to knowledge of suffering to the point where, 
through personally felt suffering, he 'reaches thoughtfulness' (WWR 1: 253) about 
suffering per se. This is, essentially, a process where Pozzo gains knowledge of his 
egoistical intelligible character -  that which is determined by an act of the will 
outside time -  through observing his empirical character -  individual acts of 
selfishness in response to motives. In this way, Pozzo acquires character, or self- 
knowledge, of himself as an egoist (WWR 1: 303). Based upon this self-knowledge 
-  painful knowledge of egoism -  and knowledge of the suffering generated by acts 
of egoism, Pozzo freely chooses to resign from life: 'Cognitive self-realization leads 
to conative self-cancellation' (Janaway, 1999b: 5).
What we observe, then, in Beckett's tragedies is that to acknowledge the existence 
of the 'Other' is ultimately a destructive event. In Beckett scholarship it is widely 
argued that Beckett's art promotes the recognition of difference, and that such 
recognition is a life-affirming act.1“ However, in Beckett's theatre of asceticism, the 
‘Other’, once acknowledged, arrives in the form of the suffering 'Other'. That we 
suffer, and that we all suffer, that we are 'comrades in distress' (Beckett, 1999: 67), 
is knowledge about the nature of existence that promotes the willing subject's 
resignation from life, not affirmation of life. In Beckett's tragedies, the 
acknowledgement of the 'Other' marks not merely the possibility of moving 
beyond the solipsist 'one' to the recognition of the existence of 'Two' as it is said to 
do in Badiouian thought (Badiou, 2003:16), the recognition of the suffering 'Other' 
also marks the possibility of'None' of'Nothingness'.
Beckett's Depiction of Successful Ascetic Practice
Beckett portrays Lucky's ascetic practice -  that of inhibiting the formation of a 
judgement by presenting a stream of unfinished concepts -  as an effective means
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of breaking the will, or placing the will in a position of suffering from which it 
freely chooses to resign from life. That Lucky has been successful in his efforts to 
'break' Pozzo -  or, in other words, that Lucky has been liberated from servitude 
and attained the state of'nothingness' -  is portrayed in two ways: through Pozzo's 
loss of sight (Beckett, 1956: 86), and through Lucky's inability to speak (Beckett, 
1956: 89). Earlier, in the preceding chapter, we saw that for Schopenhauer 
'nothing', or the state of resignation, can only be depicted negatively, that is, as an 
absence of something (WWR 1: 409). In the light of this understanding I argued 
that Beckett cannot therefore show 'nothing' as having occurred. What Beckett can, 
and does do, however, is show the absence of certain features once possessed by 
the Pozzo-Lucky pseudocouple. Pozzo's resignation in response to self-knowledge 
and the knowledge of ubiquitous suffering is signified by his loss of sight. In an 
earlier chapter on Schopenhauerian and Beckettian ontology (Chapter 5) I 
discussed Schopenhauer's theory that the 'blind' will had ‘kindled a light for itself 
(WWR 1: 150) by producing the representation-generating intellect through its 
ceaseless striving. In Beckett's tragedies ascetic practice is depicted as the process 
of slowly, and methodically extinguishing that 'light' by depriving the will of a 
motive, and revealing the reality of ubiquitous suffering. The way that Beckett 
signifies the success of ascetic practice is through the willing subject's 
deteriorating sight. Ultimately, Pozzo loses his sight because along with his 
resignation comes the simultaneous loss of the aspect of the will that represents 
the world, namely the knowing subject, and the representations it typically 
generates in space and time, i.e. the world (WWR 1: 411). It is because the will, 
Pozzo, has resigned, and now lacks an intellect -  the very thing that situates things 
in time - that he no longer has any understanding of time:
POZZO: The blind have no notion of time. The things of time
are hidden from them too (Beckett, 1956: 86).
In addition to this, Pozzo's resignation is also depicted 'negatively' through Lucky's 
silence, as indeed Beckett typically signifies the knowing subject's dissolution with 
'dumbness' (Beckett, 1956: 89) or the inability to respond. Much has already been
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written on the subject of whether or not the goal of Beckett's art is silence, and 
whether silence as an objective is at all possible. It seems that one's understanding 
of Beckettian silence depends on the interpretive framework that one brings to the 
work. Though different frameworks are in evidence - Aristotelian (Nussbaum), 
and a variety of Nietzschean, and Post-Nietzschean approaches (for example, 
Adorno, Cavell, Deleuze, Blanchot, and Critchley) -  the majority position is that 
silence cannot be achieved (Nussbaum, Adorno, Blanchot, Critchley), or is at best 
an 'infinite task' (Cavell, 2002:156).Hii
In Narrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy of Love, Martha Nussbaum understands 
Beckett's art as a project of'radical undoing' (Nussbaum, 1990: 293):
Indeed, they themselves [Beckett's voices] make increasingly radical 
attempts to put an end to the entire project of storytelling and to the 
forms of life that this practice supports. They ask us to see their forms of 
feeling as a pattern that can be unravelled, a writing that can be 
unwritten, a story that can be ended—not by bringing it to the usual 
happy or unhappy ending but by ending the storytelling life (Nussbaum, 
1990: 287-8).
Ultimately, Nussbaum discounts the possibility of the success of the desire for 
silence because the very attempt to communicate the desire for silence ultimately 
ensures, albeit reluctantly, the continuation of a particular narrative. In Beckett's 
case the narrative is the narrative of wishing to end narrative (Nussbaum, 1990, 
306-11; see also Erickson, 2007: 265).
Similarly, Adorno views silence as the 'asymptote towards which Beckett's drama 
tends', though here, silence cannot be reached because the words one uses to reach 
this goal tend, at the same time, to push it away. Thus, for Adorno, the end of 
Endgame does not mark the moment when silence is accomplished because one
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sees in the very need for the accompanying mime Act Without Words that 
'muteness has not yet been satisfactorily achieved' in Endgame (Adorno, 1991: 
260).
Countering these viewpoints, Critchley argues that silence can never be the goal of 
artistic activity, 'rather writing is the necessary desacralization of silence' 
(Critchley, 1997:152). In line with his critical progenitor, Maurice Blanchot, who 
argues that the voice cannot be silenced, Critchley adds that 'although Beckett's 
protagonists desire to be done with words, to be finally silent', such silence is 
'impossible' (Critchley, 1997: 153), 'we have to talk' (Critchley, 1997: 152).
Over against these critics, I argue that in the character of Lucky, Beckett has 
achieved the seemingly 'impossible'. In Waiting for Godot, Beckett has produced an 
artwork that calls for silence, and achieves silence. In addition to this, Beckett 
presents the means to bring about silence, or release from servitude, by 
performing systematic ascetic practice. This ascetic method combines the 
deprivation of representational knowledge with the more traditional methods of 
fasting, self-castigation, and self-mortification. The success of this ascetic method is 
evident in the way that Lucky, having successfully broken his will, is now silent, 
'can't even groan' (Beckett, 1956: 89). Lucky no longer has to talk because the 
aspect of the self that compelled him to speak has resigned. Schopenhauer 
describes the will's resignation in the following way:
If that veil of Maya, the principium individuationis, is lifted from the eyes 
of a man to such an extent that he no longer makes the egoistical 
distinction between himself and the person of others, but takes as much 
interest in the suffering of other individuals as in his own ... then it 
follows automatically that such a man, recognizing in all beings his own 
true and innermost self, must also regard the endless sufferings of all 
that lives as his own, and thus take upon himself the pain of the whole 
world. No suffering is any longer strange or foreign to him... He knows
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the whole, comprehends its inner nature, and finds it involved in a 
constant passing away, a vain striving, an inward conflict, and a 
continual suffering. Wherever he looks he sees suffering humanity, and 
the suffering animal world, and a world that passes away... The will now 
turns away from life; it shudders at the pleasures in which it recognizes 
the affirmation of life (WWR 1: 378-9).
Schopenhauer's understanding, that through personally felt suffering one gains an 
understanding of'oneness', and with it an understanding of the universal suffering 
of the will's fleeting phenomenal objectifications, finds its equivalent in Pozzo's 
recital of the knowledge he now possesses:
POZZO: [suddenly furious). Have you not done tormenting me
with your accursed time! It's abominable! When!
When! One day, is that not enough for you, one day like 
any other day, one day he went dumb, one day I went 
blind, one day we'll go deaf, one day we were born, one 
day we shall die, the same day, the same second, is that 
not enough for you? [Calmer). They give birth astride 
of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night 
once more [Beckett, 1956: 89).
Here Pozzo recounts the knowledge that led him to resign.liv It is the negative 
epiphany of ubiquitous suffering that permits Pozzo to see through the principium 
individuationis, or the principle of individuation. The next section on the 
pseudocouple of Vladimir and Estragon discusses the reasons that Vladimir is 
unable to reach a comparable state of resignation, but instead continues to strive.
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Estragon and Vladimir
ESTRAGON: {giving up again) Nothing to be done.
VLADIMIR: I'm beginning to come around to that opinion.
All my life I've tried to put it from me, saying, 
Vladimir, be reasonable, you haven't yet tried 
everything. And I resumed the struggle 
(Beckett, 1956: 9].
Why is it the case that unlike the play's other willing subject, Pozzo, Vladimir is 
unable to understand the essential, suffering, nature of life? What is the reason that 
Vladimir is unable to 'go on' (Beckett, 1956: 91) suffering, that is, endure 
personally felt suffering, and thus gain an understanding of suffering per sei As a 
means of exploring this problem, I shall re-state Schopenhauer's understanding of 
'ensnarement', which was first cited in the previous chapter on Schopenhauerian 
asceticism:
At times, in the hard experience of our own sufferings or in the vividly 
recognized sufferings of others, knowledge of the vanity and bitterness 
of life comes close to us who are still enveloped in the veil of Maya. We 
would like to deprive desires of their sting, close the entry to all 
suffering, purify and sanctify ourselves by complete and final 
resignation. But the illusion of the phenomenon soon ensnares us again, 
and its motives set the will in motion once more; we cannot tear 
ourselves free. The allurements of hope, the flattery of the present, the 
sweetness of pleasures, the well-being that falls to the lot of our person 
amid the lamentations of a suffering world governed by chance and 
error, all these draw us back to it, and rivet the bonds anew (WWR 1: 
379).
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Schopenhauer's understanding of ensnarement provides us with an effective 
means of comprehending Vladimir's inability to gain the requisite knowledge of 
suffering to resign from the life of striving. Working within this interpretive 
framework, 1 argue that the knowledge the knowing subject, Estragon, presents to 
Vladimir -  namely that suffering can be avoided -  prevents Vladimir from suffering 
sufficiently, and from acquiring knowledge of suffering by suffering. It is, therefore, 
an argument that places great emphasis on the stage direction that precedes 
Estragon's first line: giving up again (Beckett, 1956: 9). In short, unlike the Pozzo- 
Lucky pseudocouple, the Vladimir-Estragon pseudocouple is unable to proceed 
along the second path to knowledge of suffering, and thus gain knowledge of 
suffering perse. Instead, Vladimir-Estragon is left to wait interminably by the side 
of a country road (Beckett, 1956: 7).
In the previous section on the intellectual character, Lucky, I argued that Lucky's 
seemingly bizarre behaviour could be understood in the light of the more 
'traditional' methods of ascetic practice such as self-mortification, and fasting: 
Lucky's way of thinking is a unique form of psychic self-torment, at the heart of 
which is the state of unalleviated boredom. Estragon's behaviour, on the other 
hand, can be understood as the inverse of ascetic practice. The role that Estragon 
performs in Waiting for Godot is that of a counterpoint to the role performed by 
Lucky. Whereas Lucky is indeed a fortunate knowing subject to have devised a 
successful means for quieting his will, and thus to experience 'grace' in the form of 
the will's decision to resign (WWR 1: 404), Estragon stands in for the vast majority 
of humanity whom in the face of ubiquitous suffering caused by striving continue 
to believe that suffering can be alleviated by further striving. In contrast to Lucky 
who is an exceptional individual, Estragon is something of an intellectual 
'Everyman' whose desire to ensure a 'secure and pleasant existence' (WWR 2: 638) 
merely ensures that his willing aspect continues to strive, and thus that the 
Vladimir-Estragon pseudocouple continues to suffer. In contrast to Lucky, then, 
who has ceased to perform his role as servant of the will (WWR 2: 216), Estragon 
continues to carry out this function. Thus whilst Estragon certainly denies Vladimir 
knowledge in space and time (the third class of objects in the fourfold root), his 
attempts at generating uncertainty are not carried out with the intention of
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breaking his will, of causing his will to permanently resign but, rather, to have his 
will desire something else. Estragon's goal may be understood as an attempt to 
alter the object of desire (presently Godot], and not to ensure that Vladimir is left 
without an object of desire per se.
One can understand Estragon's aversion to boredom in the same way that one can 
understand Estragon's aversion to other forms of suffering. For Estragon, boredom 
is merely another form of suffering which one, when acting as a servant of the will, 
must alleviate. Thus, unlike Lucky, Estragon fails to understand the experience of 
boredom as an opportunity to break the will, and to bring suffering to a permanent 
end. In what ways, then, does Estragon attempt to avoid the kind of suffering that 
Lucky endures? What motifs does Beckett employ to designate Estragon as one 
who strives to avoid suffering? Whereas Lucky takes every opportunity to mortify 
the will -  both physically and mentally -  Estragon attempts to alleviate all physical 
and mental suffering, from head to toe. Taking my lead from the text, I shall 
explore Estragon's inability to endure suffering from the ground up, commencing, 
then, with a discussion of Estragon's aching feet.
Estragon's aversion to suffering is brought to our attention at the very beginning of 
Act I of Godot when we see him struggling to remove his boots, which are evidently 
too small for his feet and thus causing him great discomfort (Beckett, 1956: 9-12]. 
Estragon later discards the same boots, leaving them for another man with smaller 
feet, whom he believes the boots will make 'happy' (Beckett, 1956: 52]. That 
Estragon's boots are making him unhappy would, if he were an ascetic, be reason 
for him to keep them. The inference here is that Estragon wishes to discard his 
boots not because such an act will cause him discomfort, but because to do so will 
provide some relief. This inference is confirmed when Estragon later accepts the 
boots that have been left by the person whom took his (Beckett, 1956: 69] because 
life without boots is as painful as it is with them (Beckett, 1956: 48]. Estragon fails 
to go barefoot in the world (like Christ, the ascetic to whom he compares himself] 
(Beckett, 1956: 52], and he wishes not to experience the pain of boots that are too 
small for him. In ascetic terms, Estragon's behaviour can be understood as the
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failure to endure in suffering, through a failure to self-mortify. His is a constant 
process of attempting to avoid pain— first the pain of uncomfortable shoes 
(Beckett, 1956: 12), and then the pain that comes from walking barefoot (Beckett, 
1956: 48), and then the pain of uncomfortable shoes (Beckett, 1956: 92), and so 
on, ad infinitum.
But 'that's enough about these boots' (Beckett, 1956: 70). From Estragon's feet, we 
proceed upwards to Estragon's shins, and to the subjects of compassion and 
revenge.
In response to Estragon's attempts to provide Lucky with comfort - taking a 
handkerchief to dry his tears -  Lucky kicks Estragon 'violently in the shins' 
(Beckett, 1956: 32). This an important passage for our understanding of Beckett's 
thoughts on the subject of compassion, which, much like Schopenhauer, Beckett 
presents as ultimately futile:
POZZO: [Lucky has] stopped crying. (To Estragon.) You have
replaced him as it were. (Lyrically.) The tears of the 
world are a constant quantity. For each one who 
begins to weep, somewhere else another stops (Beckett, 
1956: 33)!v
A similar understanding regarding the futility of compassion can be gleaned from 
the passage that follows shortly after this, where Vladimir first attacks Pozzo for 
being cruel to his servant, and then, upon hearing Pozzo's pained defence, attacks 
Lucky for 'crucifying' such a good master (Beckett, 1956: 33-4). To come to the 
aide of one is to render another vulnerable.
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We discover that it was Lucky who taught Pozzo about the futility of compassion 
(Beckett, 1956: 33), it is also Lucky who 'teaches' Estragon about the value of 
compassion by kicking Estragon in the shins when Estragon pities him. What does 
Estragon take from this lesson? Unlike the ascetic who would present the other 
shin for Lucky to kick (WWR 1: 388), Estragon first spits on Lucky (Beckett, 1956: 
33), and later seeks to avenge himself when Lucky is defenceless (Beckett, 1956: 
87-88). Unlike Lucky who ‘never defends himself (Beckett, 1956: 87), Estragon 
avenges himself (which is a form of delayed self-defence) by kicking and abusing 
Lucky who is lying on the ground. The consequence of revenge is that Estragon 
suffers anew, as he hurts his foot during the attack. In short, Estragon suffers 
because he has failed to understand that striving, in whatever form, is suffering 
(WWR 1: 310). In a world of ubiquitous suffering, any attempt to alleviate suffering 
is ultimately futile. At the same time, in a world where all is 'one', any attempt to 
inflict suffering is just as senseless because one inflicts suffering upon oneself. As 
such, the act of revenge is as futile as the act of compassion.
That Estragon is not an ascetic, but, rather, an intellect that seeks to avoid suffering 
is also revealed by Estragon’s attitude to the matter of poverty. Estragon requests 
money, or considers accepting money from Pozzo on a number of occasions 
(Beckett, 1956: 39, 80-81). These requests permit the audience to understand his 
presently dire financial circumstance as something which has occurred 
unintentionally, as opposed to it having been deliberately brought about by, for 
example, his having taken a vow of poverty (WWR 1: 381-2). The act of asking for 
money reveals to us that Estragon still holds the opinion that his presently painful 
situation is one that can be alleviated. By longing to have money, Estragon also 
longs for the means to alter his present situation. Estragon lives in the hope that 
suffering can be avoided. We see this worldview manifested in a number of other 
ways, such as Estragon's desire to go elsewhere -  be it to the Pyrenees, or to 
somewhere 'far away' (Beckett, 1956: 81, 92). In short, Estragon simply fails to 
understand that it is neither his financial situation, nor his present location that is 
the cause of his suffering but, rather, his will, Vladimir, and the striving that is 
essential to his nature:
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But we frequently shut our eyes to the truth, comparable to a bitter 
medicine, that suffering is essential to life, and therefore does not flow in 
upon us from the outside, but everyone carries around within himself its 
perennial source. On the contrary, we are constantly looking for a 
particular external cause, as it were a pretext for the pain that never 
leaves u s... We then have, so to speak, what we were looking for, 
namely something that we can denounce at any moment, instead of our 
own inner nature, as the source of our sufferings (WWR 1: 318).
Remaining at the level of Estragon's pockets, we now proceed to Vladimir's 
defective prostate, and to the concept of providing relief
Early on in the play we discover that Vladimir has a defective prostate, which is 
causing him a fair degree of discomfort (Beckett, 1956: 10):
Vladimir breaks into a hearty laugh which he 
immediately stifles, his hand pressed to his pubis, 
his face contorted.
VLADIMIR: One daren't even laugh anymore.
ESTRAGON: Dreadful privation (Beckett, 1956: 11)
Later, Estragon deliberately stimulates Vladimir's malfunctioning gland by telling 
him a story about a drunk Englishman who visits a brothel. This story results in 
Vladimir's need to urinate, which Estragon watches with much enthusiasm:
Gestures of Estragon like those of a spectator encouraging a pugilist 
(Beckett, 1956: 16).
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There is little doubt that Estragon is deliberately causing Vladimir to suffer. 
However, the reason that Estragon inflicts self-harm is different to the reason that 
Lucky inflicts self-harm. Unlike Lucky who inflicts suffering on Pozzo (the body of 
the Pozzo-Lucky pseudocouple] with the intention of breaking him, Estragon 
inflicts personally felt suffering for the purpose of relieving the discomfort that 
comes with the state of boredom. It is the desire to relieve the acute frustration 
(Young, 2005: 212] of boredom that results in Estragon's self-harm. Vladimir's 
suffering has an element of entertainment to it; something that Beckett denotes 
with the above-cited stage direction of Estragon's gestures whilst watching 
Vladimir's discomfort. Deprived of the opportunity to tell Vladimir about his dream 
(Beckett, 1956:15-16], and unable to leave the place where they wait for Godot, 
Estragon takes out his frustration on Vladimir's ailing body. That Estragon's 
intention is to experience relief and not to generate terminal suffering, is 
supported by his subsequent wish to embrace Vladimir, after the latter has shown 
his annoyance at Estragon's behaviour (Beckett, 1956: 17]. The lesson that one is 
to take from such a scene is that relief is a problem in Beckettian tragedy. It is for 
this reason that Vladimir states that after having urinated he feels both 'relieved 
and at the same time ... appalled... AP-PALLED' (Beckett, 1956: 10-11]. It is the 
vague awareness, then, that the relief of personally felt suffering interrupts the 
process of bringing suffering to an end that results in Vladimir’s dismay.
From ailments of the reproductive system we proceed to the digestive system, and 
Estragon's stomach. The failure to inflict self-harm is also evinced in Estragon's 
acceptance and pursuit of food. Unlike Lucky, who refuses sustenance, Estragon 
accepts food from Vladimir and Pozzo (Beckett, 1956: 20, 27, 68]. One of the 
consistently utilized motifs of Beckettian ascetic tragedy is that of food, and either 
a character's acceptance, or rejection of sustenance. An intellectual character that 
fails to fast also fails to inhibit the will's capacity to strive (WWR 1: 382]. Thus we 
see that whilst Estragon accepts food, Lucky does not. In Beckettian theatre there 
is a direct correlation between a character's longing not to suffer and their 
continuing to do so. In the previous section on Lucky, I suggested that his refusal of 
chicken bones (Beckett, 1956: 27] was a deliberate attempt to promote suffering,
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and to deny the will the fuel to strive. By eating, then, Estragon provides his willing 
subject, Vladimir, with the energy to strive, and thus to suffer.
Finally, we end with the mind itself, and Estragon's understanding of boredom:
ESTRAGON: In the meantime nothing happens.
POZZO: You find it tedious?
ESTRAGON: Somewhat.
POZZO: [to Vladimir). And you, sir?
VLADIMIR: I've been better entertained (Beckett, 1956: 38).
Earlier I argued that the utilization of the unrelieved state of boredom was 
Beckett's unique contribution to the field of ascetic practice. I suggested that 
Lucky's refusal to 'entertain' (Beckett, 1956: 34] Pozzo was a key aspect of his 
preparing his willing subject for the further ascetic method of self-castigation, or, 
in Beckettian terms, the refusal of deadening Habit permits the presentation of 
painful knowledge in the form of greater self-knowledge. We thus see that the 
intellect's refusal to 'entertain' is vital to both the creation and exacerbation of 
boredom. Given this, we may note that in contrast to Lucky's refusal to entertain, 
Estragon continues to provide, or at least attempts to provide, Vladimir with 
'entertainment'. In contrast to Lucky who exacerbates boredom so as to permit a 
space for self-castigation, Estragon provides self-castigation as entertainment, and 
thus temporarily alleviates his and Vladimir's boredom:
They glare at each other angrily. 
VLADIMIR: Ceremonious ape!
ESTRAGON: Punctilious pig!
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VLADIMIR: Moron!
ESTRAGON: That’s the idea, let’s abuse each other.
VLADIMIR: Moron!
ESTRAGON: Vermin!
VLADIMIR: Abortion!
ESTRAGON: Morpion!
VLADIMIR: Sewer-rat!
ESTRAGON: Curate!
VLADIMIR: Cretin!
ESTRAGON: (with finality). Crritic!
VLADIMIR: Oh!
Unlike the self-castigatory knowledge that Lucky provides to Pozzo -  knowledge 
which has a revelatory character -  the form of self-castigation witnessed here is 
that which is undertaken for the sake of distraction. It does not provide Vladimir 
with the knowledge of suffering, but instead momentarily frees him from suffering 
by providing a distraction. And we may note that not only is such self-castigation 
performed with the intention of providing relief, it is also carried out with the 
intention of'making up', and not parting:
ESTRAGON: Now let's make it up.
VLADIMIR: Gogo!
ESTRAGON: Didi!
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VLADIMIR: Your hand!
ESTRAGON: Take it!
VLADIMIR: Come to my arms!
ESTRAGON: Your arms?
VLADIMIR: My breast!
ESTRAGON: Off we go!
They embrace. They separate. Silence.
VLADIMIR: How time flies w hen one has fun! (Beckett, 1956:
75-6).
We may also note that the provision of such a distraction m erely passes the time, 
w hereas Lucky's refusal to d istract Pozzo from suffering ultimately destroys time 
(Beckett, 1956: 86).
There are many other instances w here Estragon assists Vladimir in his attem pts to 
distract himself from the pain of boredom  (for example see Beckett, 1956: 62-65, 
69, 71-72). Often distraction is provided in the form of forced conversation, and 
contrived debate:
ESTRAGON: That's the idea, let's contradict each other...
That's the idea, let's ask each other questions ... 
That w asn 't a bad little canter.
VLADIMIR: Yes, but now we'll have to find som ething else.
ESTRAGON: Let me see (Beckett, 1956: 64).
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As Young (2005: 210-11) indicates, for Schopenhauer one of the key features of the 
experience of boredom -  in addition to the perceptual experience of life as being 
dreary and dead - is that, with existence having now become a burden, we seek to 
'kill time' (WWR 1: 313). Out of a sense of desperation, we adopt 'trivial motives', 
the value of which is 'arbitrarily assumed' (Schopenhauer, 1974b Vol. 1: 331-2).
What we witness, then, is Estragon's failure to comprehend boredom as an 
opportunity to bring suffering to an end:
ESTRAGON: Nothing happens, nobody comes, nobody goes,
it's awful! (Beckett, 1956: 41).
In response to this sensation, rather than choosing to exacerbate his and Vladimir's 
shared sense of boredom, Estragon constantly performs his function as a servant of 
the will and provides him with a motive for action, however arbitrary, or 
contrived.
The final means by which Estragon attempts to alleviate the pain of boredom is 
through the provision of the motive of suicide. It might seem strange to portray 
suicidal contemplation as a motive for action, however the provision of suicidal 
contemplation as a last-ditch attempt to provide a motive is of great concern to 
Beckett. The provision of suicide as an option is portrayed by Beckett as a motive 
like any other motive: it permits one's willing aspect to strive towards a goal, in 
this case the goal of one's phenomenal self-destruction (see WWR 1: 399-400). 
Thus when, in the face of boredom, Estragon repeatedly recommends death by 
hanging (Beckett, 1956:17, 53, 93-94) it is a motive that permits Vladimir to 
strive; it relieves the suffering that comes from lacking a motive. We may note that 
at no point does Lucky provide the motive of suicidal contemplation to his willing 
subject, Pozzo. Indeed, in Beckett's tragedies only the knowing subject that refuses 
to provide any motives, including the non-provision of suicidal contemplation, then
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goes on to break his or her will, or, in other words, places his or her will in such a 
position that it freely chooses to resign from life (WWR 1: 285, 395; WWR 2: 
629).lvi
With this discussion in place, I shall now return to the earlier cited quotation from 
The World as Will and Representation regarding the many reasons that one 
continues to strive despite having gained some understanding of suffering. 
Vladimir's soliloquy near the end of Act II of Waiting for Godot can be read in the 
light of Schopenhauerian 'ensnarement' (WWR 1: 379):
Was I sleeping, while the others suffered? Am I sleeping now?
Tomorrow, when I wake, or think I do, what shall I say of today? That 
with Estragon my friend, at this place, until the fall of night, I waited for 
Godot? That Pozzo passed, with his carrier, and that he spoke to us? 
Probably. But in all that what truth will there be?... Astride of a grave and 
a difficult birth. Down in the hole, lingeringly, the grave-digger puts on 
the forceps. We have time to grow old. The air is full of our cries...But 
habit is a great deadener... At me too someone is looking, of me too 
someone is saying, he is sleeping, he knows nothing, let him sleep on ... I 
can't go on!... What have I said? (Beckett, 1956: 90-91).
What does Vladimir now know? Vladimir is on the verge of comprehending 
universal suffering. Vladimir has become aware that he has been, and indeed may 
continue to be, insensible to the suffering of others, whose existence as 
objectifications of the will is a fleeting moment filled with suffering— 'the air is full 
of our cries'. That is, in acknowledging his insensibility to universal suffering, 
Vladimir has acquired a degree of knowledge about his essential character. 
Vladimir is also aware that Pozzo and Lucky's coming and going merely occurs in 
the phenomenal realm, and that his desire for Godot's arrival is nothing more than 
a temporary goal: 'But in all that what truth would there be?' However, unlike 
Pozzo, Vladimir is unable to ‘go on'. This phrase, 'I can't go on', refers to Vladimir's
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own suffering, that is, Vladimir is declaring his inability to go on suffering the pain 
that accompanies self-knowledge. Vladimir cannot tear himself free from his 
attachment to life, and freely choose to resign. It is because of this inability to 
endure in suffering that Vladimir must endure the pain that comes with striving 
once more. This moment is marked by the arrival of the boy who brings news of 
Godot, and of hope, in the form of tomorrow (Beckett, 1956: 91). 'Habit is a great 
deadener', then, because perceiving egoistically stops one from experiencing 
personally felt suffering, and thus from gaining knowledge of suffering per se.
I believe the reason that the willing subject, Vladimir, continues to live in the hope 
that 'tomorrow everything will be better' (Beckett, 1956: 52), and cannot 
ultimately suffer enough so as to appreciate ubiquitous suffering, is that his 
intellect Estragon fails to guide Vladimir along the second path to knowledge of 
suffering (WWR 1: 393; WWR 2: 638). Estragon lives in hope, whether it is the 
hope that comes with the ability to buy one's way out of unhappiness, or the hope 
that going to a new location will make one happy (Beckett, 1956: 81, 92). Belief in 
a better elsewhere is the knowledge that Estragon presents to his will. In short, 
Vladimir continues to live in hope that suffering can be avoided because his 
intellect, Estragon, continues to tell him that suffering can be avoided (by acquiring 
money, going elsewhere, or by ending his life). Estragon has misperceived the 
cause of suffering. Estragon mistakenly believes that what is longed for is the 
problem - that waiting for Godot is the cause of suffering -  when in fact the 
problem is longing itself.
This reading provides a challenge to Alain Badiou's understanding of Vladimir's 
determination to wait for Godot as the refusal to give up on the possibility of the 
'Other's' arrival (Badiou, 2003: 73). For Badiou the very ethicality of Beckett's 
work stems from its openness to the possibility of the 'Other', of living in the hope 
that the truth will emerge (Badiou, 2003: 22). In contrast to Badiou's reading of 
Beckettian tragedy, I argue that the truth -  in the form of the awareness of oneness 
and the ubiquity of suffering -  can only emerge once one has lost hope. That 
Vladimir continues to believe that Godot's arrival will mark the point when he,
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Vladimir, might receive some personal benefit appears not to be a moment of 
openness to the 'Other', but yet another moment of egoism. For Vladimir the 
'Other' is viewed in terms of utility, one who might answers one's prayers, after 
consulting his or her bank account (Beckett, 1956:18).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that Waiting for Godot is Beckettian theatre of 
asceticism. I believe that the knowing subject, Lucky, is both an ascetic, and a 
successful ascetic at that, an intellect who breaks his willing subject by employing 
what I have referred to as the Beckettian dynamically sublime. As part of this 
ascetic method, Lucky first denies Pozzo the painlessness of habitual 
consciousness. Whilst held in this frustrated state, Lucky then provides his 
knowing subject with the knowledge of his responsibility for the suffering of 
countless others, or, in other words, knowledge that is a disincentive to further 
action. In response to this involuntary memory, Pozzo resigns from life; an event 
signified by Pozzo's loss of sight, and Lucky's inability to speak. The Pozzo-Lucky 
pseudocouple comes to an end. Lucky is freed from the desires of an individual will 
(WWR 1: 199). All that is left of the will is the last vestige of the body (WWR 1: 180, 
411). In contrast to this, I have argued that the play's other knowing subject, 
Estragon, is not an ascetic but an intellect that misperceives striving as a solution 
to his problems rather than the cause of his suffering. The Vladimir-Estragon 
pseudocouple continues to suffer because Estragon continues to present the 
'caricature' (Beckett, 1999:14) of will-centred, habitual consciousness as 'reality' 
(Beckett, 1999: 22, 33). Estragon continues to furnish Vladimir with motives, 
which encourages Vladimir to misperceive suffering as an inessential feature of 
existence. The next chapter continues this reading of Beckett's tragedies as a 
sustained engagement with the life-denying aspects of Schopenhauerian thought 
by exploring the middle period works, Endgame, and Happy Days.
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Chapter 9: Beckettian Ethics -  Asceticism, Part Two: Endgame, and 
Happy Days
In this chapter I again explore the proposition that Beckett's middle-period 
tragedies can be understood as 'theatre of asceticism' by once again employing 
Schopenhauer's understanding of the dynamically sublime as an interpretive 
framework. It is my contention that the plays Endgame, and Happy Days are works 
in which Beckett continues to investigate the effectiveness of a variety of ascetic 
methods. The first half of this chapter presents a reading of Endgame. Here I argue 
that we witness the intellect's refusal to furnish the will with empirical objects. The 
second half of this chapter explores Beckett's ongoing utilization of 
Schopenhauerian thought through a reading of Happy Days, where I argue that we 
witness the intellect's attempts to entirely refuse the will by taking a vow of silence.
Endgame
There are many similarities between the ascetic tactics of Lucky and Clov, as 
indeed Lucky and Clov's respective willing subjects are similarly egocentric. With 
regards to Pozzo and Hamm, both willing subjects share an inability to 
comprehend the suffering of others.lvii Whilst Pozzo was wholly unable to 
understand why others were starving, Hamm's understanding of others’ suffering 
is confined to a 'formal', or theoretical understanding, which has not affected his 
behaviour. Though 'willing to believe they suffer as much as such creatures can 
suffer', Hamm still 'hesitates to end' (Beckett, 1958:12), that is, to cease striving.
As a consequence of this insensitivity to the suffering of others, the Beckettian 
knowing subjects, Lucky and Clov, establish a means of generating personally felt
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suffering, that is, they deliberately guide their willing subjects along the second 
path to knowledge of suffering as something that is essential to willed life (WWR 1: 
393). Both knowing subjects seek to deny their respective willing aspect the 
certainty it needs to be able to act, that is, both intellectual characters starve their 
willing aspect of information about the world. However, whilst the knowing 
subject, Lucky, denies the possibility of forming a judgement by combining 
concepts, Clov's method of generating uncertainty differs at a practical level: in an 
attempt to make Hamm suffer the pain of boredom, Clov refuses to provide Hamm 
with a representation of an empirical object situated in space and time. Essentially, 
then, Clov's ascetic method also involves the deprivation of habitual knowledge, 
though in this case it is the kind of knowledge that one finds in the first class of 
object in the Schopenhauerian fourfold root (Schopenhauer, 1974a: 75; WWR 1: 
11- 12).
When Clov invariably responds to Hamm's requests for the provision of 
information (Beckett, 1958: 48), he does so by providing answers that are 
essentially without content. In Endgame, then, we again observe the importance of 
the ascetic intellect appearing to perform its role as servant of the will. 
Significantly, Clov never refuses to provide representations perse, rather Clov 
refuses to provide representations that permit Hamm to act in a particular way. 
Though Clov refuses to perform his role in a way that would be of benefit to Hamm 
as the 'will not to suffer', he nonetheless consistently acts as Hamm's 'servant', or 
at least gives the impression of doing so. Where earlier Lucky had necessarily 
responded to Pozzo's tugging on the rope around his neck, Clov responds just as 
promptly to the sound of Hamm's whistle (Beckett: 1958: 13,15, and 22). As well 
as responding 'immediately' to the sound of the whistle, Clov also carries out 
Hamm's orders as long as Hamm wishes him to do so:
CLOV: I'm going to look at this filth since it's an order (Beckett,
1958:49).
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And earlier:
CLOV: Do this, do that, and I do it. I never refuse. Why?
(Beckett, 1958: 31-32; see also 48).
We may note that this is a particularly important insight on Beckett's part into to 
both the role of the intellect, and the necessity of'always' performing that role!viii
That Beckett's work is an attempt to rid the world of life-denying meaning is an 
influential interpretation of long-standing (Adorno, 1991; Cavell, 2002). Beckett's 
work has been consistently understood as an attempt to rid the world of nihilistic 
meaning, meaning which ultimately burdens life, and thus prevents us from 
knowing, and living life as it is (Adorno, 1991, Deleuze, 1995; Cavell, 2002, 
Critchley, 1997). Meaning, then, is the problem in the work of a number of 
Beckett's post-Nietzschean interpreters, and this very same concern has been 
discerned in Beckett's work.
Understood, then, in the light of the post-Nietzschean concern with the attribution 
of meaning as a case of nihilism, or a 'covering up' of existence, meaninglessness is 
thus purported to be the revelatory message (Adorno, 1991: 243), or goal of 
Beckettian tragedy (Cavell, 2002: 156).
In contrast to this post-Nietzschean position, which argues the affirmative nature 
of art generally, and Beckettian tragedy specifically, it is my contention that 
Beckettian meaninglessness is indeed intended to reveal the true nature of the 
world, but that this is done not with rehabilitative, intent, but rather for destructive 
effect. The intention of Beckettian tragedy, 1 believe, is to reveal life as an event of 
suffering (Beckett, 1999: 19). This knowledge is presented by the intellect to the 
will with the intention of breaking the will, that is, to place the will in a position of
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unalleviated suffering from which it freely chooses to resign from life. Therefore 
Beckett's refusal to ascribe meaning is not intended to uncover a life which when 
freed from the disguise of attributed meaning may then become livable, but to 
reveal the very fundamental intolerability of'reality' (Beckett, 1999: 22), which 
meaning - in the form of habitual knowledge - has up until then made bearable.
Meaninglessness is neither the end, nor goal of Beckettian tragedy, it is a means to 
an end, a tactic employed by the knowing subject in an attempt to maintain the 
willing subject in a non-habitual state of suffering. In short, Beckettian 
meaninglessness may be understood as a means to the end of a permanent will­
less existence.
Again, I contend that the tactic of meaninglessness plays an important role in the 
two-part Beckettian ascetic method, which, as I have consistently argued 
throughout this thesis, utilizes and develops an important aspect of 
Schopenhauerian aesthetics, namely the dynamically sublime. By providing a 
deliberately ambiguous response to the will's demands for a motive, that is, by 
refusing to provide a meaningful motive for action in the form of an empirical 
object, the intellect, Clov, in effect, holds the will at bay (WWR 1: 202), or denies 
the individual will the numbing experience of habitual consciousness. When held 
in this 'perilous zone' (Beckett, 1999: 18-19) between acts of habitual perception, 
the individual will, Hamm, experiences the 'suffering of being' in two distinct ways. 
First, Hamm suffers the pain of lacking an object towards which he may expend his 
energy, or, in other words, the will experiences the effects of unalleviated 
'boredom' (WWR 1: 164, 312, 364. Following this, he suffers from the knowledge 
(WWR 1: 400) he receives instead of habitual consciousness, namely knowledge 
about the ubiquitous nature of suffering (WWR 1: 315, 397). Denied painless 
habitual consciousness, the individual will is presented with an 'involuntary 
memory' of an event -  'the total past sensation, not its echo nor its copy, but the 
sensation itself, annihilating every spatial and temporal restriction' (Beckett, 1999: 
72-3) -  and is revealed to itself either as a being that has suffered, or a being that 
has caused others to suffer. In Hamm's case, it experiences both.1* This awareness
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of past suffering is itself a cause of suffering. Ultimately such suffering is brought to 
mind for the purpose of placing the individual will in a position of suffering from 
which it freely chooses to resign from life. Thus in Beckettian tragedy, involuntary 
memory may be understood as a radical disincentive to further action (Zöller,
1999: 38).
Clov's, unique ascetic method of generating uncertainty -  through the consistent 
presentation of a series of representations that are ambiguous because they lack 
an empirical object situated in space and time -  can be seen in a number of 
pertinent passages in Endgame. lx  The first part of Clov's two-part ascetic method 
for breaking (WWR 1: 392) his willing subject is executed by employing the 
negative freedom (Shapshay, 2012b: 25) of holding the will at bay (WWR 1: 202) 
by refusing to perform the intellect's normal, servile, function of generating 
empirical objects, and situating events in space and time:
HAMM: ... What time is it?
CLOV: The same as usual.
HAMM: [anguished.) What's happening, what's happening?
CLOV: Something is taking its course.
HAMM: The waves, how are the waves?
CLOV: The waves? [He turns his telescope on the waves.) Lead.
HAMM: And the sun?
CLOV: [looking.) Zero.
HAMM: But it should be sinking. Look again.
CLOV: [looking.) Damn the sun.
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HAMM: Is it night already then?
CLOV: [looking.) No.
HAMM: Then w hat is it?
CLOV: [looking.) Grey. [Lowering the telescope, turning
towards Hamm, louder.) Grey! [Pause. Still louder.)
GRREY!
Pause. He gets down, approaches Hamm from behind, 
whispers in his ear.
HAMM: [starting.) Grey! Did I hear you say grey?
CLOV: Light black. From pole to pole (Beckett, 1958: 13,17,
26].
In the last of these deliberately inhibiting exchanges, Clov not only prevents the 
will from acting, and thus causes the will to suffer by allowing the pressure of 
willing to build, bu t in addition to providing an ambiguous response to the dem and 
for information, he also makes an already ambiguous response more ambiguous 
still -  if such a thing is possible -  by making the very signifier of uncertainty, the 
colour 'grey', even m ore uncertain by describing it, oxymoronically (see Ricks, 
1993: 153-203), as light black. Equally, Clov could have used the term  dark white in 
his attem pts to make an already vague representation even less clear, and to leave 
Hamm in a state o f'acu te  frustration ' (Young, 2005: 212).
In his use of the term  'grey' to describe the world experienced by the bored person, 
Beckett appears to draw  upon Schopenhauer's understanding of boredom , in this 
instance the perceptual affect of boredom, wherein, if the will is deprived of a 
motive, all is experienced as 'colourless', 'dreary ' and 'dead' (WWR 1: 314; Young, 
1987: 141:
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Nothing a ttrac ts  ou r atten tion , nothing 'in te res ts ' us, everything is 
indifferent, of equal -  w hich is to say of no -  value (Young, 2005: 210}.
Similarly, w here  the Schopenhauerian  s ta te  of boredom  is 'colourless', 'd reary ', and 
'dead ', w ith in  the Beckettian bored  m ind all is 'grey', 'no t m uch fun', and 'co rpsed ' 
(Beckett, 1958: 26 ,17 , 25}. Thus it is th a t w hen  asked by Hamm to describe w h at 
he sees, Clov responds to this req u est by describ ing the  w orld  as the person  
experiencing boredom  view s it: as b a rren  (Schopenhauer, 1974b Vol. 2: 287}, 
'lifeless' (WWR 1: 164}, 'em pty ' (WWR 1: 312}, and 'deso late ' (WWR 1: 364}. T hat 
is, Clov p resen ts  a descrip tion  of the  m ind m inus a m otive, ra th e r than  a m otive in 
th e  mind.
T here are  num erous exam ples in Endgame of Clov's delibera te  p resen ta tio n  of 
rep resen ta tio n s  th a t lack an em pirical object, and the re fo re  deny the  willing 
subject know ledge of the  w orld th a t perm its action:
CLOV: Your dogs are  here.
He hands the dog to Hamm who feels it, fondles it.
HAMM: He's w hite, isn 't he?
CLOV: Nearly.
HAMM: W hat do you m ean, nearly? Is he w hite  or isn 't he?
CLOV: He isn't.
HAMM: Is it light?
CLOV: It isn 't dark.
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HAMM: Am I very white? [Pause. Angrily.) I'm asking you am I
very white?
CLOV: Not more so than usual [Beckett, 1958: 30, 42).
In this series of obscure responses, Clov appears to perform his role as 'servant of 
the will' (WWR 2: 216), that is, Clov invariably presents a picture of the world at 
the behest of the willing subject. However, at no point does Clov provide a clear, 
usable motive for action. Whilst appearing to perform his servile role, Clov inflicts 
upon the will the type of suffering that is generated by uncertainty, namely the 
pain of boredom: the mind minus a motive, experiencing the full force of willing 
[WWR 1: 364). Beckett has the willing subject, Hamm, describe the effect that this 
ascetic method ['Character -  Motive [Representation) = Inaction') is having upon 
him:
Hamm: This is deadly [Beckett, 1958: 25).
One may compare Hamm's awareness of the destructive nature of Clov's behaviour 
to Pozzo's earlier declaration that Lucky's actions were 'killing' him [Beckett, 1956: 
34).
In addition to Clov's ascetic method of refusing to provide representations in the 
form of empirical objects, Clov also systematically removes existing empirical 
objects from the world. Badiou understands this process -  the 'subtraction of 
ornaments', and the 'loss of inessential attributes' -  as an important part of 
clearing the ground, a means of revealing a certain 'essence', which Badiou refers 
to as 'generic humanity' (Badiou, 2003: 3). Badiou understands this process, then, 
as one undertaken in preparation for the arrival of the truth (Badiou, 2003: 22).
For Badiou the truth is the arrival of the 'Other', which signals a move away from 
solipsism. For Badiou the truth is life-affirming 'Event'. Once again, I believe 
Badiou's assertion of the arrival of the 'Other' as a life-affirming possibility tends to
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ignore the nature of the 'O ther' th a t arrives in Beckettian tragedy  th rough  the 
practice of the 'sub traction  of ornam ents '. W hen he o r she arrives, the  Beckettian 
'O ther' com es in the form of the suffering 'O ther'. The 'tru th ' is th a t one has 
suffered, or caused o thers to suffer. The tru th  is unbearable. Thus Beckett 
describes habitual consciousness as a 'pain-k iller' (Beckett, 1 9 5 8 :1 4 ,1 6 -1 7 , 23, 28, 
34). The thing th a t allows us to go on is not know ing the tru th  th a t all is 'one', and 
th a t suffering is therefo re  ubiquitous.
By rem oving em pirical objects from the  w orld  -  bicycle w heels, pap, nature , tides, 
rugs, blankets, coffins (Beckett, 1 9 5 8 :1 5 ,1 6 , 41, 44, 49) -  th a t is, by rem oving the  
'inessential a ttrib u tes ' (Badiou, 2003: 3) -  Clov is essentially  depriving his will of 
relief, the relief of a phenom enal motive, or, in Beckettian term s, a 'pain-killer', 
w hich o therw ise p reven ts  one from acknow ledging the  suffering 'O ther':
HAMM: Is it no t tim e for my pain-killer?
CLOV: No.
HAMM: This is slow  w ork. [Pause.) Is it no t tim e for my pain­
killer?
CLOV: No.
HAMM: Give me my pain-killer.
CLOV: It's too soon.
HAMM: Is it no t tim e for my pain-killer?
CLOV: [violently.) No!
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HAMM: Is it no t tim e for my pain-killer?
CLOV: No! (Beckett, 1958: 14 ,16-17 , 23, 28, 34].
A 'pain-killer' m ay be unders to o d  as som ething th a t perm its the  'will not to suffer' 
to avoid suffering. It is akin to a Schopenhauerian  'm otive'. A m otive perm its the 
will to  strive, and thus to avoid the  suffering th a t com es w ith  no t striving, nam ely 
the pain of Schopenhauerian  'boredom '. A pain-killer, o r m otive, perm its the  will to 
perceive the  w orld  'habitually ', th a t is, as a th ing of m ere utility  for the  individual 
will; such know ledge positions the individual will as the  cen tre  of th e  w orld, w here 
its individual needs are  of param o u n t concern (Beckett, 1958: 23-24; cf. WWR 1: 
177]. Finally, a pain-killer is a lim ited version  of the  w orld, th a t bo th  p reven ts  the 
pain of boredom , and th e  pain of the  m ore com prehensive know ledge th a t is 
po ten tially  destructive  to  the idea one has of oneself.
Thus w hen  deprived  of a m otive for action, the w illing subject is held in the 
'perilous zone' (Beckett, 1999: 18-19], of habit-free consciousness w here  the 
individual is perm itted  to  experience reality, th a t is, the ub iqu itous n a tu re  of 
suffering:
HAMM: Is it no t tim e for my pain-killer?
CLOV: Yes.
HAMM: Ah! At last! Give it to me! Quick!
Pause.
CLOV: T here 's  no m ore pain-killer... You'll never get anym ore 
pain-killer (46].
Pause.
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HAMM: But the little round box. It was full!
CLOV: Yes. But now it's empty (Beckett, 1958: 46).
Here Beckett captures the utility of the mind within the skull with the phrase 'little 
round box', and in turn  reveals the mind of the ascetic as som ething that lacks 
content. In Beckettian asceticism, the only true pain-killer is the non-provision of 
pain-killer (cf. WWR 1: 380). To deprive the will of the comfort of habitual 
consciousness, the intellect m ust refuse to furnish the will with the objects of 
habitual consciousness. Only then might suffering come to an end, as opposed to 
merely not being felt.
This completes my presentation of the first part of the two-stage Beckettian 
method of ascetic practice that one finds in Endgame: the presentation of 
ambiguous representations which lack an empirical object for the purpose of 
causing the willing subject to suffer the pain of non-habitual consciousness. W hat 
we begin to see, then, is tha t in the middle period tragedies, Beckett appears to be 
exploring different m ethods of representational deprivation. In Waiting for Godot 
we observed the intellect's refusal to provide the will with a judgem ent by 
presenting concepts that preclude the developm ent of an argum ent. In Endgame 
we w itness the intellect's refusal to present the will with representations in the 
form of empirical objects. In both cases the intellect's m ethod of fighting the 'war' 
against the willing subject is based upon refusing to do w hat the intellect normally 
does, that is, to provide the will with a picture of the world. The next section 
explores the purpose of the intellect's deliberate refusal of pain-free, habitual 
consciousness, and the generation of the suffering experienced in the state of 
boredom, namely to perm it the presentation of knowledge tha t is normally 
excluded by the function of'H abit' (Beckett, 1999:18-19), the deeper knowledge of 
aesthetic consciousness (Beckett, 1999: 79): knowledge of ubiquitous suffering. 
This knowledge comes in the form of an involuntary memory (Beckett, 1999: 72-3). 
W hat deeper knowledge of his character does the intellect Clov present to Hamm 
as a disincentive to further striving?
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Voluntary and Involuntary Memory
In all three of Beckett's ascetic tragedies, the 'war' between the knowing and 
willing subjects is fought on the battleground of memory. On one side of the war the 
willing subject seeks to understand the world through the memory of Habit, 
voluntary memory: the, recollection of a limited, useful, version of events 
generated at the time for the benefit of the will not to suffer (Beckett, 1999: 32-33). 
This is memory that presents the willing subject to itself in a favourable light:
HAMM: I love the old questions. [With fervour.) Ah the old
questions, the old answers, there's nothing like them! 
(Beckett, 1958: 29)
On the other side of this war, the intellect attempts to present the willing subject 
with the knowledge of either the suffering caused, or the suffering felt, or both 
forms of suffering. Thus whilst denying the will the painlessness of habitual 
consciousness, the intellect also seeks to present the will with the painful 
knowledge of the past, namely that presented in the form of an involuntary 
memory (Beckett, 1999: 72-3), which I have earlier presented as a more 
comprehensive version of past events, a version of one's personal history that 
includes painful material otherwise omitted by voluntary memory (WWR 2: 208).
To understand the workings of voluntary memory in Endgame we need to look 
closely at Hamm's 'chronicle' (Beckett, 1958: 40), the censored version of his life 
and his character:
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HAMM: Enough ofthat, it's story time, where was I? The man
came crawling towards me, on his belly. Pale, 
wonderfully pale and thin, he seemed on the point o f .. 
No, I've done that bit... Well, what is it you want? ... It's 
my little one, he said ... My little boy... Well to make it 
short it finally transpired that what he wanted from 
me was ... bread for his b ra t ... Well to make it short I 
finally offered to take him into my service. He had 
touched a chord ... In the end he asked me would I 
consent to take in the child ... [Beckett, 1958: 35-7).
In his chronicle, Hamm presents himself to himself as a good man, one who saves 
the lives of the vulnerable. Much like Pozzo before him, Hamm understands his 
character as that of a man who is generous, and whose actions are benevolent, 
despite evidence to the contrary [Beckett, 1958: 15).lxi
1 shall now compare this flattering, self-aggrandizing, version of the self and one’s 
past actions to the knowledge presented to the will through involuntary memory 
[Beckett, 1999: 72-3), which 'recalls the past self as well as the full extent of the 
seifs experience; both not disfigured by the will-controlled mechanisms of 
everyday survival and both therefore true' [Pothast, 2008: 125-126). Having 
opened up a 'perilous zone' by depriving the willing subject of a motive, the 
intellect then generates further suffering by presenting painful knowledge in the 
form of uncensored recollections. With regard to the theoretical framework I have 
established for interpreting Beckettian tragedy, I assert that the following occurs: 
by holding the will at bay, by refusing to provide the will with a phenomenal 
motive, the intellect has prepared the will for the ascetic method of self-castigation 
[WWR 1: 382), whereby the individual verbally denounces himself or herself as a 
form of penance. By accusing oneself of past misdeeds, the intellect attempts to 
disabuse the will of self-misperception, which in Hamm's case is that of selflessly 
coming to the aid of those in need.
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After a protracted battle of motive demand and motive refusal, whereby Hamm has 
been denied not merely self-centered knowledge of the world but the possibility of 
such knowledge ever being presented again -  'There's no more pain-killer' (1958: 
46) -  that is, when the suffering of 'boredom' is at its zenith, Clov then presents to 
Hamm a disincentive for action (Zöller, 1999: 38), namely that he allowed his 
neighbour, old Mother Pegg, to die of'darkness' (Beckett, 1958: 48). There is a 
suggestion here that Hamm has allowed 'old' Mother Pegg to die because she had 
grown 'old', and was therefore no longer of any use to him. Earlier Hamm had 
described Mother Pegg as 'a great one for the men!' (Beckett, 1958: 31). Having 
grown 'old', Mother Pegg no longer possessed sexual utility, and because of this 
was allowed to die.lxii
The Beckettian two-part ascetic method of first denying the will a motive, which is 
then followed by the presentation of a disincentive for action, is performed with 
the intention of presenting to the will a devastating understanding of its intelligible 
character (WWR 1: 289). Through the presentation of the involuntary memory of 
Hamm's utter indifference to an individual life -  a representation of Hamm's 
intelligible character -  the knowing subject, Clov, is able to furnish Hamm with an 
understanding of his true, callous, nature. Here the Beckettian intellect reveals to 
the individual will its intelligible character by ensuring that incidents of empirical 
character previously deemed by the will to be unfavourable to the will's positive 
self-perception (Beckett, 1999: 18-19; WWR 2: 208), and therefore not previously 
brought before the will because of the pain they would cause, are made known to 
the will. In this way the individual will acquires character, which may be 
understood as 'self-knowledge' (WWR 1: 303). In short, the Beckettian intellect 
uses self-knowledge -  painful 'involuntary' memories (Beckett, 1999: 72-3) - to 
break the individual will.
In this process, the willing subject, Hamm, transitions from the experience of 
personally felt suffering -  that of boredom, and the knowledge of having not been 
cared for as a child (Beckett, 1958: 35, 38) -  to an awareness of the suffering of
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other individuals (old Mother Pegg], and finally to an understanding of suffering 
per se:
HAMM: Before you go say... say something ... a few words to 
ponder ... in my h e a rt... A few words ... from your 
heart.
CLOV: {fixedgaze, tonelessly, towards auditorium). They said 
to me, That's love, yes yes, not a doubt, now you see 
how—
HAMM: Articulate!
CLOV: {as before). How easy it is. They said to me, That's 
friendship, yes yes, no question, you've found it. They 
said to me, Here's the place, stop, raise your head and 
look at all that beauty. That order! They said to me, 
Come now, you're not a brute beast, think upon these 
things and you'll see how all becomes clear. And 
simple! They said to me, What skilled attention they 
get, all these dying of their wounds (Beckett, 1958: 50- 
51).
Once again, as was the case in Waiting for Godot, when in Endgame the 'Other' is 
truly acknowledged, that 'Other' arrives in the form of the suffering 'Other'—those 
dying of their wounds. In Hamm's case the suffering 'Other' is his neglected 
childhood self (1958: 35, 38), and the neighbour who died of'darkness' because of 
his selfishness. Again, as was also the case in Waiting for Godot, this awareness of 
the 'Other' does not result in an affirmation of existence, but rather a withdrawal 
from the life of striving, which is now understood as the cause of suffering!xiii
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The End of Endgame: Beckett's Depiction of Successful Ascetic Practice
Much has already been written on the subject of what happens, or fails to happen, 
at the end of a number of Beckett's works. Of all of Beckett's tragedies, the play 
Endgame has borne the closest philosophical analysis regarding whether or not the 
goals of silence, and meaninglessness can ever be attained. I have already 
discussed the existing philosophical framework for comprehending Beckett's work 
in other parts of this thesis. Suffice it to say that Beckett's philosophical 
interpreters have argued that silence is either not a goal that can be reached 
(Adorno, 1991; Nussbaum, 1990), or not a goal at all (Critchley, 1997), or a goal 
that can be reached, by confronting and overcoming the nihilism of language for 
the purpose of affirming life (Deleuze, 1995).
Through a determination to portray Beckettian tragedy as a life-affirming medium, 
a number of Beckett's interpreters have argued that at the end of Endgame all is 
essentially as it was at the start of the play. It is because of this sense of having 
come full circle that one may argue that the whole routine could, conceivably, start 
all over again.lxiv This reading dismisses the claim that the state of nothingness has 
been attained at the end of the play, and thus that 'nihilism' has been shown to fail 
once more (see, for example, Weller, 2005: 23; 2006: 193; 2009: 39; Boxall (2010: 
31). The early interpretive work of Adorno is particularly influential in this regard. 
In addition to observing that at the end of Endgame we do not see Clov exit,
Adorno also states that:
This is an allegory whose intention has fizzled out. Aside from the 
differences which may be decisive but may also be completely 
irrelevant, it is identical with the beginning. No spectator, and no 
philosopher, would be capable of saying for sure whether or not the play 
is starting all over again (Adorno, 1991: 269).
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Adorno's dismissiveness of the details of the play ties into his overall contention 
that the content of the work has been made irrelevant by Beckett's refusal of 
ontological meaning, which also renders the form and content meaningless 
(Adorno, 1991: 242] (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). What, then, are the 
'irrelevant' differences that we see at the end of the play? One of the characters, 
Nell, has 'died' (Beckett, 1958: 22). Clov changes his attire to one who is 'dressed 
for the road' (Beckett, 1958: 51). Hamm, who is first observed covered with a 
sheet, is left uncovered at the end of the play (Beckett, 1958:11, 51). And, finally, 
Hamm discards his ability to summon Clov, by throwing away his whistle (Beckett, 
1958: 52). What Adorno's argument ultimately suggests is that there is another 
unseen second Act where the characters change their attire, regain their 
possessions, and return to life. That is, Adorno's argument is predicated on 
something that is not in the text. Adorno's claims are not supported by the content 
of the play, and nor are they supported by the form of the play.lxv
In contrast to these arguments, I contend that in the play Endgame, the knowing 
subject, Clov, achieves the goal of silence, which signifies the willing subject's 
resignation from the life of striving. That the willing subject, Hamm, now 
understands his true nature, and freely chooses to resign based upon this 
knowledge, is revealed in the following passage:
HAMM: It's the end, Clov, we've come to the end. I don't need
you any more (Beckett, 1958: 50).
Broken by the knowledge of his true nature, his intelligible character - that Hamm 
is capable of allowing others to die if they no longer have anything to offer him - 
Hamm no longer wishes to continue. This state-of-affairs is borne out by the way 
that Hamm refuses the opportunity to recount his 'chronicle' again. When 
presented with the knowledge that there is a small boy situated outside the bunker
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-  most likely the memory of Clov's arrival as a child (see Little, 1978: 47], Hamm 
evinces his disinclination to reminisce (Beckett, 1958: 49-50).
With Hamm's resignation, also comes the end of the world as representation: 'No 
will: no representation, no world' (WWR 1: 411). The 'light', which the will has 
kindled for itself in the form of the world as representation (WWR 1: 150) is 
extinguished with the will's resignation or, as Clov describes this process, 'the 
earth is extinguished' (Beckett, 1958: 51). With the dissolution of the knowing 
subject, the willing subject, Hamm, also experiences a loss of one of the intellect's a 
priori capabilities, sequentially situating empirical objects in time:
HAMM: time was never and time is over (Beckett, 1958: 52).
Beckett therefore portrays Clov's ascetic practice -  that of providing 
representations that lack an empirical object, prior to the presentation of an 
involuntary memory that acts as a disincentive for action -  as a successful means 
of breaking the will, or placing the will in a position of suffering from which it 
freely chooses to resign from life. That Clov has been successful in his efforts to 
'break' Pozzo is again portrayed in two ways: through Hamm's loss of sight, and 
through Clov's lack of response. Once again, it is through the combination of the 
will's blindness and the intellect's lack of response that Beckett signifies the will's 
breaking. As Beckett cannot show 'nothing' as an event that has occurred, he must 
again depict nothingness as an absence of certain features (WWR 1: 409): Clov, a 
servant who always responds when put into motion by the will (Beckett, 1958: 31- 
32, 48, 49), now fails to respond:
HAMM: One more thing. (Clov halts.) A last favour. [Exit Clov.)
Cover me with the sheet. [Long pause.) No? Good 
(Beckett, 1958: 51).
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Instead, Clov now stands by the door, 'impassive and motionless' (52).lxvi
Hamm's resignation, conceived as such, may again be understood in relation to an 
important passage from the Fourth Book of The World as Will and Representation 
on the subject of the will's resignation (WWR 1: 392-3). To assist in the 
comprehension of my argument, I shall interleave Schopenhauer's description of 
the process of resignation with several key moments from Endgame:
We then see the man suddenly retire into himself,
HAMM: It's the end, Clov, we've come to the end. I don't need
you any more (Beckett, 1958: 50).
after he is brought to the verge of despair
HAMM: (anguished). What's happening, what's happening?
(Beckett, 1958: 17).
through all the stages of increasing affliction with the most violent 
resistance:
HAMM: All those I might have helped... Helped! ... Saved! ...
The place was crawling with them ... Get out of here 
and love one another! Lick your neighbour as yourself. 
... When it wasn't bread they wanted it was crumpets... 
Out of my sight and back to your petting parties! 
(Beckett, 1958: 44).
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We see him know himself
CLOV: [harshly.) When old Mother Pegg asked you for oil for
her lamp and you told her to get out to hell, you knew 
what was happening then, no? [Pause.) You know what 
she died of, Mother Pegg? Of darkness.
HAMM: [feebly.) I hadn't any.
CLOV: (os before.) Yes, you had (Becket, 1958: 48).
and the world,
CLOV: what skilled attention they get all these dying of their
wounds (Beckett, 1958: 50-51).
change his whole nature, rise above himself and above all suffering, as if 
purified and sanctified by it, in inviolable peace, bliss, and sublimity, 
willingly renounce everything he formally desired with the greatest 
vehemence,
HAMM: Good... Discard. [He throws away the gaff makes to
throw away the dog, thinks better of it.) Take it easy......
Well, there we are, there I am, that's enough... Discard. 
[He throws away the dog. He tears the whistle from his 
neck) (Beckett, 1958: 52).
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and gladly welcome death. It is the gleam of silver that suddenly appears 
from the purifying flame of suffering, the gleam of the denial of the will- 
to-life, of salvation. Occasionally we see even those who were very 
wicked purified to this degree by the deepest grief and sorrow; they 
have become different and are completely converted...
HAMM: Good... Since that's the way we're playing it... let's play it
that way ... and speak no more about i t ... speak no more 
(Beckett, 1958: 52-3).
In his Berlin Diary, which he kept during the self-directed production of Endgame, 
Beckett describes this process in the following way: The notion is that when one 
has given the tyrant his full account of suffering, he lets the victim go. Only when 
one has given life its full accounting can one leave it' (Gontarski, 1992: 69).
Because the intellect-servant, Clov, has presented Hamm with the ‘full account’ of 
life, knowledge of suffering per se, which breaks his tyrannical master, Clov is then 
freed from the service of the individual will (WWR 1:199). All that remains of 
Hamm at the end of Endgame is the last vestige of the will, the body (WWR 1: 180, 
411).
Happy Days: The purifying flame of suffering
I conclude this textual analysis of Beckettian asceticism with a reading of the two 
Act play, Happy Days, a play that may be understood as the willing subject's ability, 
as the primary aspect of the self, to deny its own suffering. In Winnie’s case the
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knowledge of suffering, which she as the 'will not to suffer' (Beckett, 1999: 43) 
seeks to deny, is the knowledge of her own childhood sexual abuse at the hands of 
a family friend (Weller, 2006:185). It is this knowledge of personally felt suffering 
which she evades through a regimen of habitual behaviour (Beckett, 1999:18-19):
Habit generates the mind-numbing ennui we use to anesthetize 
whatever is painful or threatening; by invoking it we live at a re-move 
from whatever is authentic in our existence (Rabinovitz, 1995: 217).
It has been noted that Happy Days is a play about warring opposites (Weller, 2005: 
151). I have argued that the basis to this war is the intellect's attempts to refuse to 
provide a motive for action to its willing subject. On one side of this 'war', then, we 
have the intellect, Willie, who wishes to deny his willing subject the painlessness of 
habitual consciousness (Beckett, 1999: 90), namely consciousness of the world 
which benefits the individual 'will not to suffer' in its goal to avoid the pain of 
uncensored life. On the other side of this war, stands Winnie, a subject of willing 
that wishes to remain in a state of painless, habitual, consciousness, and therefore 
constantly demands the provision of motives, or distractions, from the intellect.
Willie's ultimate tactic in Happy Days is to deny Winnie recourse to new 
information about the world, and to the lifelong series of distractions that Winnie 
has gathered together in a large shopping bag (cf. Badiou, 2003: 3). Winnie's tactic 
to prevent the comprehension of personally felt suffering (WWR 1: 397) is to push 
Willie to provide her with new trifling (Beckett, 1961: 6) information, and to draw 
upon the contents of 'the bag', which she utilizes in her attempts to occupy her 
consciousness:
WINNIE: There is of course the bag... The bag... Could I
enumerate its contents? ... No...Could I, if some kind 
person were to come along and ask, What all have you
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got in that big black bag, Winnie? give an exhaustive 
answer? ... No... The depths in particular, who knows 
what treasures... What comforts... Yes, there is the bag 
(Beckett, 1961:14).
In this sense, Happy Days is typical of Beckettian theatre of asceticism, in that 
ascetic practice is presented as a series of skirmishes between the intellect and the 
will to deny and to demand the provision of information. However, Happy Days 
stands alone in Beckett's theatre of asceticism as a tragedy in which, unlike its 
predecessors, Waiting for Godot, and Endgame, 'nothing' fails to happen. In the 
preceding readings of Godot and Endgame I described both the successful methods 
of ascetic practice, and the way that Beckett represents their success. This reading 
of Happy Days is an attempt to understand why it is that the intellect, Willie, is 
ultimately unsuccessful in his attempts to break his willing subject, Winnie, with 
the knowledge of her own suffering (Beckett, 1961: 31). For unlike Lucky, Clov, 
and Nell, Willie is an ascetic who fails to endure in suffering, and thus fails to break 
the will.
Before discussing the ascetic methods that set Willie apart from his Beckettian 
ascetic predecessors, I shall first discuss the 'traditional' methods of asceticism 
that mark Willie as an ascetic in Schopenhauerian terms: the ascetic methods of 
self-mortification, celibacy, and fasting.
Self-mortification, or self-torture (WWR 1: 382), is the deliberate self-infliction of 
physical harm. 'Embedded up to above her waist' in the ground, Winnie is held 
firmly in place whilst being exposed to the full force of the sun; unable to move, she 
is unable to avoid the effects of the 'blazing light', the 'blaze of hellish light'
(Beckett, 1961: 1, 3). Here we witness one of the more literal Beckettian 
deployments of Schopenhauerian ascetic imagery, where the willing subject is 
exposed to the 'purifying flame of suffering' (WWR 1: 393). Beckett's work also 
draws our attention to a wide array of ascetic methods that Schopenhauer lists in
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The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1. This list includes aspects which 
appear pertinent to Willie's ascetic practice namely 'the forsaking of every 
dwelling-place ... deep unbroken solitude spent in silent contemplation with 
voluntary penance and terrible slow self-torture ... being buried alive' (WWR 1: 
388).
Winnie's 'being buried alive' also serves to deny the will the means to express its 
central characteristic, namely its sexual aspect (WWR 2: Chapter 44; O'Hara, 1981: 
255-6, 260). Thus Winnie's burial is an act of enforced celibacy on Willie's part 
(WWR 1: 380). By Act II of the play, Winnie is buried in the earth up to her neck. 
This ensures both celibacy and Winnie's inability to make herself attractive to 
Willie (Beckett, 1961: 30).
Willie's demarcation as a practicing ascetic can also be discerned in the way that he 
provides Winnie with the ability to continue to inflict suffering upon him and thus 
at the same time herself. One example of this is the way Willie returns the parasol 
that Winnie has used to beat him about the head in her attempts to rouse him:
WINNIE: Hoo-oo! [Pause.] Willie! [Pause.] Wonderful gift. [She
strikes down at him with the beak of parasol] Wish I 
had it. [She strikes again. The parasol slips from her 
grasp and falls behind the mound. It is immediately 
restored to her by WILLIE's invisible hand] (Beckett, 
1961:4).
As a practicing ascetic, Willie takes every opportunity to experience suffering:
... every injury, every ignominy, every outrage. He gladly accepts them as 
the opportunity for giving himself the certainty that he no longer affirms
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the will... He therefore endures such ignominy and suffering with 
inexhaustible patience and gentleness, returns good for all evil... and 
allows the fire of anger to rise again within him as little as he does the 
fire of desires (WWR 1: 382).
That Willie is manifesting the behaviour of an ascetic is additionally confirmed by 
the way Winnie experiences his behaviour:
WINNIE: Poor Willie... running out... ah well... can't be helped...
just one of those old things... just can't be cured... 
cannot be cured...
Poor Willie ... no zest... for anything... no interest... in 
life... poor dear Willie... sleep for ever...
[Brings out almost empty bottle of red medicine, turns 
back front, looks for spectacles, puts them on, reads 
label] Loss of spirits... lack of keenness... want of 
appetite... [Beckett, 1961: 2, 4).
With Willie's reluctance to perform his role as 'servant of the will' [WWR 2: 216), 
Winnie is forced to rely upon a limited array of existing motives, which she uses to 
distract herself.
These ascetic methods -  self-mortification, celibacy, and fasting - are the 
'traditional' ascetic methods that Willie employs in his attempts to break the will. In 
addition to these methods, Willie also employs a number of other unconventional 
methods, namely those of disgust and silence.
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Disgust
In her essay on Beckett, Martha Nussbaum (1990) presents a reading of Beckett's 
work as a Christian narrative, a religious understanding, where the body, in 
typically Christian fashion is viewed with disgust. In presenting this view, 
Nussbaum compares Beckett's writing to fellow anti-religious, 'therapeutic' 
authors Lucretius and Nietzsche (Nussbaum, 1990: 306-9). But unlike, Lucretius 
and Nietzsche, Nussbaum holds Beckett's pessimism to be such that it closes the 
door on the possibility of'restoration' (Nussbaum, 1990: 307-8). Beckett is simply 
too disgusted with life to attempt a revaluation. It is Beckett's despair at the 
impurity of human life, and disgust of the body in particular that explains some of 
his character's desire for escape. This escape is represented as silence, which will 
bring 'freedom' from the filth of existence (Nussbaum, 1990: 311).
This section builds upon Nussbaum's insight into the matter of Beckettian disgust, 
namely that the feeling of disgust in response to the 'impurity' of life, results in the 
desire to escape from life. However, unlike Nussbaum's reading which understands 
Beckettian disgust as an evaluation of existence, my reading of disgust as a feeling 
that is warranted, yet presently absent, and therefore must be deliberately 
generated, understands disgust as an ascetic tactic: the knowing subject attempts 
to promote feelings of disgust within the willing subject, feelings which are not 
presently acknowledged. Thus whereas Nussbaum understands Beckett's disgust 
with life as the cause of his attempts to end the storytelling life (Nussbaum, 1990: 
287-8), I understand Beckettian disgust as part of an attempt to end the 
storytelling life. The will must be made to feel disgust by being disgusted.
One of the presently overlooked aspects of Happy Days is the often repulsive 
behaviour that Willie displays in Winnie's company. Whilst I have used the word
282
disgust, which refers to the emotion that I believe Willie wishes to elicit in Winnie, 
one may, however, also understand Willie's behaviour as an attempt to repel his 
willing subject, and to have her leave him alone:
WINNIE: [WILLIE's hand reappears, takes off hat,
disappears with hat...Hand reappears, takes 
handkerchief from skull, disappears with 
handkerchief...WILLIE blows his nose loud and 
long, head and hands invisible. She turns to look 
at him. Pause. Head reappears. Pause. Hand 
reappears with handkerchief, spreads it on skull, 
disappears. Pause. Hand reappears with boater, 
settles it on head, rakish angle, disappears. 
Pause.] Would I had let you sleep on [Beckett, 
1961: 7-8).
And later, whilst Winnie is looking his way, Willie picks his nose and eats the 
contents:
WINNIE: Oh really!... Have you no handkerchief, darling?
... Have you no delicacy? ... Oh, Willie, you're not 
eating it! Spit it out, dear, spit it out! [Beckett, 
1961: 19).
There are a number of other examples of similarly repugnant behaviour. In an early 
scene in Act I, Willie admires a pornographic postcard, which Winnie asks to see:
WINNIE: Heavens what are they up to?... No but this is
just genuine pure filth...Make any nice-minded
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person want to vomit!... What does that 
creature in the background think he's doing? ... 
Oh no really! [She ... takes the edge of the card 
between right forefinger and thumb, averts head, 
takes nose between left forefinger and thumb.] 
Pah!... Take it away! (Beckett, 1961: 7]
Clearly, the purpose of showing the pornographic photograph to Winnie is not to 
arouse her in any way, but rather to repulse her. The act of showing Winnie the 
postcard may be understood as the deliberate presentation of a motive that acts as 
a disincentive (Zöller, 1999: 38] for further action.
The overall intention of Willie's behaviour is two-fold: first, Willie, as mentioned, 
wishes to no longer be the object of Winnie's incessant 'affection'. Thus Willie seeks 
to make himself an object that repels rather than attracts. Second, Willie wishes to 
disabuse Winnie of her romantic views of sex. By showing Winnie the pornographic 
postcard, Willie wishes to undermine Winnie's romanticised understanding of the 
past. In short, Willie's actions may be understood as asceticism, described by 
Schopenhauer as 'the deliberate search for the unpleasant and the repulsive' (WWR 
2: 607] with the intention of having Winnie no longer equate 'love' with romance, 
but rather 'sex' with 'disgust'. Willie's ultimate intention is to disabuse Winnie of 
the idea that all of her sexual experiences have been romantic in nature.
This is an important tactic in Willie's attempts to provide Winnie with the 
knowledge of her own suffering, that is, to have her no longer misremember the 
past. Presently, Winnie remembers her childhood with great fondness:
WILLIE: [reading from a newspaper] His Grace and Most
Reverend Father in God Dr Carolus Hunter dead in tub.
[Pause.]
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WINNIE: [Gazing front, hat in hand, tone of fervent reminiscence.] 
Charlie Hunter! ... I close my eyes ... and am sitting on 
his knees again, in the back yard at Borough Green, 
under the horse beech... Oh the happy memories! 
(Beckett, 1961: 5).
As things presently stand, Winnie is able to both nostalgise the past, and to conflate 
early sexualisation with later romance. Almost immediately after Willie has 
provoked Winnie with the name of her abuser, Charlie Hunter, Winnie then 
proceeds to recall later social events -  voluntary m em ories 'relied on to reproduce 
for [her] gratified inspection those im pressions of the past that w ere consciously 
and intelligently formed' (Beckett, 1999: 32-33):
WINNIE: My first ball! ... My second ball! ... My first kiss! (Beckett,
1961: 5).
Later, I discuss the reason that Winnie is able to successfully defend herself against 
the destructive knowledge of actual events. However, I now turn  to the second 
ascetic m ethod that Willie consistently attem pts throughout Act I of Happy Days, 
m aintaining his silence.
W hilst Willie's intention, much like Lucky and Clov, is to cause suffering through 
irresolution, Willie's approach differs from the m ethod employed by Lucky and 
Clov. Unlike his fellow ascetics who either provide motives tha t lack an empirical 
object -  'Grey... Grey. GRREY!' (Beckett, 1958: 26) -  or motives in the form of 
concepts, the incomplete nature of which precludes a judgem ent from being formed 
-  'On the other hand... but not so fast...' (Beckett, 1956: 42-3) -  and thus fail to 
provide a clear motive for action, Willie's ascetic method incorporates an attem pt 
on his part to refuse to respond at all. In Willie's case, not only is the goal of his
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ascetic practice 'silence', but the refusal to respond is also a tactic. Willie employs 
silence as a weapon against the will.
In the first excerpt, in which Willie attempts to remain silent, Winnie wishes to 
know the correct way of referring to one's hair:
WINNIE: Them? [Pause.] Or it? [Pause.] Brush and comb it? 
[Pause.] Sounds improper somehow. [Pause. Turning a 
little towards WILLIE.] What would you say, Willie, 
speaking of your hair, them or it? [Pause.] The hair on 
your head I mean. [Pause. Turning a little further.] The 
hair on your head, Willie, what would you say speaking 
of the hair on your head, them or it? [Long pause.]
WILLIE: It.
WINNIE: [Turning back front, joyful.] Oh you are going to talk to 
me today, this is going to be a happy day1. [Beckett, 1961:
9)
In the next excerpt, Winnie again bombards Willie with demands for 
seemingly trivial information, this time regarding the technical definition of a 
hog:
WINNIE: Hog's setae. [Puzzled expression.] What exactly is a 
hog? [Pause.] A sow of course I know, but a hog...
This question hangs for some fifteen pages of text before Winnie returns to it:
286
WINNIE: What is a hog exactly? [Pause. Turns slightly towards
WILLIE.] what exactly is a hog, Willie, do you know, I 
can't remember. [Pause. Turning a little further, 
pleading.] What is a hog, Willie, please! [Pause.]
WILLIE: Castrated male swine. [Happy expression appears on
WINNIE's/ace.] Reared for slaughter. [Happy 
expression increases] (Beckett, 1961: 7, 22).
Here we witness a clear example of the tactics employed by the 'warring opposites': 
the will strives tirelessly to put the intellect in motion so as to then receive a 
motive. In turn, the intellect attempts to refuse to provide the will a motive for 
action.
In ACT I of Happy Days, then, we witness a multifaceted approach to ascetic 
practice, an approach that incorporates both 'traditional' and unconventional 
methods of asceticism. Ultimately, though, we are witness to a failed attempt at 
ascetic practice as Willie is unable to maintain his silence. By regularly yielding to 
the ceaseless pressure of the will, and providing a motive for action (WWR 1: 106, 
307-8), however trivial it may seem (Beckett, 1961: 6), Willie permits Winnie to 
transition from one habitual state to the next, and thus to avoid the pain that 
accompanies the lack of a desired object, namely Schopenhauerian boredom: the 
mind minus a motive, experiencing the full force of willing (WWR 1: 364). In 
Beckettian terms, Willie is unable to maintain his silence and thus hold Winnie in a 
'perilous zone' where she can no longer avoid knowledge of her own suffering, the 
'suffering of being' (Beckett, 1999:18-19).
Thus Winnie is simply able to evade knowledge previously deemed by the will to be 
distressing, or harmful:
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WINNIE: ... all comes back. [Pause.] All? [Pause.] No, not all. 
[Smile.] No no. [Smile off.] Not quite. [Pause.] A part 
(Beckett, 1961: 7).
We recall that Schopenhauer similarly suggests that the will is able to 'prohibit' the 
intellect from having certain representations 'by absolutely preventing certain 
trains of thought from arising' (WWR 2: 208).
Part of the will's ability to deny the presentation of harmful knowledge is to have 
the intellect p resent a raft of harm less knowledge instead. Indeed, the provision of 
trivial facts about the world provides Winnie with a storehouse of motives which 
she may draw  upon to get through the day— (motives such as the definition of a 
hog, the way one refers to one's hair, the contents of the shopping bag -  which we 
may note Willie gave to Winnie (Beckett, 1961: 23) -  her parasol, her song, and so 
on). Because Willie continues, how ever reluctantly, to provide new motives to 
Winnie, Winnie never runs out of distractions, and is able to rebuffMViWie’s a ttem pts 
to provide another version o f‘love’, and thus another version of her childhood, 
namely the involuntary m em ory (Beckett, 1999: 72-3) of having been sexually 
abused (WWR 2: 208).
ACT II o f  Happy Days: S ilen ce
In the stage direction tha t establishes the setting at the beginning of ACT II, the 
audience discovers Winnie now em bedded up to her neck. Winnie is no longer able 
to 'turn, nor bow, nor raise' her head (Beckett, 1961: 23). Similarly she is no 
longer able to delve into 'the bag' for a distraction when she begins to feel the 
effects of boredom  take hold. As a consequence, Winnie resorts to listing the things
288
that she is able to see (Beckett, 1961: 24-25). The reason for this progression, in 
ascetic terms, is that the knowing subject, Willie, has for a long time now refused to 
'speak', or, in other words, refused to provide a motive for action. Winnie is 
therefore 'embedded' to the extent to which Willie is able to maintain his silence:
WINNIE: May one still speak of time? [Pause.] Say it is a
long time now, Willie, since I saw you. [Pause.] 
Since I heard you... There is so little one can 
speak of... one speaks of it all (Beckett, 1961: 23).
It is clear from the above-cited passage that Winnie is beginning to run out of 
things to say, or more specifically, Winnie is about to reach the point when she 
begins to 'speak' about things that she has fought to keep 'quiet': namely, 
childhood trauma:
WINNIE: Ah well, not to know, not to know for sure,
great mercy, all I ask ... Ah yes ... then ... now ... 
beechen green ... this ... Charlie ... kisses ... this 
... all th a t... deep trouble for the mind (Beckett, 
1961:24).
During the self-directed production of Happy Days at the Royal Court theatre, 
Beckett described this process in the following way: ‘When the outer help wears 
out, she goes back into herself... a kind of inward meditation' (Knowlson, 1985: 
130). No longer distracted from her suffering, Winnie is also no longer able to 
conflate early acts of abuse with later romantic occasions. The kisses once ascribed 
to later suitors are now remembered in their correct, earlier, context. Beckett 
made the affect of this habit-denying process more explicit in his self-directed 
production of the play. When ‘going back into herself, Winnie recalls the memory
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of her childhood in the following disturbing way: 'I close... knees again... in the 
backyard...' (Knowlson, 1985: 137).
With regards to the theoretical framework that I have established to read 
Beckettian theatre of asceticism, I believe Act II is a clear evocation of the 
Beckettian dynamically sublime, which, as I have argued, is a development of 
Schopenhauerian aesthetic theory. By remaining silent, and thus refusing to 
provide a motive for action, Willie utilizes the intellect's negative freedom to hold 
Winnie, the will, at bay (WWR 1: 202). Willie's silence -  the non-provision of a 
motive -  forces the ever-striving Winnie to deplete her stocks of existing motives, 
i.e. the contents of the bag, and then, in ACT II, all she is able to see; as such, Winnie 
is placed in a 'perilous zone' (Beckett, 1999:18-19) where the w ill is denied the 
pain-free state of habitual consciousness. In this state, Winnie begins to suffer from 
the absence of an object towards which she may direct her attention. In short, 
Winnie suffers the pain of Schopenhauerian-defined 'boredom': 'a feeling of the 
most frightful desolation and emptiness' (WWR 1: 364). Denied painless habitual 
consciousness, the individual w ill is revealed to itself -  via an 'involuntary 
memory’ (Beckett, 1999: 72-3) -  as a being that has suffered, in this case, a being 
that has endured abuse:
WINNIE: What now? [Pause.] What now, Willie? [Long
pause.] There is my story of course, when all else fails. 
[Pause.] A life... A long life... Mildred has memories... 
She is now four or five already and has recently been 
given a big waxen dolly ... The sun was not well up 
when Milly rose, descended the steep... [Pause.] ... 
slipped on her nightgown, descended all alone the 
steep wooden staircase... tiptoed down the silent 
passage, entered the nursery and began to undress 
Dolly. [Pause.] Crept under the table and began to 
undress Dolly. [Pause.] Scolding her... the while. 
[Pause.] Suddenly a mouse -  [Long pause.] Gently,
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Winnie. [Long pause.] Willie! [Pause. Louder.] Willie! ... 
all this time, it is not like you to be wantonly cruel 
(Beckett, 1961: 26).
Here Winnie begins to remember the painful events of her childhood. The 
voluntary memory of pleasant afternoons spent in the garden makes way for the 
more complete, involuntary memory of suffering. One may note in this passage 
that Winnie pleads for Willie to intervene, and to provide a distraction from the full 
force of the looming involuntary memory. However, Willie maintains his silence. 
After a short period of time in which Winnie is again able to momentarily distract 
herself -  in this instance with the story of Mr. and Mrs. Shower's coming and going 
-  Winnie, now absent a motive, or another voluntary memory, is compelled to 
experience the involuntary memory of childhood abuse:
WINNIE: And now? [Pause. Low.] Help ... Help, Willie... No?
[Long pause. Narrative.] Suddenly a mouse ran up her 
thigh and Mildred, dropping Dolly in her fright, began 
to scream - [WINNIE gives a sudden piercing scream] - 
and screamed and screamed - [WINNIE screams twice] 
-  screamed and screamed and screamed till all came 
running... (Beckett, 1961: 28).
Thus in contrast to the nostalgising voluntary memory of happily sitting on Charlie 
Hunter's knee, the involuntary memory of Winnie's childhood is one of being 
undressed, 'scolded', and experiencing the confusion, and terror of abuse.
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Failure to break the will
An individual cannot deliberately bring about denial of the will -  more 
than knowledge of true nature is required -  i.e. the will must deny it 
itself (Atwell, 1995: 164).
Despite this experience of personally felt suffering (WWR 1: 397), Winnie is not 
broken by such knowledge, and therefore does not freely resign from life (WWR 1: 
285). Rather, Winnie again reverts to a romanticised understanding of her life; in 
this case Winnie recalls the day Willie proposed to her:
WINNIE: That day... The pink fizz ... The last guest gone... The
look... Sing. Sing your old song, Winnie (Beckett, 1961: 
29).
In response to this reminiscence Willie reappears at the front of the mound -  as 
was Winnie's earlier want (Beckett, 1961:21)- and breaks his vow of silence by 
saying the word, 'Win' (Beckett, 1961: 31). In Schopenhauerian terms, Willie has 
been unable to endure in suffering. Regardless of the ambiguity of what has been 
said, or the reason that Willie has returned - most likely to destroy the Winnie- 
Willie pseudocouple -  his breaking his vow of silence has presented Winnie with a 
motive for action (WWR 1: 300-1; WWR 2: 358). Thus Willie's failure to break the 
will is displayed by Beckett as the intellect doing what the intellect does when 
acting as a servant of the will, that is, presenting a motive to the will. This contrasts 
with the way that Beckett displays his successful ascetics who, having broken their 
will, cease to respond in any way.
What, then, is the reason for Winnie's refusal, as the willing subject, to freely 
abolish herself? What enables Winnie to go on? I believe that Beckett's ultimate
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point regarding Happy Days is two-fold. First, through the play Happy Days, Beckett 
reveals Willie's ascetic method of silence to be an ineffective one. Whilst silence is 
the goal of the ascetic practitioner, the technique of silence, or complete refusal to 
respond, as a means of bringing about silence is shown to be wholly ineffective. 
Beckett's insight in this regard is that one must continue to appear to act as a 
servant of the will at all times. Winnie herself reveals the ultimate flaw of Willie's 
ascetic method:
WINNIE: Days perhaps when you hear nothing... But days too
when you answer... So that I may say at all times, even 
when you do not answer and perhaps hear nothing, 
something of this is being heard, I am not merely 
talking to myself... That is what enables me to go on... 
(Beckett, 1961:8).
Beckett's ultimate position on Willie's vow of silence is that silence as a tactic is 
unable to generate the requisite level of uncertainty to hold the will in the perilous 
zone between motives, that is, the willing subject can continue to expect the 
provision of a motive at some point in time. Whilst Pozzo and Hamm endure 
genuine uncertainty, and are made to suffer the pain of boredom, Winnie knows 
that so long as she speaks, or strives, Willie is there and therefore may return to 
her and prove his love to her once more by providing her with a motive. Willie's 
silence permits Winnie to live in hope rather than uncertainty. In Beckettian 
tragedy, silence is a signifier of ascetic success, but not a successful ascetic method. 
It is 'the allurement of hope' that permits Winnie to go on, even though as a result 
of'the hard experience of her own sufferings or in the vividly recognised sufferings 
of others, knowledge of the vanity and bitterness of life' have come close to her 
(WWR 1: 379).
Secondly, Winnie's resignation is not something that Willie can cause. Though 
Willie may, through his representation-depriving behaviour, encourage Winnie to
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gain some awareness of suffering, that suffering will not necessarily result in 
resignation:
Consequently, there can be no causal explanation of the denial of the 
will, that is, no explanation of the form: 'Whenever suffering -  whether 
merely known or personally felt -  occurs, denial of the will is causally 
produced.' No, every case of denial of the will is a case of freedom; it is a 
case of the will's freely denying itself (Atwell, 1995:159).
The 'only direct expression of the freedom of the will’ (WWR 1: 395) is solely, and 
therefore ultimately, a matter for the will. Whilst the intellect can place the will in a 
position of suffering, and can seek to present the will with knowledge of suffering, 
the intellect cannot ensure that the 'will' will then turn its back on life:
... one can deliberately engineer suffering, but true salvation does not 
come about by intention or design (Janaway, 2002:113; see Atwell, 
1995: 164).
Release from one's servitude is a matter of'grace' (WWR 1: 404). It is 
fundamentally a matter for the will to decide. Whilst 'knowledge of the bitterness 
of life has come close' (WWR 1: 379), Winnie remains unbroken. In essence, 
Winnie refuses to acknowledge the suffering 'Other', which in this case is the pain 
she experienced as a child. Thus the refusal to acknowledge the suffering 'Other' 
results in the will's continued striving. In Beckettian thought, one affirms life, then, 
by not acknowledging the suffering 'Other', and by not acknowledging the 'truth'. 
This is, if anything, an inversion of Badiou's claims about Beckettian art (Badiou, 
2003: 22). Winnie goes on by refusing to allow the truth to arrive.
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Beckett signifies the will's withholding of'grace', in the same way that he signifies 
the will's resignation, namely through the metaphors of'sight' and 'silence'. 
Whereas in Waiting for Godot, and Endgame, the act of grace is signified by the 
will's loss of sight and the intellect's inability to respond, in Happy Days the 
withholding of grace is signified by the will's ongoing ability to 'see', and the 
intellect's ongoing ability to speak.
Conclusion
Over against the majority of Beckett's interpreters I argue that two of Beckett's 
middle period tragedies depict the cessation of action. This cessation is the state of 
nothingness that occurs when the Beckettian will not to suffer resigns from life. 
This event occurs in Waiting for Godot and Endgame. Beckett depicts the will-less 
state of 'nothing' through the will's loss of sight, and the intellect's inability to 
speak. By revealing both the successful and unsuccessful methods for breaking 
one’s will, Beckettian tragedy not only implicitly advocates resignation (WWR 2: 
433-4), it explicitly teaches one how to resign (cf. Nietzsche, 1968: 434-5). The 
Beckettian method for breaking the will utilizes many of the ascetic methods that 
Schopenhauer outlines in the Fourth Book of The World as Will and Representation. 
Beckett's ascetic intellect's employ the methods of self-castigation, celibacy, 
fasting, and self-mortification. In addition to this well-established means of 
mortifying the will, the Beckettian intellect also employs an ascetic method that 
attempts to deprive the will of spatio-temporal knowledge. The enactment of the 
Beckettian dynamically sublime deprives the will of habitual knowledge, which 
leaves the will unable to act, and therefore susceptible to devastating involuntary 
memories of previously unacknowledged suffering.
Having completed a detailed, play-by-play analysis of Beckettian asceticism I now 
turn to a discussion of the main problem that faces the ascetic practitioner, the 
contemplation of suicide. As we observed at the end of Happy Days, the
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contemplation of suicide is a significant problem for the ascetic intellect. Only 
those Beckettian knowing subjects who refuse to present the motive of suicide to 
the willing subject continue to hold the willing subject in a position of suffering in 
which he or she becomes aware of the ubiquity of suffering, and from which he or 
she freely chooses to resign from life.
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Chapter 10: Schopenhauerian Suicide and Beckettian Suicidal 
Contemplation
The problem of suicidal contemplation in Beckettian theatre of asceticism
Suicide, the arbitrary doing away with the individual phenomenon, 
differs most widely from the denial of the will-to-life, which is the only 
act of its freedom to appear in the phenomenon ... Far from being denial 
of the will, suicide is a phenomenon of the will's strong affirmation. For 
denial has its essential nature in the fact that the pleasures of life, not its 
sorrows, are shunned. The suicide wills life, and is dissatisfied merely 
with the conditions on which it has come to him. Therefore he gives up 
by no means the will-to-life, but merely life, since he destroys the 
individual phenomenon. He wills life, wills the unchecked existence and 
affirmation of the body, but the combination of circumstances does not 
allow of these, and the result for him is great suffering (WWR 1: 398].
ESTRAGON: Let's hang ourselves immediately! (Beckett,
1956: 17]
To better understand the importance of the motif of suicidal contemplation in 
Beckettian theatre, I believe one must also understand the problem of suicide in 
Schopenhauerian thought: suicide fundamentally interrupts the process of 
breaking the will. For Schopenhauer, the subject of knowing's presentation of 
suicide as a motive allows the will to strive -  in this case towards the objective of 
destroying oneself -  and therefore to avoid knowledge of essential suffering.
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It is for this reason that Schopenhauer describes suicide as 'the masterpiece of 
Maya':
the most blatant expression of the contradiction of the will-to-life with 
itself... the one individual declares war on itself. The vehemence with 
which it wills life and revolts against what hinders it, namely suffering, 
brings it to the point of destroying itself, so that the individual will by an 
act of will eliminates the body that is merely the will's own becoming 
visible, rather than that suffering should break the will (WWR 1: 399).
In contrast to suicide, which is an act of egoism that is predicated on the illusion of 
one's individuality, asceticism is an awareness of'the inherent and possible 
sufferings of all who draw their breath' (Singh, 2007: 51). Whereas in the act of 
suicide the individual makes way for 'another' to suffer in his or her place, by 
breaking the will the knowing subject ends suffering within the objectification of 
the broken will (WWR 1: 382). The successful ascetic does this by ensuring that 
within the body of the broken will the principle of individuation -  time and space - 
no longer exists.
The way Schopenhauer differentiates between the consequences of taking one's 
life, and the effect of breaking the will is a valuable way of understanding the motif 
of suicidal contemplation in Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days. In these 
three Beckett tragedies there are, broadly speaking, two approaches taken by the 
Beckettian intellect to the alleviation of suffering. The first of these approaches, the 
contemplation of suicide, ensures that that a pseudocouple will continue to strive 
and therefore continue to suffer. The second approach, namely that of breaking the 
will, can only be achieved if the intellect refuses to provide any respite to the will, 
including the thought that one can always end one's suffering by ending one's life. 
In Beckett's middle-period tragedies, only 'servants of the will' who do not present 
the motive of suicidal contemplation attain their freedom by breaking the will.
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The contemplation of suicide is the last and therefore most significant obstacle in a 
knowing subject's attempts to break the will through ascetic practice. The 
contemplation of suicide ensures that the ascetic process fails, and that the process 
must start once again from the beginning. In Beckettian thought, the contemplation 
of suicide - the thought that 'when all else fails, I can always end my suffering' -  is 
depicted as an idea that provides last ditch 'hope' to the willing subject. That one 
can always do something about suffering, suggests that suffering is ultimately 
avoidable, and thus permits one to continue to hope, that is, to strive. Therefore, 
far from transcending the will-to-life, the act, or contemplation, of suicide is merely 
another way that the will is permitted to express itself (Jacquette, 2005:134).
Thus one could argue that at the core of Beckettian thought is the importance of 
'hopelessness': the ascetic knowing subject must deprive the willing subject of all 
hope. Only in this way does suffering become unbearable.
This understanding of Beckett's work in turn builds upon Horkheimer's 
understanding of Schopenhauerian philosophy. For Horkheimer, the significance of 
Schopenhauerian thought is its hopelessness, and the deleterious affect that living 
without hope has upon egoistic thought. Schopenhauerian thought leads to an 
understanding 'that solidarity stems from hopelessness' (Horkheimer, 1980: 32). 
Rather than rallying humanity to better its situation by, as Horkheimer recounts, 
calling for 'Decision, or for Engagement, or for the Courage to Be' (Horkheimer, 
1980: 21), Schopenhauer calls for us to appreciate that life is the way it is, not 
because of something we have failed to do but rather because of something we 
have failed to appreciate: we live in a universe that can only punish striving 
(Dienstag, 2006: 108). To accept that life is 'a place of atonement' (Schopenhauer, 
2004: 49) results in a stance towards the world where human beings 'seek nothing 
positive from it' but instead 'concentrate on minimizing their shared pain' 
(Janaway, 1999a: 324). The problem with hope, then, is that it has the propensity 
to increase suffering by encouraging egoism. Similarly, I believe Beckett argues 
that the problem of egoism can only dawn on the willing subject that has been 
denied all hope.
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This position on the subject of 'hope' contrasts markedly with the position one 
finds in the work of Badiou. In Badiou's reading of late Beckettian art it is the 'hope 
of truth' (Badiou, 2003: 22) which permits one to ‘go on', that is, it is hope that 
ensures that one lives in such a way as to facilitate a future in which 'happiness' is 
possible. Happiness is predicated on the individual acknowledging the 'Other', as 
this recognition promotes the possibility of love. 'Happiness can only exist in love' 
(Badiou, 2003: 33). In contrast to Badiou's position on 'hope' in Beckett's work, I 
argue that it is only by denying the willing subject any hope of relief that life can 
then be acknowledged as something that is ultimately unbearable. Hope permits 
one to continue to suffer. Rather than providing hope, Beckett's work is the 
determination to deny all hope. In Beckettian tragedy it is the willing subjects 
desire not to know the truth, the will-not-to-know (WWR 2: 208), which permits 
the will to go on.
The Motif of Suicide
In Beckett's tragic works suicide is contemplated often. Indeed, across the three 
plays that are the focus of this thesis, certain characters, or pseudocouples, 
contemplate, or demand the motive of suicide on no less than fifteen separate 
occasions. To break this figure down, suicide is contemplated six times in Waiting 
for Godot (Beckett, 1956:10,17, 34, 53, 93-94), four times in Endgame (Beckett, 
1958: 15, 29, 41, 49), and five times in Happy Days (Beckett, 1961: 4,14, 23, 25, 
29). In terms of frequency alone, suicidal contemplation must be considered a 
major theme both within and across a number of Beckett's tragic works.
Yet despite the prevalence of this particular theme in Beckett's work, 
comparatively little has been written about its import. Whilst a number of authors 
have mentioned the motif of suicide in passing, the subject of suicide in Beckett's
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work is rarely granted the attention that the frequency of its elicitation by Beckett 
appears to warrant.lxvii
In addition to this, when the subject of suicide in Beckett's oeuvre is raised it tends 
to be incorporated into existing - more often than not, existential -  frameworks for 
understanding the works as ultimately affirmative in nature (see Büttner, 2000; 
Valentine, 2009; White, 2012). Understood within the interpretive framework of 
existentialism, the inability of Beckett's characters to either take the matter of 
suicide seriously, or to go ahead and act upon such self-destructive thoughts, is 
viewed by a number of Beckett's interpreters as confirmation that Beckett is to be 
understood as an affirmative artist who refuses to succumb to the nihilism of 
suicide.
Büttner's work provides an example of this line of thinking:
Complete resignation could lead to the wish to finish one’s life, but 
whereas Beckett's protagonists often reflect on suicide as a way of 
ending their suffering - Didi and Gogo particularly come to mind -  they 
never follow through. In Beckett's great plays there are always some 
glimpses of hope... (2000:116; see also Valentine, 2009: 137-8).lxviii
It is somewhat perverse that one is held to affirm existence by continually rejecting 
thoughts of suicide that occur to one because of one's existence.
In contrast to the existential readings of the motif of suicide in Beckett's work, I 
believe the contemplation of suicide in Beckettian tragedy is a problem because it 
affirms life. The contemplation of suicide must be understood as an act that has 
dire consequences for a number of Beckett's will-denying tragic characters. It is the 
contemplation of suicide that allows for the 'glimpses of hope' that Büttner
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mentions: If my suffering ever becomes unbearable I can always end my life. And 
because of this thought, my suffering never becomes unbearable, and therefore I 
continue to strive, which causes further suffering. One can always do something 
about one's suffering. It is for this very reason tha t suicidal contem plation is a 
significant problem  w hen attem pting to attain freedom from the will, which as we 
have seen requires the knowing subject to hold the will at bay (WWR 1: 202). It is 
not the case, then, that hope precludes suicide, but ra ther tha t suicidal 
contem plation perm its hope.
W hilst suicidal contem plation takes a variety of forms in Becket's theatre  of 
asceticism -  Beckett's characters contem plate death by hanging, drowning, blunt 
force traum a, handgun, and falling from a great height -  the consequence of such 
contem plation is ra ther m ore consistent. A systematic understanding of Beckett's 
approach to the subject of suicide is available to the reader who is cognisant of 
Beckett's work as 'thea tre  of asceticism': to contem plate suicide is, perversely 
enough, to provide short-term  relief to the part of oneself which makes one suffer: 
the willing subject. The contem plation of suicide perm its the will to life to go on:
VLADIMIR:
BOY:
VLADIMIR:
Was I asleep, while the others suffered? Am I 
sleeping now? ... We have time to grow old. The 
air is full of our cries... But habit is a great 
deadener... I can't go on! W hat have I said?
Mister... Mr. A lb e rt...
Off we go again (Beckett, 1956: 91).
Here, having recounted his growing aw areness of the ubiquity of suffering we 
w itness Vladimir's evocation of suicidal contem plation -  'I can 't go on.' Having 
contem plated his own demise, tha t is, having prioritized his own suffering, 
Vladimir forgets about suffering perse, and resum es the process of pursuing his
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own wellbeing. In short, his contemplation of suicide ensures that he continues to 
strive.
When read in the light of Schopenhauerian philosophy we may feasibly read the 
contemplation of suicide in Beckettian theatre as an inability to persist in the non­
relief of suffering. For in Schopenhauerian thought, as in Beckettian theatre, 
thoughts of suicide demarcate the moment when the sufferer wishes their 
suffering to end. In addition to this shared understanding, in Beckettian theatre -  
as in Schopenhauerian philosophy -  suicidal contemplation also marks the 
moment when the sufferer wishes his or her suffering to end before a particular 
moment arrives: the moment when his or her will is broken. To use a 
Schopenhauerian analogy, the thought of suicide is the moment the sufferer stops 
the operation that might cure him or her (WWR 1: 399), and turns his or her back 
on the idea of being free from suffering:
Just because the suicide cannot cease willing, he ceases to live; and the 
will affirms itself here even through the cessation of its own 
phenomenon, because it can no longer affirm itself otherwise. But as it 
was just the suffering it thus shunned which, as mortification of the will, 
could have led it to the denial of itself and to salvation, so in this respect 
the suicide is like a sick man who, after the beginning of a painful 
operation that could completely cure him, will not allow it to be 
completed, but prefers to retain his illness (WWR 1: 399-400).
This understanding - that in the contemplation of suicide something other than the 
prospect of death occurs -  positions Beckett as a thinker who sees another 
either/or to that of life or death. The other either/or in Beckettian art is that of the 
contemplation of suicide or breaking the will. This suggests that another state of 
being is being proposed in Beckettian art. It also suggests that the main reason 
such a state is not attained is the contemplation of suicide. Therefore the 
contemplation of suicide, far from being a perverse affirmation of life per se, or a
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refusal to slide into nihilism (Valentine, 2009) because one does not act upon such 
thoughts, may mark the moment when one fails to break one's will and again steps 
back from the possibility of experiencing permanent compulsion-free knowledge 
(WWR 1: 390).lxix
Two Types of Knowledge
Through the act of suicide, a person prevents the only thing that can break the will 
from occurring:
The will itself cannot be abolished by anything except knowledge. 
Therefore the only path to salvation is that the will should appear freely 
and without hindrance, in order that it can recognize or know its own 
inner nature in the phenomenon. Only in consequence of this knowledge 
can the will abolish itself, and thus end the suffering that is inseparable 
from its phenomenon. This, however, is not possible through physical 
force, such as the destruction of the seed or germ, the killing of the new­
born child, or suicide (WWR 1: 400, 330).
As discussed at length in the three preceding chapters, I believe knowledge cf 
suffering is central to both Schopenhauerian and Beckettian quietism. It is through 
personally felt suffering alone that the majority of those who acquire an 
understanding of the unity of existence, and therefore the ubiquity of sufferiig, 
reach that understanding (WWR 1: 393). Thus suffering is both the medium and 
the message: to suffer is to acquire knowledge of phenomenal life as suffering. The 
more one suffers, the more one knows. In turn, the more one knows, the more one 
suffers. In both Schopenhauerian and Beckettian thought, then, phenomenal life 
must be maintained so that the lessons of suffering can be learned. Central to this 
objective -  breaking the will through knowledge -  is the provision of the corect
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type of knowledge to the will. The kind of knowledge that the knowing subject 
presents to the will defines what the will knows.
There are, essentially, two kinds of knowledge that the knowing subject can 
provide to the willing subject: the first is the type of knowledge that is subject to 
the principle of sufficient reason. This 'filtered' knowledge is the world as 
representation. Here the faculty of understanding (Schopenhauer, 1974a: 75; 
WWR 1: 11-12) takes the raw sensory data received by the body, and with it 
generates representations of individual things situated in space and time. For 
Schopenhauer, this kind of knowledge - that of a world divided up into 
innumerable individual things -  is an 'illusion' (WWR 1: 353). To have the will act 
upon this kind of information, then, is to have the will proceed in error. Here the 
act of suicide is depicted as an 'extreme' form of egoism because the suicide 
misperceives suffering as something that is experienced by the individual alone 
(Young, 1987: 127; Young, 2005: 195), and not something that is largely caused by 
the erroneous belief that one is an individual.
The second type of knowledge is knowledge of the essential nature of the will. This 
kind of knowledge -  that individuation is an illusion -  is imparted by the knowing 
subject in a variety of ways, namely in aesthetic contemplation (WWR 1: 196), 
through a rare, innate appreciation of oneness (the Saint), and, finally, and more 
commonly, as a consequence of personally felt suffering (WWR 1: 392).
The provision of the first type of knowledge ensures that the will fails to recognise 
itself in 'others', and acts in such a way as to perpetuate suffering—both in the 
phenomenon through which it acts, and in other phenomena that come into 
contact with that individual (WWR 1: 354). On the other hand, the second type of 
knowledge may ultimately lead to the willing subject's resignation (WWR 1: 397). 
By presenting this kind of information, the knowing subject no longer deceives the 
willing subject about the nature of reality: namely that 'constant suffering is
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essential to life' (WWR 1: 283, 318), and based upon this understanding, the will 
freely chooses to turn its back on life.
Schopenhauer's main argument against the act of suicide is that the act of 
terminating the individual phenomenon is nothing more than confirmation of the 
illusion generated by the first type of knowledge. Suicide is both the confirmation 
of an error, and the permanent foreclosure on the possibility ofthat error ever 
being corrected (WWR 1: 283, 399; Young, 1987: 127-8; Janaway, 2002: 110):
The only cogent moral opposition to suicide is based on the fact that the 
suicide stands against the realization of the highest moral good in that 
for a genuine salvation from this world of misery he substitutes a merely 
apparent and illusory one (Schopenhauer, 1974b: Vol. II, 309).
In Schopenhauerian thought, then, the motive of suicide is the presentation of the 
type of knowledge that is provided by an intellect that remains the servant of the 
will (WWR 1: 176-177). As we have seen, the role of the knowing subject -  the role 
for which it has evolved -  is to provide the willing subject with motivation (WWR 
1: 106). Motives allow the will to strive in a character-dependent way. In 
Schopenhauerian thought, suicide is a continuation of this relationship of give and 
take. By providing the motive of suicide, the knowing subject continues to provide 
a motive for action, and the willing subject continues to decide on a course of 
action that will relieve its personally felt suffering. By providing the drastic motive 
of suicide in response to the experience of extreme suffering that accompanies the 
will's on-going frustration, the knowing subject allows the will to continue to strive 
by destroying its objectification, the body. Because of the act of suicide, a flawed 
understanding of life -  that suffering is inessential -  remains unchallenged.
The intellect's provision of the motive of suicide affirms life, then, by ensuring that 
the will never suffers sufficiently to reach the understanding that suffering is
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essential to life. Minus this information, the willing subject is never placed in a 
position from which it freely chooses to resign from willed life. Rather, through the 
act of suicide, one's striving after pleasurable outcomes, or, in other words, one's 
striving to avoid suffering is affirmed as the very meaning of life (See Magee, 1997: 
222; Janaway, 1999a: 337; Young, 2005: 194).
Schopenhauer's critique of suicide -  that suicide precludes knowledge of suffering 
by bringing the process of suffering to a premature end -  provides a productive 
framework for understanding the motif of suicidal contemplation in Beckettian 
tragedy.
A Reading of Beckettian tragedy in the light of Schopenhauer's 
understanding of suicide
The False Dusk
The problem of suicidal contemplation can be understood as the problem of 
Beckettian theatre of asceticism. The contemplation of suicide is a 'habit' (Beckett, 
1956: 91) that one must break if one is to break the will. Only those knowing 
subjects who refuse to present the motive of suicide to the willing subject continue 
to hold the willing subject in a position of suffering from which he or she freely 
chooses to resign from life. Denying the motive of suicide, then, is of paramount 
importance. The prospect of there being an end to suffering in the phenomenal 
realm ensures that the will continues to strive. Only by denying the motive of 
suicide, and thus removing the prospect of there being an end to the suffering that 
accompanies striving, does striving then become intolerable for the willing subject.
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In Beckettian theatre of asceticism the success of a number of knowing subjects to 
free themselves from their willing subject must be read in the light of other 
knowing subjects who equally attempt to deny their will but whom fail to do so. 
Only in this way can we begin to see the Beckettian motif of suicidal contemplation 
as a comment upon the failure to persist in suffering. To ignore the actions of the 
Beckettian knowing subjects who do not contemplate suicide (O'Hara, 1981: 260), 
and who therefore persist in suffering, results in the tendency to portray suicidal 
contemplation as a legitimate means of getting through life (see, for example, 
Worton, 1994: 72-73; Büttner, 2000; Valentine, 2009: 137-138). More than this, it 
tends to portray suicidal contemplation as a legitimate means of persisting 
because it is, at certain times, the only means of doing so.
This tends to align Beckett with a particular, existential, reading of Nietzschean 
thought regarding the utility of suicidal contemplation, namely that the 
contemplation of suicide allows one to go on:
The thought of suicide is a powerful solace: by means of it one gets 
successfully through many a bad night (Nietzsche, 1990: §157).
Here the very thought that one can bring the night to an end is enough to assist one 
through it (cf. Schopenhauer WWR 2: 240). This reading suggests a utility to :he 
thought of suicide: suicide is the idea one has when one has run out of ideas. 
However, to hold that Beckett endorses a 'positive' position on the utility of 
suicidal contemplation, as a number of Beckett's interpreters have done, tencs to 
overlook the negative effect of repeated suicidal contemplation in Beckett's 
theatre: rather than allowing one to get through many a bad night, it appears that 
the effect of suicidal contemplation is to put one through many a bad night:
ESTRAGON: Didi.
VLADIMIR: Yes.
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ESTRAGON: I can’t go on like this.
VLADIMIR: That’s w hat you think (Beckett, 1956: 94).
This in itself problem atises the existential reading of the motif of suicide in 
Beckett's work. W hereas in existential term s suicide is viewed as a kind of crutch 
one uses until one can again walk w ithout it, that is, the idea of suicide perm its one 
to go on when one cannot go on, in Beckettian theatre, the thought of suicide is 
portrayed as a crutch upon which, with repeated use, one becomes entirely reliant. 
Far from providing occasional assistance, the thought of suicide is the crutch that 
trips its user.
It seems that the existential reading of the motif of suicide in Beckettian tragedy -  
namely that suicidal contem plation is of some benefit because it perm its life to go 
on -  confuses the problem  with the solution.
In addition to this, there is also an underlying assum ption in the existential 
readings of Beckett's w ork that Beckett's characters contem plate suicide because 
at times suicidal contem plation is all one has. Can it be said that Beckettian theatre  
presents us with the idea that suicidal contem plation is, at certain m om ents in life, 
the only alternative? That there are Beckettian intellectual characters that in the 
face of suffering and despair do not contem plate suicide suggests tha t this is not 
the case.
Had the country road in Waiting for Godot been inhabited solely by the 
pseudocouple of Vladimir and Estragon, then one could possibly argue that Beckett 
and existentialism w ere of a piece on the subject of suicide. But as we know only 
too well, Pozzo and Lucky also traverse this stretch of country road prior to the fall 
of night. As with Vladimir and Estragon, Pozzo and Lucky also suffer. But unlike 
Estragon, who responds to Vladimir's inability to 'go on' w ith thoughts of hanging,
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Lucky does not offer such solace to Pozzo when he declares that he is unable to 
'bear it any longer' (Beckett, 1956: 34).
There is, then, I believe, an alternative to the contemplation of suicide presented in 
Beckettian theatre. This alternative is, of course, breaking the will through the 
practice of asceticism. A number of Beckett's middle-period tragedies provide both 
a method for ending the suffering of the compelled life, and a powerful critique of 
suicidal contemplation as a means of persisting in such life. To better understand 
the ascetic 'alternative' to suicidal contemplation we need to compare the actions 
of Estragon and Willie who both provide the motive of suicide to the will, to those 
of Lucky and Clov, neither of whom present the thought of suicide as a motive, and 
therefore refuse to provide a 'pain-killer' (Beckett 1958: 14,16, 23, 34, 46). What 
are the implications of these different approaches to suffering?
Waiting for Godot: 'What do we do now?'
Whilst a variety of means of carrying out suicide are either contemplated, or 
remembered, in Waiting for Godot -  such as drowning (Beckett, 1956: 53), leaping 
off the Eiffel Tower (Beckett, 1956: 10), and hanging (Beckett, 1956: 17, 53, 93-94) 
-  in this section I shall focus on the means of suicide contemplated in the present 
of the play, namely that of hanging. However, that is not to suggest that one ought 
to overlook the fact that Vladimir and Estragon have a history of suicidal 
contemplation. One must bear this 'history' in mind as it is one of the reasons that 
we find Vladimir and Estragon here, waiting by the side of a country road, unable 
to proceed along the second path to knowledge of suffering (WWR 1: 393), but 
instead living in hope and contemplating death should the longed for event -  that 
of Godot's arrival -  not eventuate.
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Estragon first recom m ends the motive of suicide in response to the frustration of 
boredom:
VLADIMIR:
ESTRAGON:
VLADIMIR:
ESTRAGON:
W hat do we do now?
Wait.
Yes, but while waiting.
W hat about hanging ourselves? (Beckett, 1956: 
17).
This recom m endation appears alm ost casual, suggested in the m anner tha t one 
might recom m end any other means of passing the time. In itself it suggests tha t the 
recom m endation of suicide as a motive has become a habitual undertaking. Indeed, 
far from causing shock, Estragon's recom m endation provides both relief and 
excitement:
VLADIMIR:
ESTRAGON:
VLADIMIR:
Hmm. It'd give us an erection!
[highly excited]. An erection!
With all that follows. W here it falls m andrakes 
grow. That's why they shriek when you pull 
them  up (17).
Here thoughts of suicide are linked to procreation, of generation, of going on in 
some way. Thus suicide is allied to the very opposite of breaking the will, and 
suffering no more. Suicide, as with procreation, is an affirmation of the will. In 
death by hanging one ejaculates -  there m andrakes grow -  they shriek w hen you 
pull them  out of the ground -  tha t is, from one's death comes life, which is striving, 
which is suffering. In short, death by hanging fertilizes the will, by eradicating the
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frustrated objectification (WWR 1: 281], and freeing up the space in which another 
objectification of the will can strive and therefore suffer.
By asking, 'What do we do now?' Vladimir still believes that something can always 
be 'done' to alleviate suffering, that is, Vladimir neither understands striving as the 
cause of suffering, nor that suffering is something that one cannot evade. By 
presenting Vladimir with the motive of suicide, Estragon again presents his willing 
subject with the type of knowledge that Schopenhauer describes as an 'illusion' 
(WWR 1: 353]: Estragon presents Vladimir with the knowledge that his suffering 
can be brought to an end by striving.
In this first instance of suicidal contemplation we also begin to understand the 
importance of contemplating suicide to one's on-going ability to live in hope. In 
Beckett's tragedies the contemplation of suicide permits the will to continue to 
strive, which in Waiting for Godot comes in the form of hoping to receive word 
from Godot. Having begun to doubt that Godot will come, that is having lost hope:
ESTRAGON: If he came yesterday and we weren't here you
may be sure he won't come again today 
(Beckett, 1956: 15].
Vladimir is then permitted to regain hope by contemplating his self-destruction:
ESTRAGON: What about hanging ourselves? (17]
Though following a protracted discussion about the technical aspects of suicide by 
hanging, Vladimir decides that he would prefer to wait for news from Godot after 
all:
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VLADIMIR: I'm curious to hear w hat he has to offer. Then 
we'll take it or leave it (Beckett, 1956: 18).
In Beckett's work the contem plation of suicide perm its the willing subject to strive 
(WWR 1: 399-400): the thought that one can always end one's suffering -  the 
striving tow ards self-destruction -  then perm its one to again live in hope. The 
possibility of suicide ensures that the pain of longing rem ains tolerable because 
suicide provides one with the comforting thought that the pain of striving is 
something tha t can be brought to an end by further striving: 'then we'll take it or 
leave it'.
The second time that death by hanging is contem plated in Waiting for Godot occurs 
at the end of Act I. The character of the Boy, one of Godot's employees, has again 
brought news that Godot will not come this evening 'but surely tom orrow ', tha t is, 
the Boy again provides Vladimir with hope. Shortly after, Vladimir conveys this 
message of hope to Estragon:
VLADIMIR:
ESTRAGON:
VLADIMIR:
ESTRAGON:
VLADIMIR:
ESTRAGON:
VLADIMIR:
Tom orrow everything will be better.
How do you make that out?
Did you not hear w hat the child said?
No.
He said tha t Godot was sure to come tom orrow. 
[Pause.) W hat do you say to that?
Then all we have to do is w ait on here.
Are you mad? We m ust take cover. [He takes 
Estragon by the arm.) Come on. [He draws
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Estragon after him. Estragon yields, then 
resists. They halt.)
ESTRAGON: (Looking at the tree.) Pity we haven't got a bit of
rope (Beckett, 1956: 52-53).
Here we see another evocation of the idea that suicide and hope exist in a 
correlative, or symbiotic relationship. One might wonder how Vladimir is able to 
go on hoping for something that shows few signs of ever happening. The answer is 
that his hope for a better tomorrow is always supported by the thought that 
tomorrow will be his last day on earth. Suicide is hope's hope. One might go so far 
as to say that suicidal contemplation breathes life into hope. In Beckett's theatre 
the contemplation of suicide is part of a cycle of suffering: hope causes one to 
suffer, which causes one to wish to end one's life, which allows one to strive, which 
allows one to hope, which causes one to suffer, which causes one to wish to end 
one's life...
We see this cycle of suffering at the end of Acts I and II of Waiting for Godot. 
Thoughts of suicide at the end of the day permit a forum for the return each night 
of hope, which in Beckett's theatre of asceticism arrives in the form of the 
character of the Boy (Beckett, 1956: 49-53). Hope of deliverance from suffering is 
thus associated with the naivety of youth. In Beckett's theatre, the contemplation 
of suicide, far from marking the moment of one's disillusionment, permits one to 
remain in a childlike state. Suicidal contemplation perversely allows one to remain 
naive. I refer the reader to the inscription that appears on the cover page of the 
First Book of The World as Will and Representation. The inscription Schopenhauer 
chooses to mark his philosophy as 'mature' thought is that of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau:
Sors de Tenfance, ami reveille-toi! ("Quit thy childhood, my friend, and 
wake up.'')
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Similarly in Beckett's work, a naive outlook on life is presented as childishness, as 
something that prevents one from waking up and becoming aware of the essential 
nature of life. One would rather die than wake up. Indeed, Vladimir is becoming 
aware that he is asleep and being allowed to sleep on (Beckett, 1956: 90-91). The 
thought of suicide -  'I can't go on' -  prevents him from waking. Thus hope is sleep, 
and the contemplation of suicide ensures that one remains asleep.
As a brief aside, I shall take this opportunity to elaborate on the idea of the 
character of the 'Boy' as 'hope'. This character appears in various guises in 
Beckett's three ascetic tragedies. In Waiting for Godot the Boy, a servant of Godot, 
is the promise of tomorrow being different to that of today. The Boy brings news 
that tomorrow Godot will come (Beckett, 1956: 50; 91). In Endgame the Boy sitting 
outside the bunker -  in all likelihood Clov's arrival as a child (see Little, 1978: 47) -  
presents Hamm with the opportunity of telling his story again (Beckett, 1958: 49). 
And in Happy Days the Boy arrives courtesy of the classified section of Reynolds 
News (Beckett, 1961: 5-6; 22):
WILLIE: Opening for smart youth... Wanted bright boy (1961:
5-6; 22).
Is there a more hopeful time in one's life than when first starting out in the world? 
All three 'Boys', then, provide hope, and offer the prospect that one's suffering can 
be brought to an end. But the 'offer' of hope alone is insufficient. What factor, then, 
decides whether or not hope is accepted? As Vladimir cannot 'go on' suffering, the 
news that Godot will come tomorrow is again accepted. Hamm, on the other hand, 
now broken by knowledge of suffering, refuses hope in the form of the Boy sitting 
outside the window. In Happy Days the 'bright boy' wanted in the classifieds 
section offers the promise of today being the same as yesterday—another 'happy 
day' where Willie responds to Winnie's demands for information. Unlike Hamm, 
Winnie happily takes the same news day after day. Thus it seems that one is
315
broken depending upon one's character, and its ability to withstand or ignore 
suffering (WWR 1: 404). It also depends, however, upon whether or not the offer of 
hope is presented alongside, or in conjunction with, the possibility of suicide. 
Vladimir is offered the motive of suicide and he continues to hope. Winnie is 
offered the motive of suicide and she also continues to hope. Neither Hamm, ror 
Pozzo are ever presented with the option of suicide. Both Hamm and Pozzo 
ultimately lose hope.
I now return to the discussion of the complementarity of hope and suicide in 
Waiting for Godot.
The contemplation of suicide on Estragon's part permits Vladimir to live in hope, 
the non-fulfilment of which causes him to wish to end his life, which allows h m to 
continue to strive ad infinitum:
Hope deferred makes the heart sick, but a dream fulfilled is a tree of life 
(Proverbs 13: 12).
This is Vladimir's motto for life, though now in the form of'Hope deferred maketh 
the something sick (Beckett, 1956:10)', a piece of scripture that Vladimir ha? taken 
to the forgotten organ in question. This is a piece of biblical wisdom which affirms 
the need for hope but also, perhaps inadvertently, offers a condemnation of l ving 
in such a way. According to Proverbs 13: 12, one is not to lose hope because is sick 
as it makes one, imagine when the long awaited day finally arrives and one i; no 
longer sick. As with the scriptural encouragement to live in hope, Estragon's 
contemplation of suicide from said tree of life, though intended to relieve suffering 
-  in the sense of 'if Godot doesn't come, then we can hang ourselves' -  in fact 
promotes suffering.
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The third and final occasion that hanging is contemplated - though the idea of 
'finality' is something that Godot's two Act structure throws into doubt (Kenner, in 
Boxall, 2000: 73] -  is at the end of Act II. Estragon's provision of the motive of 
suicide comes after a pivotal moment in Vladimir's suffering. Here Vladimir 
delivers a soliloquy that bears many similarities to that of Pozzo's earlier 
reflections on the essential, suffering, nature of life:
POZZO: They give birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an
instant, then it's night once more (Beckett, 1956: 89].
VLADIMIR: Astride of a grave and a difficult birth. Down in the hole, 
lingeringly, the grave-digger puts on the forceps. We have 
time to grow old. The air is full of our cries. [He listens]. But 
habit is a great deadener. [He looks again at Estragon]. At 
me too someone is looking, of me too someone is saying, he 
is sleeping, he knows nothing, let him sleep on. [Pause). I 
can’t go on! [Pause). What have 1 said?
He goes feverishly to and fro, halts finally at extreme left, 
broods. Enter Boy right. He halts. Silence.
BOY: Mister... [Vladimir turns). Mr Albert...
VLADIMIR: Off we go again (Beckett, 1956: 90-91].
But unlike the now 'broken' Pozzo, in the case of Vladimir, the Boy again delivers a 
message of hope -  'the dream of him who is awake (WWR 2: 216]'. Vladimir, about 
to recognise as his own 'all the suffering of the world (WWR 1: 392]' again 
experiences hope in relation to his own wellbeing, and by so doing continues to 
sleep.
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As we have already seen, Schopenhauer was well aware of this phenom enon, this 
drawing near to an understanding of reality, only to be pulled back by one's 
individual concerns:
Even in the case of the  individual who approaches this point [the 
aw areness of universal suffering], the tolerable condition of his own 
person, the flattery of the moment, the allurem ent of hope, and the 
satisfaction of the will offering itself again and again, i.e., the satisfaction 
of desire, are alm ost invariably a constant obstacle to the denial of the 
will, and a constant tem ptation to a renew ed affirmation of it (WWR 1:
392 ) .
Having almost reached the point w here he understands life as an event of 
ubiquitous suffering, Vladimir declares that he cannot go on. In saying this, 
Vladimir declares tha t he does not wish to suffer anymore. Thus Vladimir cannot 
turn  his back on his life, cannot tear the veil of Maya, and see through the 
principium individuationis. His saying T can't go on' ensures th a t he will go on, 
because in response to it Estragon will once again confuse Vladimir's not wishing 
to suffer with no longer w anting to strive, and will again respond to Vladimir's 
striving not to suffer by contem plating suicide.
The cycle of suffering tha t Vladimir-Estragon are trapped within is succinctly 
captured near the end of Act II:
ESTRAGON: You say we have to come back tom orrow ?
VLADIMIR: Yes.
ESTRAGON: Then we can bring a good bit of rope.
VLADIMIR: Yes.
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ESTRAGON: Didi.
VLADIMIR: Yes.
ESTRAGON: I can't go on like this.
VLADIMIR: That's what you think.
ESTRAGON: If we parted? That might be better for us.
VLADIMIR: We'll hang ourselves tomorrow. Unless Godot 
comes.
ESTRAGON: And if he comes?
VLADIMIR: We'll be saved (Beckett, 1956: 94).
The consequence, then, of habitually providing the motive of suicide as a means of 
avoiding the suffering that comes from striving is that it allows one to continue to 
strive and thus perpetuates suffering.15“
Pozzo and Lucky
The cycle of striving in which Vladimir and Estragon find themselves trapped, one 
perpetuated by thoughts of suicide, is put into stark relief by the behaviour of the 
play's other pseudocouple, Pozzo and Lucky.
Unlike Estragon, who habitually provides his willing subject with the solace of
suicidal contemplation, Lucky does not provide the motive of suicide when his
willing subject declares that he is no longer able to bear his suffering (Beckett,
1958: 34). Rather, Lucky understands that the only way that his suffering might
come to an end is if he exacerbates it. Far from alleviating Pozzo's suffering, Lucky
takes every opportunity to aggravate his situation (see Chapter 8).
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When we first encounter Pozzo and Lucky we discover that they are on their way 
to the fair so that Pozzo may get rid of Lucky:
VLADIMIR: You want to get rid of him?
POZZO: I do. But instead of driving him away as I might
have done, I mean instead of kicking him out on 
his arse, in the goodness of my heart I am 
bringing him to the fair, where I hope to get a 
good price for him. The truth is you can't drive 
such creatures away. The best thing would be 
to kill him (Beckett, 1956: 32)
Here we see a Beckettian evocation of the Schopenhauerian will's indifference to 
the individual phenomenon. Though particular slaves may come and go the will is 
always the master. Pozzo is seeking to get rid of Lucky in the hope of acquiring 
another slave, or 'intellect', that will perform the role of servant of the will, that is, 
present useable representations of the world. The will as thing in itself, as we have 
noted, is indifferent to individual objectifications of will, which to the will are mere 
phenomenal representations that exist in space and time. Life is certain to the will 
to life (WWR 1: 280). It will gladly get rid of one phenomenon, and replace it with 
another:
POZZO: As though I were short of slaves! (Beckett, 1956: 31)
We discover later that the reason Pozzo wishes to get rid of Lucky is because he 
can no longer bear the way that Lucky 'goes on', in reference to the manner in 
which Lucky now 'thinks':
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POZZO: (groaning, clutching his head). I can't bear it... any 
longer ... the way he goes on... you've no idea... it's 
terrible... he m ust go... [he waves his arms)... I'm going 
mad... [he collapses, his head in his hands)... I can't bear 
it... any longer... (Beckett, 1956: 34].
This is a significant m om ent in Pozzo's suffering, as it evinces the wish for his 
suffering to end. Pozzo's 'I can't bear it any longer' is similar to that of Vladimir's, 'I 
can 't go on'. Both are cries for help, or cues, if you will, for the knowing subject to 
intervene and to provide the motive of suicide, and thus to relieve the suffering 
th a t comes from striving. In response to Pozzo's cry for help, Lucky does nothing 
w hatsoever to alleviate Pozzo's distress. Unlike Estragon who offers Vladimir 
recourse to suicide, Lucky's response to Pozzo's wish not to suffer is to heap m ore 
suffering upon him through the perform ance of the 'tirade' he delivers shortly 
thereafter. Lucky does not 'offer' to bring Pozzo's suffering to an end, as Lucky 
understands that Pozzo's demands for relief indicate he has not yet understood life 
as suffering (WWR 1: 400). To provide the motive of suicide, and thus to relieve 
Pozzo’s suffering at this m om ent would be to provide Pozzo with the incorrect 
knowledge that suffering caused by striving can be alleviated by further striving. 
The fact that Pozzo wishes to 'get rid' of Lucky alerts Lucky to the fact tha t Pozzo 
wishes to continue striving. Pozzo has not yet turned his back on life despite the 
knowledge of suffering that Lucky has communicated to him. On the contrary, he 
w ishes to rid himself of a particular knowing subject who Pozzo mistakenly 
believes is the cause of his pain. By refusing to provide the motive of suicide, Lucky 
refuses to 'in terrupt' the procedure of breaking his individual will, of breaking 
Pozzo (WWR 1: 399).
Thus in Waiting for Godot we see two conflicting responses to the willing subject's 
explicit dem ands for the alleviation of suffering. Unlike Estragon, Lucky provides 
no recourse to suicide. To offer the motive of suicide would be equivalent to 
putting down his burden, accepting a handkerchief to dry his tears, and chewing on 
the scraps from Pozzo's table. Instead he prefers to carry his suitcase full of sand,
321
prefers that the running sore on his neck continues to weep, rejects sustenance, 
rejects compassion, and not once suggests that the rope with which he is driven 
'on' be thrown over a bow of the willow tree and used as a means of ending his and 
Pozzo's suffering. Because of this, Pozzo gains knowledge of life as suffering, and 
turns his back on life (Beckett, 1956: 88; WWR 1: 379-80).
Endgame: 'Why don't you kill me?'
In Endgame the demands to be put out of one's misery have become more overt 
than in the earlier Waiting for Godot. Far from Vladimir's somewhat ambiguous 
declarations of no longer being able to 'go on', in the figure of Hamm we witness a 
number of unequivocal demands to be finished (Beckett, 1958: 15, 29, 41, 49). In 
response to these demands the character of Clov finds ways to respond other than 
acceding to Hamm's wishes.
There are, in effect, two parallel stories being told in Endgame. This is the game: 
bringing Hamm's story to an 'end'. The first story is that of Hamm, as told by 
Hamm. The second story is that of Hamm as told by Clov. Having reached an 
impasse in his story, his 'chronicle', Hamm wishes to 'end' his story with suicide:
It is true that Hamm wants death ... and one can say that his entire 
project is to achieve his death (Cavell, 2002: 133).
It is through the act of suicide that Hamm will move his story along. For Hamm, 
suicide is a plot device, a means of ensuring further striving by removing an 
objectification of the will in which striving is frustrated (WWR 1: 280):
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In the case of suicide, the will finds itself so hampered in its advances 
that it opts for its typical indifference for the individual phenomenon. 
Since life is forever assured to the will, which is why it is called the 'will- 
to-live', it gives no importance to its individual phenomena (Singh, 2007:
51).
Appreciating that the act of suicide will permit the story to continue, Clov refuses 
such an ending, (WWR 1: 399). Clov thus refuses to allow the relief of suicidal 
contemplation. Clov's refusal ensures that Hamm must go over the same story 
again and again without the prospect of it coming to an end, and thus suffer both 
the pain of boredom and, ultimately, the pain that comes from the more 
comprehensive knowledge -  in the form of an involuntary memory -  of one's 
intelligible character. In Clov's version of Hamm's life, Hamm has not been the 
benevolent person that he describes in his own self-aggrandizing story.
In short, both Hamm and Clov are trying to 'break' one another. Whereas Clov is 
attempting to place Hamm in a position of suffering from which he freely chooses 
to resign from life, Hamm is attempting to drive Clov to suicide. The will has 
declared war on itself (WWR 1: 399), as in turn the intellect has declared war on 
the will.
It is Hamm's intention to drive Clov 'mad' (Beckett, 1958: 49), so that he provides 
Hamm with the motive of suicide. Hamm attempts to achieve this outcome by 
demanding an endless succession of petty 'moves', or provocations. This tactic is 
established early in the play. Frustrated by Clov's refusal to provide him with his 
'pain-killer', or a motive for action (WWR 1: 106), and thus to relieve his boredom, 
Hamm then begins to order Clov about the room, or in Schopenhauerian terms, 
sets the intellect in motion (WWR 2: 213):
HAMM: How are your eyes?
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CLOV: Bad.
HAMM: How are your legs?
CLOV: Bad.
HAMM: But you can move.
CLOV: Yes.
HAMM: (violently). Then move! [Clovgoes to the back w a ll 
leans against it w ith his forehead  and his hands.) Where 
are you?
CLOV: Here.
HAMM: Come back! [Clov returns to his place beside the chair). 
Where are you?
CLOV: Here.
This seemingly pointless toing and froing - much like the moving of a chess piece 
from one position on the board to another and then, for lacking an alternative, 
returning it to its previous position (Cohn, 1973: 152) -  ends with this question:
HAMM: Why don't you kill me? (Beckett, 1958: 14-15)
As the Beckettian 'will not to suffer', Hamm wishes to avoid suffering at all 
costs—if not by sleep, then by a 'pain-killer' (a motive), and, if a pain-killer is not 
forthcoming, then by death. The tactic that Hamm uses to elicit the response of 
suicide is to tirelessly order Clov back and forth in the hope that Clov will concede 
and end the game Hamm's way. This kind of provocation permeates the play.
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The next move on Hamm's part is to seek to elicit the motive of suicide through 
self-castigation. Beckett is alive to the fact that the same knowledge that can be 
imparted to break the will -  that is, an involuntary memory of the suffering one has 
caused -  can also be used to generate self-pity, and thus the motive of suicide:
HAMM: One day you'll be blind like me. You'll be sitting there,
a speck in the void, in the dark, for ever, like me ...Yes, 
one day you'll know what it is, you'll be like me, except 
that you won't have anyone with you, because you 
won't have had pity on anyone...
Again, this 'move' ends with the demand that the intellect motivates the will with 
the motive of suicide:
HAMM: Why don't you finish us? (Beckett, 1958: 28-29)
In response to this demand, Clov replies by saying, 'I couldn't finish you.' For Clov 
to 'finish' Hamm is to do Hamm's bidding as an entity that tirelessly strives not to 
suffer (Pothast, 2008: 88-9). Clov's response also alerts us to the idea that 
ultimately the subject of willing must finish him or herself (WWR 1: 398). As the 
willing subject, Hamm must choose to turn away from life (WWR 1: 412), or, if you 
will, concede. Only when the individual will to life turns its back on life, in 
Schopenhauerian terms, or ceases to tell its story, (Nussbaum, 1990: 287-8) in 
Beckettian terms, does suffering come to an end. Far from turning away from life, 
the act of suicide is one of turning away from suffering, which in Endgame is 
depicted as writer's block.
In the abovementioned passage Clov also displays a profound awareness that the 
act of suicide would not end in the destruction of striving perse, but merely result
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in the end of the individual phenomenon. W hereas Hamm uses the word 'us' -  'why 
don't you finish us?' -  Clov appears to understand tha t by presenting Hamm with 
the motive of suicide only he, the knowing subject, would be finished. Hence Clov's 
response alters the 'us' to 'you': 'I couldn't finish you'. Unlike Estragon, who 
continues to believe tha t 'the best thing' for Vladimir to do would be to kill him 
'like billions of o thers' (Beckett, 1956: 62), Clov refuses to allow another 
objectification of the will to take his place w here suffering occurs, tha t is, in space 
and tim e (WWR 1: 281).
In essence, Clov refuses to fertilize the will with the death of Hamm, a frustrated 
objectification of the will. Denying this 'fertilization', Clov also denies the prospect 
of renew ed striving:
HAMM:
CLOV:
HAMM:
CLOV:
HAMM:
CLOV:
Did your seeds come up?
No.
Did you scratch round them  to see if they had 
sprouted?
They haven't sprouted.
Perhaps it's still too early.
If they w ere going to sprout they would have 
sprouted. (Violently.) They'll never sprout 
(Beckett, 1958: 17).
We may com pare Clov's refusal to fertilize the will to Vladimir's response to the 
prospect of suicide, and the thought that suicide will generate further striving and 
further suffering. Remarking tha t suicide by hanging would provide Vladimir with 
an erection, and possibly an orgasm, Vladimir comments on the prospect of on­
going life, and on-going suffering:
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VLADIMIR: W here it [ejaculate] falls m andrakes grow. 
That's why they shriek when you pull them  up 
(Beckett, 1956: 17).
Further recourse to suicidal contem plation occurs later in the play, after Hamm 
has recounted his 'chronicle'. Clov is asked to show in terest in the progress of the 
story. When asked 'Will it not soon be the end?', Hamm replies 'I'm afraid it will' 
(Beckett, 1958: 41). Clov is rightly sceptical about Hamm's assertion. Indeed, the 
end Hamm has in mind is not one of turning away from story telling but, rather, 
suicide:
HAMM: If I could drag myself down to the sea! I'd make a
pillow of sand for my head and the tide would come in 
(Beckett, 1958: 41).
Unable to develop his story in any other way, Hamm contem plates drowning 
himself. This, then, is the 'end' that Hamm proposes. Clov's response to this wish is 
to reply, 'There's no more tide'. This is a two-fold act of asceticism: it both denies 
recourse to suicide in a particular instance, and denies Hamm the ability to make 
this particular move again.
The final occasion of suicidal contem plation in Endgame alerts us to the nature of 
the on-going w ar taking place within the bunker. In a series of rapid-fire dem ands 
tow ards the end of the play, Hamm attem pts to again push Clov too far, that is, to 
the point w here Clov will do Hamm's bidding and end his life. This is the tactic that 
Hamm has employed throughout the play: by his constant dem ands -  often quite 
pointless dem ands -  Hamm attem pts to drive Clov to the point of distraction, and 
to end the story Hamm's way. One after the other, Clov is ordered to look out of the 
window, then to re tu rn  Hamm to centre of the room after having moved his chair,
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and finally to restore the toy dog to Hamm's arms (Beckett, 1958: 48-49). Out of 
sheer frustration, Clov hits Hamm with the stuffed toy, whilst declaring 'You drive 
me mad, I'm mad!' Disappointed at the object chosen to vent Clov's anger, Hamm 
suggests alternatives:
If you must hit me, hit me with the axe. [Pause). Or with the gaff, hit me 
with the gaff. Not with the dog. With the gaff. Or with the axe.
In response to this demand Clov implores Hamm to stop 'playing', to which Hamm 
in turn replies, 'Never! Put me in my coffin' (Beckett, 1958: 49). This draws our 
attention to the fact that suicide is not the end for the will per se, but merely one 
objectification of the will. Far from being the end, Hamm views death as a means of 
continuing. The 'playing' will go on by Clov killing his master. As when Clov had 
earlier precluded drowning by removing the motive of 'tides' from the world, he 
now removes the motive of death perse. Clov will not put Hamm in his coffin 
because 'There are no more coffins'. There are no more coffins because there is no 
more death. If there is no more death there can be no more wanting to die. If death 
no longer exists, then suicide no longer exists as a means of attaining it.
It is because of this that Hamm ultimately refuses hope—delivered in Beckettian 
fashion by the Boy who now sits outside one of the bunker's windows (Beckett, 
1958: 49). No longer believing that he can always kill himself if he begins to suffer 
too much -  because there is no more death -  Hamm also refuses hope. To deny 
suicide as a last resort undermines the entire mechanism of hope. Without the 
prospect of death, hope becomes intolerable. By the end of Endgame Hamm has 
suffered so much that he turns his back on life. The motive of the Boy sitting 
outside the bunker -  which in all probability is Clov, and thus the story waiting to 
be retold (Little, 1978: 47) -  is refused (Beckett, 1958: 50).
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A Schopenhauerian-informed reading of the play Happy Days concludes this 
discussion of the motif of suicide in Beckett's theatre of asceticism.
Happy Days
As a means of escaping suffering, suicidal contemplation -  or the thought that one 
can always end one's own suffering - features prominently in Happy Days. It is, to 
quote one of Beckett's stage directions, a 'conspicuous' aspect of the play (Beckett, 
1961: 23]. In Happy Days we again witness Beckett's concern that the willing 
subject's on-going expectation that the motive of suicidal contemplation will be 
provided permits the willing subject to live in hope, which in turn permits the will 
to continue to strive, and therefore to suffer. Here, the willing subject, Winnie, lives 
in the hope that the knowing subject, Willie, still loves her, and will prove his love 
by providing Winnie with 'help' (Beckett, 1961: 28), namely the provision of 
habitual -  will-centred - material that precludes knowledge of suffering.
The willing subject, Winnie, perceives suicidal contemplation as an act of on-going 
devotion, indeed, of'love'. Winnie lives in the hope that despite her knowing 
subject's silence, Willie will one day return to the front of the mound of earth in 
which she is buried alive (WWR 1: 388), and again assist her to perceive life 
romantically, or naively. Thus once again one of the key themes of Beckett's 
middle-period tragedies is the importance of hopelessness to the ascetic's task of 
breaking the will with knowledge of ubiquitous suffering. To show the willing 
subject that she has not been 'loved' in the past, Willie must refuse to prove his 
love in the present by refusing to afford Winnie the painlessness of habitual 
consciousness.
That the thought of suicide has a 'romantic' connotation for Winnie is revealed 
early on in the play:
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[Turns to bag, rummages in it, brings out revolver, holds it up, kisses it 
rapidly, puts it back...] (1961: 4).
Through this kiss, Beckett reveals Winnie's association, or conflation, of suicidal 
contemplation with romance. The revolver is the thing that will reunite the willing 
and knowing subjects as an entity that seeks to avoid suffering.
Like Estragon and Vladimir, Winnie and Willie have a history of suicidal 
contemplation. However, unlike the intellectual 'Everyman', Estragon, the ascetic, 
Willie, no longer wishes to put himself 'out of his misery' by attempting suicide. 
Willie wishes to convey knowledge of suffering through suffering, and understands 
suicidal contemplation as the ultimate problem with regards to the alleviation of 
suffering:
WINNIE: [She opens eyes, brings revolver front and
contemplates it. She weighs it in her palm.] You'd 
think the weight of this thing would bring it 
down among the ... last rounds. But no. It 
doesn't. Ever upmost, like Browning. [Pause.] 
Brownie... [Turning a little towards Willie.] 
Remember Brownie, Willie? [Pause.] Remember 
how you used to keep on at me to take it [the 
gun] away from you? Take it away, Winnie, take 
it away, before I put myself out of my misery 
(Beckett, 1961: 14).
To avoid thoughts of suicide, then, Willie has given away the means to carry it out, 
and situated himself in such a way that the revolver is out of reach. But whereas in 
Willie's case the non-contemplation of suicide is presented as the objective, in
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Winnie's case it is Willie's non-contemplation of suicide that is cause for concern: 
'your misery', she says ‘derisively’ with regard to Willie's refusal to contemplate 
suicide, and thus prove his love. The longer that Willie goes without contemplating 
suicide the longer Winnie is permitted to suffer the thought that Willie will never 
prove his 'love' to her by providing her with habitual knowledge.
For Winnie, Willie's refusal to contemplate suicide is viewed as a lack of devotion. 
Thus the war that we witness in Happy Days is that of Willie's attempts to inflict 
suffering by refusing to provide any motivation, or 'love', to his willing subject, and 
Winnie's attempts to remind Willie of his marital obligations, and to have him 
return to her once more to carry them out. To this end Winnie uses the revolver as 
bait, a means of encouraging Willie to return, and to end his, and thus Winnie's, 
suffering:
WINNIE: I'll leave you out, that's what I'll do. [She lays
revolver on the ground to her right.] There, 
that’s your home from this day out [Beckett, 
1961 : 14).
These are the key moments for our understanding of the motif of suicidal 
contemplation in Act I of Happy Days. It is in Act II of Happy Days that we witness 
the consequences of Willie's flawed ascetic method of absolute refusal to respond 
to the demands of his willing subject. In the preceding chapter on the topic of 
Beckettian asceticism I discussed the reason that Willie's ascetic method fails, 
namely that Willie's silence permits Winnie to live in hope rather than uncertainty. 
The consequence of permitting the willing subject to live in hope - by permitting it 
to believe that the silence, no matter how long it goes on, will eventually be broken 
-  is that the willing subject is encouraged to continue to strive for an end to 
suffering, rather than appreciating that striving is the cause of suffering.
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In Act II, as Winnie's suffering increases, she again reminds Willie about the 
revolver, thus soliciting suicidal contemplation on his part:
WINNIE: You remember Brownie, Willie, I can see him.
[Pause.] Brownie is still there, Willie, beside me. 
[Pause. Loud.] Brownie is there, Willie. [Pause. Eyes 
front.] That is all. [Pause.] (Beckett, 1961: 25).
Thus despite the fact that Willie's ascetic method of silence later results in Winnie's 
involuntarily recalling her childhood trauma -  in the form of her 'story' (Beckett, 
1961: 26) - this particular method also means that Winnie never loses hope, and 
therefore continues to strive:
WINNIE: I hear cries... Sing... Sing your old song, Winnie
(Becket, 1961: 29).
Again, as was the case with Vladimir, Winnie has approached an awareness of 
suffering, indeed has come very close, but then withdraws. It is the 'allurement of 
hope' that allows this withdrawal (WWR 1: 392). Winnie has not lost hope.
In response to this act of striving, Willie is no longer able to endure in suffering. 
Instead, Willie 'shuns suffering', interrupts the painful procedure 'that would 
completely cure him' (WWR 1: 399-400) and returns to Winnie as her devoted 
servant. That Willie has returned to perform his role as servant of the will, to end 
the will's suffering, is suggested by one of Beckett's drier stage directions:
Willie's head appears to her right round corner of the mound. He is on all fours, 
dressed to kill (Beckett, 1961: 29).
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Here we may also note the knowing subject's servile posture: ‘on all fours'. It is the 
deferential posture of a servant approaching his master.
That Winnie views Willie's suicidal intent as a romantic act of devotion is again 
captured in the following passage:
WINNIE: [Mondaine]. Well this is an unexpected
pleasure! Reminds me of the day you came 
whining for my hand... I worship you, Winnie, 
be mine... Life a mockery without Win... What a 
get up, you do look a sight! ... Where are the 
flowers? (Beckett, 1961: 29).
Willie then makes a number of concerted, though ultimately unsuccessful, efforts 
to reach the revolver that sits on the top of the mound. Eventually, lying at the 
bottom of the mound, Willie breaks his vow of silence, saying the word 'Win' 
(Beckett, 1961: 30). The willing subject has won this battle of warring opposites. 
By clambering up the hill in his attempts to silence Winnie, Willie removes the 
earth from Winnie's breasts and returns her to the state in which she will again be 
found at the start of Act I. With this, the contemplation of suicide is revealed as a 
significant setback for the practicing ascetic.
By temporarily relieving her suffering, Willie allows Winnie to continue to perceive 
the world romantically, naively. In Winnie's romantic understanding of life, Willie 
is digging her out of the earth with his bare hands (Beckett, 1961: 20). This act - 
this failure to persist in suffering - permits Winnie to believe that Willie still loves 
her:
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WINNIE: It's true, it's true,
You love me so! (Beckett, 1961: 31).
This in turn  perm its Winnie to believe in the rom anticised idea of love p e r s e ,  and, 
m ost im portantly of all, to believe that she has always been loved. We may 
com pare W innie's understanding to that of Hamm, who because his intellect no 
longer 'loves' him (Beckett, 1958: 14) is now aw are of his parents' neglect of the 
young Hamm, and the way this childhood neglect later played out in his egoistical 
interactions with others.
In Beckett's tragedies I believe that love is not a 'tru th  procedure' as Badiou argues, 
nor is the rew ard for love 'happiness' (Badiou, 2003: 33). Rather in Beckett's 
m iddle-period tragedies, 'love' is shown to be the way one avoids the truth. 'Love' 
is a suicide attem pt, which stops one from thinking of one's childhood abuse. 'Love' 
is the violence one inflicts upon oneself to stop thinking about the violence others 
have earlier inflicted, so tha t one can continue to perceive such abuse as affection. 
'Love' does not result in 'happiness'. Rather, in Beckett's work, 'love' perm its the 
continuation of one's suffering.
Conclusion
I have argued tha t Beckett presents the contem plation of suicide as the main 
obstacle that the intellect faces in its attem pts to break the will. Beckett 
consistently depicts the dem and for suicidal contem plation as a last-ditch attem pt 
by the willing subject to avoid the suffering generated by the intellect during the 
ascetic method of depriving the will of the painlessness of habitual consciousness. 
In Beckett's tragedies, the thought that one can always end one's life perm its one 
to live in hope, which in tu rn  perm its one to continue to strive, and to continue to
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suffer. Without the prospect of there being an end to one's suffering, living in hope 
is shown to be an intolerable state of affairs.
The next, and last, chapter of this thesis is the Conclusion and Recommendations 
for Further Research.
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Chapter 11: Thesis Conclusion and Recommendations for Further 
Research
Throughout this thesis I have explored Beckett's middle-period tragedies by 
interpreting them in the light of the work of Arthur Schopenhauer, Beckett's most 
important quietist-ascetic predecessor. This approach to Beckett's tragedies 
provides a challenge to existing philosophical readings of Beckett's work, which I 
have argued tend to utilize the interpretive lens of Nietzschean thought, 
particularly Nietzsche's understanding of the life-affirming role of art, and 
Nietzsche's critique of'nothing' as 'nihilism'. As a result of the interpretive method 
developed and utilised here, I have made a number of claims about the nature, and 
the intent of Beckettian tragedy. These claims relate to the instructive, and 
destructive role of tragedy in Beckett's aesthetics; Beckett's use of the medium of 
tragedy to develop his ontological theory regarding the 'will not to suffer'; 
Beckett's significant development of the dynamically sublime as a central aspect of 
an aesthetic-ascetic method; and Beckett's understanding of the ultimate value, 
and utility of the human capacity to reason.
The Role of Tragedy in Beckett's Aesthetics
Nietzsche's interpretation of the life-affirming nature of ancient Greek tragecy has 
often served as the template, or foundation for the later, post-Nietzschean 
philosophical interpretation of Beckett's art. For Nietzsche, art affirms life by 
providing humanity with a means of perceiving the horror of life without being 
devastated by such knowledge:
Aware of truth from a single glimpse of it, all man can now see is the 
horror and absurdity of existence ... it repels him. Here, in this supreme
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menace to the will, there approaches a redeeming, healing enchantress - 
art. She alone can turn these thoughts of repulsion at the horror and 
absurdity of existence into ideas compatible with life... (1993: 40).
In Nietzschean aesthetics art presents the 'truth' in such a way that it becomes 
bearable, and allows one to go on. I have consistently argued that the life-affirming 
lens of Nietzschean aesthetics is a highly problematic theoretical means of 
interpreting the work of a thinker who was drawn to the life-denying thought of 
Schopenhauer. In contrast to the dominant philosophical understanding of 
Beckettian tragedy, I have interpreted Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy 
Days as the work of an essentially anti-Nietzschean artist.
I have argued that in Beckett's aesthetics we have tragedy in order that we may no 
longer be shielded from the destructive potential of reality -  the 'suffering of being' 
-  but, rather, to know the 'horror of existence', and as a consequence of this 
knowledge no longer wish to go on. Further to this, I have argued that the role of 
art in Beckett's aesthetics is to devastate the 'will not to suffer' with unbearable 
knowledge of suffering. In Beckett's aesthetics art actively encourages the 'will not 
to suffer's' repulsion by generating the aesthetic moment, an involuntary memory 
of previously unacknowledged pain. The role of tragedy in Beckett's aesthetics is 
educative: tragedy teaches the spectator how to generate an involuntary memory 
of suffering through ascetic practice. Through the medium of tragedy, Beckett 
guides the audience through the ascetic process, providing lesson after lesson on 
both effective and ineffective methods of breaking one's will.
The 'will not to suffer'
Central to this current reading of Beckett's middle-period tragedies is the idea that
Beckett's tragic 'pseudocouples' bear many of the traits of Schopenhauer's 'self as
that comprised of'willing' (ontological) and 'knowing' (epistemological) aspects.
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This work therefore presents a challenge to Adorno's central claim that Beckettian 
tragedy lacks metaphysical meaning, which in turn deprives Beckett's work of 
other traditional aspects such as the transformative epiphany (Adorno, 1991: 242]. 
Instead, I argue that the 'will not to suffer' of Beckett's early critical work Proust, an 
ontological understanding informed by Schopenhauer's will-to-life, is significantly 
developed in the tragedies of Beckett's middle period. The 'will not to suffer', 
which is later manifested as the striving aspect of the Beckettian tragic 
pseudocouple, can be understood as the problem for the Beckettian intellect in 
Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy Days. Beckett informs us that the essential 
aspect of the self is oblivious, or insensible to the suffering it has endured or 
inflicted. The will is insensible to suffering because the intellect has presented it 
with filtered knowledge that facilitates this state-of-affairs. It is this obliviousness 
that permits the willing subject to continue to strive, and thus to continue to suffer. 
To promote the 'will not to suffer's' resignation, the intellect must challenge the 
will's insensibility. The Beckettian negative epiphany provides this challenge to the 
willing subject's state of obliviousness, or will-not-to-know (WWR 2: 208).
The Beckettian intellect -  the other aspect of the Beckett's pseudocouple -  seeks to 
break the 'will not to suffer' by presenting it with previously unacknowledged 
involuntary memories of suffering. The intellect's presentation of an involuntary 
memory acts as a negative epiphany, which presents the 'will not to suffer' with a 
disincentive for further action. Based upon this knowledge, the 'will not to suffer' 
may choose to resign from life. Contrary to Adorno, then, this thesis argues that 
one's metaphysical basis, the Beckettian 'will not to suffer', is the problem of 
Beckettian tragedy, and the negative epiphany is presented as a potential solution 
to that problem.
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Ascetic-Aesthetic Theory: The Beckettian Dynamically Sublime
I have argued that the subject matter of Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Happy 
Days is asceticism, the 'intentional mortification of one's own will' (WWR 2: 613). 
Whilst the Beckettian tragic intellect also utilizes the 'traditional' kinds of ascetic 
practice that inhibit the body -  methods that Schopenhauer outlines in The World 
as Will and Representation -  Beckett's main focus is on the how the intellect might 
best refuse to furnish the will with a representation of the world that permits the 
will the certainty it requires to strive towards an object of desire. These three 
works depict the intellect's varied attempts to refuse the will the 'motivation' that 
it requires to be able to act. This is the principal method of ascetic practice in 
Beckett's theatre. The primary form of ascetic practice depicted in these works is 
the dynamically sublime.
In this thesis I have charted the development of the dynamically sublime found in 
Kantian, Schopenhauerian, and Beckettian aesthetics. Kant argues that the sublime 
presents us with an understanding of our ability to refuse our instinctive drives, 
and thus to act morally. Building upon this understanding, Schopenhauer further 
develops Kantian aesthetics (see Shapshay, 2012a: 502) by arguing that our ability 
to hold the will at bay allows us as to present the will with knowledge that is 
destructive to life. I believe that Beckett takes this life-denying Schopenhauerian 
development of the dynamically sublime and presents it artistically. In Beckett's 
middle-period tragedies the dynamically sublime transitions from an aesthetic 
theory to an ascetic theory presented theatrically. The Schopenhauerian 
dynamically sublime, a two-step process where the will of the spectator is first held 
at bay (WWR 1: 202, 392), so that it may then gain knowledge of suffering it would 
otherwise seek to evade, is later manifested in Beckett's tragedies as the subject 
matter of the performance. Beckett stages the dynamically sublime. In Beckett's 
middle-period tragedies the action of the play is the two-stage process of denying 
the will -  by depriving the will of habitual consciousness -  so that the will might 
become aware of the ubiquitous nature of suffering, or 'reality' (Beckett: 1999: 22,
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33). Through his tragic works, Beckett explicitly draws the spectator's attention to 
the ascetic potential of the dynamically sublime as a capacity human beings 
possess to employ the negative freedom not to act.
Reason -  The Capacity to Do Nothing
Beckett's significant contribution to asceticism is to incorporate the human 
capacity to 'reason' into ascetic practice. Schopenhauer, as we have seen, dismisses 
the capacity of reason to affect one's will (WWR 1:185-6,190). Schopenhauer 
views reason as a mere 'tool' of the will, which the will utilizes to attain its 
objectives. Beckett's understanding of reason as a capacity that permits human 
beings to suspend judgement, and thus to defer action, marks a significant moment 
in our philosophical understanding of the value of reason. Whereas reason has 
typically been valued for the way it permits one to avoid suffering, in Beckett's 
work the value of reason is that it permits one to cause and experience suffering. In 
this sense, Beckett's understanding of reason deviates significantly from the role 
ascribed to reason in stoic thought, where the avoidance of suffering is key. 
Beckett's deployment of reason also differs markedly to the Kantian understanding 
of reason, as once again in Beckett's aesthetics the ability not to respond to 
instinctive drives is an end in itself. Beckett's understanding of the value of reason 
is also un-Schopenhauerian in its nature. Beckett's use of reason has much in 
common with Schopenhauer's critique of reason, namely that reason has made life 
worse because 'with the faculty of reason, doubt and error have appeared in the 
theoretical, care and remorse in the practical' (WWR 1: 35).
The Beckettian intellect deliberately generates 'doubt and error' to prevent action. 
This is epitomised in Waiting for Godot by Lucky's speech, and its ultimate effect on 
Pozzo:
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LUCKY: ... but no t so fast for reasons unknown... left unfinished 
for reasons unknown... left unfinished... for reasons 
unknown... for reasons unknown... for reasons 
unknown... approxim ately  by and large m ore or less... 
for reasons unknown... in light of the labours l o s t ... 
the light of the labours lost... in the year of the ir  Lord 
six hundred  and something... for reasons unknown... 
but not so fast... for reasons unknown... the labours 
abandoned left unfinished... abandoned  unfinished... 
unfinished... (Beckett, 1956: 42-45).
In Beckettian asceticism, the generation o f 'd o u b t  and erro r ' in tu rn  prom otes 'care 
and rem orse '.  Reason permits the intellect to hold the will in a painful state of 
boredom . Whilst held in this non-habitual state, the  will experiences the 'suffering 
of being':
LUCKY: ... figures s tark  naked in the stockinged feet in
Connemara in a w ord  for reasons unknown... the 
skull... the tears...the skull the skull the skull the skull 
in Connemara ... the skull the skull in Connem ara the 
skull... (Beckett, 1956: 42-5).
Beckett rep resen ts  Pozzo's resignation in response  to knowledge of suffering -  the 
s tate  o f 'no th ingness '  -  through the  use of two motifs: the loss of sight, and an 
inability to respond. These motifs are  employed consistently th roughou t Beckett's 
th e a tre  of asceticism.
341
Recommendations for Further Research
Having established a new framework for interpreting Beckett's work -  one that 
understands Beckett's work in the light of the life-denying aspects of 
Schopenhauerian thought -  the next step is to see if the same interpretive method 
can be used to approach Beckett's other theatrical works, and other aspects of 
Beckett's oeuvre. I believe that there are a number of Beckett's theatrical works, 
works contemporaneous to the tragedies discussed in this thesis, as well as earlier 
and later works, which invite the application of the Schopenhauerian-informed 
interpretive method.
With regards to Beckett's first completed, but never performed play, Eleutheria 
(1947), I believe the subject matter of the play, particularly that of longing for 
freedom from oneself, and experiencing 'nothing', invites a reading of the work in 
the light of Schopenhauerian quietist thought. Once again, I believe understanding 
the idea of longing for 'nothing' in relation to Schopenhauer's work will help to 
depathologise the present understanding of nothing as nihilism. Existing readings 
of Eleutheria tend to interpret the desire for 'nothing' through the lens of'nothing' 
as nihilism (see, for example, Weller, 1995: 119), and therefore as a critique of 
'nothing' on Beckett's part.
With regard to Beckett's later tragedies, I believe the play Ohio Impromptu (1981) 
is a work that can be understood as a late example of Beckettian theatre of 
asceticism. Ohio Impromptu is comprised of a number of formal elements that are 
also in evidence in the ascetic tragedies of Beckett's middle period. Again the play 
is comprised of a pseudocouple, in this case that of Reader and Listener. I believe 
this relationship may be understood as one that is informed by Schopenhauer's 
understanding of the self as comprised of intellect and will. Again we witness an 
attempt to end the story-telling life, a life comprised of loss and anxiety, by 
revealing the impossibility of avoiding suffering. At the end of the short play, the
342
pseudocouple reaches a state 'Of mindlessness', and the stage directions call for a 
scene where Reader and Listener are left 'unblinking', and 'expressionless'. This 
stage direction calls to mind the depiction of Clov at the end of Endgame once the 
will has resigned and the knowing subject is no more. Is Ohio Impromptu, 
therefore, a case of successful ascetic practice? What are we to make of the 
development in the play, where at the start of the work there is 'Little is left to tell' 
to the end of the play where there is 'Nothing is left to tell'?
In addition to this claim, namely that other Beckett tragedies lend themselves to a 
Schopenhauerian-informed, quietist reading, I believe it is also possible to read 
other instances of Beckett's work in the light of the broad findings of this thesis, 
i.e., in the light of my claims regarding Beckett's position on the true value of 
human reason. The middle-period mime, Act Without Words I (1957] continues to 
develop Beckett's position on the utility of reason, namely that reason permits 
human beings to appreciate that there is nothing to be done. Throughout this short 
mime, the unnamed character of the man repeatedly 'reflects' upon events until 
eventually the futility of striving dawns upon him and he ceases to respond to 
events in the world. Is this a play about the human capacity to reason, to learn 
from the past, and to project into the future, which permits an awareness of 
futility, and therefore permits human beings to cease striving? I believe that 
Beckett's position on reason can be understood as an ongoing development of 
Schopenhauer's late position on the link between negation and reason, namely that 
because human beings alone possess the faculty of reason only human beings can 
reflect on life, and ultimately turn away from life (WWR 2: 637].
How might the reading of Beckett's middle-period tragedies conducted in this 
thesis affect the way that interpreters of Beckett's work approach other aspects of 
Beckett's oeuvre? For example, how does a Schopenhauerian-informed reading 
impact upon the present, largely poststructuralist reading of the middle-period 
Trilogy of novels, MoIIoy, Malone Dies, and The Unnameable? Can it be argued, for 
example, that Beckett employs different art forms to pursue different objectives? 
Does Beckett employ the medium of prose to describe the nature of consciousness,
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and in turn employ the medium of tragedy to describe the process of ridding 
oneself of consciousness?
How does this reading of Beckett's tragedies impact upon the present reading of 
Beckett as a stoic thinker (Nussbaum, 1990; Calder, 2001; Uhlmann, 2008)? Does 
Beckett's contrarian position on the value of'reason', and the deleteriousness of 
suicidal contemplation underline the need to read Beckett's work as a sustained 
critique of stoic ethics?
Having claimed a common, Schopenhauerian and Beckettian utilization of the 
negative freedom found in Kantian thought, I believe further research into the 
Kant-Schopenhauer-Beckett nexus is worthy of investigation. At present, Beckett's 
relationship to Kantian and Schopenhauerian thought is positioned as an either/or 
situation (see, for example, Murphy, 1994). In contrast to this position, I believe it 
is important to note the development of thought from one thinker to the next, as 
well as moments when such development is later questioned. The importance of 
this approach was revealed in the section of this thesis where I discussed Beckett's 
development of the sublime. To date, Beckett's exploration of the sublime has been 
understood in relation to the Kantian sublime alone (see, for example, Myskja 
(2002). I argued that Schopenhauer's moral development of the Kantian sublime 
was in turn further developed by Beckett into an aesthetic-ascetic method. I 
believe that this kind of development will continue to be under appreciated unless 
further research is undertaken on the Kant-Schopenhauer-Beckett triumvira:e.
Samuel Beckett's contribution to aesthetics, to asceticism, and to the subject of 
'reason' is one of great significance, and awaits further exploration and 
philosophical debate. The present work argues for the need to take into account 
Beckett's avowed interests when undertaking any interpretive endeavour. By  
exploring the ramifications of Beckett's sustained engagement with 
Schopenhauerian thought this work affords a new understanding of Beckett as an 
artist whose work depicts the ascetic process as a serious ethical matter. This
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reading of Beckett's middle-period tragedies as theatre of asceticism provides an 
important counterweight to the singular, life-affirming, role assigned to art in 
Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean thought. Beckett's theatre of asceticism reveals, 
again and again, that art performs more than one role in life.
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Appendix
Synopsis of the three plays
It is, of course very difficult to describe the plot of a typical Beckett play, as 
traditional aspects of theatre are generally lacking in Beckettian tragedy. Very little 
tends to happen. Boredom prevails. Uncertainty seems to permeate every aspect of 
the work. As the character, Estragon, states in Godot, 'Nobody comes, nobody goes, 
it's awful.' In short, each play comprises two sets of hostile couples, or, to use the 
Beckettian term, 'pseudocouples' and these pseudocouples are at war with one 
another.
In Waiting for Godot we have the 'old friends' Vladimir and Estragon, and the 
master and slave, Pozzo and Lucky. Vladimir and Estragon are down and out. Each 
evening they wait by the side of a country road for news from a mysterious Godot 
as to whether today will be the day he calls for them, and lifts them out of their dire 
circumstances. Vladimir is intent on waiting for Godot. Estragon would prefer that 
they both leave, or, failing that, go their separate ways. While they wait they bicker, 
and attempt to pass the time. Along with Vladimir and Estragon, Pozzo and Lucky 
also traverse the country road. Pozzo is a wealthy landowner and Lucky is his 
slave, a slave who has taught his master about the nature of the world, but whom 
of late has started to act in a less than useful fashion. Thus Pozzo is taking Lucky to 
the fair to 'get rid of him'. In Act I, Pozzo has Lucky entertain Vladimir and 
Estragon by dancing and thinking aloud. Lucky, who had once thought very 
'prettily', now delivers a monologue of seemingly incongruous thoughts. These 
'thoughts' cause Pozzo immense suffering. So much so, that in Act II, when Pozzo 
and Lucky return, Pozzo has gone blind, and Lucky no longer speaks.
In the play Endgame, we are presented with something of a similar scenario. In a 
bunker near the sea, Hamm, a blind, old man, sits in a wheelchair, and orders his 
servant, Clov, to do his every bidding. Clov is trying to leave his master, Hamm,
356
who despite all evidence to the contrary, views himself as benevolent. To this end 
he retells a story in which he has acted with great generosity.
Though we note that an altogether different version of Hamm's 'character' is 
beginning to make its way into his narrative. This less favourable portrayal of 
Hamm -  as selfish, malicious, and— one might go so far as to use the 
Schopenhauerian term 'wicked' (WWR 1: 320} -  is slowly introduced to the 
narrative by his 'servant' Clov. So much so that Hamm is forced to come to terms 
with his true, destructive nature.
The other couple in the play is that of Nagg and Nell, legless husband and wife, 
father and mother of Hamm. They are deposited in ashbins on the corner of the 
stage. Nell is also trying to leave Nagg, who insists on waking her so that he may 
tell her the same joke he has told each and everyday prior to this one.
The social bond of marriage again serves as the metaphorical relationship, or tie, 
between both sets of pseudocouples in the play Happy Days. One couple -  Winnie- 
Willie -  comprises a nagging wife and browbeaten husband. The other couple -  Mr. 
and Mrs. Shower -  is comprised of the inverse of this cliche.
In yet another of Beckett's barren landscapes -  alerting us to the diminution of 
representation (Beckett, 1961:1} -  Winnie and Willie perform a repetitive series 
of pointless gestures. In Act I Winnie is buried up to her waist in the ground. In Act 
II she is buried up to her neck. Inversely Willie has burrowed down into the earth. 
The inference is that Winnie is buried to the extent that Willie performs his 
excavation. Their relationship is one of demand and reluctant response. Winnie 
demands that Willie listens to her talk, demands answers to trifling questions. 
Whereas, Willie seems inclined to want to ignore his partner. In Act II Willie 
attempts a vow of silence, hoping to remain quiet for long enough that the earth 
will one day cover Winnie's mouth and silence her for good.
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The other couple in Happy Days is comprised of another unhappy husband and 
wife pairing, Mr. and Mrs. Shower. Again, this couple forms a hostile pairing: Mr 
Shower continually asks questions about the events occurring before him, and Mrs. 
Shower appears to resent their being asked.
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Notes
1 On the subject of Beckett’s interest in Thomas ä Kempis see Rosen, 1976: 90-1; Knowlson, 1996: 172-4; 
Ackerley, 2000, 2004; Nixon, 2011:199. For Beckett’s interest in Meister Eckhart see Ackerley, 2004. For 
Beckett's interest in Arnold Geulincx, see Fletcher, 1965; Ackerley, 2004; Feldman, 2008, 2010; Weller, 2008; 
Nixon, 2011; Tucker, 2012. And for Beckett’s interest in Arthur Schopenhauer see O’Hara, 1981; Weller, 2005, 
2009; Pothast, 2008; Feldman, 2010; Nixon, 2011; Wimbush, 2013.
11 The one book length work on the Schopenhauer-Beckett nexus, Ulrich Pothast’s The Metaphysical Vision 
(2008) does not approach Beckett’s work in terms of life-denying ethics. Instead, Pothast focuses primarily on 
Beckett's development of Schopenhauerian aesthetics.
111 See, for example, Rosen, 1976; Knowlson, 1996; Ackerley, 2004; Feldman, 2008, 2010; Pothast, 2008; Nixon,
2011 .
iv With regard to the subject of grace in Beckett’s work, see Esslin, 1961: 40-2, and Ackerley, 2004: 36.
v 1 will discuss these approaches in the literature review.
vl The main exception to this assertion is the work of Martha Nussbaum (1990). In Narrative Emotions: 
Beckett's Genealogy of Love, Nussbaum reads Beckett’s work in the light of stoic thought, and discovers a non­
restorative, pessimistic aspect to Beckett's Trilogy (1990: 307-8). Nussbaum positions Beckett, then, as an 
author whose works pursues, though ultimately fails to attain, silence.
vii Referring to the works of Sartre and Heidegger, Beckett states, ‘I never read the philosophers; I don’t 
understand what they write’ (Fletcher, 1965: 43).
viii It is should be noted that the discipline of history, which draws upon a number of different, evidence-based, 
interpretive frameworks to those of literature and comparative literature -  for example, Popper’s modified 
essentialism (see Feldman, 2010) -  tends not to face the same interpretive problems when it comes to 
understanding Beckett’s interest in Schopenhauerian thought, and philosophy more broadly. See, for example, 
Feldman, 2006, 2010; Nixon, 2011.
ix It also fails to take into account Beckett’s diverse approach to a wide range of different pre-Nietzschean 
philosophers (Feldman, 2010).
x Beckett first used the term ‘pseudocouple’ in the final novel of the ‘Trilogy’, The Unnameable. 
Xl See Appendix for synopsis of the three plays
xii The work of Georg Lukacs is an exception to this viewpoint Lukacs (1963) argues that Beckett’s work aims 
at ‘nothing’, and that ‘nothing’ has replaced ‘God’ as the promise of nihilistic ‘salvation’ (44). For a 
comprehensive discussion of the literature on the broader subject of Beckett and nihilism see Weller (2005), 
and Critchley (1997).
359
xiii A similar approach to Beckett’s work is found in the work of Deleuze (1995). In The Exhausted, Deleuze 
reads Beckett’s oeuvre as a sustained, and ultimately successful attempt to overcome the nihilism of language. 
Medium by medium, Beckett progresses towards a state of silence.
xiv The immediate problem that one sees with this particular argument is that Hamm does not want to 
'conclude the game’, nor does he wish to finish his story (Beckett, 1958: 12, 49). Indeed, Hamm makes a 
number of attempts throughout Endgame to continue his 'chronicle'. It is Clov, Hamm’s ascetic intellect, that 
wishes to bring the game to an end. I will discuss Hamm’s unwillingness to ‘end’ in Chapter 5 where I situate 
Hamm as the willing aspect of the Hamm-Clov pseudocouple, one of the key traits of which is ceaseless 
striving.
™ See also Nussbaum, (1990: 305) where Nussbaum also holds that 'We can be redeemed only by ending the 
demand for redemption, by ceasing to use the concepts of redemption’.
Pothast’s work also contrasts with the work of earlier thinkers working in the field of literary studies, such 
as Rosen, who posit that whilst Beckett’s early work explores the idea of there being a metaphysical basis to 
existence, in his later work Beckett consistently argues that that basis is ultimately unknowable (see Rosen, 
1976: 14-5). For Rosen, Beckett’s work does not lead to knowledge -  metaphysical or teleological -  other, that 
is, than knowledge of one’s own ignorance.
w“ I shall further discuss the ‘ordinary’, ‘will-fuH’ way of perceiving life in a later chapter (Chapter 6) in which I 
discuss Beckett’s theatrical 'pseudocouples' in relation to Schopenhauer’s subjects of willing and knowing.
xviil Cf. Beckett, 1956: 74, where the intellect, Estragon declares, 'I’m in hell!’ This draws out attention to the 
way Beckett relocates the experience of the spectator on to the stage.
xix See also Atwell, 1996: 98; Janaway, 1996: 56-57; Trigg: 2004: 172; Young, 2005: 120; Shapshay, 2012a: 494.
xx Pothast notes that Beckett uses Proust’s work as a ‘stepping stone for setting out his own thoughts about 
art... which are in fact philosophical and metaphysical thoughts’ (2008: 4).
xxi Though the influence of Schopenhauerian aesthetics on Beckett’s early critical work has been widely 
acknowledged (see, for example, Acheson, 1978; Pothast, 2008; Wood, 1994; Murphy, 1994; Feldman, 2010), it 
is also generally held to be the case that any influence is short-lived for being quickly transcended. Indeed it is 
commonplace in the secondary literature on Beckett's literary and philosophical influences to cordon off the 
influence of Schopenhauer to the very early stage of Beckett’s writing career (see, for example, Pothast, 2008:
6; Murphy, 1994: 234). There are, of course, exceptions to this position on Schopenhauerian influence - 
predominantly in the fields of literary criticism, and history -  where the implications of Beckett’s engagement 
with Schopenhauer are seen to extend throughout Beckett’s oeuvre (see, for example, O’Hara, 1981; Olivier, 
1996; Nixon, 2007; Feldman, 2006: 12; Feldman, 2010; Nixon, 2011).
It is, however, more common in the secondary literature of Beckett’s philosophical interpreters to either omit 
the influence of Schopenhauer altogether (see, for example, Critchley, 1997), or to suggest Schopenhauerian 
metaphysics is subject to Beckettian derision (Adorno, 1991: 269). Whilst it is most certainly the case that 
Beckett's utilization of Schopenhauerian aesthetics is not merely a matter of unquestioned reception, to then 
proceed to claim that the ramifications of Beckett’s engagement are short-lived -  or, for that matter non­
existent -  is, 1 believe, a highly debatable assertion. Note, Pothast (2008) is one of Beckett’s philosophical 
interpreters who suggests an early, and continuous, Beckettian engagement with Schopenhauerian thought.
xx" This position on knowledge contrasts with that of Rosen who argues that Beckett's aesthetics differs to 
Schopenhauer's in that it does not lead to knowledge, except in sense of realised ignorance (1976:15). In contrast, I 
argue that in Beckett's tragedies one realises one has been ignorant and one learns of what one has been ignorant.
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xxi'i See Knowlson, 1996: 118, 215, 226, 268, 271, 653; Feldman, 2006: 12; Pothast, 2008: 12-15; Weller, 2009: 
43-44.
xxw Again, this is not to say that the mathematical sublime is absent from Beckettian tragedy, an example of 
which is Pozzo’s description of the ‘night’ in Waiting for Godot (Beckett, 1956: 38). My claim, however, is that 
the mathematical sublime plays a secondary role to the structural aspect provided by Beckett’s repeated 
employment of the dynamically sublime.
xxv The only book-length work dedicated solely to the subject of Beckett’s utilization of Schopenhauerian 
thought (Pothast, 2008) makes no reference to the sublime.
xxvi For although Beckett’s work has also been discussed in relation to the postmodern sublime (Olivier, 1996; 
Smith, 2004; Slade, 2007; Tubridy, 2010), and a critique of the ‘romantic’ sublime (Eastham, 2007), and the 
Wittgensteinian sublime (Rudrum, 2009), for reasons of scope, and because I wish to argue for a genetic 
understanding of Beckettian middle-period tragedy, 1 shall focus on the secondary material that has sought to 
understand the Beckettian sublime in relation to the Kantian sublime alone.
xxvii In addition to this, by implicitly discounting Beckett’s engagement with Schopenhauerian aesthetics a more 
direct approach to the sublime and art -  and more specifically, tragedy -  has also been overlooked. Indeed, in 
the work of Schopenhauer we do not have to work by analogy, as in regard to the sublime and tragedy, 
Schopenhauer draws a direct connection:
Our pleasure in the tragedy belongs not to the feeling of the beautiful, but to that of the sublime; 
it is, in fact, the highest degree of this feeling ... in the tragic catastrophe we turn away from the 
will-to-life itself (WWR 2: 433).
In contrast to this, Myskja is forced to defend his approach of applying the Kantian sublime to works of art, as 
much of the focus of the Kantian sublime is the feeling elicited by forces of nature, and not works of art 
(Myskja, 2002: 233). Thus Myskja has to defend his discussion of a Beckettian novel by analogy to Kant’s 
discussion of poetry (ibid.). Similarly, Tubridy (2010) applies Kant's understanding of the mathematical 
sublime to a form of art -  theatre -  which plays no part in Kant’s aesthetic discussion. This would be less of a 
concern if a more obvious candidate for understanding Beckett’s approach to the sublime did not exist. 
However, I believe such a candidate exists in the form of Schopenhauerian aesthetics.
xwiii For a more comprehensive analysis of Schopenhauer’s ontology and epistemology see Janaway, 1989; 
Young, 1987; Atwell 1990, 1995.
xxix See the First and Second Books of WWR 1 and Chapter XIX of WWR 2. Schopenhauer also sets out the ways 
in which the intellect can subvert its typical function in the Third Book of WWR.
xxx See, for example, Worton, 1994; Catanzaro, 1986; Cavell 2002: 117; Badiou, 2003: 74; Weller, 2006; Barry, 
2008; Pothast, 2008; Baroghel, 2010.
xxxi See Janaway (1989: 265-6) for criticism of Schopenhauer’s assertion.
xxxii This reading has a precursor in the work of Martin Esslin (1961). However, Esslin's own influences 
(primarily Sartrean existentialism) mean that his understanding of the Beckettian pseudocouple as will and 
intellect is almost instantly discounted in preference for uncertainty of meaning. That Esslin was able to 
suggest that Beckett’s work may represent the intellectual and emotional sides of life, and yet go no further 
with this observation itself suggests a critique of reading Beckett in the light of theory that has no bearing on
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the formation of the artwork -  in this case Esslin reads Beckett in the light of existentialism. Reading Beckett in 
the light of Sartrean existentialism provides Esslin with a conception of'nothing' as 'open possibility’, rather 
than the Schopenhauerian 'nothing' as that beyond conceptual thought. Given this Sartrean understanding of 
nothingness as the blank slate upon which one writes one’s life, Esslin cannot take the next step and work 
through the life-denying implications of his reading of Beckett’s theatre as that of 'personality in conflict’ (51). 
In addition to this, Esslin’s claim that certain readings ought not be pursued if certain questions cannot be 
definitively answered prevents Esslin from exploring Endgame as an example of ‘monodrama’ (50).
xxxiii See, for example, Chapter XIX, 'On the Primacy of the Will in Self-Consciousness', in Vol. 2; but also the very 
division of the main work (Vol. 1) into epistemological and ontological aspects.
xxxiv I will discuss this process in much greater detail in Chapters 8 and 9, 'Beckettian asceticism’.
xxxv For the Kantian basis to this thought see The Critique of Pure Reason see WWR 1: 289).
xxxvi See the First Book of WWR. Schopenhauer also details the intellect’s capacity to deny its will-serving 
function in the Third Book of WWR, i.e., in aesthetic contemplation.
xxxvii w e know that Beckett was well versed in both works (see Pothast, 2008: 13, 26).
xxxviii See Atwell, 1995: 38-39, 43-44, 53; Janaway, 1989 172; White, 1999: 70; Young, 2005: 37.
xxxix For criticism of Schopenhauer’s position see, for example, Hamlyn, 1980: 18-21; 54-63; Young, 1987: 
Chapter 2; Janaway, 1989.
xl See Nietzsche, 1997: 81 for a criticism of this tendency in philosophy.
xli See WWR 1: 152, 233, 274, 393; WWR 2: Chaps. 29-31; Schopenhauer, 1974b Vol. 2: chapter 14 and 19.
x1111 will later (Chapter 10) compare this ethical act to another means of self-destruction, namely that of 
suicide.
x<‘» See Young, 2005: 190; Atwell, 1995: 170; Zoller, 1995: 8.
xllv See, for example, Adorno, 1991; Critchley, 1997, Weller, 2005, 2009; Pothast, 2008; Boxall, 2010.
xlv Again, an exception to this position is found in the work of Lukacs (1963) who understands Beckettian 
tragedy as an example of apolitical nihilism.
xlvi Atwell takes this understanding from a letter written by Schopenhauer dated September 1 1860.
xlvii One may note that the otherwise comprehensive edited collection by Smith allocates no space to the 
influence of Schopenhauerian ethics on Beckettian thought. There is only a passing comment about the 
importance of Schopenhauer’s work in the formation of Beckettian ethics in the collected work Beckett and 
Nothing. Here Weller raises the matter, but does not explore the implications of Beckett’s interest (Weller, 
2010 : 111 ) .
xiviii Weller's claims of Beckett’s 'anethicality', that is, that Beckett’s work is neither ethical nor unethical (2006: 
190-95; 2010b: 127) are, I believe, a result of the fact that the life-denying implications of the Schopenhauer- 
Beckett nexus have not been comprehensively explored. To discount the possibility that Beckett’s work is 
ethical before attempting to understand Beckett’s engagement with Schopenhauerian asceticism renders 
claims of anethicality premature.
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xlix This understanding of Beckett’s work bears a num ber of similarities to Uhlmann’s (2008) understanding of 
Beckett's utilization of stoic thought. Uhlmann discusses Beckett’s interest in the human capacity to 'actively 
refuse’ to realize a potential, or passion, by ‘withholding assent’ (59). Whilst there is little doubt that stoic 
thought played an im portant role in Beckett’s philosophical education, Uhlmann's reading of Beckett’s work 
suggests that Beckett’s interest was ultimately in perturbation, that is, Beckett is more interested in states of 
distress rather than the apathy brought about by reason (60). This marks the main difference between 
Uhlmann’s reading and my own. It is my argument that Beckett is very much interested in the emotionless 
state that lies beyond perturbation.
1 The danger of altogether refusing the will is implied in Act I of Godot, when Pozzo, in response to Vladimir’s 
question as to whether Lucky ever refuses to perform, replies that Lucky ‘refused once’ (Beckett, 1956: 40). 
The implication is that Lucky’s complete refusal was met with such violence that such behaviour has since 
been avoided. This is an im portant Beckettian comment on the necessity of the ascetic intellect finding 
alternative ways of denying the will the requisite motivation. Indeed it is vital that the intellect appears to 
continue to be a servant of the will. The problem of not responding at all will be discussed in relation to the 
knowing subject, Willie.
11 Although one might note the comment towards the end of WWR vol. 2 where Schopenhauer suggests that 
only human beings possess the faculty of reason, and because of this only in human beings can the will deny 
itself and turn away from life (WWR 2: 637). By this, I understand Schopenhauer to mean that w ithout the 
capacity for reason, humanity would not be able to understand the causes and consequences of suffering 
because it would not be able to stop and reflect upon past actions, and project their consequences into the 
future.
111 See, for example, Adorno, 1991: 243; Critchley, 1997: 141; Badiou, 2003: 4; Weller, 2006: 2, 27-8.
Uli Deleuze is one in terpreter who argues that silence is both the goal of Beckettian art, and a goal that is 
ultimately achieved. In The Exhausted (1995) Deleuze reads Beckett’s work an example of Nietzschean 
overcoming. Thus although silence is sought and attained in Beckettian art, it is pursued in an attem pt to 
overcome the nihilism of language. Once again, then, the application of a Nietzschean lens results in a reading 
of Beckett’s work that ultimately understands Beckett’s quietism as a life-affirming endeavour.
liv Remembering that unlike Schopenhauer, 'Beckett gives a voice to the will (O’Hara, 1981: 265, 267).
lv Cf. Schopenhauer: 'The ceaseless efforts to banish suffering achieve nothing more than a change in its form’ 
(WWR 1: 315).
lvi See Chapter 10 of this thesis for a detailed discussion of the motif of suicidal contemplation in Beckettian 
tragedy.
lvii The willing aspect of Endgame's minor pseudo-couple, Nagg, is similarly unable to comprehend others’ 
suffering. Indeed, Nagg’s tendency is to make light of such things:
There’s something dripping in my head... A heart, a 
heart in my head.
Do you hear him? A heart in his head!
He chuckles cautiously (Beckett, 1958: 19-20)
lviU See note xlix
HAMM:
NAGG:
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lix Nagg and Nell exist in the skull as a means of making Hamm suffer -  he suffers the knowledge of being 
neglected as a child:
HAMM: Scoundrel! Why did you engender me?
NAGG: I didn’t know.
HAMM: What? What didn’t you know?
NAGG: That it'd be you (Beckett, 1958: 35).
And later:
NAGG: We let you cry. Then we moved you out of earshot, so
that we might sleep in peace (38).
Thus one of the suffering ‘Other’s’ of which Hamm becomes cognizant is that of himself as a neglected child.
lx Once again, this unique Beckettian ascetic method also incorporates more traditional aspects of asceticism 
(WWR 1: 380-82), such as fasting, which in Clov’s case is marked by an indifference to sustenance (Beckett, 
1958: 14), celibacy -  depicted as the refusal to propagate (17), and the urge to eradicate life (27, 37, 49) -  and 
self-mortification, or the deliberate infliction of physical suffering:
CLOV: [He starts pacing to and fro, his eyes fixed on the
HAMM:
ground, his hands behind his back. He halts.) The pains 
in my legs! It’s unbelievable! Soon I won’t be able to 
think anymore.
You won’t be able to leave me. (C/ov resumes his 
pacing.) (33).
HAMM: Give me a rug, I’m freezing.
CLOV: There are no more rugs (44)
Similarly, Endgame's minor knowing subject, Nell, also evinces traditional methods of asceticism when she 
refuses food (18) and refuses to go in from the cold (19).
lxi Similarly, Endgame's other willing subject, Nagg, asks Nell for the provision of voluntary memories (1958: 
18-19).
lxii Cf. Schopenhauer -  the important thing to the will is not the individual but the species (WWR 1: 276).
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lxiii Similarly, Nagg’s callous character is revealed through the deprivation of habitual thought. Instead of 
laughing along, Nell instead alerts the willing subject to its propensity to dismiss the suffering of others:
HAMM: There’s something dripping in my head. A heart, a
heart in my head.
NAGG: Do you hear him? A heart in his head!
He chuckles cautiously.
NELL: One mustn’t laugh at those things, Nagg. Why must you
always laugh at them?
NAGG: Not so loud!
NELL: (without lowering her voice). Nothing is funnier than
unhappiness, 1 grant you that. But------
NAGG: [shocked.) Oh!
NELL: Yes, yes, it’s the most comical thing in the world. And
wc laugh, we laugh with a will, in the beginning. But 
it’s always the same thing. Yes, it’s like the funny story 
we have heard too often, we still find it funny, but we 
don’t laugh any more. [Pause.) Have you anything to 
say to me? (Beckett, 1958: 20).
We may note that Nagg sti\\ te\\s the oft-told joke about the tailor who compares his trousers to the shoddy 
work of God, but Nell no longer laughs. This is the first time that the knowing subject has not laughed at this 
joke (21). Nagg’s joke, then, is analogous to Hamm’s chronicle: a version of the world that permits one not to 
appreciate one’s attitude. Deprived of laughter, Nagg subsequently recalls his behaviour when his son, Hamm, 
was still a baby, namely letting the child cry, and then moving him out of ear shot so that they could get some 
sleep. By no longer laughing, Nell has woken Nagg to the suffering of the world, and his indifference to it.
ixiv For example, see Adorno, 1991: 269; Weller, 2005: 140, Connor, 1992(b): 136, Critchley, 1997: 152; 
Horowitz, 2004: 123, Esslin, 1961: 49; Pothast, 2008: 213.
lxv Endgame's one act structure alludes to finality. In writing about Waiting for Godot, the theatre critic Hugh 
Kenner argued that the two act structure suggests a series, perhaps an infinite series (Boxall, 2000: 73). Weller 
believes that unlike Godot which is interminable, Endgame is very much terminal, and that this is reflected in 
the refusal of the two act structure (Weller, 2005:137-9).
lxvi Similarly, Nell no longer responds to the sound of Nagg’s knuckles rapping on her ashcan lid (Beckett, 1958: 
38).
lxvii See O'Hara, 1981,1997; Ricks, 1993: 153; Büttner, 2000; Uhlmann, 2006; Pothast 2008; Valentine, 2009. 
Laird (2012) provides an overview of the modernist approach to the subject of suicide, which incorporates a 
discussion of Beckett’s work. Laird, however, does not explore the motif of suicide in any systematic way with 
regards to Beckett’s oeuvre, but rather concentrates on Beckett’s first published literary work, More Pricks 
than Kicks. Laird’s conclusions also tend to view Beckett’s employment of suicide as a modernist literary 
device rather than an ethical concern:
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the horror of suicide yielded to something peculiarly literary and distinctively modernist: a kind 
of play, chatty or profound, cheerful or desolate, with suicide’s often traditional, often irrational 
rationales (544).
lxviii Here Büttner overlooks the fact that Gogo did actually attempt to drown himself in the Rhone (Beckett, 
1956: 53).
lxix This is another important difference between breaking the will and suicide; suicide precludes the 
possibility of perceiving the world as the pure subject of knowledge, that is, in a manner free from the 
limitations of the principle of sufficient reason (WWR 1:198).
lxx Vladimir and Estragon's behaviour alerts us to Schopenhauer's critique of Stoic ethics regarding stoicism’s 
final resort to suicide as a means of avoiding suffering (WWR 1: 87-91). Beckett’s apparent endorsement of 
Schopenhauer’s critique of Stoic ethics -  that the resort to suicide raises questions about the viability of any 
system that advocates the avoidance of suffering -  raises a number of questions about the extent to which 
Beckett can be aligned with Stoic thought (see Nussbaum, 1990; Calder, 2001; Uhlmann, 2008).
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